US fighting code 1959

US fighting code 1959

US fighting code 1959

By virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States; and as Com­
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the
United States, I hereby prescribe the Code of
Conduct for Members of the armed Forces of
the United States"which is attached to this
order and hereby made a part thereof.
Every member of the Armed Forces of the
United States is expected to measure up to the standards embodied in this Code of Conduct .while he is in combat or in captivity. To ensure achievement of these standards, each member of the Armed Forces liable to capture shall be provided with specific training and instruction designed to better equip him to counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him, and shall be fully instructed as to the behavior and obligations expected of him during comlmt or
The Secretary of Defense (and the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard exeept when it is serving as part of the Navy) shall take such action as is deemed neeessary to implement this order and to disseminate and make the said Code known to all members of the Armed Forces of the United States. THI'J WHITE HOUSE August 17, 1955
For sale by tbe Superintendent of Documents, U,S. Government Printing Office
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abili~_ g wi£[nlu(i'e no o~aror,-,;.ritten statem%ttt5
6is(O~aCto attp its atiles or h~t . to their cause.
Foreword....... .... .... .. 1
Introduction.......................... 2
TheNewRoleof thePOW.............. 4
TheLessonsofHistory................. 12
OutbreakinKorea.................... 27
"Progressives" and "Reactionaries"... . . 38
Interrogation......................... 44
Indoctrination. ....................... 51
Propaganda.......................... 59
ProbingforWeakSpots................ 66
The POW Can Resist " .. .. 73
10.The CodeIsYourArmor............... 80
The GenevaRules..................... 90
12.You GuardOurCountry............... 100
Never SayDie........................ 106
14.Keep UptheFight..................... 114
Keep Faith........................... 122
ByWordandByDeed............ .. 132
Faith Will Triumph , .. . 140
Bibliography......................... 148


uring and after the Korean war it became appar­ent that many U.S. fighting men had been inade­quately prepared for the ordeal they faced in Korea. Accordingly, a "Code of Conduct for ::Uembers of the Armed Forces of the United States" was drawn up. Based on traditional ideals and principles, the Code is intended to give guidance to all members of the. Armed Forces in any future conflict.
Since the Code was proclaimed in 1955, each of the Serv­ices has improved its instruction on how to avoid capture and what to do if taken prisoner of war. Each Service program has been analyzed, and the best points are reflected in this revised pamphlet, "The U.S. Fighting Man's Code." Some of the material in the booklet has been drawn from Army Pamphlet No. 30-101, "Commu­nist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of 'Val'''; The Airman, official journal of the Air Force; and the Naval T1'aining Bulletin. Materials and suggestions have been received also from the U.S. Marine Corps, and these are reflected in this pamphlet.
The assistance of all of the Services is acknowledged with thanks.
he United States is proud of the record of its fj.ghtingmen. The overwhelming majority of them have metthe standards of the Code of Conduct from the beginning
of our military history. Every war has produced outstand­ing examples of their devotion to duty, country, God.
Although the Code of Conduct grew out of studies of
behavior in Korea, that conflict also had its heroes, too
many to list here. The individual acts of courage and
fortitude by Americans in Communist prison camps alone
would fill volumes. For their exemplary conduct while
prisoners of war, many American fighting men were
But the fact remains that in Korea, as in every other
war, a few Americans did less than their best to avoid
capture-and a few of those who were captured cooper­ated with the enemy. 'Vho is responsible? Certainly, themen concerned.
But the military Services, the Department
of Defense, and our Nation must assume a share of theresponsibility.
An indomitable will to resist is not acquired overnight.
Kor can it be supplied by military training alone. For itrests on character traits instilled in our homes, ourschools, our elull'ches-traits such as self-confidence, self­reliance, self-discipline, self-respect, moral responsibility,and faith in country and God.
The sen'iceman equipped with the will reinforced bythe skill to resist is prepared for whatever military serv­ice has in store for him.
Both the will and the skill toresist a Communist foe are strengthened by knowledge ofCommunist tactics and techniques. '
The serviceman who understands the nature of Com­munist enslavement will do his utmost to avoid it. Guided
by the vrecepts of tlle Code of Conduct, and profiting bythe experiences of those unfortunate enough to have beencaptured by the Comillunists, he will never surrender him­self 01' his men while there is the slightest chance of avoid­
ing it. He will never give up the fight before the situation is truly hopeless.
If capthre is inevitable, he will continue the battle in the prisoner-of-war camp. He will make every reasonable effort to escape and help others who attempt to escape. He will resist enemy efforts to make a tool of him. He will strive to maintain the unity of his group. He will assume leadership if necessary, or obey the leader of his group.
In so doing, he will be fulfilling his mission and uphold­ing the tradition of U.S. fighting men of the past.
Chapter 1
omething baffling happened to the American fighting
man who became a prisoner of war in Korea. It
baffled' his Service, the Department of Defense, and our
Nation as welL
The Po-W expected interrogation and brutal treatment. He knew the Communists would try to squeeze military information from him, and he certainly did not think they would use kid gloves. In this situation, he was to give only his name, rank, service number, and date of birth. He would evade answering other questions to the utmost of his ability.
If tortured, he could pray for strength to withstand his ordeal.
If possible, he would try to escape and rejoin U.S. forces.
Otherwise, based on the experience of past wars, the POW could expect to "sit out" the remainder of the con­flict in a prison camp.
The POW got what he expected ... plus Illuch he had not expected!
The moment a PO'W fell into Comillunist hands in Korea, his captors launched an assault upon his mind and his spirit. Taking advantage of his bewilderment, they plotted their every move with a definite end in view,
The Communist aim: To make pl:isonel's of war serve the cau,se ot international communism.
Accordingly, American PO"V's were subjected to a well­planned and well-organized type of warfare with which few were familiar and for which few were prepared. Briefly, this warfare was aimed at undermining their loyalty to their country and their faith in the democratic
way of life--and thereby, conditioning them to accept communism.
How did the enemy wage this new type of war against our fighting men? 'Vhat strategy and tactics were em­ployed? What kind of weapons were used? A thorough study of hundreds of interviews with repatriated Amer­ican prisoners providecl the answers to those questions.
"rhere the Communists were most successful in making a prisoner do as they wished, they preyed upon his clefects, his lack of knowledge, and his lack of experience. It fol­lows, then, that if U.S. fighting men in Korea had known what to expect and had been prepared, those who became PO'V's could have spared themselves much agony ... and could have put up much more effective resistance.
As long as the Communists threaten direct or indirect
aggression to free nations anywhere, the danger of war
continues. The United States and her allies will seek
by every honorable means to avoid a shooting war. In the
event of hostilities, however, you-as a U.S. fighting man­could become a prisoner.
The prisoner's life is never an easy one. And life as a prisoner of the Communists is especially grim, since it holels ordeals beyond the usual hardships of captivity. Hence, you will want to avoid it to the best of your ability. In doing so, you will not only be following the honorable course-set forth clearly in Article II of the Code--but you will be serving your own best interests as well. Some alternatives to surrender are indicated in
chal,ter 13. If you fail to explore every alternative when threatened with capture, you will be making a serious mistake--possibly a fatal mistake.
The purpose of this booklet is to help you prepare your­self for any eventuality. By reviewing what happened in past wars, especially in Korea, and by examining ,vhat the Communists are trying to achieve, you will be better pre­pared for what may lie ahead.
Specifically, this booklet aims to acquaint you with someof the tactics, techniques, and methods of Communistinterrogation, indoctrination, and handling of prisoners ofwar, and to suggest some defenses against these enemyweapons. It is intended to show you also how the U.S.];'ighting Man's Code can serve as your armor, either incombat or in a POlY camp.
"KnOWledge is power." 'I'his holds just as true for the
U.S. fighting man facing the Communist aggressor as itdoes for the scientist in the laboratory. Much of theknowledge and much of the strength you need to sustainJ'ou as an effective fighting man will sustain you also ifyou become a prisoner.
'['0 combat Comlllunists effectively, either in battle or ina prison camp, remember this:
.. International communism seeks world domination.
.. Communists will use military force when it suits theirpurpose.
Military force is simply onc way of winning control of the world.

Communists also keep up an unrelenting war of propa­ganda, subversion, sabotage.

In :1\"orth Korea, most American POlY'S learned the hareI way that no enemy is a friend in a prisoner-of-war camp; that friendships must be deYelolled among their own people and not with the enemy. In the eyent of another con­flict with a Communist foe, American fighting men can expect similar treatment. All Communists are trained for one purpose--defeat of the capitalist democracies, eSllecially the United States.
If you eyer find yourself a llrisoner of the COIlllllunists and are tempted to think that war has swept on beyond you, just remember: thcrc is 110 SlIch thing as "timc out" in the global struggle between communism and the forces of freedom. Your Communist captor \vill not take 'time out" to proyide shelter, food, or medical care. 'Yhateyer care or help he gives you will not be for humanitarian reasons. It will be giyen to help atlvc£nce thc COIIUllllnist cause.
How coulcl the Communists use you? What woulcl they expect of you?

First, as in preYious wars, they woulcl be seeking military information. There is nothing new about this. Captors haye been seeking this from llrisoners since the clays of primitiYe warfare. Next, they will attempt to get all kinds of nonmilitary information-about you, your fellow pris­oners, ancl your country. Your instructions in either case remain the same.
You will giye only your name, rank, service number, and date of birth. You will evacle answering other ques­tions to the utmost of your ability.
If you were defending a vital spot, you would not sur­rencler it simply because enemy fire threatenecl your life. To do so woulcl be to unclermine the safety of your outfit
and your ('ountry. By the :-;ame token, if you become a1'0\", you will not gi\"(~
the enemy any information Ill'('an use again:-;t your fellow PO\"'s, your fighting forees,
your eountry, or your ('ountry's allies.
A Comlllunist interrogator may threaten a 1'0\" withdeath, torture, or solitary ('ontinement:. If the 1'0\" givesIlim what he wants beeause of these threats, he is asdisloyal as the lllan who surrenders in ('omlmt to saveIli:-; own hide.
If eH~r you are ta ken priso]H'r of war, a big test willcome when you are firM interro,u:ated. Hefuse to giveanything but your n:une. rnnk. :-;en'ice number, and date ofbirth nnd you impro\"(~ yonI' "hnnees of survivnl. If you
waver. you nre lo:-;t! If you allo\v your Communist captorto drag other informn tion froll1 you-military or other­wise--he will ],eep mnl,ing more and more demands. Inthe end, he will foree you into n sh:unefnl ('ollaboration. The COmll11111ists ,,'ill nse wlwtever means they feel istbe most ejIe('tiH~ to g'et the information tlwy want. Being
only human, they prefer to ao this the easy way. If they can get what they want from you with sweet talk, so much the better for them. But if you indicate a willingness to talk, or cooperate, you are a better subject for further questioning than the prisoner who obviously will not cooperate. If you show you are afraid of harsh treatment, you invite it.
What can you expect when you resist? In later chap­ters, you will read of men who did resist-even when threatened with death or physical torture. Some of them did die, victims of Communist brutality. But many more lived ... and came home with honor!
The path of honor is neyer easy for a fighting man. But it is the onTy path for a man who respects himself and loves his country!
Apart from information, what will the Communists be seeking from you if you ever become a PO'V?
They will want to use you in the cause of cOlllmunism. This does not mean that they want you to become a mem­ber of the Communist Party. Even in the Soviet llnion, the Communist Party has accepted only 8 million members out of a total population of 200 million. However, the Communists woulcl like to have you become an open cham­pion of their ideas. If they succeed in getting you to cooperate, they will find many uses for you-both as a PO'V and after you are repatriated. For example, while you're a PO'V, they would like for you to broadcast propaganda messages to the folks back home. After you are released they would like for you to help pave the way for commu­nism in the USA. They will not be concerned in the least with your welfare, your rights, or Y01tr happiness as an individual. 'l'hey will be concerned with you only as a tool of comm11llisill.
The Communists will sometimes offer small bribes or rewards to get you to do what they want. If you prove uncooperative, they will not hesitate to use force.
For example, suppose' the Communists want yon to be an informer-to tattle on your fellow PO\V's, If any PO\V yalues a few cigareUe's :md "ome ('andy more' than he does his honor and the welfa re of his fpllow PO\V's, lJe ean make a deal. If he ean supply information of more than routine usefulness. his reward may be more. Suppose he refuses; Ill' nwy be subjeeted to all kinds of penalties, from lJeatings to solitlHY confill('ment. But he still has his honor!
GUISES OF COMMUNISM Some of what happened in Korea may be outmoded if und jclicn another war breaks out:. If so, aIHI if ~'ou be­come a PO\\', be alert for ne\Y tricks and new ways to eon'r up old trieks. Comnll111ism assumes many disg:ui"ps. At Y1Hious times awl places, it Inay 1'rp"ent itself as friendl~' and eonsidera teo ()n the other hand, dependi n,S\' 011 the situation, it ma~' be displayed in all its naked brntality. Some Ameri<'lln prisoners o!Jsen'ed both sides and many g:ui"es dnring their captlYity in Korea. OtllPrs saw only one side of communism. Most Alllerieans were imprps"pd by the Illannpr in which cOlllml111hlll can undergo quick changes from one guisp to another. Any man falling into ('Olllmllllht hands in the I'utul'e should Ill' jJl'('jJah'd to
encounter communism in any of the forms it may assume-­even the indignant denial that it is communism at all.
No matter how the Communists change their tactics, their motives and broader purposes will not change. Learn these, and you will understand that whatever they want YO/l to do will have some calculated end in view, and that ena will be to advance the ComIllunist cause.

The odds are that 'you will never become a prisoner of the Communists. At the same time, in any realistic appraisal of what lies ahead, it is a possibility that can­not be overlooked.
If such a fate should overtake you, you may be sure that your Government will do everything possible to rescue you. Meantime, until such help comes, you will have to rely on your own resources. This is the hard, cold truth!
In sUlllming up, remember that the Communists have three basic uscs for prisoners of war. They may seek to use any prisoner in one or more of these ways:

As a source of military information.

As a champion of communislll.

As a stooge to do their dirty work.

All three possibilities are repulsive. Yet your Govern­ment would be doing you a disservice if it did not try to make you aware of them. As bad as they are, fear of the unknown is worse. An ugly truth is no less ugly if it remains in hiding.
Face the facts! You'll find them, unadorned, in this pamphlet.
505596°--59----2 11
Chapter 2
OR a full understanding of today's prisoner-of-war problem, knowledge of the past is essential. This can help you prepare for the future.
Looking back to prehistoric times,we know that primi­th-e man and his barbarian descendant annihilated or enslaved all captive foemen. In time it occurred to the conqueror to hold a captured leader as hostage. Such a vidim was Lot. According to Scripture, he was freed by the forces of Abraham-perhaps the earliest prisoner­rescue on record.
The Romans sported with their war prisoners, often using them for target practice or for gladiatorial shows to amuse the public. Enslaved warriors rowed Caesar's galleys to North Africa and Britain, and were killed when they could no longer pull an oar. "Slay, and slay on t" Germanicus ordered his Rhineland invaders. "Do not take prisoners! vVe will have no peace until all are destroyed."
Chivalry developed in the ·Western vVorld with the rise of Christianity, the concept of "Do unto others." The code of knighthood served to curb the warrior's steel. The true knight refused to slay for slaughter's sake. Facing battle, he was pledged to remain true to his king or cause, even if captured. The disclosure of a trust or the deli\"er­ance of a friend to the enemy was treacherous and merited swift punishment.
Thus rules for the fighting man in combat or in cap­tivity were linked to knightly concepts; of duty, honor, loyalty to friend, and gallantry to a worthy foe.
Some time during the Crusades a prisoner-interrogation rule developed. The captive knight was permitted to divulge his name and rank-admissions necessitated by the game of ransom. However, the medieval foot soldier continued to risk death or enslavement at the hands of a conquering enemy, without hope of escape through ransom.
In Europe; during the 17th c"entury, the idea emerged that prisoners of war were charges of the capturing sov­ereign or state. No rules for their treatment had been formulated, but they were protected from servitude and personal revenge. Later, during the 18th century, captivity came to be considered a means of preventing the prisoner's return to friendly forces. This was a step forward. Military prisoners were no longer considered guilty of crimes against the state.

To discourage desertions during the Re\·olution,. the Unitecl States established the death penalty for prisoners who, after capture, took up arms in the service of the enemy. Duress or coercion was recognized as mitigating only in the event that immediate death had been threat­ened. This was the first definition of required prisoner conduct.
Since' George III decreed that all Americans who re­volted against Crown authority were war criminals subject to' hanging, Revolutionary soldiers and sailors went to war under the shadow of the gallows. The noose was relaxed only because it proved impractical and because English liberals deplored such high-handecl tyranny. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, prisoner exchanges were begun and paroles arranged.

During the Civil "Val', about 3,170 captured Federals joinecl the Southern forces, and about 5,450 captured Con­federates joinecl the Fecleral army. War Department Gen­eral Order No: 207, issued 3 July 1863, apparently was intended to curb widespread surrender and subsequent parole to escape further combatant service. It provided, among other things, that it was the duty of a prisoner of war to escape. Punishment for misconduct was based on three criteria:
• Misconduct where there was no cluress or coercion.

Active participation in comlmt against Federal forces.

Failure to return voluntarily.

In cases involving disloyal prisoners of war, the ques­tion of duress-or degree of duress-was weighed in the balance. The Union Judge Advocate General recognized coercion as a defense. It was held that "extreme suffer­ing and privation which endangered the prisoner's life" might justify his enlistment with the enemy. However, if the prisoner made no effort to escape when opportunity offered, he was liable to a desertion charge.
Lieber's Code. Civil 'War prison camps were harsh. In Southern camps, particularly AnderSOllYille and Florence, men suffered greatly from malnutrition and lack of medi­cation. The Union prison on Johnson's Island in Lake Erie was a bleak Alcatraz, and Union stockades at Point Lookout on the Potomac were described as "hell holes."
Humane citizens, North and South, appealed for lenient treatment of captives. In 1863 President Lincoln requested Professor Francis Lieber to prepare a set of prisoner rules. Lieber's Instructions tor the Governmcnt at Arm'ics at the Unitecl States were probably the first comprehensive code of international law pertaining to prisoners of war to be issued by a government. Based on moral precepts that recognized the enemy as a fellow human with lawful rights, Lieber's code contained the following injunctions:

A     prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity.

A     prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed before the captor's army or people, (for crimes) committed before he was captured, and for which he has not been punished by his own authori­ties.

A     prisoner of war ... is the prisoner of the govern­ment and not of the captor.

JlIIII!! Civi! ·Wllr prisollcrs lI'crc cOllfillcd in ICllls (aliovc) or }J}II!;csiJ/f1 Slrll('[llrc8 (11('!01l') ((lid !lIc!;ed liJe most ele­Jl!clilllr/! sallitar/! facilitics.
Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or im­prisonment such as may be deemed necessary on account of safety, but they are to be subjected to no other intentional suffering or indignity.

A     prisoner of war who escapes may be shot, or other­wise killed in flight; but neitl1er death nor any other punishment shall be inflicted upon him simply for llis attempt to escape, which the law of order does not consider a crime. Stricter means of security shall be used after an unsuccessful attempt at esca[Je.

Every captured wounded enemy shall be medically treated according to the ability of the medical staff.

Lieber's code was a step forward. The Confederacy agreed to abide by the code but could not always fulfill the code's intention. For example, the code required that prisoners' rations be similar to those issued their captors. But the South was slowly starving under pressure of blockade, and Southern soldiers as well as their prisoners suffered from the scarcity of food.
Interrogation and Information. In the American Civil War, espionage, military intelligence, and counterintelli­gence were important features. In previous wars, few trained intelligence operators had served the American forces. Efforts to gather military information had been haphazard and disorganized. The advent of the Pinkerton Service which operated with l\IcClellan, the Federal Secret Service under Colonel Lafayette Baker, and a well-organized Confederate Secret Service put intelligence-gathering (and defensive counterintelligence) on a modernized basis.
Spies were called "scouts." As old as war was the rule that enemy spies, caught in disguise, faced death. They were beyoncl the pale of prisoner-of-war exemptions. The Civil War featured many heroic spy exploits. It also featured daring raids on enemy lines to take prisoners for interrogation.
The officer or man who gave his captors military infor­mation was as dangerous to country and cause as the
deliberate traito'1', So soldiers were enjoined "not to talk." Lieber set down the rule:
•     Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from giv­ing to the enemy information concerning their own army, and the modern law of war permits no longer the use of "any violence against prisoners, in order to extort the desired information, or to punish them for having given false information.
The rule was easier to recite than observe. On the one hand, there was the interrogator ordered by his chiefs to acquire vital information-intelligence that might win a battle and save many lives. On the other hand, there was the prisoner, sworn to withhold information that might cost a battle and the lives of his countrymen. Here are the oPvosing forces for a cruel contest.
Despite Lieber's rules, prisoners were sometimes chained together, placed in brutal irons, or "bagged" (a suffocating canvas sack tied over the head). They were placed in soli­tary confinement and denied water. These vicious meas­ures were used more often to wring information from a cavtive than as disciplinary punishments. Such "third degrees" were conducted privately, usually by military police or Secret Service agents.
Backsliding there was on both sides. However, the gen­eral trend was toward more humane treatment of POW's. The going was slow, but the stel)s were in the right direc­tion.
III H:iG4, the Swiss philanthropist Henri Dunant wrote a book that set the stage for a conference at Geneva and the founding of the International Red Cross. The Red Cross offered relief to all combatants, regardless of the flag they served, All participants agreed that "the sanitary personnel might continue its duty in the presence of the enemy." 'l'hrough the determined campaigning of Clara Barton, the United States joined the convention in 1882, and the AmeriC'an Red Cross was organized.
Dunant's work inspired the founding of other prisoner­relief societies. In 1874, a conference was held in Bnls­sels at the instigation of the Russian Goyernment. Dele­gates of all the major European nations attended. A code based on Lieber's was projected. The Brussels code was not ratified, but it strongly influenced the first Hague Conference, which met at the turn of the century.
Czar Nicholas II sponsored the Hague Conference of 1899, which produced a Convention with respect to laws and customs of war on land. Representatives of 26 nations attended the conference. Discussed were disarmament proposals and the possibility of establishing a world court. The delegates negotiated various agreements relating to warfare and war prisoners.
The prisoner-of-war code adopted at The Hague was
based on the one proposed at Brussels. It embodied many of Lieber's original stipulations. Prisoners of war were to be considered as lawful and disarmed enemies.. They were captives of tIle hostile government and not in the power of the individual captors or jailors. It was agreed that unruly prisoners could be punished for insubordina­tion, but humane treatment was required.
Twenty-foul' of the attending powers ratified the Hague Convention. Signers included the United States, Germany, France, England, and Russia. A hopeful generation called the conference the "First Parliament of Man."
Acting on a Russian proposal, the Netherlands called a second Hague Conference in 1907. During this conference, the powers reaffirmed their adherence to the principles previously adopted.

Another conference was in the making when the First 'World War exploded. German intentions seemed only too clear when the Kaiser's spokesman described a treaty with Belgium as a "scrap of paper."
The concept of total war-mustering an entire nation and its forces for the conflict-was not new. But in the mod­
ern sense, it was first advocated by a Prussian militarist before "World War 1. If rules and codes abetted the war effort, observe them. If they didn't, they were unrealistic and to be dispensed with. Total war was no gentleman's game. Any expedient that spelled victory was justifiable.
This concept was not entirely accepted by the High Com­mand, but the Prussian school generally endorsed a policy of Sclire7clichkeit (planned terror or "Frightfulness") to subdue defiant enemy peoples. Prussian "Frightfulness" was amateurish, and" not very effective. But it did repre­sent a 20th-century development in psychological warfare. Its usefulness was countered when it backfired in another area-propaganda warfare.
'l'he Germans introduced another innovation during World 'Val' 1. This new element could be called "political warfare." As distinguished from propaganda, it involved the process known today as political indoctrination.
At Limburg and Zossen, the Germans set up what were known as "political camps." To these camps were sent prisoners who seemed likely subjects for subversioll. The inll\ates were quartered in comfortable barracks. Instead of the normal prisoner ration they were fed the best food available. Tobacco and candy were plentiful. During the first eighteen months of the war, Irish prisoners were selected for these segregated camps.
As reported by Major H. C. Fooks in his book P1'isoners of War: "One commandant talked to his men and stated that the emperor was aware of the downtrodden state of Ireland, and wished that the Irish captives be placed in a separate camp, where they would be better fed and treated better than the English captives."
By ancl large, the Germans met with little Sllccess. Most of the Irish PO'V's resisted subversion. But the Germans were vioneering. They were setting a pattern for the future.
At war's end approximately 2,200,000 prisoners were in the hands of the Central (Germanic) Powers. The Allies were holding 615,900. The Americans had captured some 49,000 Germans and the Germans, 4,120 Americans. A total
of 1A7 Americans (lied in the enemy's prison camps. Few Americans escaped from Germany, but daring attempts \H're made. On the whole, the American prisoners \Yel'(~ \yell treated.
In reviewing ,Vor](1 ,,'ar I-the first total \\"Hr-one may note four major deH>]opments:
• Scientific intelligence ,,'arfare.
o Psychological warfare.

o Propaganda warfare.

• Political warfare.
All dealt with tlw Illlm:lll mind, and all \vou]d be IJrou,gbt to be'ar on future priso]l('rs of ,,'ar-in \\'or]dWar II :llU] in I\:orea,
During ,Yol'ld \\"11' II a total of 12D.701 ,\lllel'k'lllS ,,'ere captured by tile ,\xis enemy.
A t this model German prisoner-oj-war camp neal' FVetzlar,
Gerll/allY, Allied ail'lI/cl/ captured dUl'ing lVorld lVal' 11 reecired e,rcellcnt eal'e.
T!tese liberaled Amerieall inmate!; of a German prison hos­
liila! at PlidtSlltlle!t1 (World War 1J) show tlte cjfects of a "farratitJII diet.
Perllnps fenring reprisnl more than public opinion, the German military were fairly careful in handling American ]>O\\"s--with SOllIe ex('elltions. Americnns captured in Italy were gin'n silllilarly ('Orl'ect trentlllent.
In tile matter of prisoner interrogation, the German mili­tary seem to have behaved well enclUgll-at least toward the
Americans. There was none of the brutalizing that existed in such Japanese camps as Ofuna and Ashio, where Ameri­can submariners were tortured.
Tl1e Americans captured by General Homma's forces on Bataan Peninsula and at Corregidor were fortunate if they reacl1ed a prison camp alive. In tl1e Bataan Deatl1 March General "\Vainwright's surrendered troops endured one of tl1e most excruciating ordeals of tl1e war. Britons and Aus­tralians caught at Singapore were treated witl1 similar brutality.
Airmen and submariners bore tl1e brunt of interrogation ordeals. Reason: tl1ey usually possessed information of more value to the enemy than an infantryman's. Tl1ey may have flown from a carrier or perhavs i>ailed from some l1id­den island base. The name of tl1e flattov, the location of tl1e base-this was vital intelligence. The submariner knew a dozen secrets: his sub's cruising range, its radar and sonar devices, its torpedo gear. One of tl1e best kept secrets of tl1e war, and one of the most important, was tl1e devth at which a U.S. submarine could operate.
So pilots and submarine sailors who were captured "got the works." The Japanese did not employ subtle interroga­tion methods. Prisoners were flogged and tortured. They were treated to such Oriental punishments as judo exverts and hatchet men could devise. The ordeal of one submarine skipper who "took it" hardly bears recital-cigarette burns, bamboo splinters under the fingernails. . .. But the Jap­anese did not extract from him the diving depth of U.S. submarines.
In the Pacific after the war, Americans found the graves of American destroyermen who had been beheaded and the bodies of other American prisoners who had been drenched with gasoline and burned alive.
These grim deeds, which the present Japanese Govern­ment condemns as heartily as we do, may be regarded as the exception. However, even where the treatment was more humane, the realities of war were making themselves felt. The blockaded Japanese were reduced to meager rations.
The Philippines and the Home Islands were undergoing non­Rtop bombardment. Consequently, food and medical supplies were at barrel-bottom. The 1'O",V's received the leftovers.
But beheadings, torture, the 1'alawan massacre, and the Bataan Death March were on the record. Like the Malmedy maRRacre in the Belgian Bulge, like Buchenwald and Belsen, they awaited an accounting. The outraged people of the United Nations demanded retributive justice.
The Germans applied other and seemingly more effective interrogation methods. Consider the testimony of Joachim Seharff, an interrogator stationed at Auswerstelle "'Vest, Obernrsel, Germany. This was the camp where all captured aviators (except Russian) were brought for questioning. From "all but a handful" of the 500 Americans questioned, Seharff obtained the information he was after. Scharff's methods were not so remarkable. It might be said that he killed his victims with kindness.
In the war there were many "Scharffs." Not all of them were on the German side. Adept Allied interrogators pumped information from case-hardened Luftwaffe pilots and U-boat skippers. In the closing days of the war they pumped their riYals-captnred Nazi interrogators-among them Joachim Scharff.
THE COMMUNIST SHADOW That coming events cast their shadows proved true in the Sovipt treatment of Axis prisoners taken during ",Vorld "'Val'
II. l<;yen then the Soviets demonstrated methods that they :11\(1 other Communist nations were to use in later years.
'l'he Communist pattern was beginning to unfold in Octo­ber 1!Jl1, when the Red (Soviet) Army sent a directive to all Communist interrogators, which read in part: "From the vpry moment of capture by the Reel Army, and during the entire period of captivity, the enemy enlisted men and offi­cerR IllUSt be under continuous indoctrination by our polit­ical workers and interrogators."
This was followed by a series of directives that explained in detail what type of information would be extracted from
German prisoners first, how the interrogations shoul<1' be conducted, and the manner and extent of the indoctrination. Analysis of these directives revealed that the Communists were more intereste<1 in economic all<l political inform:1tion than in purely military inform:1tion, though they di<1 not overlook military information. Military information was sought, as a rule, soon after the prisoner was capture<1 and while he was being enlcuated from the combat zone to the rear.
Physical Pressure. The COlllmlll1i~t intel'l'ogators ll.'<erl physical pressure against German PO",V's in an effort to lower their resistance to interrogation and to make the job of the interrogator easier. Physical pTCSSltTe, wilen IIscd, was dit'ectecl aga'inst sclectecl 'indidr/1lals ancl not '((!Jail/st gTOlipS ot p1"1soneTs. The Communists realized that vhysical pressure against a prisoner group would strengthen the unity of the group and defeat their purpose of obtaining information. Examvles of the types of physical IJreSsUre exerted against selected indiYidual prisoners are: Solitary confinement; requiring the prisoner to assume rigid and un­comfortable positions for long periods of time: prolong-ed interrogation of the vrisoner by using-relays of fresh inter­rogators; depriving the vrisoner of sufficient sleep or rest; and denying the prisoner the use of the latrine.
",Vhen the Soviet interrogators relaxed their pressure, it was not for humane reasons. They were being realistic. After all, the object of interrogation is to obtain informa­tion. A badly injured prisoner, or one too exhausted or confused to talk intelligently, is of no use to the interro­gator; therefore, there are definite limits on the amount of physical pressure that can be exerted on a man under inter­rogation. It should be noted that such methods as those mentioned above were reserved for selected prisoners who were known, or thought, to possess important information; they were not applied to the prisoner vopulation as a whole because of the obvious expense in both manpower and time.
The Indoctrination Process. Although some Cominnlli~t attempts at indoctrination of German prisoners were made near the front lines almost immediately after cavtul'e, the
organized, concerted indoctrination program began at per­mallent POlY ('tUllpS.
The basic technique was to disereflit not only Hitler but the whole German concept of goYernment. The ComIllunists attacked all German leaders and all German schools of thonght. Eyery social system exeellt communisIll was de­seribed as being against the common man. ComIllunism was adnmeed as the salYation of the workers and the guardian of peaee.
Propaganda. C(lll1Iilllllist propaganda was perhaps the most effeeti,-e part of the Communist indoctrination of German prisoners. 'l'he COIllmunists collected a large num­ber of diaries and letters of deacl German officers that indi­eated defeatist attitucles after Hitler's forces began to slow down on all fronts. These clocumeuts were disseminatecl to newly eavtured vrisoners. They were used to discredit and degrade the officer class and served to create doubt and to weakell the enlisted prisoners' faith in their officers and in Germany.
Germau prisoners were asked to make recordings, sup­poserlly to be broadcast to relatives in Germany. The re­corrlings were broadcast, instead, as propaganda to the ovvosing troops on the front line, and gave the impression that life with the Soviets was pleasant. These propaganda reeonlings caused Illany Germans to surrender to the Red Army.
"Peaee" was the basic theIlle of the Communists. How­ever, this theme was merely a frout to hide their true moth'es. In actuality, it meant peaee on Communist terms. Thron,~h fraud, deception, and some German collaborators, nllIllerous German prisoners signed "peace petitions," which the COIllmunists Imblished throughout the world. These "petitions" gave German soldiers and civilians the false iIll­pre"sion that only the COIllmunists wanted peace. As a matter of fact, the current Oommllnist "lwa,ce e1"1lsade'­st:1I'ted in their prisoner-of-war camp" in 1945.
Handling' of Japanese POW's. Communist methods of han­dling Japanese prisoners of war were generally the same as
those employed in handling German prisoners. The interro­gation procedures were the same, as were the techniques of indoctrination. The illegal and unjustified detaining of Jap, anese prisoners for years after hostilities had come to an end paralleled the illegal holding of German prisoners, some of whom were released as late as October 1955, more than ten years ajte1' the-ir capture. Others, so-called "war crim­inals," may never be released.

The interrogation and indoctrination methods used by the Soviets against German and Japanese prisoners of war fol­lowed the same pattern as those used against the Russian people. They are a Communist trademark, an established procedure peculiar only to communism.
At the close of 'VorIel 'Val' II, these facts had already been written on the pages of history. Unfortunately, llluch of what was on those pages was still a Comlllunist secret. If we had known all the facts and had taken them to heart, we could have spared oursel\'es much grief during the Korean
Chapter 3
rmed with Soviet weapons, North Korean Communist
forces invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. Six days
later a battalion of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division was
rushed to Korea from Japan.
Thus began one of the strangest wars in American history. Our cause was simple and just, but our objectives were frequently confused in the public mind.
The Korean war had three aspects. There was the civil war aspect-North Koreans fighting South Koreans for con­trol of a divided country. There was the collective aspect­the first United Nations' attempt to stop a treaty-breaking aggressor. And there w~s the cold war aspect-the Western powers blocking the expansion of Commlmist imperialism.
The causes of the war, United Nations' objectives, and the need for American intervention were not clearly delineated in the public mind. This lack of understanding prevailed among American civilians and fighting men.
The Communists attempted to exploit to the fullest this condition both in international propaganda and in dealing with our prisoners of war.

The United States began a piecemeal bUild-up of the fight­ing forces in Korea. The first units to reach Korea were not well prepared for combat. However, by November 1950, the North Koreans had been completely beaten, their capital was in Allied hands, and their remnant forces' were scat­tered and disorganized. The victory seemed assured until the Chinese Red avalallChe crashed over the Yalu.
In late November, the Chinese opened a massive counter­offensive, hurling our forces into retreat. Early in Decem­ber, American and Allied forces were trapped at the Chang. Jin Reservoir. By fierce fighting they broke the trap and fought their way to Hungnam, where they were evacuated.
There ensued a \vinter of back-to-wall battling in subzero cold.
It was during this grueling period, which began in .July 1950, that most of the American PO,Y's were captured.

The first ordeal the prisoners had to suffer-and often the worst--was the mardi to the PO,Y camps. 'l'he .L\orth Koreans frequently tied a prisoner's hands behind his back or bound his arIllS with wire. 'Younded prisoners \,"ere jammed into trucks that jolted, dripping blood, along broken roads. Many of the wounded received no medical attention until they reached the camp. Some were not attended to until days thereafter.
The marching prisoners \vere likely to be beaten or kicked to their feet if they fell. A nunrlJer of the Communist oflicers "·ere bullwhip barbarians. The~' were particularly brutal to
South Korean captives. Many ROK prisoners were forced to dig their own graves before they were shot-an old orien­tal custom applied to the execution of criminals. Some Americans, with their hands tied behind their backs, were shot by the enemy.
So the journeys to the prison camps were "death marches." On one of these marches, 700 men headed north. Before the camp was reached, 500 had perished.
The camps were what might be expected in a remote corner of Asia. Prisoner rations were scanty-a basic diet of rice occasionally leavened with some foul kind of soup. The average American could not stomach such fare. Sick­ness broke out in the camps, and many of the men suffered long sieges of dysentery.
The men suffered much from c0ld in winter and heat in summer. 'Water was often scarce; bathing became difficult. Barracks were foul and unsanitary.
In the best of the camps, the men behind the barbed wire were sometimes given tobacco, a few.morsels of candy, occa­sional mail. A few Red Cross packages got through. How­ever, the enemy consistently refused to permit the Interna­tional Red Cross to inspect prisoner-of-war camps. There was good reason!

In the worst of the camps, the prisoners existed by the skin of their teeth and raw courage. Men in the "bad" camps were known to lose 50 pounds in weight in a matter of weeks.
The "bad" camps included the so-called "Bean Camp" near Suan, a camp known as "Death Valley" near Pukchin, an­other camp called "The Valley," apparently in the vicinity of Kanggye. Among the worst camps were the "Interroga­tion Center" near Pukchin and a neighboring disciplinary center called "The Caves." This last was literally composed of caverns in which the men were confined. Here they 'Were forced to sleep without blankets. Their food 'Was thrown at them. There were no latrine facilities. In "The Caves" the
prisoners were retlueetl to a tlegTE'e of miselT n]](l degradn­tion almost unbelievable. 'I.'hose sent to "Tile eaves" prisoners accused of insubordination, breaking camp rules, attempting to escape, or committing some otller so-called crime. 'rhe testimony of sun'ivors suggests tlwt tl1E' "crime" was seldom fitted by the punisllllwnt.
Tile primnry interest of the Korth Koreans was to impress United Kations captives and Korean civilians with their "superiority" over "'Vestern barbarians." TllPY operated on the theory that "might is right" and demonstrated that "right" by some of the most inhumane types of atrocities and brutalities that "'estern civilization has seen. '1.'0 im­press the civilian pOlHllation, the Korth Korean Communists placed American capOn's on display in the village squares of Korea. They beat and even murdered exhausted, sick. :lllcl wounded Americans who could not defend themselves.
J:\Iistreatment of American prisoners by the Korth Koreans had no relationship to interrogation and political indodrina­tion. Ac:tually, the Korth Koreans were not primarily inter­ested in collecting intelligence information or exploiting the prisoners of war. 'I.'hey did not conduct an organized pro­gram of indoctrination.
They did conduct some interrogations of United Nations prisoners. These were limited, crude, and aimless, and did not produce enough tactical or political information to con­stitute an achievement. One of the stock questions was, "Why did the United States invade North Korea 'I" Most Americans questioned by the Koreans were asked, "How many automobiles has each American?" 'I'he manner in Which the Koreans conducted their limited interrogations, using tlll'eats and beatings, usually resulted in opposition by the prisoners rather than cooperation.
'I.'he brutal manner in which the North Koreans treated captives became known to thousands of the United Nations forces. As a result, many Americans felt that capture by the Chinese would bring similar treatment. Therefore, when an American captive of the Chinese was not shot or other­
trained and indoctrinated themselves in communism and all of its techniques was demonstrated by their bitter criticism of everything American and by repeated references to the "capitalists."
After the initial contact with the enemy. some Americans seemed to believe that the enemy was sincere and harmless. They relaxed and permitted themselves to fall into a well­disguised trap by a cunning enemy.
The Chinese Communist leaders, military and political, were educated-many, in the United States.c Many also spoke English fluently. Most of them possessed a fairly good understanding of Americans and of the other nation­alities that composed the United Nations forces. They were shrewd, and they recognized the potential value to the Oom­munist cause of converting prisoner-of-war camps into lab­oratories in which they could experiment with various methods of group-handling and indoctrination of United Nations prisoners, especially Americans.
Shortly after capture, American prisoners were escorted to a point some distance behind the front lines. The Ohinese used these points for assembling and briefing the prisoners before marching them to permanent prison compounds. When assembled at the collecting point, the prisoners were briefed by an English-speaking Ohinese Communist officer.
The officer told the prisoners that the war in Korea was a civil war, like the Civil War in the United States in 1861. The prisoners were told that the United States was the real aggressor in Korea and that the American capitalists forced other nations to send troops to Korea to help fight a war for Wall Street. The prisoners were told that the military aggression by the United States so angered the Ohinese people that the "workers" of China decided to "volunteer" for military duty and come to the rescue of the North Korean people. The prisoners were told that the war in Korea was illegal because the Oongress of the United States did not declare war against the People's Republic in North Korea.
The Communist officer further told the prisoners that, in view of the fact that the war wrrsnot legal, the Chinese and K:or-ean peoplewonld not consider thecaptives:,pl"isoRers of war but rather as "students." As students they would be reeducated .by the Chinese and K:orean People's Govern­ments. The reeducation about which the enemy spoke meant indoctrination-Communist indoctrination.

After the prisoners.had undergone the briefing at the collecting points and had been identified and tagged, they were evacuated to one of the permanent camps in North Korea. The evacuation under the Chinese was more orderly and less ruthless than umler the North Koreans-another instance of the Communist deception technique in operation. The sick and wounded were assisted by Korean civilians who used carts to help them along the marches. The food en route did not meet American standards but was far better than the food given prisoners by the Koreans. Medical care for the marching prisoners was poor, but the Chinese made what they had available to the more serious cases of sick and wounded.
After arriving at permanent camps, the prisoners were immediately organized into units comparable in size to United States Army units. They were grouped into squads, platoons, and companies, each under a unit leader. Orig­inally, the leaders were selected by the Chinese Communists on the basis of leadership qualities, military bearing, and a loud, commanding voice. This manner of selection, however, was discarded almost immediately because the units were run too much like regular military organizations, and this was contrary to the Communists' strategy. The enemy re­examined the original leaders, checked their backgrounds, and determined which ones could be depended upon to lead the units in the way the Communists wanted them led. In many instances, the unit leaders were studied as potential group leaders and monitors for indoctrination classes. Obvi­ously, the objective behind all this was to gain and maintain complete control over the prisoners.
After the Chinese had established a POW organization that would satisfy their purposes, they began a conditioning process designed to render the prisoners more vulnerable to their propaganda assaults and to their political indoctrina­tion program. The enemy's initial objective was to gain the prisoners' neutrality, if not cooperation, by undermining their sense of duty, their friendships, and their democratic ideals. To attain this, the enemy had no set of rules. No trick was too dirty or mean, no weakness too unjust to ex­ploit, no threat too violent 01' subtle to be used again and again to batter the resistance of the prisoners and to crush their will.
Fear, threats, confusion, tension, isolation, retaliation, informers, and censorship of mail were used effectively by the Chinese Communists. Since these control measures played such an important part, and since they will probably be used again and again in any future situation of this kind, it is important to explain some of them in detail.
The Chinese Communists first generated fear among the prisoners by warning them that they might be strafed by our own planes in Korea. This was not an unfounded warn­ing, because we had ail' superiority in Korea at the time, and the Chinese did not report accurately the locations of the various PO'V inclosures. This warning created a pecul­iar fear in the minds of the prisoners-fear of harm by friendly forces. Stories of atrocities and brutalities, a few of which were based on fact, were deliberately spread. In this instance, the implication was that in some rare and unusual situation, the enemy might find it necessary to re­sort to torture, but if he did it would be as a last resort for the sake of discipline. The enemy spread rumors that some prisoners might be shipped to Manchuria or to China and that the trip might be a one-way affair.
Another rumor deliberately. planted and spread by the. enemy was that if prisoners did not cooperate wiJh the Chinese and Korean People's Governments for peace, some might not be repatriated. This inspired the greatest fear in
the prisoners-of spending an indeterminate period as pris­oners of the ComIllunists.
Playing on basic human instinC't and emotions, the enelllY started a rumor that food might be withheld from those prisoners who did llot cooperate with the enemy. 'I'his rumor, coupled with another that even the primitive medical care would be withheld in case of illness, intensified the normal fear of siekness and disease. This fear increased further when the prisoners considered the fact that they were liVing under conditions far below the normal sanitary standards in the United States and other modern countries of the world.
Perhaps the most significant and destructive fear was fear of the unknown. The Chinese played upon it in the hope of redueing the resistance of the prisoners. 'I'his caused some prisoners to weaken and a few to accede to Communist de­mands. An analysis of this aspeet of group-handling by the Chinese COllUllunists reH~als that the prisoners actually
were more afraid of the unknown than of the things theycould see, feel, and hear.
One of the most VICIOUS and despicable tactics employedby the Chinese Communists was to organize nets of in­formers. The enemy had two types of informers. One ,yasthe unwitting informer. He had no specific instructionsfrom the enemy nor, as a matter of fact, did he realize thathe was serving as an informer. He was called to the enemyheadquarters at various times and engaged in general con­versation. The conversation would alwi1~-s lead to prisonlife and prisoner actiyities. Through careless talk, the pris­oner gave the enemy information about other pi'isoners andunwittingly informed on them.
The other type was the regular informer, who reportedto the enemy at night or at other specific hours designatedby the enemy. He gave the enemy information about otherprisoners through weakness or to enhance his position in theeyes of the enemy. In certain instances a regular informerdeliberately gave the enemy false information about some
prisoner or prisoners, which resulted in unwarranted pun­ishment or hardship for the victims. As a result, prisonerswere tried and severely punished for offenses about whichthey knew nothing-the work of the informer.
The position of the informer was so insecure that he hadto report any questionable act in case someone else informedon him, thus causing him to lose his position. These "ques­tionable" acts included such indefinable misconduct as "nn­wholesome" or "hostile" attitude, the recording of "impropernotes" at an indoctrination lecture, and expressing "a capi­talistic philosophy." The type of prisoner recruited by theenemy for this work was the opportunist, who stopped atnothing to further his own gains.
In return for informing,the Chinese enemy permitted him to conduct various activ­ities, snch as selling food to hungry prisoners. The informerswere feared to some extent by the other prisoners, but theirattitude and conduct more frequently were viewed withanger, shame, and dis6'ust.
Despite the wide publicity given to informers and collabo­rationists, they did not set the pattern for our fighting men in Korea. The large majority of American prisoners resisted the enemy in the highest tradition of the service and of our country. Of those who resisted, some were singled out for brutal treatment. Some of these cases will be discussed in later chapters. In the long run, however, those Americans who I:esisted fared about as well physically and materially as the few who chose t:p,lil road of least resistance. And they had this decided advantage-the personal satisfaction of having acted in the highest moral tradition of a nation under God.
Chapter 4
ho were the "progressives" and who were the "reac­tionaries" ?
These words took on special meanings in the prison camps of North Korea. American fighting men who considered themselves liberals were proud to be called "reactionaries" for demonstrating firm resistance in a Communist prison camp. On this point, they saw eye to eye with their more conservative buddies. And both liberal and conservative POW"s looked with contempt on the P01V who came to be known as a "progressive."
How did a man become a "progressive"?
If he began to show the "propel' spirit"-to cooperate with his captors-he was lectured and handed Communist litera­ture. A docile prisoner who read the literature and listened. politely to the lectures was graduated to a better class.
Finally he might be sent to "Peaceful Valley." In this lenient camp the food was relatively good. Prisoners might even have tobacco. And here they were given all sorts of Marxian propaganda.
The graduates from "Peaceful Valley" and others who accepted Communist schooling were called "progressives." And there were shades of meaning!
A British study described a "progressive" POW as one who accepted the political, economic; and social gospel of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin-even if he was not quite sure what this was. In order to be fully accepted as a "pro­gressive," however, the prisoner had to do more than pas­sively accept communism. He had to become a Communist propagandist and assist the Chinese, not only by giving them all the military information he had but also by acting as an
informer, reyealing the plans and thoug11tS of his fellow prisoners, and helping to spread COItlInunisIll among them and among his family and friends at home. Thus he would show that he had becOIl1e "politically conscious."
'l'lie seeond allil more literal application of the "progres­siYe" label beeallle apparent in the systematic exvloitation of a prisoner's serykes once he had giyen in on just one issue. Often the first bit of eooperatioll with the enemy seemeel minor in nature; and the prisoner eould rationalize, with the captor's help, to justify the act. But the first eon­cession vayeel the way for a second, and so on down the line. "l,Vith each "progressiye" step dOWll collaboration road, the chance of turning back becaml' more remote. 'rhus SOUle vrisoners learned too late that they couldn't be just "a little bit" of a collaborator so long as the COIIlmunists wanted their senices.
The "prog]'essin~s" were called UpOll to deliYer lectures, write pamphlets, and make propaganda broadcasts. They
wrote speeches condemning capitalism and "American ag­gression in Korea." They organized a group known as "Peace Fighters."
On a percentage basis, fewer officers than enlisted men were "progressives." However. the officers' influence, unfor­tunately, was strong on the enlisted men. "If the Captain can do it, why can't I?" "If the Colonel signs a peace peti­tion and orders the rest of us to do it, we have to follow orders, don't we?" Altogether, the officers and enlisted men who resisted were on a spot. That most of them refused to join the "progressives" (and rejected a promise, sometimes unfulfilled, of better food, minor luxuries, and mail call) says something for the spirit of both officers and enlisted men.
The Communists soon learned that Americans were not readily sold on communism. Even those of lesser education, or perhaps having little appreeiation of their own country's principles, were by no means eager to accept this foreign ideology or to submit to it. The early "converts" turned out to be simply opportunists seeking to better their own lot without regard to the consequences for their fellow pris­oners.

Ho,v did the "reactionary" fare? He could expect to be separated from those prisoners "'hom the enemy deemed to be more susceptible. 'Yhile there was good chance the "re­actionary" would experienc'e some solitary confinement, in time the Communists found themselves short of facilities for handling all resisters in that manner. Thus small "reac­tionary" groups formed, increasing in size as time ,vent by, isolated to prevent their interference with the subjugation program in the "progressive" camps. Brought together by virtue of their demonstrated resistance to the enemy, these were men who could, despite any personal differences alllong themselves, present a united front against the enemy and help each other survive.
Still, the "reactionary" label ,vas n6 guarantee that the
prisoner was permanently free from enemy efforts to sub­
jugate him. Any American who signed a propaganda leaflet, a peace petition, or a gerIll-war eonfession was a big f('ather in the enemy's hat. Logieally, the higher the rank of the prisoner the more useful would be sueh serviee to the enemy. Also, the "breaking" of a senior offieer, a "notorious reac­tionary," or anyone who had demonstrated leadership and other strong qualities that had earned the respeeot: and trust of fellow prisoners, was of tremenelous benefit in the COIll­munist effort to convince other prisoners (anel people baek home) that resistance was futile. For that reason, various ''reactionaries'' were subjected to pressures often loosely refel'l'ed to as "brainwashing."
Breakdown of leadership was what the enemy wanted. Ofiieers were usually segregated. "Progressives" were placed in leadership positions. And if the enemy's .appointees weren't obeyed by the other pOIV'S, punishments were in store for the "insubordinate prisoners."
"'hat did the "progressiye" expect to gain in the long run ... after the Korean war was oyer? "Vas he thinking that far ahead?
It is doubtful that any of the "progressiyes" beeame sin­cere converts to the Communist ideology. Even in the ease of the turncoats-21 American prisoners who refu~ed re­patriation and remained in Red China-the seemingly logi­eal assumption that they lw,d been c<l!1verted has pro\'ell erroneous. Perhaps this· misconeeption was fostered by frequent references to them during the repatriation proeess as ,·those who chose cOlllmunism." Indications are that this misleading phrase was introduced by Communist publica­tions.
In any event, reports by returned American prisoners on the actions of those men indicated that they remained for quite different reasons. The subsequent return of some of the 21 further refutes the idea that they "dlOse eommu­nism." One of these, interviewed in Hong Kong and asked why he stayed in Red China in the first place, replied, ".•• I'll tell you this much-it wasn't for political reasons."
,Yhy did the 21 refuse repatriation? Perhaps, in some cases, they feared vengeance at the hands of men they had betrayed, or at the hands of friends of men who had died because of their treason.
Having cut himself off from his own country and his own people, what can the collaborator expect from the Commu­nists? The answer became apparent during the Korean war and it is just as true today.
The Communists know that the turncoat will be no more trustworthy for them than he was for llis own side. The enemy cannot expect to [lain actua.l allegiance from a col­la,bomtO?" if for no other reason tllan tllat lie has none to [live. For a chan[le of alle[lianee, the ultimate possibility of colla,boration, wouldneeessItate a willingness to die for the enemy. Obviously, the prisoller 1[ho betrays his Olen people
out ot teal' tor his lite isn't going to be willing to die tor anyone else, either.
:1'10 matter where collaboration begins, the Communists continue to press a POlY for further services until they have no further use for him. At that point they drop him; and no one is anxious to pick him up. Certainly his prison-mates will lwve little use for him, since his collaboration with the enem~'. no matter what it was, will have in some manner inflieted further hardship on them. Perhaps even more illl­pOl'tant, from the standpoint of his chances for survival, the collaborator will have little respect for himself.
'Yhatever the Communists may promise in exchange for collaboration, their payoff will be smalL Any slight advan­tage the collaborator might gain as a result of service to the enemy will be of no value over an extended period of im­prisonment. In the long run, the resister and the col­laborator may fare about the same in the purely physieal sense. But psyehologically, there will be a big differenee. For the man who gives in will have several handieaps: A sense of failure, or remorse: the loss of respect, both self­respect and that of his fellow prisoners, that in time may well destroy his ,vill to live. In any case, "Man does not live by bread alone," In a Communist prison, where bread is likely to be sean'e, snstenance of the spirit-hope, faith, and Will-may well be the determining factor in survivaL
Having kept faith, the "reactionary" is the winner.
505596°--59----4 A3
Chapter 5
pow should be prepared for brutal treatment if inter­rogated soon after capture by an enemy seeking military information of immediate value. Tactical inter­rogation, wherein time is of the essence, is more likely than any other to include severe physical torture. Certainly it will include many threats, probably beginning with the first refusal on the part of the captive to give information.
During the Korean war, practically all Air Force POW's were given special attention. The primary objective of the Chinese Communists was to use them for propaganda pur­poses, particularly for germ-warfare propaganda. How­ever, they were grilled also for military information.
Not only in fliers but in all POvV's, the Chinese interroga­tors tried to create a fear that, by some mysterious process, they would break under questioning. The idea of "brain­washing" was spread by the Communists to create the false
impression that their method and manner of conducting interrogations were irresistible.

Actually, the methods used by the Communists to obtain information are not new, mysterious, or irresistible. They have been used for centuries. These methods are based on the simple idea of progressively weakening an individual's physical and moral strength. They are not based on some weird psychological theory. Numerous persons have faced Communist interrogation and withstood so-called Commu­nist "methods" for weeks, months, and even years, without "breaking" or even demonstrating fear of any kind. Many of those persons have returned without showing any IJecul­iar or unusual ill-effects as a result of their experiences.
Communist interrogation of United Nations prisoners of war in Korea revealed this significant principle-that Communist objectives frequently limit the use of physical
eoprdon or torturp. The intplTogator knows that thp pris­oner eannot answpr (] uestions after he is dead. AliYe, re­J'nsiug to yield, the prisoner remains a potclltial sourep oj' iu[ormation to his captors: dead he is worthless. Although the Commnnists will attempt to make use oj' a prisoner's nntural anxiety and J'ear, most oj' the prisoners who are subjP(·tp(l to Communist interrogation will not be physieally tortured, (,yen though they reJ'usp to cooperate with the pm·lll~·. '1'he rpnsons for this "nry. but a "ery important one is that the Comillunists are praetiC'al in their approaeh to illtprrogation. The~' learned during their earl~' reigu of terror in thp SOYiet {'nion that physieal "iolence. morp fre(llwntly than not, stiffens gronp l'l'sistance, rather than the rp\'prse.
Ill[('l'!'og"ation has some charnC'tpristics oj' both a sdpnce nud au art. It rpsemblps a sdenee ,,"hen conducted by a
shrewd and trained interrogator who knows what he wants and proceeds in an orderly, logical, and determined fashioll.
Interrogation resembles an art when the interrogator establishes a relationship between himself and the person being interrogated wherein the latter is subtly persuaded to cooperate in giving information beyond the simple answer­ing of questions. The interrogator, by demonstrating pa­tience, tolerance, sympathy, and understanding, is able to obtain cooperation in achieving his desired results.
Some of the Chinese Communist interrogators in Korea were skilled and possessed the drive, tolerance, and patience to obtain the information they were after. Often they knew English and were well-informed about life in the United States. Some had been educated in the United States and were familiar with the economic and political institutions of the United States. In fact, some of the enemy personnel in the interrogation section were better informed on certain aspects of American life than many of the prisoners.
From the first interrogation, the COlllmunists tried to confuse the American PO",V's into questioning the sincerity of our objectives in Korea. "Divide and conquer" was the insidious keynote. Only a few Americans were casualties in this battle to capture their minds in the PO",V camps. The Communists, nevertheless, regarded their interrogation and indoctrination program as an effective weapon in exploiting American POvV's.
The Communists began their interrogation soon after a PO",V was captured. ·With a downed flier, it began almost immediately after he was picked up. ",Vith other PO",V's, it began at the collecting point where they were brought to­gether. However, the first conversation was more like an interview than a real interrogation:
Generally, the enemy asked the prisoners several routine questions and a few questions on the military situation in the United Nations areas. After completing his direct inter­rogation, the enemy distributed numerous forms and told the prisoners to sign them. Some of these forms carried American, International Red Cross, or one of many other headings, most of which were invalid. In addition to sign­ing and completing these forms, the prisoners were told to sign just their names on blank pieces of paper, which the enemy collected and subsequently used for propaganda purposes.
Many Americans signed the various forms because they did not know or believe at the time that the enemy would use the contents of the forms for purposes of incrimination. During the initial interrogation, many Americans talked freely with the enemy and answered most of the questions asked. The lack of resistance during the initial interroga­tion by the enemy resulted from the apparent friendliness the Chinese had displayed when the prisoners were captured.
At the various collecting points were Chinese whose duties were to screen the completed forms and record the results of the initial interrogations. They studied the answers to the questions on the various forms and compiled a per­sonnel file on each prisoner, which included the question­naires, results of the initial interrogation, and the blank slips of paper on which the prisoners had signed their names. These files were later forwarded to the camps to which the prisoners were assigned, and the results of all subsequent interrogations were added to them.
An analysis of the results of the interrogations enabled the Communists to select or determine the subjects or atti­tudes that should be emphasized and exploited in the indoc­trination program. In this way they could hand-tailor the indoctrination given to the various groups of prisoners.
At the permanent camps, appropriate physical facilities were provided by the prison command. The United States­British Prisoner of 'Val' Camp Number 5, located near the city of Pyoktong, North Korea, was the model for all other camps in Korea. The interrogation sections were located in the camp headquarters, usually near the commanding officer or near the security officer. They were equipped with wire recorders, exposed and hidden microphones,two­way mirrors, and a version of a lie detector. The interroga­tors were Chinese officers, assisted by Chinese women,
whose duties primarily were to record interrogations on paper in Chinese characters and maintain accurate rosters of prisoners who had and who had not been interrogated. The sections operated on a 24-hour basis and conducted some of the most fruitful interrogations at night.
Alone and disarmed, what can one man do under such interrogation? If he yields, he knows he is disgracing him­self and undermining his country's safety. Yet when he holds out, he knows he may be in for rough treatment. Is there an easier way out?
Just after the Korean war, there was talk about sueh a solution. One suggestion was that members of our Armed Forces should be instructed, if taken prisoner, to "confess to anything." Not only would this take the pressure off the PO,,,, it was argued, but it would also confuse the enemy since he would not know where truth left off and fiction began.
This strategy was to haye included the preliminary announcement to the world that our men would do this if captured, thereby "nullifying" the propaganda value to the enemy of any such things as false confessions and peace petitions. In its original form, the "confess-to-anything" fOl'mula made clear that it was to apply only to such things as false confessions and propaganda. In the realm of military information and maintenance of unquestionable faith with fellow captives, there could be no deviation from a rigid standard.
It was a fine theory! However, experience has shown that once a prisoner started answering questions, the skilled interrogator could be certain of gaining some information from him if he had sufficient time. By no means does this mean, as some have contended, that an interrogator can get all that he wants from a prisoner in due time. It does mean, however, that the prisoner who tries to outmaneuYer the interrogator is certain to divulge some information.
Baiting a trap for the POW, the Communists will allow him to "get away" with pretense during interrogation­
eyen encourag"e it-for the simple reason that they want the prisoner to develop a habit of pretending. One official study of Communist methods in attempting to elicit false "germ warfare" confessions from captive American fliers describes them as something of a training process. The victim was not simply confronted with demands for a false "confes­sion": he was enticed into pretense. First the subject of "germ warfare" was discussed in very general terms, with broad hints that the prisoner knew quite well what it was all about. Suggestions were made that if the prisoner "had something on his conscience," it would be to his own advan­tage to "unburden himself." This could go on for days or "'eeks, until the prisoner himself Blight ask if he was being accused of such activity. To this, the enemy would often respond with something to this effect: "I have accused you of nothing. Howeyer, if you have something on your conscience ...!"
The prisoner was left to figure out for himself exactly "'hat was wanted. If he did figure it out and if he did comply, he soon learned that "tongue-in-cheek" compliance was not enough. He must learn to speak, write, and act as if his false confession-hmyever preposterous-was en­tirely true. Since he was "confessing" to a "horrible atrocity," he must also pretend feelings of guilt, shame, and eyen repentance.
""here such pretense supported Communist propaganda, as in the case of a "confession" to germ warfare, the Com­munists could-and did-go along with it indefinitely. But where they had encouraged the PO,V to lie as a way of trapping him, they showed no leniency when the conflict in his stories became apparent.
The prisoner whose lies led him into the Communist trap was considered a more grievous offender than the man who refused to answer, for in addition to wasting the interroga­tor's time he proved that he was "insincere" and "had not learned the truth." An interrogator was more likely to desire personal vengeance against the prisoner who "sold" him on false information than against the prisoner who maintained a position of respectful noncompliance.
The means employed by the Communists to obtain infor­mation from United Nations prisoners of war were not new, unique, mysterious, or irresistible. They were recognized and understandable methods of undermining an individual's physical and moral strength. By deception, and by other tricks, the Communists obtained apparently useless informa­tion from prisoners who did not realize that all information is important. The success of the enemy's program of in­terrogation depended, to a large extent, on the prisoners' lack of knowledge of what was happening to them-a factor on which the Communists have always relied.
The American fighting man should remember that the Communist interrogator is not a superman with mystic powers and unique methods by which he can accomplish the impossible. He is not all-knowing, nor is he all-powerful, eyen when dealing with a seemingly powerless Yictim, such as a prisoner of war.
It would be foolish, however, to underestimate the skill of the Communist interrogator. Effective resistance to in­terrogation, as one ex-prisoner has put it, is not so much a matter of outwitting the interrogator as of otttlasting him­by determined, steadfast refusal to cooperate in the face of all manner of treachery, threat, coercion, and even death.
Those who resisted completely the most skilled Communist interrogators deserve the gratitude and admiration of every American, for they are examples of courage, determination, and endurance.
Chapter 6
hen plunged into a Communist indoctrination mill,
the average American PO'V was under a serious
handicap. Enemy political officers tried to force him to
read Marxian literature, to participate in debates. He was
prodded to tell what he knew about American politics and
history. Lectures -study groups -discussion groups -a
blizzard of propaganda and hurricanes of violent oratory
were all a part of the enemy teehnique.
To many American prisoners this procedure came as a complete surprise and they were unprepared. That some refused to read the literature, participate in the debates, or engage in politieal discussions with their skilled captors is a tribute to their courage.
But to a frightened, confused, and hungry prisoner, depri"ed of leadership and guidance, these initial steps by the Communist enemy were effective. Although most pris­oners did not realize what was happening to them as the program progressed and while they were being subjected to interrogation, there were no secrets about what the enemy planned to do along the line of "reeducating" the prisoners. It was reiterated numerous times that they were "students," and, as students, they were going to be reeducated along Communist lines. This fact was made clear at the very beginning. It was never altered.
Basically, the indoctrination program had two main objectives. One was to indoctrinate completely a smaH, select group of prisoners in the actual theory and practice of communism as a world conspiracy. The second objective was to undermine the faith and trust of the other prisoners in their country, their government, and its 'political leaders -not to make Communists out of all the prisoners.
In attempting to achieve the first objective, the Commu­nists selected the prisoners on whom they felt they could depend, gave them special training, tutoring, and counsel­
ing, and extended them special treatment. This was in keeping with the ComllJunist concept, as advaneed by Lenin, that a small, select, disciplined group should lead the masses. As an incentiTe for the "chosen few" to apply themselves to the task of betraying their country and their fellow prisoners, the Communists told them that tlH'y were the "liberators" of thc nHlsses, and prollJised tlH'm positions of leadership in the 17nited States-after a Commlmist­(ljreeted revolution had replaced our democratic system with a Communist forlll of government.
In pursuing their second objective, the Communists con­sistently smeared the 17nited States. Any imperfections of our political and economic institutions were (listorted com­pletely out of proportion. At no time was mention of the true democratic principles of the 17nited States Government permitted in discussions. In addition to attacking Ameri­can concepts of democra('y, the COIllmunists launelled attack
a[U'!' 1Itt1l('k :lg"ill"r..\lll('rican statesillen by nallle, c!1Iillling
th1lt tll('y we!'e the ('bid' pNpetrators of war and e\"il.
'1'11e COllllllunists felt that if they eoul<l su('('eed in the se('ond ol,jedil-e--sub,-erting the prisoners' loyalty--·-tlwse AllIericans would be less opposed to eOItlIllunislll after their repatriation to the United States. The COllllllunists also re:lsoned that these ex-pl'isoners would be mo!'e likely to be f'~-lllp:lthetie to all.v C"ltllllunist eonspiraey against the l'nited St:ltes. Part of their plan ('ailed for the thoroughly indoetrinated prisonerf', upon their return to the United Sr;ltes. to 1ISSllIll(, leadership of the snbverted ex-prisoners alld lII'ge tI,Plll to snppo!'t tile C"'lllllllllist eonspiraey through the instrunwnt:llity of the COlllIllunist Party.
OTHER OBJECTIVES III support of these two main but general ohjel'tiYes, there were sppelfie (J!JjeetiYes that had a more direct: e[[eet on the lin's of the prisoners. '1'0 faeilitate internal eontrol of the pris"ner p"pulation, the Chinese COlllIllunists at­tE,mptecl to org:lni%e a net of informers to relay to the camp
authorities information concerning the activities of other prisoners. Through informers, the Chinese Communists were able to thwart many escape attempts. Informers also furnished the Chinese Communists information concerning prisoners who were actively resisting indoctrination.
Another objective was to recruit collaborators to assist the Chinese Communists in implementing the indoctrination program. These collaborators would give propaganda lec­tures, write articles, and attempt to talk other prisoners into signing "peace petitions," surrender leaflets, and other types of propaganda.
Still another objective, which fortunately had no success, was to recruit potential agents to perform espionage or sub­versive activities for the Communists after re]latriation. The few who agr-eed to work for the Communists realized soon after their repatriation that they had been duped and notified the American authorities of this Communist ]llot.
Every Communist activity in North Korea was geared for one general purpose-to support the overall mission of political indoctrination. Early in the war, for example, there were various Peace Committees, whose job was to smear America as a warmonger and to laud Communists as champions of peace. In addition to operational committees for indoctrination, the Communists established a number of committees for the administration of the prisoners. These were: Sanitation Committee, Daily Life Committee, Athletic Committee, Mess Committee, and a Committee for Prisoner Morale. The membership of these committees, like that of the others, was made up of prisoners. At all levels of committee activities there were Communist politi­cal advisers who insured discipline, control, and nondevia­tion from the established routines of the program.
Most Americans have heard about Communist-front organizations. A Communist front is an organization con­ceived by Communists, inspired by Communists,controlled by Communists, and directed by Comlllunists, but which has as a "front" some popular or ]lseudo-patriotic cause. The
various committees in the prison camps in North Korea served as fronts for the Communist enemy. POvV's who became members served the Communist enemy in North Korea in the very same manner in which other naive individ­uals have seryed the Communist conspiracy outside of prison camps.
PHASES OF INDOCTRINATION The Communists administered their indoctrination pro­gram in two general phases. The first can be called the preparatory phase, the second the implementation phase.
Preparatory Phase. This phase, a "softening-up" or "con­ditioning" process, was conducted through the medium of a series of lectures on the imperfections of the governments under which the prisoners lived before capture. Th.e United States Government and its economic and political systems constituted the main target for all lectures. During this phase, the United States was accused of instigating the war in Korea.
Implementation Phase. This phase of indoctrination was devoted to selling communism as a way of life to be preferred over the democratic system. The Communists used an old technique during this phase--comparing one with the other, pointing up the favorable aspects of com­munism and emphasizing the so-called "defects" of democ­racy. The enemy pictured the Communist state as a state in which every man, woman, and child lives a life of happi­ness, free of poverty and class discrimination.
METHODS OF CONTROL The Communists used the carrot-and-stick method of controlling POW's. When the carrot failed, they relied on three sticks: repetition, harassment, and humiliation. Repetition. This technique was used against all prisoners at one time or another during their captivity. Some pris­oners, yielding to pressure, memorized certain material and were questioned and examined on it for days, weeks, and months. They were asked to answer the same questions over and over again. They were required to read and re­
read Communist propaganda over and over again. By
repetition the enemy caused some prisoners with relatively
poor formal education to memorize heavy works on com­
munism and economics. Some of these prisoners memorized
entire sections pf books by Stalin and Lenin. .As a result of this repetition technique, some prisoners who had not advanced beyond the sixth grade could recite long essays on communism and its economic and political theories.
Harassment. This technique, like repetition, was used against a great number of prisoners during their captivity. Harassment was employed on a precise schedule that did not vary from day to day, week to week, or month to month. Its purpose was to create a state of anxiety in the prisoners -to keep them tense and in a state of constant uncer­tainty. It was also contrived to make the prisoners believe that harassment would end eventually, and that they could then live as normally as possible in prison. Harassment was usually based on trumped-up charges against prisoners. These charges could be anything from a very minor infrac­tion of the rules to a major offense, such as striking an enemy officer. However, it worked best on, and was designed for, prisoners who committed minor offenses in connection with the indoctrination program.
Humiliation. This technique was designed to be used against prisoners who demonstrated a great deal of per­sonal pride. Its objective was to break down a prisoner's personal pride by making him look ridiculous in the eyes of the other prisoners-to provoke shame and embarrassment in him. To assure its effectiveness, it was almost always used by the enemy in the presence of other prisoners.
The results of Communist indoctrination in North Korea by the Chinese must be appraised in the light of the enemy's objectives. .As mentioned earlier, the Communists in North Korea did not attempt to convert every United Nations prisoner. They wanted to indoctrinate a few selected prisoners whom they could trust to accept com­munism as a \Yay of life. These could subsequently develop
into Communist revolutionists. Primarily. the Communists in North Korea desired to destroy, or at least reduce, the hostility felt by the prisoners toward the Communist cause. They attempted to plant seeds of doubt that would grow and produce an attitude less opposed to communism.
In the light of those objectives, it is reasonable to assume that the Communist program of indoctrination in Korth Korea was successful to some degree. Official find­ings revealed that a small, select group of United Nations prisoners of war in North Korea was indoctrinated by the enemy in the theory and practice of communism. They also revealed that an undetermined number of other United Kations prisoners of war did not accept communism as such, but adopted an attitude of "seeing both sides" of commu­nism, observing some "good" points here and there. These sources further showed that the indoctrination weakened the old beliefs of some prisoners, confused other prisoners, and frustrated still others. 'With the exception of the allegedly indoctrinated prisoners, the others who saw merit in some aspects of communism failed to visualize com­munism as a threat to their democratic governments or the political institutions in their countries.
The political indoctrination program had two major objectives:
The first was to indoctrinate a small, select group of prisoners in the theory ancI practice of communism, not as it appears through Communist propaganda but as it actually exists-an international conspiracy.

The second objective was to weaken the loyalty of the prisoners to their countries by undermining their political, religious, and moral convictions and thereby so confusing them that when they returned to their native countries they would be less opposed to communism.

Some American POW's did not know what the Communist program was all about. Some were confused by it. Self­
seekers accepted it as an easy out. A few may have be­lieved the business. They signed peace petitions and peddled Communist literature. It was not an inspiring spectacle. It set loyal groups against cooperative groups and broke up camp organization and discipline. It made fools of some men. and tools of others. And it provided the enemy with stooges for propaganda shows.
Fortunately, that was not the whole story. The over­whelming majority of United Nations prisoners of war rejected communism as a system of government and as a way of life. Generally, the Americans returned to their country wiser in the ways of communism and stronger in theIr faith in the United States of America.
Chapter 7
ropaganda is tl1e H'ry lifeblood of communism. It
keeps tl1e Communist world conspiracy alive. 'Yitl1out
propaganda, communism could never have grown an(l
spread as it has. Througl1 propaganda, tl1e Communi",t
leaders sound the keynote of tl1e current "party line" to be
followed and parroted by tl1eir underlings. The terms
"'Yall Street warmongers," "Yankee imperialism," and
"decadent democracies" are but a few that were conceived
by Communist l)rOva.~andists. The "big-lie" technique, em­
ployed in the germ-\varfare accusations leveled against the
"['nited States, exemvlifies tYllical Communist propaganda
in action.
It should have been expected, therefore, that the Com­munists \vou](l try to use e.x. prisoners in Korea for provaganda purposes. In the prisoner-of-war camps, provag'anda was the backbone of the enemy's indoctrina­tion program.
The tie-in with the worldwide Communist plot is shown by the fact that several Soviet vropaganda experts were attached to the Chinese Communist prison organization and actively supported the Chinese in all vhases of prisoner­of-war administration. The presence of these experts from the Soviet l;nion ,,-as one of the reasons that group­handling in North Korea by the Chinese was so similar to Communist group-handling in Germany, Polaml, and the Soviet Union. One such eXl'ert was from the )foscow Aeademy of Propaganda, where eareer Communist propa­gan<lists are specially trained in the propaganda themes best suited for each of the geograllhical areas of the world or for each of the various racial groups.
In addition to the Soviets serving on the propaganda staff, an Australian newspaperman and longtime Communist an(l a British Communist correspondent served as advisers to the Communist propaganda chief. These two "'estern newspapermen were responsible for giving the propaganda
50;)59GO-59~-5 59
n ""'est'ern sIn nt" nnd presl'nting it in a falllili:lr "'estern forlllat.
The objel'tive of all CoIIInlllllist propng"lIl<1a in .'iorth Korea was the glorification of l'omlllunislll amI the degrada­tion of the Vnited States. It was tbe COlllnlOn ell'nH'nt of cOllllllunism present in all COllllllunist ac-tivities of the prison COIllIlW]H1.
TIle basil' theme of COlllmunist propag':l!Hla in 1'\orth Korea wns penl'e, nnd tlwt general tIlellle nen~r challged because the "pence offl'nsive" J)y COllllJl11l1ists throughout the Y\'orI<l hns ne\'er ch:lIlg-e(1. The COllllllllllists were talkill,g peace back in 1!)80 and said tIlPn that tlH'~' \vould lull tIll' free world into a stnte of pP:H'e nnd thell strike \dtIl a c1endwd fist. In lllore ]'('('('nt times. tIw Comlllllllists have llePIl trying actin'ly to achien' th:1t objectin'. In 1!)17. the COlllllll1lIists held a series of confer('I!('ps in :\Josco\\' and m:t<]e plans for an international peal'e oj'fpnsive, A similar
conference was heW in 1949. As a result of these peace con­ferences, the Stockholm Peace Convention, the Chicago Peace Crusade, and the Helsinki Peace Conference followed. The latter conferences were heW to convince the world that communism was a peaeeful movement and that the Com­munists were the real d1amlJions of peace. At the same time, the Communists were accusing the \Vestern powers of prelJaring for \Vorld \Var III. This strategy followed the plans made by the Communists at their various conferences for peace.
In 1Q:")O, the Comlllunists accelerated the peace offensive as. a result of the war in Korea. PrOIJaganda generated in North Korea by the Chinese COIllmunists was designed for the prisoners, for the Communist and non-Communist worlds, and for the hig;h eommand of the world Communist con­spiraey. The manner in ,vhkh a typical "peace lJetition" was used hy the Communists in Xorth Korea serves as a good example of the far-reaching effects of this type of propaganda.
Communist lJropagandists prepared the basic material for peace petitions. The petitions then were forwarded to the prison camps for signatures. After each petition had been signed by several hundred prisoners, the Communist propa­gandists checked it amI made ,vhatever additions woulel more sper-iti<-ally support the overall Communist objectives. 'rhe peace petition was then sent to certain strategic coun­tries, s\1(·h as the United Stntes, }~ngland, India, Japan, and all Communist countries. In those countries, certain Com­munist agencies receiyed them for further dissemination. l~or example, in the Unitecl States, the Daily 1Vorkcr, the Conm1l1lli,st Pnrty, nnd the Xationnl Peace Center receiYed the petitions and distributed them to the ;'front organiza­tions," In addition to Communist agen(jes, one other organ­ization receiYed at lenst fiye copies of almost eyery petition signed in Xorth Koren by United Xations vrisoners. That agene.y was the Unitecl Xations. The reason for this is obyious.
Few, if any, United Xntions prisoners who signed peace petitions thougllt those documents woulcl find their way into
every Communist channel in the world and eventually reach the United Nations as an "indictment" of the United States. Too late they realized that they had helped the Communists with two propaganda objectives, which were (1) to portray Communists as lovers of peace and (2) to demonstrate to the world that comlllunism had won hundreds of United Nations prisoners over to its cause.
Certain special propaganda targets were designated by the Communists. These, as a rule, were the aspects of American life that the Communists believed they could attack on the basis of their imperfection. The Communists attacked these targ"ets by using false "confessions" made by prisoners, in which they leveled charg"es against the United States and against the American way of life. For example, some 11ris­oners volunteered to write long papers on American banking, relating it to war and profits. Other prisoners wrote on racial discrimination and religious intolerance, making it appear that these practices were usual and not exceptional in the United States. The Communists would take this material, distort it, and fashion it into propaganda against the United States.
The most ambitious and far-reaching propaganda effort was the extraction of utterly false germ-warfare charges, which were coordinated with the "peace offensive." The Communists obtained from some United Nations prisoners "confessions" in which the prisoners allegedly admitted that they personally had engaged in germ warfare against the Korean civilian population. Such "confessions" were not, in themselves, enough to support the Communist charges, so the Communists also used "confessions" from other pris­oners who said they believed that America used germ-war­fare weapons against the Korean people. The prisoners' voices were recorded, and the comments of those who heard and saw them were recorded.
By actual count, the Communists broadcast the germ-war­fare charges against the United States throughout Asia at least 415 times during one period of 17 days. They prepared
(lnd (]istributed the "eonfessions" in book form, eom]llete \\itll 1'1lUtogral'hs of the "bombs" and the Unite(] "'ations prisoners who admitte(] using the "bombs," So deU'rmined \\ere the COlllmunists to distl'edit the United Stat('s that the eharges were oflieially ]lresented to the Unite<1 Xations Gen­eral Assembly by (]elegates "frolll the Soviet Union. Tbese ebarges \\"l!re so serions that the Cnited States Govermnent found it ]l(.'eessary to issue an official denial.
On a [ess('r seale, the COllllllnnists trie(] lllany other triC'ks. Tbey tried to pr()pag'lIj(li~e the fre(! world into belie\'ing that tbt'y l\"l're providing the Cnited Xations prisoners \I'itll faeilities eOlllparable to those the prisoners had enjoyed be­fore their ('apture. The COlllllll111ists l)('lien~ that notbing produ('es better "proof" tban a picture. So, in pnrsuit of their objeetin" t!lPY made lIUlllel'ons photographs of pris­
oners enjoying ba:--:k(lthall. f('Ullis, s\\'inulling, and cheC'l\:er:-;
in a nlUdern re(']'('al iona1 elllbilOllse. These )lllOtographs were
disseminated to the world under glowing captions, indicating that the prisoners in North Korea were well treated by the COmllllll1ists.
For months, prisoners did not receive any mail whatsoever because the Communists were withholding it. At the same time, the Communists did not permit the prisoners to write letters to the Cnited States. At the propaganda center, how­ever, the enemy made numerous "prop" photographs of prisoners sitting at tables in the clubhouse writing letters or reading alleged mail from their families in the United States. These "props," like the others, were given wide dissemination in the free world to create the false impres­sion that the Communist enemy in North Korea was permit­ting a free exchange of communications between the pris­oners and their families. Some such "prop" photographs even had captions "urging" the prisoners to write to their families.
This publication was the official organ of the Communist prison command and was under the supervision of the propaganda section. Although it was staffed by United Na­tions prisoners, a Communist propagandist served as adviser and insured that the newspaper would not deviate from the accepted policies. The paper appeared to be a purely pris­oner activity, with prisoners contributing to it as editorial writers or as reporters of camp news. However, most of the articles were Communist-inspired, supporting the enemy and severely attacking the United States and the United Nations. The prisoners submitted an average of 600 articles for each iSHue, of which approximately one dozen were published. The ones that were not published in the paper were pub­lished in a wall newspaper-a sheet plRced on all company and unit bulletin boards at all camps. "Toward Truth and Peace" was published at United States-British Prisoner of 'Val' Camp Number 5 and was circulated to all other camps.
Of the various aspects and techniques of communism, propaganda is one vital element that the American fighting
lllan shou!<l know, lllH]erstand, and be able to evaluate in the light of COlllmunist. objc'etives. The lUere reeognit:ion of
C\Hlllllunist IH'()paganda is a defense against COllllll1ulist in­
doctrination, beeause in(]oetriuation is nothing more than an organized distortion of faets aud fabric-ation of falsehoods disseminate(] through the medium of propaganda.
It. SllOU!<l be reiterated, too, that the Amerlean fighting lnan should yiew (;omnl11uist propaganda in the light of COlUmunist. objettin's-loeal, uational, and worldwide. Com­munist propaganda nen'!" ehanges its basic liue of exaltiug communism and eriticizing eapitalism, especially eapitalisIU as it exist.s in the Unite(] States. All local COlUlUuuist prop­ngauda lias a din'tt or ind]n'('(: relntiouship with worl(I\Yitle COIlllunllist IIl'Ollag:lnda.
.i1 !.'JJ/Z SCCIIC at Dcalh Gallip (Calilp O'DollllclI) on LII;OIl, Aftcr tli c pllOlo[jraplicr SII«PPCr! Iii is picturc of Amcric«u prisollcrs Of /1"«1', sclcctcr! for thcir hcalthy appcarancc, the ricc ICC18 rCl/torcr!.
Chapter 8
rom the moment a PO'V falls into their hands, the Com­munists begin probing him for weak spots. Sometimesthey cajole; sometimes they threaten. In either case, theyare trying to find ways to make him do their bidding. Sometimes by direct threat, sometimes by subtle implica­tion, the prisoner is made to feel that unless he does theenemy's bidding, he will die.
In early stages of captivitythe threat is more likely to be direct: "Answer the question!-"-rite a self-criticism! -Sign this peace petition! 01'you will die!"
Captain Theodore Harris, an Ail' Force PO'V, experiencedthis in dramatic fashion during the Korean war.
One dayhe was forced to dig his own grave. Then he was told hewould be shot unless he signed a confession that he haddrolllled germ bombs on North Korea.
'Vhen he refused, hewas lliaced before a firing squad. Triggers were pUlled, butthe guns were emllty.
By his bravery, Captain I-Iarris won this game of Russianroulette. But this did not end his troubles. 'l'hroughout his14 months as a PO'V, the Communists kept probing-IJrob­
TACTICS CAN CHANGE Sometimes a PO'V will respond to a threat of death with
hopeless resignation, rather than with the determinationthat moved Captain Harris. 'When this happens, the Com­munists can do a quick about-face. Dead, the PO,,' is of no
value to them. Their job now is to find other ways of makinghim do what they want him to do.
Kext comes a period of "reassurance" to bring the man outof his fatalistic, resigned mood.
"'Ve do not kill prisoners,"he is told; "we have a lenient policy." Great "sympathy" isshown by the enemy for this unfortunate fellow, much "con­cern" for the things concerning him the most. But at the
first sigh of relief or flicker of IlOPO in the prisoner's eyes, there follows: "Of course, if yon are to qualify for our lenient treatment, you must demonstrate your Willingness to ('ooperate."
In some such nUlIlner it begins. Like a eat toying with a mouse, the captor manipulates the llrisoner's emotious, alter­nating between wistful hope for release and abject fear of death. Whether the threats are direct or implied, til(; skilled interrogator does his best to hold the captive on the fine edge of indccision. He relies on the tug of war between the prisoner's hopes and fears to wear down his resistance. For
a prisoner, except for the opportunist, does not decide collaborate; he submits gradually-"progressively," fro the Communist point of view.
In probing for weak spots, the Communists make no co: cessions to decency. They know that food, medicine, ar mail are important items in prisoner-of-war camps, more f than in normal life. In North Korea, they used these thin! to break down prisoner resistance. Each had a place in tt enemy's program of indoctrination, and each was used by tl: enemy in a variety of ways, for a variety of reasons.
Food. Food was manipulated, not so much by tIle enem. as by prisoners whom the enemy had selected to distribut it. "Progressives" or collaborators in several camps weI' given the responsibility of issuing food. They manipulate, the food as a reward for cooperating with the enemy. AI though this practice was not the general rule, it nevertlleles was used to persuade certain prisoners.
Medicine. Medicine and medical treatment for a time wen offered to prisoners as special rewards. The fact that th. enemy did not allow the captive American medical officer! to attend the sick and wounded prisoners indicates tIm medical treatment was considered a controlled function re served for the enemy to use as he determined. Many Ameri can lives could have been saved if the enemy had actec humanely by dispensing available medicine and hy llermit ting American doctors to care for the sick and wounded prisoners.
Mail. Under the provisions of the Geneva Com"pntion, and under the established policy of the International Red Cross, the detaining power is required to deliver the mail to the prisoners after it has been censored. Such mail must be conveyed by the most rapid method at the disposal of the detaining power. Instead of following this established pro­cedure, the Communist enemy used the mail as a weapon and released it piecemeal in many instances as a reward for
To break down the resistance of the prisoners, the Com­munists established a "system" of releasing mail. If they wanted to gain control of an individual prisoner, they would select and release only letters whose contents reflected worry and discontent, or conveyed bad news. Naturally, such let­ters would have an adverse effect on the prisoner. Knowing what the normal reaetion would be, the enemy approached the prisoner and, by hints and insinuations, further added to his worries and loneliness. The Communists tried to con­vinee the prisoner that they were the only friends he had. By withholcling favorable letters from the prisoner, they weakened his spiritual bond with his family. In some cases, the enemy IH'aetically divorced prisoners from their families and loved ones simply by manipulating the mails. By so doing, the enemy hoped to establish himself as the only prop on which the prisoners could lean for moral support.
At this stage, Communist pressure would be applied gently. The Communist captors would do their best to arouse the POlY's self-concern. "You must consider yourself," they would tell him. Then they would add that he owed nothing to the "fat capitalists" who were living in luxury while he suffered in prison. Under the pressures of the moment, the POlY frequently forgot that the very enemy who pretencled this sympathy was responsible for his suffering.
Sometimes the Communists defeated their own purpose by pnshing a man too far. Thus they learned that the sarne factors ancl cirCitrnstances that had aided thern in their efforts to s~tbj'l{,gate ancl eamloit a lwisoner can also destroy the pdsonel"s will to live! And in many cases, death inter­vened to end a POW's troubles.
Unquestionably, the physical hardship of imprisonment accounts for most of the deaths; lack of medical care for the wounded and siek, for example. But time and again when survivors were asked how some particular prisoner of their acquaintance had died, the answer was, "He just gave up."
Investigation of the nature of "give-up-itis" showed certain similarities in all cases. One of the most noticeable was what might be termed the "withdrawal." Each prisoner who died in such a manner had isolated himself from the others. Not only had he avoided conversation or association, but he had actually resisted-in the earlier stages when he had strength to resist-overtures of friendship or assistance from others. In the latter stages, he had lacked the strength to tell anyone to leave him alone, but his unresponsiveness had usually been enough to discourage any would-be Samar­itans.
Most often the victim huddled in a corner. He would cover his head with a blanket, if he had one, or some piece of his clothing-anything to shut himself off more com­pletely. He refused to eat, if anyone bothered to offer him food. He soiled himself rather than get up and go to the latrine. Usually, when he died his body would be drawn up into an approximation of the prenatal position. Each "victim" of "give-up-itis" died tttterly alone. Rarely, if ever, did any of the witnesses sincerely mourn his passing.
WHILE THERE'S LIFE ... The Communists do not want to promote "give-up-itis" any more than a lobsterman wants to promote a disease that will kill his lobsters. Most of the men who resisted the more extensive pressures realized somewhere along the line that the enemy did not want them to die; at least not while they were under special duress. Often, in fact, the Communists exerted considerable effort to keep a prisoner alive if he became dangerously ill. And they tried to prevent him from killing himself if he appeared suicidally inclined. This is perhaps explained in part by the simple fact that the Com­munists want martyrs tor their "cause," not against it.
This was shown in the case of Captain Theodore Harris, previously mentioned. Once, as a protest against the type of questions being asked him, he went on a hunger strike that lasted 12 or 13 days. His Chinese captors finally got him to end the strike by agreeing not to ask him any more ques­tions about germ warfare. They honored their agreement
for one month-nntil he lwll rei!:ninell some of his streni!:th. 'l'hen they bei!:an probing ni!:nin for weak spots.
'l'he Communists ha"l"e leilnwd through long experience that seH~re physical mistreatment is not the best way to obtain reliable information from a prisoner. 'l'hough an in­tt'lTog-lltor lllily be able to foree a lUan to talk by nsing torture. he lloes not know whether a nswers so obtainell are reliable or false. 'I'ht, answer may hnY(~ been made up for the simple purpose of stopping the torture. Nor llo all meu break (lo\\n nwl talk under tortnre. Sometimes uneonsdous­ness or siwek relieves them of all pnin: in other eases, so intense is the hatred awl delianee aroused that they o\er­whelm all other sensa tions.
COllsider th(~ case of it tough .ArlllY Sergeant natHed ~ral­bert, who was a PO\\' in Korea. Questioned ai!:ain and ai!:ain, he stu('k to name, rank, serinl nUlllber, and dnte of birth. In tellini!: of his experienees, he said the Communists made
him kneel on sharp boards, they put him in a grave, the made him stand outside in the winner cold in his unckrwem They shot a pistol behind his head.
"If I got no other satisfaction out of the war," he saic "I do have the satisfaction of knowing that I didn't tel those anything and they couldn't make Ill< tell them."
In probing for weak spots, the Communists frequentl: meet "Sergeant Talberts." They provide food for thought
Chapter 9
he C'ommunists haH~ j('al'llel1 that if they push a POIV too far too soon, their al1vautag-l' will be lost. A pris­oner's acceptance of his fate--ileath, torture, or whatevl'r­l1eprh'es them of tllPir main lever ag-ainst him: tear.
.\t till' mOlllent of his l1edsion to resist the enemy, eome \\-1111 t may, the prisoner will 1mn' overcome the main psycho­log'ii'al ohstnl'les to slll'\'intL '['his cOl/l/l/est of fear on his part relien'S his minl1 of frustration. Ill' retains hope, hut lIP is no long'er torn lll'tween hope nUil fear. His lllinl1 is now alert to prohlems of survival awl escape. No long-el' is lte ilreamy allll wishful; heneefot'th, he will a vail himself of
11t the risk of death, A-meTiean prisollCrs of war celebrated
ttll: -1tt! of .TI/tl!, I.'Jf!, in a Japanese j)ri.~oll eamj) on, Jli}/(talw.o, Pit ilij!Jline T8tU liltS.
every opportunity to care for himself and help others do the same. He welcomes work details that might offer an oppor­tunity to pilfer from enemy supplies or scavenge for food in fields or woods. Rather than benHmnhis cireumstanee, he makes the best of it: thus he counters the eaptors' efforts to make him feel dependent on them.
Despite his apparent vietory, the POlY must remain alert. His Communist captors have not given up; they probably are biding their time ... just as tIley did with Captain Harris during his hunger strike. IVhen they think the time is ripe, they will renew their efforts.
If ever you become a PO,,' and find yourself at this point in your relations with your Commujlist captors, remember this: not only must you gct outside yourself; you must stay outside yourself. For the man who is free in spirit, "stone walls do not a prison make,nor iron bars a eage."
Even if you are kept isolated for long periods of time, you can stay outside yourself if you think of yourself as a fighting man, still fighting for your country. Think of your fellow Americans who are counting on you to help preserve our way of life. Think of your fellow POlY'S whose welfare will often depend on your success in resisting subjugation. You are not alone!
Although long periods of solitary confinement are a possi­bility for which you must be prepared if you become a prisoner of war, the chances are much greater that you will spend most of your time in the company of other POlY'S. If so, you can draw strength from them, and they will draw strength from you. This was pro,ed again and again in Korea.
Especially insplrmg was the record of the Turkish pris­Ollers captured while fighting on the side of the U.N. forces. Although almost half of the Turkish POlY'S had been wounded before being captured, not one died in prison. In an article on prisoners of war that appeared in The New
rorkCl' o[ :2(; Octobpr 1!);')/, Brig-ac1ipr Gpneral Willis A. Perry, CSA, \\'as quoted as [ol!O\\'S :
At Dpath "allpy, one of the tpllll'Onu'y prison camps established by thp .\'orth I(orpan COllllllunists in the early <1ays o[ thp war, wheJ'(~ thp skk amI \\'onIlde<1 pOllr('d in
for \yeeks ill a ghastl.v stTf?Hlll, the T1nl'ks lost not :l sing'le
Illan ont o[ a hUIHlrec1 all(l ten, \\'hile we lost I'onr huu<1red to eig-ht hIllHII'('([ out of tiftppn hUIHlred to eig-bteeu Imn­dred. \\'hen a Turk g-ot skk, thp I'(,,.;t nur,.;pd him back to hpalth, If a ,.;ick Turk \\'a,.; ordered to thp llO";l'ital, t\\'O wpll Turk,.; weut along'. Thpy mini,.;tpred to him hand all(l foot \\'hile he \\'as there, all(l when lIe \\'as discharg-ed, they carripd him hack to the COIllPOIIIHL The Tnrk,.; all ,.;lwrpd thpi l' (·loth ing-and thpi I' food equa Ily. "'hen thp Com­lll\llIists did the cooking-for thp caJllp, t\\'o Tnrks were dispatched to bring-ba('k 1'00<1 [01' thp g-ronp, amI it was <11\'ided in equal portion,.; ([m\'ll to the Inst JIlor,.;el. '1'11erp
,vas no hog'g'illg'~ no rule of dog eat clog.
"'hile it is true that some Americans fell short of what was expected of them, this was not the general rule. MallY seryicemen exhibited pride in themselyes and their units. This was particularly vronounced in those who had belonged to the same unit for years. They stood by one another like that "hand of brothers" inspired by Nelson. If a man was sick, his fellow POlY'S took care of him. They washed his clothes, bathed him, and pulled him through. They exhibited true fraternal spirit, comradeship, military lll·ide. These men did not let each other down. Nor could the Korean Reds win much cooveration from them.
'Yherever resistance was successful, esprit de C01·pS aIHl disciVllne were imvortant factors. This was true of Ameri­cans as well as Turks. In their hatred of COllllllullism, how­ever, the Turks were eyen more outspoken than the Ameri­cans. HaYing llYed near the Communist world where they could see communism at close range, the 'l'urks loathe~l everything communistic. They broke camp rules and refused to obey eyen reasonable requests simply because those re­quests were made by Communists.
,Yhile such behayior showed courage, it is generally true that an unduly antagonistic attitude 'Yill not help you if you become a POlY. The best conrse is to maintain a proper and forlllal military bearing. 'Yhile no course of aetion ean relieve all hardship, respectful refusal to gi\-e information or to comply with other improper demands is less apt to incur further vhysical maltreatlll,,"nt than are those actions or mannerisms that in themselYes might insult or infuriate the captors.
Self-resvectlng demeanor and formal prnvriety in the face of all threats and abuses will in some measure hinder the enemy's efforts, perhrrps in time thwart them altogether. A3To{jauce, on the other hand, cannot but bring on further abuse. A captor can hardly be expected to accept personally abusiYe or insulting language from a captiye. Nor would he be likely to permit for long an insolent attitude or actions disrespectful to himself. A little comIllon sense-an appraisal
of the situation from the captor's point of view-will show why proper military bearing is the most desirable conduct in the face of whateYer the enemy might threaten or do.

As a fighting man, you are prepared to give your life for your country. If you fear that under torture you may do or say something that would hurt your country, the thought of suicicle may haye occurred to you. If so, get rid of that thought NOW.
Neither yonI' country nor your Service will countenance suicide. Kor will your God! Suicide runs counter to the teachings of both Christianity and Judaism.
You are prepared to giye your life only when you are so oYerwhelmell that you c-an no longer resist. If you choose to die at tllC 7/(/nd8 at tlic cllcm!J rather than to yield in such a way that yon compromise yonI' country, you will have died a hero's death. Between death and dishonor, you will have chosen death.
You haye no such choice if you contemplate suicide to esc-ape torture. If you resist to the bitter end in a POW camp and if death comes at the hands of the enemy, you will haye liYed and died as a fighting man. But if you die by your myn hanel because you are afraid you will not be able to uphoW your honor and your country's honor when the test comes, yon actually will have surrendered-finally, and for all time.
Suicide is no way ont!

Resistance by a fighting man can bring on his death, either in combat or as a PO'V. A wise man understands and accepts this. He knows also that resistance can lead to his surviyal. "'hat will be his own fate, he cannot say.
It has been said that "eyery man has his breaking point." If by this we mean that any man can be broken physically, driven to the point where he may collapse because of pain, hunger, or lack of sleep, the statement is true. However, it
is not true if we mean that a man of intc,gTity can reach a point at which-to escape further suffering-he will con­sciously and willingly do or say things to dishonor himself and his country.
Viewed thus, anyone who still holds that "eYery man has his breaking point" is necessarily including himself among the breakable. He also is demonstrating a fairly common human shortcoming: namely, he is trying to justify his own self-recognized shortcomings by telling himself that "eyery­body is like that." A man may very well not be sure how much physical or mental stress he can withstand until he is put to the test. He can be taken at his word if he announces in advance that he lias no values, principles, or convictions for which he is willing to endure more than minor incon­venience.
The man who dies resisting is not broken. Nor is one who is driven to mental distraction. Men were driven to distrac­tion by psychological pressures in the Communist prison camps of Korea. But this was a form of mental escape, much as unconsciousness is relief from physical suffering. ViThen the preSfHlres were removed, mental faculties soon were restored. The man who dies for something in which he believes does so willingly, and without regret unless the regret is such as that expressed by Nathan Hale-that he had "but one life to lose."
Our foes in the past have expressed admiration fot' U.S. fighting men who fought valiantly against them or held fast to their convictions at all costs. The Communists actually fear the man who proves himself willing to die rather than submit to their demands. His resistance creates for them something of a dilemma; even though they are in a position to kill him if they wish, to do so would create a martyr against their "cause." This they wish to avoid. Further than that, such resistance proves that the Communists are not invincible, negating the Marxist premise that comnlU­nism is the "irresistible waye of the future."
So long: as tht'l'e l'('llUtillS rt llUlll \\"ho is \vHling h) (lie for
his cOll\'idious, it cauuot be said that "e\'ery man has his brpakiu,:';-I'0iut:." Those who woul(l claim for themselves the title of U.S, fighUug Ulau, a.nd all olhers who staud reso­lnlel:..-for luullan <1ig'nity ami freedom, must be persons of sw,h ('ouyictions ami faith, So 10llg as men lin~ there will he those who, by one me:lllS or another, will strin> to force their ways 11iH>!1 all lll:lllldnd, Only so long as other lllell are \villing to die for their principles, will they c011tin11e to know-or even deserve to know-the meaning of freelloJU!
Chapter 10
yery war has its disturbing aftermath. 'l'here is al­ways another side to the Victory coin. If the victory is not clearly imprinted and the war has ended in what seems a stalemate, the coin becomes susjlect. In any event, there is usually a postwar inventory. If losses haye been heavy and objectives obscure, the coin may seem debased.
'l'he inventory after the "War of 1812 was unpleasant. There were some painful reactions after the Spanish-Amer­ican ,Val'.
In a great war, some battles are inevitably lost. lIlilitary leaders study these battles, determined to uncover' "mistakes, if any were made, so that errors in kind may be avoided in the future.
Correction of possible errors and the need for a unified l,lan for the future led the Dejlartment of Defense to ex­amine closely the prisoner-of-war situation in Korea. Accord­ingly, the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of ,Yar was organized early in 1955 to study the problem.
Guidelines for the Committee were given by Honorable Charles E. ,Vilson, then Secretary of Defense. In a memo­randum to Mr. Carter L. Burgess, then Chairman of the Committee, he had this to say:
I am deeply concerned with the imllortance to our na­tional security of provifling Americans who sen"e tlleir country in battle with every means ,ve can devise to defeat the enemy's techniques. To assure tile success of our Armed Forces it is equally as essential to arm them with the best weajlons of the mind and body as it is to W'ovide them with the machines of war.
Our national military needs must be met. This requires that each member of the Armed Forces be thoroughly in­doctrinated with a simple, easily understood code to gov­ern his conduct while a jlrisoner of war. However, this
!IIilit:I!'Y nel'd 11ll1~t be Inet ill a ll\;lllllPr cO!llpatible with thp prilleil'h'~ and p!'eeepts l"ISie to onr fO!'!11 o[ gOH'rn­!IIent. En [oj'('ellIPll]-!IInst bp 1ll'l'Olllpiisheil \\'ith justice and nnderstall<ling,
A SEARCHING STUDY Going to \\'ork i!llllll'diatply, thp COIll!llitl:ep Illade a search­illg ~tndy o[ thp 1'0\\-probleills rHi~ed by the {(orPHn \\'ar. AftPI' a review 0[ the treatment of PO\\"s in past centnrips, thp Comlltitl:ep sc!'ntini%pd \\'hat the COlllllllmists bad done to (',S, lighting lllen \y!lo ],l'l'ame pl'isoners in KorPIl, It stndipd t!lp CO!llmnnist Illenwds of iIltl,lTogation, indoctri­natioll, anll propagallll:l Ile~crihed in prpyions (·bapters. Delying' into statbties, the COllllllit(:ee facell t!H'se filets: A totlll of ct,t::!'" Allle!'iean fighting mpn were recovered
frtnn ellPlllY pl'i~()n C'alllpS ill I~()l'ea. rrhe prison exchanges
],egan \yUh "Operation Litne S\\'itcb" in April lD;i8. Some noo .\llietl prisoners were retnnwd in eXI'bange for ten times
"Operation Little 81uiteh." American soldier in first: group
oj' si('k II}/({ f("o/Ii/(/('iI 1'0 lV's ('.I'chllili/cllin Eorca reachcs JlljillII , .n April l!6.i.
"Operation Hip S1vitch." U.N. prisoners, released by Com­
11/lIllisl fol'('I',~ ful' I'I'))(//I'i(//iol/, (/1'1'11'(' (// ]'(/)/1111111)0/)/. 11'01'('(/. ti ..I11,1/lls1 If/.j'!.
thut muny Conllllunist ChilW~P und :\orth Kor('un~.Dlll'il1" Nub~elluent "Operution Big S\\'i!'ch" mo~t of tbe Alllerir'ull pri~oller~ \\,prp re,'oYered. At thi~ tillw it \\'n~ lenrned thnt 2,7:30 Amerir'un~ hud (liell ill Korenn prisoll cump~. ThiN \Yn~ f! gha~tly denth toIl~-gS%, or nenr]y fOllr out of en'!'Y tell.
By joint action of the SerYir'e~, all of the ]Jri~olll'r~ I'('COY­ered \\'ere ~crpened by militnry intelligence ngen('ie~. Of the 565 \yhONe cOllduct \\'a~ /lne~tiolled. a7:3 \\,el'(' c!P,lred or the charges again~t them \\'('1'1' dropped after in\'('~tigntion, ()f the remnining 1!l2 sll"']Ject~, the Cf!~es of ,17 \\'(~re j'ol'\yarded to the appl'oprin te lield comlllaIj(ler~ for in\'('sl ig'u lion to dptermine \Yhether they \\'f!l'I'anted Irial by ('onl't~-III:lrtin!. Only 14 of the 47 cases \\'(~rp Iried by conrt~-lllnrtia!. nnd of tl)(' 1'1, three \\'en" f!c/lnitted nnd 11 conyicted.
Typical Charges. A PO\\' \\'n~ aC('ll~ed b~-1SO otll('l'~ of delh'pl'ing anti-U.S. ",peecl!es, infol'llling on fello\\" prisoner~,
hoarding food, teaching classes in communism, and ordering men to sign peace petitions. There was no evidence he suffered duress.
Another case involved a PO,Y accused by many witnesses of "ratting" on his prison-mates, beating a sick prisoner, forcing' a fellow prisoner out into the snow and leaving him therp. to die.
There was a PO,Y who allegedly courted favors of his captors as soon as he reached prison camp. He was charged with confiscating the small tobacco ration dealt to the other men and eating more than his share of the food. Allegedly, he made the heartless remark, "The more men who die here, the more food for the rest of us." He signed peace petitions, made propaganda broadcasts, and evidently "ratted" on other prisoners. There was no evidence that he was coerced.
There was evidence that a PO,Y informed on fellow pris­oners planning to escape. He wrote Red literature for his cal)tors. He was put in charge of a spy system that led to the lmnishment of "reactionaries" in his camp. He asked for the job. No "brainwashing" there.
Turncoats. The Oommittee studied the cases of the 21 turncoats who decided to stay with the Oommunists. Their nUlnlJer included men accused of informing-which sugg'ests a good reason for electing to remain in the enemy's country. Evidence indicates that few of these 21 were "sincere" con­verts to communism. Expediency, opportunism, ancl fear of reln'isal doubtless infiuenced some of the group.
No Drugs Used. The Committee also learned that POW's in Korea had not been drugged. Other methods, such as denial of food or sleep, had been equally effective and more practical.
The "braimvashing" question ,vas thoroughly investigated. In some cases this time-consuming and coercive technique was used to obtain confessions. Most of the prisoners, how­ever, were not SUbjected to brainwashing but were given high-powered indoctrination for propaganda purposes.
Only a handful of the PO'V's in Korea were able to main­tain absolute silence under military interrogation. Xearly all of the American prisoners went beyond the "absolute" name, rank, number, date of birth restriction.
Reviewing the interrogation matter, the Committee felt that the steps taken up to 1955 by the Armed Forces had been decidedly inadequate.
The Committee heard evidence which revealed that many of the PO'V's knew too little about the United States and its ideals and traditions. So the Chinese indoctrinators had the advantage.
The uninformed PO'V's were up against it. They couldn't answer arguments in favor of communism with arguments in favor of Americanism, because they knew very little about their America. The Committee heard a number of ex-PO''''s state that a knowledge of communism would have enabled them to expose its fallacies to their camp-mates. The Red indoctrinators tried hard to win the support of faetory workers. But as one of them put it, "'Ye'd heard all that guff before. Back home. 'Ye knew their line." Knowledge was a defense weapon.
'Yhile it might be argued that few of the men became sincere converts to communism-indeed, the percentage seems to have been infinitesimal-the inability of many to speak up for democracy distressed loyal PO,Y's. Acti"e collaborators aside, there were certain passive prisoners "'ho "went along." They lacked the weapon of knowledge.
However, such conduct was not typical of U.S. prisoners in Korea. On this point, the Committee exvressed itself as follows:
A few statistics may prove reassuring to anyone who thinks the Armed Forces were undermined by Communist propaganda in Korea.
A total of about 1,600,000 Americans served in the Korean war. Of the 4,428 Americans who survived Com­munist imprisonment, only a maximum of 192 were found chargeable with serious offenses against comrades or the
United States. 01' put it another way. Only lout of 23 American PO'V's was suspected of serious misconduct.
'Vhen one realizes that the Armed Forces come from a cross-section of the national population, the record seems fine indeed. It seems better than that when one weighs in the balance the tremendous pressures the American PO'V's were under. "'eighed in that balance, they cannot be found wanting.
As the Committee grapIlled ,,'ith these problems, answers gradually became apparent.
In a war for'the minds of men, the enemy's methods can be successfully combated by military training and civilian education. In battle and in captivity the fighting American is no better than his training and character. Military school­ing can teach him combat skills. Such know-how is a "must."
But skill must be reinforced by will-by moral character and by basic beliefs instilled in home and classroom long before a lad enters the military service. Pride in country and respect for its principles-a sense of honor-a sense of responsibility-such basics should be established long before "basic training," and further developed after he enters the Armed Forces.
As the Committee saw it, united action was needed. Al­though all the Services had regulations on conduct, the U.S. Armed Forces had never had a clearly defined code of con­duct. There had been piecemeal legal restrictions and regu­lations but no comprehensive codification. However, despite this lack of a code, American fighting men had demonstrated through all wars that they do not surrender easily. They had never surrendered in larg'e bodies. 'Vhen overwhelmed and captured, they had-in the main-acquitted themselves with honor. Still, a clear-cut code was desirable.
Accordingly, the Committee undertook to (lraft a code of conduct that would reflect the basic 11rinciples by which U.S. fighting men have lived since the days of the Revolution. But was some change needed to meet new conditions? For
example, should a PO,\, be ginm :my leeway in ans\ypring questions beyond name, rank, seryice nl1ln]wr, and date oj' birth '!
'There \"as s()ulethin,g to l)e said IIY ()Xppl'iellCed oHlcC'l's
who felt: t1Jat a man could bp taught to hold his O\yn in thp battIe of wits against enemy interrogators. Authoritips pointed out that the Gpl1('ya Conn~ntion (lid not impose "absolute silence" on the interrogated war prisoner. Thpre were e1auses indicating that he might discuss his employ­ment, his finances, his state of health. or "conditions of eaptiYity" if necessity demanded. In short. he did not han: to remain IIlute.
The Committee agree(l that the main line of resistance must he drawn as far fOl'\yanl as possible. The name. rank, and sen'ice number vroyj,.don of tllt: Geneya Conn'ntion \yas accevted as this line of rpsistance.
In the fnee of exveri<~n('e, it wns recognized that the PO'V might be subjected to a n extreme of coercion. En'll then he
'/f)I../n_ ~ 1z;urduu
RANK __ v ~~.....--------------­
SERIAL NO. __~~:_
is expected to avoid by every means any disloyalty in word or deed to his country, his Service, or his comrades.
THE CODE IS PROCLAIMED After long study and earnest deliberation, the Committee came to its decision. That decision is embodied in the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States. The Code, duly proclaimed by President Eisenhower, is as follows: Article I I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.
Article II I will never surrender of my own free will. If in com­mand I ,vill never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.
Article III If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.
Article IV If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every ,vay.
Article V "'hen questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evaell' answering further questions to the ut­most of my ability. I will make no oral or written state­ments disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.
Article VI
I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.
The Code is your armor. It was hammered out for you by successive generations of fighting men, who loved their coun­try and who demonstrated their love by what they dirt In drafting the Code, the Committee merely put down on paver certain basic ideals and rules by which these fighting men had lived. Tried and tested, the Code meets the neefls of
this new age.
The conscience and heart of all America are needed in the support of this Code, and the best of training that can be provided in our homes, by our schools and churches and by the Armed Forces will be required for all who under­take to live by this Code.
Thus spoke the Committee in a letter to the Secretary of Defense. Signed by all the members, the letter continued, in part, as follows:
America no longer can afford to think in terms of a limited number of our fighting men becoming prisoners of war and in the hands of an enemy in some distant land. Modern warfare has brought the challenge to the doorstep of every citizen, and so the Code we propose may \vell be a Code for all Americans if the problem of survival should ever come to our own main streets.
And then too the United States must constantly be aware of her high position of world leadership, and the Code we propose must consider the standard of the 'l'en Commandments and of our Constitution, as well as our pledge to the United Nations.
No Code should overlook the watermarks of America's greatness or bow to the easier courses which might entrap more easily our men as alleged war criminals and \veaken
their fiber for the many ordeals they may face. We must bear in mind the past and future significance of the reser­vation made by Soviet Russia and other Oommunist na­tions to Article 85 of the Geneva Oonvention of 19c19 on prisoners of war.
How does this reservation affect you? How can you meet the obligations imposed upon you by the Geneva rules and by the Oode? How can the Oode protect you?
. These and other questions will be considered in the re­maining chapters.
Chapter II
ny discussion of atrocities, brutalities, and mistreat­ment of prisoners must logically include some reference to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1!l29 and 1949. These grew out of the Hague regulations, mentioned in Chapter 2.
Troubled by the terrible death toll of prisoners in ·World War II, delegates of many countries met at Geneva in 1949 to formulate and define 11igher standards of treatment for POlY'S. The articles of the earlier Geneva Convention ,vere clarified and strengthened. It was agreed that the detaining power would be responsible for the health and welfare of any prisoners held. Fifty-seven nations signed the new Geneva treaty.
In general, the rules llrovide that prisoners of war nllmt be treated humanely. Svecifically forbidden are "violence to life and person ... cruel treatment and torture ... out­rages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment."
Under the articles of the Convention, vrisoners must be given decent housing; nourishing food, adequate clothing, and the right to communicate with their families.
They may not be punished for refusing to ans\ver qnes­tions of any kind. They are to be given medical care, and allowed to worship, exercise, and participate in sports and intellectual pastimes.
Machinery was set up to enable protecting powers amI the International Red Cross to have access to camIJs amI to investigate conditions in them.
In short, the Convention spells out in detail the treatment to be accorded prisoners of war.
The Soviet Union signed the 1949 Convention as did eight other nations in the ComIIlunist bloc. 'l'he U.S.S.R. and its
satellites held out, however, on certain points. One of their reservations concerned Article 8;; of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of ·War. The Article reads:
"Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the De­taining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Com'en­tion."
The Soviet delegate entered the following reservation:
"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not con­sider itself bound by the obligation, ,,;hich follows from Article 85, to extend the aplllication of the Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of the Detaining Power, in accordance with the principles of the Xuremberg trial, for war crimes and crimes against humanity, it being understood that persons convicted of such crimes must be SUbjected to the conditions obtaining in the country in question for those who unclergo their punishment."
Under this resel'Yation, a prisoner of war convicted of an alleged war crime under the laws of the captors loses the protection afforded a prisoner of war by the Geneva rules. Therefore, a confession or a statement by a prisoner is likely to be used to convict him as a "war criminal" and thus, according' to this Communist bloc device, deny to him any protection under the terms of the Geneva Convention, including repatriation until his sentence is served.
This reservation was a disturbing sign of Soviet intention. Moreover, it set the pattern for later action by other Com­munist countries.
Early in the Korean war, the United States and the Gov­ernment of South Korea announced that they would act in accordance with the humanitarian principles contained in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of ViTal' of 12 August 1949. A few days later, North Korea said that the terms of the Convention were being followed. Still later, the Red Chinese stated that they were following the provisions of the Convention "with resel'Yations."
505596°--59----7 91
The effect of these reservations became painfully apparent when the Communists deluded prisoners and tricked them into admitting' acts that the Communists claimed were "war crimes." Then they used this admission, either verbal or written, to convict prisoners as "war criminals" and to declare that they had lost their status as prisoners of war.
In practice, the articles of the Convention were consist­ently violated by the Red Chinese and the North Koreans in their treatment of prisoners.
An investigating committee of the U.S. Senate noted that:
American prisoners of war were placed in solitary con­finement for long periods of time.

They were shackled.

They were subjected to the curiosity and insults of the local populace.

They were physically maltreated.

They were not given adequate medical attention or adequate clothing.

Officers were forced to work.

Prisoner-of-war camps and hospitals were not properly marked and identified.

All of these practices were in direct violation of specific articles in the 1949 Geneva Convention.
Because experience has shown that the Communists will observe the Convention only when it suits their purpose, one must inevitably wonder why we should be concerned with it.
There are at least two reasons why you should have some knowledge of the provisions of the Geneva Convention.
1. The United States is a law-abiding Nation. We have ratified the Geneva Com'ention and we will abide by it­both as a Nation and as individuals. Your conduct as a
U.S. fighting man will be judged accordingly.
2. The second reason is equally important from your per­sonal Sl<lIH1point. If you (10 not know the provisions of the Connmtion. yOl1 nlig'ht violate some of them llllwitting1y. '1'he COlllmunists, altllOugh they may not obsen'e all the l'rol'isions o[ the ConHmtion. han~ demonstrated t:lwt they
are qnic-k to seize upon alleged yiolatiolls.
In ease yon eyer become a PO\". here are some of the illlportant Genenl rules yon sllOnl<1 I,now:
Yon mnst giye your name. rank. spryice nnmber, and date of birth (Article (7),

YOl1 lllay not rellOllllCe any of the rights to which you are entitled under the Geneva ConHmtion (Article 7).

o     You are snbjpct to medical inspection at least once a month (Artiele 81) .
•     If you a re a l'hysieian, a snrgeon. a dentist, a nurse. or a nlf>dical orderly. yon may be required to care [or pO\,,·s who need yonI' sen'ices crcil if !fOil o/'c /lot
attached to the medical service at your branch ot the AI'med Forces (Article 32).
o     You must salute officers of the enemy and show them any other mark of respect required of their own forces. However, officer PO'W's must salute only officers of higher rank... except for the camp commander, who must be saluted regardless of his rank (Article 3D).

o     Enlisted PO'W's who are physically fit may be required to work. However, noncommissioned officers who are prisoners of war may only be required to do super­visory work. Unless he volunteers, a POW may not be employed on labor of an unhealthy or dangerous nature. Nor may any POW be assigned to labor deemed humiliating by the detaining power when per­formed by a member of its forces. Prisoners of war may not be compelled to do, nor may they volunteer for, the following classes of work when these have a mili­tary character or purpose: (1) Public works and building operations; (2) transport and handling of stores; (3) public utility services (Articles 49-54;

62) . .. If you have cash in excess of a fixed amount when cap­hIred, it may be taken from you and held in account for you. However, before repatriation the detaining pmver must give you a statement showing the credit balance due you. The United States is responsible for settling with you any credit balance due from the detaining power at the end of your captivity (Articles 58, 64, 66).
o     You are subject to the la,,'s, regulations, and orders in force in the armed forces of the detaining powers. If accused of a violation, you may be brought to trial (Article 82).
Under the Code of the U.S. Fighting Man, you must make
every effort to escape and to help others to escape if you
should be captured. The Geneva Convention recognizes
that prisoners will attempt to escape and limits punish­ment for POW's attempting it to mild disciplinary action.
However, you should know that you can be prosecuted in the enemy's courts for serious criminal acts committed while you are trying to escape.
Article 93 of the Geneva Convention states that "offenses committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of facilitating their escape and which do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as offenses against public property, theft withQut intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary punishment only."
The clisciplinary punishment so authorized (Article 89) consists of the following:
A fine which shall not exceed 50 percent of the advances of pay and working pay which the pris­oner of war would otherwise receive under the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a period of not more than thirty days.

Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the present Convention.

Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily.

Confinement. The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be applied to officers. In no case shall disciplinary punishments be in­

human, brutal or dangerous to the health of prisoners of war.
You may steal the food or dothing-even money in small amounts-that you need to effect your escape and yet retain your status as a prisoner. But if you commit a murder, or steal valuables to enrich yourself, while attempting to escape, there are no limitations on the punishment you may be sentenced to as a result of appropriate judicial proceed­ings, except that it must be the same as provided for members of the armed forces of the detaining power who have committed the same acts.
The United States may, as a son~reign nation, prescribe certain rnles of conduct, compatilJle with the Geneya Con­vention, for its military personnel who become prisoners of war.
Artide 105 of the Uniform Colle of Milita!'y Justice is an example of sucll a rule. This artide, concerning the punishment of misconduct by a United States senieeman while a prisoner of war, proYides:
Any person subject to this code who, while in the hands of the enemy in time of war­
(1)     for the purpose of secnring faHH'able tl'(~atment by his captors aets without proper authority in a man­ner contrary to law, custom, or regulation, to the detriment of others of wlwten'r nationality held by the enemy as ciyilian or militarJ' prisoners: or
(2)     while in a Ilosition of authority over such tlersons maltreats them without justifiable cause; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Another example of rules of conduct prescribed by the United States is the Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces of the United States.
Pillally, j·cmcmbcr this: If eyer you become a PO'V, you are expected to abide by all of the Geneva rules that affect you personally, eyen though the enemy is obserying only those he chooses to observe. In some instances, captiyes luwe been able to imluce their captors to comply with the Geneya rules, but this cannot be expected of a Communist captor.
During 'Vorld War II, Colonel Paul R. Goode, at the risk of his life, demanded that his German captors accord the prisoners of war the rights to which the Geneya Convention entitled them. The Colonel, who commanded a regiment of the 29th Infantry Division, was captured soon after the Allied invasion of Normandy while personally leading an attempt to rescue elements of his division. Stumbling" into a German bivouac in the rlarkness of night, he was oyer­powered and wounded by the enemy. Colonel Goode as­sumed the leadership of his fellow prisoners, American and British officers, organizing them along the lines of a regi­ment and maintaining the highest morale among them until his release in May 1945. He narrowly missed being shot for an attempt to escape but continued to work toward that end and to help others in their attempts. For his superior leadership, character, and soldierly conduct, Colonel Goode was awarded the Legion of Merit.
'Vhether or not your captor follows the Geneva rules, you should abide by them as a law-abiding fighting man of a law-abiding Nation. You can't force good faith on your Communist captor. But you can demonstrate to him and to the world that we Americans live up to our word-as individuals and as a Nation.
'! ONly 1ll::CRET TH,\T t
 TO LosE rOR MY COU~ln'
.+:'''7'4 ;~
SEPT n. L:;"
oam an AmericanY..9llting man. f\ serve in -the forces whlchguar6 m~ countrg an6£ur ll7a.:~ £f ~.~\an~pt::pare6 to glue m-':.\ Cite in their6ifense.
Chapter 12
I am an Ame1"ican fighting man. I se1've in the forces which guard my country and 01tr way of life. I am pl'epa1'ed to give my life in their defense.
-Article I, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code. hese words were quoted with deep conviction.
The speaker was Admiral Arthur Radford, appearing on 25 October 1955 at the Second Kational Conference on Spiritual Foundations. The Code of Conduct had been proclaimed during the preceding summer, and Admiral Radford-then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff­was discussing its meaning.
"I believe," he said, "most of you realize this is written in the form of a creed. Possibly some of you feel that it is written mostly for those of us in uniform. If so, you are not wrong. It is written as a guiding precept to be followed by the men in our Armed ]'orces.
"I would suggest, however, that this creed could ,ery well be a part of every American's attitude. '1'here is no hidden meaning, nor is there lack of meaning, when you pledge: 'I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life.' These words are the key to the part played by the mind and the spirit in our national security. They signify:. Militant Liberty.
Every American should be dedicated to this mis­sion. It is not sufficient for only a relatively few to defend the United States. In our present peril, lleople everywhere must unite in the fight against militant international com­munism, or any other threat to our American way of life."
The people of the United States have united in this fight. But if the need arises to defend our country on the battle­field or in the prisoner-of-war stockade, the United States relies on you.
You are an American fighting man!
Wllat is tllis Allleriean way of life \\'11 iell you-as a lllPlll bel' of tile ArlllPd Foreps-are sworn to l]pfend'! Can you dptine it'! A(lmiral Hadford did so in a few silllple words.
":\Iy own unclerstamlin." of tile AlllPl'!eau \\'ay of life is many-foW," he sa1<1. "First it is Frc'edom awl Liberty.
"l·'reedom bpgan \\'ith a bl'lief in human dignity. and it' gre\\' \\'itll thp history of the world. Often it {'ame in eon­flkt \\'itll tyl'<lnny and {lespotbm, Oftpn it was lmoekpl! do\\'n. bnt al\\'a~'s it arose to figllt again. It. \\'ould fight. and losp, am] tllpn figllt again,
"WP lparnp(] this in hbtory \\'hen ]\Josps stood ll{<[ol'e Pllar'lOll ;1]1(1 sai(l: 'Lpt illy peop]p go.' \\'e read it again \\'llpn thp barons stoo(l ]wf'orpKing Jolln am] the :\lagna Carta \\'as Plllbodipil into l,[\\'s, \\'p li\'e(] it still agnin in thp epk of \'all('y Porg(',
"Our Founding Fathers were adept at choosing the right words to explain the meaning of our way of life. Thomas .Jefferson called it 'Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi­ness.' Patrick Henry summed it up when he said: 'Give me liberty or give me death.'
"All of you lmow well the other meanings of our four freedoms. They are all part of the American way of life: -freedom of religion, freedom of press, freedom of assem­bly, freedom of speech, and many more. We have liYed with these freedoms so long, and have enjoyed them so much, that we are prone to take them for granted."
Continuing, Admiral Radford cited faith as a "second primary ingredient in our American way of life."
"Faith," he continued, "is our belief in the equality of man in the sight of God. It is our belief in what Alexander Hamilton referred to as 'the Sacred Rights of Mankind.' Far beyond the point of lip service, we must all belieye that each and every human is entitled to 'Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.' These are the 'substance of things hoped for.'
"That cold winter at Valley Forge was truly an ordeal. The suffering from freezing and starvation almost led American troops to abandon their cause. Faith in their God; faith in their great leader, George Washington; and faith in the righteousness of their cause inspired the cour­age with which these men were victorious in their hour of trial. These are the 'evidence of things not seen,' to return again to the words of the New Testament.
"Without such faith, we could not be ready, as written in the Code of Conduct, 'to give my life in their defense.' But with it, we can meet successfully any future hour of trial."
Admiral Radford called next for "individual acceptance of responsibility" to defend our way of life against any threat. Then he asked how we could meet the Communist threat.
"The answer lies," he said, "in the heart, the mind, and in the spirit of all Americans. "\Ve must teach a better
understanding and appreciation of 'the American way of life'; ,,'e must rebuild the conviction that our path is the closest to that which God would have us follow, that it is truly worthy of personal sacrifices."
Toward the close of his address, Admiral Radford voiced this thought:
"'Ye must spread the word, both at home and abroad. "'e must call on the good offices and influence of the home, church, school, and Armed Forces, to develop the sound minds and deelicated spirits upon which our national secu­rity is fundamentally based. 'Ve can take our cue from Nathan Hale, who, when asked by his captors if he had any last words, simply said: 'I only regret that I have but one life to lORe for my country.' "
Life held great promise for Nathan Hale. A graduate of Yale, he had taught in Connecticut. His parents wanted him to enter the ministry. However, soon after the Lexing­ton alarm in 1775, he wrote his father that "a sense of duty" urged him to "sacrifice everything" for his country. Soon afterwarcls he entered the Army as a lieutenant, and a few months later he became a captain.
After the retreat of the Army from Long Island in 1776, General 'Yashington asked for a discreet officer to enter the British lines and get information as to British plans. Hale volunteered and was accepted.
Disguised as a Dutch schoolmaster, he visited the British camp "'here he made full drawings and memoranda of all the del'ired information. However, on his return, he was captured by the enemy. Taken before General Howe, of the British f01'('es, Hale was ordered executed the next morning.
Denied the comfort of a Bible or a clergyman, Hale stood facing the gallows. Instead of cringing, he spoke those last words that revealed the full measure of his elevation to his country.
In death, Xathan Hale sen-ed as an inspiring example to other Revolutionary fighting men struggling to safeguard
our country's new freedom. Ever since that tragic day in 1776, his name has symbolized the selfless devotion that American fighting men of all generations have felt for our country.
From their final resting places, other heroic fighting men speak also-to you, the men who have fallen heir to their task of defending our Nation. They speak in the words of the poet:
Take tiP our quarrel with the foe"
To you from failing hands we throw The torch,' be yours to hold it high. If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though pOPIJies grow In Flanders fields.'"
'John McCrae, "In Flanders Fields."
9 wilT neuer surren6er ~ mg ownJl-ee wi(r. f1[i~ comman~, 0wi.ll ~e\Jer surren6er m.!J men UJhi(e 1he~1 still have themeans 10 resist.
Chapter 13
I wUl never s/l1"1'c}ulcr ot my own tree will. It in command, I will never slll"rendel' my men while they still have the means to l'esist.
-Article II, The U,S, Fighting Man's Code.
he tradition of "never surrender" \yas born during the Revolutionary ·War. On land and at sea, U.S. fighting men proved their mettle.
On 23 September 1779, John raul Jones, Captain of the Bonhomme Richm'd, challenged two British ships of war, the Sel"apis and the Oountess ot Scal'bol"Oit[lh. Old and slow, the Richard was outclassed. The Serapis was beating in one of the Richard's sides while blowing out 'the other. The Richard caught fire again and again. Meanwhile, the waters in her hold were rising alarmingly.
"Do you ask for quarter?" called the calltain of the
"I have not yet begun to fight," Jones hurled back. The outcome is well known. After three and a half hours of fighting, the Serapis struck her flag. Then Jones and his crew boarded the Serapis and watched with mixed emotions as the Richard sank. The spirit of John Paul Jones has inspired America's fighting men ever since. On many occasions, the will to resist, no matter how unfavorable the odds, has served other fighting men as well as it did Jones. In modern war, combat units or individual combatants may frequently find themselves isolated from the main body of friendly forces. Without communications, the situation may appear hopeless. Even with radio or other communications, the isolated unit or individual cannot be completely aware of what goes on outside the immediate area. However, there are innumerable instances in which iso­
lalpd units haye fought tll('ir way out 01' llaye held fast until joinpd by olher friendly forcps.
Somplimps onr men haye foughl Iheir way out; at otller UlllPS t1H'y ll<lye slipped through pnemy lines. Airmpn shot down dePll in pnemy tpl'l'itory han' walk('cl 11luHlrecls of miles, liYing off natural foods from the land and ayoiding eapture, in order to reaeh fl'ipn(1Jy tpl'l'itory. Soldiers, sa ilors, airmen, or ma rines-they were fulfilling their mis­sions and their obligations.
Recognizing tll(' flifTerent eireumstanees-tlle confusion, Ullcprtainty, apIll'P)lPnsion, and other pressures on the man who finds himself isolated in cOlllbat--the simple guirlelinc suggPSls itself-Iltc ji!lltlil/!/ II/llJl lI/u81 I/fTer surrcl/dcr of It is 0/1'1/ frec/cill.
It should not be neeessary to define the meaning of "his own free will," as some h11ye asked. If 11 man giyes up, he \\'ill lmow full \\"C'll wllNllcr his surrender was willful. No
amount of rationalizing will rid him of the stigma of failure to himself if his surrender was voluntary, born of wellk­ness. His sense of failure and the realization of his lack of will are with him for the rest of his life.
As long as a fighting man can inflict casualties on the enemy, he is selling himself short if he does not. For the casualties he infEcts, however few, or the disruption he effects in the enemy's attack may be the determining factor in repelling the enemy and in llis rejoining friendly forces. In case he is isolated and can no longer inflict casualties, perhaps because he lad;:s ammunition, it becomes his duty to evade capture.
Once in Korea, a machine-gunner found himself isolated. Having used all the available ammunition and worn out two gun barrels in the process, he sat helplessly-or so it seemed-in his foxhole as hordes of attacking Chinese Communist soldiers streamed by. But as the last of the enemy passed his position, his own forces moved in from the flanks and cut off the Chinese.
Suppose a man surrenders while he still has the means to fight back or can remain in hiding. 'Vlwt can Ill' expeet to gain? Four out of ten Ameriean prisoners of the Com­munists died in Korea. Untold numbers were coldly exe­cuted shortly after laying down their arms, and these were not induded in the "prisoner" statistics. The odds are in favor of the man who sticks by his guns. And realizing that many of the deaths in a prison eamp result from lack ot will, how much less is the chane'e of sun'inl1 for the fellow whose surrender to the enemy is for that very same reason?
No responsible U.S. comllwmler advocates suieidal resist­ance when nothing is to be gained by further fighting. The view of the average commander was expressed by Viee Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN (Ret.), in these words: "I am not advising anyone to fight to the death. 'Yhen your chances of being captured or killed are so strong that further resistance is useless, then it is the duty of the
>"'lii,,]' 1l1:'11 ]irC'>'C'l11 t" dc'('ide wlwt lllllSt be dOlle, A1'ter all, gn';\ I :C;,'liC'r;\!s, ill IllallY II"arS, h;\ I'e snrrelll!el'e(l Iheil' ll'o"pS I" ]ll'eH'lll lIsl'll'ss I"ss "f lifl', bnl y"n Illusl always l'l'lllelll­1,,-1' Ih;\1 y"'1 Ill;\~' he OI"'lIp~'ill:':' a stl'all'!,d(' POSitiOll Il"1lidl Illll~1 h" hl'ld as 1"11(( as 1'"ssihl(, ill ol'dl'r 10 kel'1' Ihe l'lil'llly f1'<>lll :C;l'tlin:c; !>l'hind onr OIl'll Jilles, Thel'l' are a Ilulllhl'l' of alll'rli'lliI"l'S 10 ~lllT('Ill!l'r, ~I[("h as slippill:C; tllr"u:c;ll tlH' sllr­l'(ltlli(lill.~-C'll('ltly Hut's to your 0\\'11 troops or (lyen });1(·k ()f
tlll' ('lll'lll,\" lim's'"
(lltl' "l1ll-r alli'rllalin-is silllpl~' to fly/If ~'our \Ya~' ou!. alld this is wh"l tll(' Firsl Dil"isi"11 "I' Ihl' C,S, :\Iarille COl'PS (lid ill ]\:"n'<I iii l<lll' 11;;)0, C<ln,Ud ill a lll"mllaill"ns an'a
][(',11' flH' Chi).'-dll l'{,~t'l'\'(lir, Oll' IJi\"i:··:iI>ll \\'(\:-, :"tll'l'(lunt!e(l by Chilll'""r-C"II<lllnllisl~, Till' ,lilll o[ thl' ChitH'sr' \\',IS plaill: Th,',\" illl"l1d"l! I" "ll1lillil"I(' Ihc,\I,Il'illl'S, ,"\01 ol1l~' 1I'''l1ll! this I,,, " dl'll<"r,liizill,l( 1>1"11" to "II Cllitl'd :\aliolls for('('s, Imt it 11"'lllll! ('Iil<tilllll,' a siz,,]>I,' l'!<'llll'lll of Ihe tlH'1l al'"ilahle AI<H'ri"<lll ""IIlI',1I s1l"'ll"lh, For Ihis l"ask 111l' l'lll'llly h,\(l Ir,'rl<"lld"l1S lll1rl<"I'i",,1 ~rrp('riol"iIY, "'illl 110 rl'lil'[ possihle, llll'lIU','li"lwl>I,\" Ih,' pr"L>I"lll [or U,l' SUl"l'oulldl't! ullit hl'caIlll'
one of survival and breakout. As the Marine comman<ler pointed out, when a fighting unit is surrounded by the enemy there is no such thing' as retreat.
Three weeks of fighting in subzero cold preceded the lO-day ordeal of the breakout. There were daily instances of smaller units and individuals breaking out of smaller pockets of isolation, fighting their way or infiltrating through Communist forces, sometimes simply to join a larger force that still had to fight its way out. These included British Commandos, U.S. Army men, and men from otller forces­fighting men all.
Casualties? Of course there were-heavy casualties. Some due to the constant assault by the enemy, others due to the bitter elements of the :North Korean winter. But how many more would there have been if they had sur­rendered'? How many would have died as prisoners of war?
Command Knows No Rank. Often the decision to keep fighting or to surrender will be made not by an officer but by an enlisted man. During a land battle, more of direct command authority will be exercised by squad leaders than by generals, for the simple reason that there are more of them. Kot infrequently, when casualties are high, even the senior private in the remnants of a combat unit must assume leadership of his unit. He may not be as well prepared in terms of training or experience as those of higher rank, but he remains in command for the duration of the battle or until properly relieved. 'l'hat command carries with it certain responsibilities and demands that cannot be set aside. It is his job, in short, to keep his men fighting as a unit as long as tlley can fight effectively.
IN CONCLUSION If individuals and commanders were permitted to sur­render whenever a situation seems desperate it would he an open invitation to all weak of will or depressed in spirit. As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may never voluntarily surrender himself. 'When he is isolated and can no longer inflict casualties on the enemy, it is his duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly forces.
The responsibility and authority of a commander never extend to the surrender of his command to the enemy while it has power to resist or evade. ·When isolated, cut off, or surrounded,a unit must continue to fight until relieved, or able to rejoin friendly forces by breaking out or evading the enemy.
]'\0 matter how tough the going, a U.S. fighting man never says die.
~0amc::YJture6 g will continue to -resist Gg aCI means avaiGt6re_ 9 1.vilI make everg trtfort 10 esc~pe an6 ai6 others 10 esc~e_ 9 will acc!pt neithe:yaroLenor~peciaCfivor~omthe enel~_
Chapter 14
If I am capturcd, I ~r;ill continllc to l'csist by all means avallable. Izeill make evcry effo'rt to escape awl aid (Jtli crs to cscapc. I ~cill accept ncIther parole nor spceial favors fl'om the enemy,
-Article III, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code,
oweyer determinNl a lighting man mH~' he to Hyoid it, there remains a llossibility that he will be cavtured by the enemy. The PO\V could be anyone of these:
The soldier or marine rendered unconscious or badly wounded in battle.

The sailor adrift at sea, whose raft is hardly equipped to engage an enemy warship or effect an amphibious assault on an unfriendly beach.

The airman bailing out over enemy territory and com­ing down in a populated area or llerhaps into the waiting hands of an armed patrol; or caught during his long, evasive trek to freedom.

\Vhat can the PO,V do when he faces his Commnnist captors? He knows they 'Yill try to suhjngate him and use him to defeat his own country. Disarmed, he could feel completely helpless-if he let himself. But he is not alone! His country and his Sen'iee are with him in sllirit ... guiding and sustaining him in this crucial hour. 'Vhen a PO\V repeats to himself the words of the Code, he is com­muning with his fellow Americans. He knows he is fight­ing their fight , .. as well as his own. He is one with them, and they are one with him . . . eyen thongh he IIlay be thonsands of miles from home. Liying by the Code, the PO,,, 1;;nmos also that he is keelling faith with America's fighting men of past generations. From these sources, he draws strength to resist his Communist calltors.
·. BY ALL MEANS AV AILABLE That the "me:lns :lyailahle" for resistance after capture are limite<l is (Iuite ohYiou". "\ Ilhyskal attack on an in­terrogator, for eX:lmple, will he use<l as an excuse fnr more Yiolent physical abuse of the jlrisoner. Sometimes the prisoner will IUlye to "take" treatment against which his instincts rebel.
Consider the case of one PO"W in Korea. '''hen his Chinese guard wiped his feet on the PO,,"s dothe:", the PO,,, struck him. );'01' this, the p(nV was jllaced in a box about 30 inches square. Kellt there for nine hours, the PO,,' became temporarily jlar:ll~·zed. Afterwards, his arms ,yere IWlHkuffed to his :lnkles for three or four days; following this, he ',",lS hallllcul'fe<l in a conYentional manner for about six weeks.
'VI' can admire the courage of the ro'v. At the same time, we recognize that this kin<l of resistance sen'es no useful jlurjlose. It takes "guts" to stand calmly in the face of insult and abuse, but it will most often be the best thing to do.
For the timc bcing, the PO,,"s best resi:-;tauce is jlassive resistant·p. The means he still jlossesses are his mental faculties :lnd his llloral code-the determination amI the will to resist. 'I'hese must be kept alive in the captiye lighting" man bec'ause they are what "'ill keep him alive. 'l'hat the Communist enemy is aware of these '"means" too, and their imjlortance, is eYidenced in his vrolonged and continuous efforts to destroy them.
The fighting Ulan has one alternative to "taking" what­ever treatment his captors ajljlly-for as long as they choose to ajljlly it. 'l'hat is, of course, escave. Hc must conccn­tTatc all his 'resollrccs to/("ard cscapc-both for himsclf and oth crs. '1'his will eutail the full apjllication of his 1'1'­lllallllllg me'lIls-w!t:-;, wilL and jlatience. Furthermore, the Genenl Convention imJlliecUy recognizes the right of
a prisonpr of \,-ar to try to escape l)~' pro\'iding a limitation of puni"llment for certain offense"-",,ncll as oJTen"es against pnblic IJroperty, theft. \yitllont intention of self­enricllmpnt, tlle dra\ying up or u"e of false papers, or tlle wearing' of ciyilian clotlling"-\\'llen snell otIpnsps are COIll­mitted \yitll tlle sole intenUon of fal'ilitating escape and do not entail any \'iolenee against' life or limb,
HClI/ell/rIC)' t1/('sc p)'ocisiolls, and abide by tIH'm if yon become a 1'0,\', Xencr gin' ~'onr COllllllllllisj' captor any \'alid rpaSOll for labpling yon a \\'ar criminal.
Aboye all elsp, usp good jndglllPnt in pl:llllling to pscapp, Bp alprt to opportnniUes of tlle llJoJllPnt-tlle careless gnard or a fripndly one interested in dpsert!ng'-or moments of c'lllfnsion (Teated by an a ir raid or :J ttack by friendly forces, Sncll opportnnitips Illay be tlle (JllI~-ones ~'()n will get. Tlley are more likelr to occnr in til(' enrlr singes of enpt!yifT, before trnnsfer to a prison camp,
By all me:ws IlJnke :H1ya11<'e plans and pJ'('pnrations if you can, but don't e"pel't tllnt tIlis \yill be possible in
any COllllllllllist pl'isonl'r-of-\\'ar camp, Once in an e~tab­lishl'(l call1p, yOll Illay he ahle to org-anize an l1lHlerg-ronnd ('~capc COlllllliUl'l', Thi~ c'tn incn,"t~e your cllance~ of lilaking' a StlC'('p;..;;..;flll e:'(";l!Je.
11'01' reaSOllS pl'cyiol1s1y eite(l, physical yiolence agaillst l'llemy PCI'SO]lIlel dnring-escapl' from a l'O\V camjl shonld he al'oided except as a last n'sort, wilen the sitnation is despl'r'lte, (That is, if a prisoJl(']' fl'el:-; deatll hy tile
enC'IllY's lIalld is iIllIllillCllt ;lllY\Vay, and as a fighting lnan
he is detl'I'lltined to take some of the elH'my ,,'!til him in his tillal hattie,) Except in such extreillely desperate eir­('1llllstallces, it is a(!\'isahle for til(' prbo]l<'r to avoid violence dllring-his escape frolll camp 'tnd ltis trek to freedom until his ohjedin'-J'ril'ndly fOITI'S or Il<'lltl'al territory-is aT­tllally in viell' and nlltil snl'11 ph~'si<-al adion migllt elimi­llate til(' fillal o!>stal'1es to ltis hid for freedom.
Onc pilot who escapel] his captors in Korea against tn'mC!l<]ollS odc]s is Major Wan] :.\lillar (tllen Captain).
As his plane plunged into enemy territory both of his
ankles were broken. Dragging himself on his stomach
to a creek, he attempted to gain coYer, but the Communists
soon spotted him. From the moment of his capture, Cap­
tain Millar began planning to eSCalJe. He eluded his guards
before his improperly set ankles had healed and started
his slow, painful trek to freedom on foot, using sticks as
crutches and hobbling along in ill-fitting galoshes. As
hope of a successful escape was dimming, he enlisted the
help of a Korean-a sergeant in the Xorth Korean army­
'''ho also wanted to escape the Communists. The two
succeeded in signalling a U.S. helicopter, which flew them
to safety.
A captor's deYiees-especially a Communist captor's-to subdue a prisoner or render him complacent are many and ,'aried. Among the more subtle of these is the offer of "parole"-an agreement whereby, in exchange for certain privileges or freedom of mo,ement, the prisoner gives cer­tain promises to the detaining power, such as the promise that he will not try to escape.
It is sometimes suggested that captured Chaplains and medical personnel should accept parole in order to minister to other prisoners. In accordance with the Geneva Con­"ention, parole is not necessary for such persons in that they are "retained" personnel, rather than prisoners, with minimal restrictions placed upon them in order that they may render their sen"ices as needed. Howeyer, you should remember that the Communists did not honor that ruling during the Korean war and cannot be expected to in the
Recognizing that the captor is in a position to make parole terms advantageous to themselves and disadvanta­geous to an unwitting captive, the United States caJp1·cssly forbicls lIcr captive figll ting men to enter intosllch agree­ment with the enemy.
·.. NOR SPECIAL FAVORS Another ruse of captors such as the Communists is to offer special favors. However innocent these offers may seem, you may be sure there are strings attached. 'l'he cigarette or bit of candy offered by an interrogator at the beginning of a session, apparently to establish a relaxed atmosphere, may place the prisoner under an obligation. The wisest course is to reject all offers of favors, even in exchange for what may seem to be very minor concessions. Such offers should be Jeported promptly to the senior in cOlllmand of the prisoner group. There are several reasons why favors should not be accepted-even as a "planned" deception, so that the pro­ceeds may be divided among the group. In the first place, such a deception would necessarily involve pretense, which could lead to a trap. For another, there can be no overall benefit to the group for the simple reason that the favors­or the funds to purchase them-will have come from the sources allotted for the prisoners anyway. The prisoner who accepts favors and keeps them for himself is incli­rectly stealing from his fellows. And even if he accepts them in order to share them with the others later, he is contributing to the downfall of his group by allowing the enemy to increase his control over it. It thus becoI1l!!s apparent that the captive fiyht'iny man mU8t not accept 8pecial favor8 from the cnemy.
The fight is e,-erywhere. Even in the prison camp! ,"Vhen the use of physical weapons is denied, the mental ,and moral "will to resist" must be kept alive in every prisoner.
A PO'V has no alternatives. Either he resists, to death if necessary, or progressively submits, in time completely, to the dictates of his captors. Nor is death any less likely in submission than in resistance. It Illay be different in submission-more lingering-but the more to be avoided because of that. Certainly this leaves little choice for the fighting man who cherishes freedom.
He will escape if able to do so and will help others to escape. He will not sign or enter into a parole agreement.
In the POW camp as in battle, there is no place for the coward. In either place, the watchword is:
"Keep up the fight."
0J0_become ayrisoner gflvat~ 0 wier k€~ jaith with. ~feUol1)yt'isoners. £\ wier give no it}jDnna· tion nor ta[~e part in 1'mg action m~ht be bar~C fo ;~ comrabes_ 0]~ am senior, f) wiU take comn~n6. Wnat, 0 will O(;E the GU~Jl1.[ or6ers§ those ~eP0inte6 over me an6 wi[ 6ack them ~ in eve~ wa~_
Chapter 15
If I become a p1'isoner of wa1', I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information n01' take part in any action which might be harmfnl to my C01nTCldcs. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed ove1' me and will back them up in every way.
-Article IV, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.
ne of the worst acts an American can commit is to give aid and comfort to the enemy by informing on, or otherwise harming, fellow prisoners. A POW must avoid helping the enemy identify fellow prisoners who may have knowledge of particular value to the enemy, even if this course brings coercive interrogation.
If ever the Communists hold you as a prisoner, they will try in many ways to make you an informer. At the same time, they will try to break down your faith in your fellow PO'V's and their faith in you. In Korea, they deliberately placed many prisoners under a cloud of suspicion:'-by requiring their company on walks or by frequently calling them to headquarters for interrogation-in order to create the impression that they were "cooperating." This practice had a two-fold purpose. It made it difficult to detect an actual informer by hiding him within a selected group. It also cast suspicion on every other individual in the group.
l~aced by such tactics, tl/C fighting man who becomes a prisoner of war must keep faith 1cith his fellow p1'isoners.
It is natural during a long term of confinement for men to discuss intimately their past lives and their future dreams, as well as matters of immediate concern, such as thoughts or plans of escape. They will talk with eacl'
other of many things they would .not wish disclosed to the enemy. The need for mutual confidence is obvious.
In this connection, an inspiring example was set by Derek Godfrey Kinne, captured on 25 April 1951.
In July 1952, the Chinese Comlllunists accused Kinne of being uncooperative. He was brutally interrogated about other prisoners of war who had uncooperative views.
"As a result of his refusal to inform on his comrades, and for striking back at a Chinese officer who assaulted him," his citation for gallantry in captivity stated, "he was twice severely beaten up and tied up for periods of 12 and 24 hours, being made to stand on tip-toe with a running noose around his neck which would throttle him if he attempted to relax in any way."
In conclusion, Kinne's example was cited as "an inspira­tion to all ranks who came into contact with him."
The Central Peace Committee was one of several organiza­tions used by the Communists to support their political in­doctrination program in Korea. Composed of prisoners, the committee helped prepare material to be used in courses given to other PO",V's. From the setup and activities, it should have been apparent that this committee was being used to undermine PO'V resistance and to mislead them as to the role of the United States in the Korean war and in world affairs.
Nevertheless, two American prisoners played key roles. One had charge of indoctrination. The other had charge of propaganda. Both took instructions from the Commu­nists. Under this committee was an elaborate workshop staffed by approximately 30 prisoners. The principal duty of the prisoners stationed there was to pose for propaganda pictures. For example, 10 men would be shown playing basketball. Others would be snapped playing tennis, swim­ming, or engaging in other sports or recreational activities.
505596 0 --59----9 123
Subsequently these pictures would appear in various newspapers. The purpose, obviously, was to convey the impression that UN prisoners in Korea were being well treated by the Communists.
By their actions, the PO-VV's who worked on this COlll­mittee helped give an erroneous picture of their fellow POW's. At a time when world opinion should have been mobilized against atrocities in Communist PO'V camps, some of our own men were helping to a vert this. For their labors, they received a "mess of pottage."
Here, if you ever become a PO'V, is an example of what not to do. There will be many other things also. The COlllmunists are clever, and they will propose many things that cannot be predicted. Keep alert! Make up your mind now that in peace or in war, in combat or in a PO'V camp, you NEYER will take part in any action that could harm your fellow fighting men.
Strong leadership is essential to discipline. 'Vithout dis­cipline, camp organization, resistance, and even survival may be impossible. Personal hygiene, camp sanitation, and care of the sick and wounded are imperative. Officers and enlisted men of the United States will continue to carry out their responsibilities and exercise their authority after capture. The senior officer or enlisted man eligible to com­mand within the prisoner-of-war camp or group will assume command according to rank (or precedence) without regard to Service. This responsibility and accountability may not be evaded. If the senior officer or enlisted man is incapac­itated or unable to act for any reason, command will be assumed by the next senior.
Such command can be exercised, even when conditions make it seem impossible. This was demonstrated in Korea.
For their inspiring conduct while prisoners of war, 56 American soldiers were decorated. Consider the conduct of four, selected at randolll-Corporal Donald R. Bittner,
Sergeant Gale \V. Cartel', Lieutenant Colonel .John :r. Dunn, and Corporal Riehard J? Doug!;lss. Theil' citations speak for themselYes.
Corporal Bittner's "leadership awl personal example in clefying his eaptors and in cliseouraging eo!lahorators raised the morale of his fellow prisoners and holstered their faith in Amerkan ideals." The Corporal headed an aetin' prisoner organi:oation to keep eo!lahorators in line. J;'or repeateclIy refusing to sign lll'opaganda dO(:lI­ments, he ineurre(l sw·h l>llnishlllents as hard lahor for more tlwn a year and eonfinement in a eold room for two months.
Sergeant Carter, who also led a prisoner resistance group, "was sel'erely punished and mistreatec1 for his aetivities. Howen'r, throughout the periods that he was sUhjeeted to solitary eonfinement, hard lahor, ,1I\(1 staryation, he re­mained steadfast in his devotion to duty and eountry."
Lieutenant Colonel Dunn, then Major, was the senior otIieer in a group of seyeral hundred Allleriean POW's.
He received the Legion of Merit for his "courageous and outstanding leadership, despite the multitude of difficulties confronting him and without regard for the fact that he was sick and wounded at the time he assumed those im­portant responsibilities. He was instrumental in main­taining the morale and welfare of his comrades, assisting many to defy communistic teachings and to maintain hope necessary to remain alive. Throughout the period of cap­tivity he constantly demanded more food, clothing, and better living conditions essential to the preservation of life."
Corporal Douglass, whose "determined stand against Communist teachings gave heart to those with less spirit and fortitude . . . risked severe punishment by liberating from confinement a fellow prisoner suffering from maI­nutrition and cold."
But superior leadership was not a monopoly of the Army. Lieutenant Colonel 'Villiam G. Thrash, a U.S. Marine Corps aviator, won a Gold Star in lieu of a second Legion of Merit for his conduct as a senior officer in a Korean prison camp. Although threatened with harsh punishment if he attempted to organize resistance, and under constant surveillance, he went to work tightening discipline and uniting the prisoners-officers from several nations. For his work in counteracting Communist in­doctrination, the Colonel endured solitary confinement for eight months, intense mental pressure, and physical mal­treatment. These efforts to "break" him succeeded only in strengthening his influence upon the other prisoners.
The Communists in Korea attempted to prevent group unity by suppressing leadership. Prisoners were ordered to report to the Communist camp officials if any of their seniors in rank attempted to exercise authority. That there may be weaklings and opportunists who will comply must be considered. This happened in several instances.
Against such odds, the establishment of order and dis­cipline by the prisoners themseh'es is clifficult, to say the
least, And even when established, it will need cOBstant reinforcement, as the Communists will do their best to undermine it. But it must be done, and it can be-as was proven in Korea-if men will stand together behind proper leadership. Obviously, the senior officer can effectively fulfill his responsibilities in this regard only when those of lesser 1'ank obey his lawful 01'ders and back him tiP in every way.
Being a PO'V does not relieve you as a serviceman from your obligation to follow designated leaders. 'Vhen pris­oners reject the autho:i'ity of their superiors and refuse to obey lawful orders, discipline and organization break down. This is just what the Communists want, for they know how important discipline is to the success of any resistance movement in a prison camp.
There is the possibility, of course, that the prisoner in authority may be an opportunist, a weakling, or one who will collaborate with the enemy. To prevent wholesale betrayal of the group by such a person, it is stipUlated that only lawfttl orders must be obeyed. This does not mean that a prisoner can arbitrarily refuse to obey orders. But, obviously, if a senior tells a subordinate to sign a propaganda leaflet or perform some other collaborative service for the enemy, it is not a lawful order and should be refused. By the same token, collaboration by a senior is not justification for similar action by those of lesser rank.
Sometimes keeVing faith calls for strange action. If some strange act contributes to the welfare of the POW group, it should be judged by what it accomplishes,
In Korea, for example, a PO'V was showing early signs of "give-up-itis." He was soon rejecting food and spurning the attention of his fellow POW's who were trying to "snap him out of it." Nothing his fellow POW's said Oll did seemed to make much difference. Expressions of sympathy seemed only to increase his self-pity.
One day when chow was being passed out, a Navy Chief
Petty OiIicer noticed that this 1'0\\' had failed to dailll his portion. ~When called, the POW replied that he was not hungry,
"Tell that ," sahl the Chief, "to go out nnd dig his o\\"n gran" ilpfore hp gets too \\"eak to do it. OtlJel'\yise, some of the rest of us \\'i Il ha \'e to do it for
him, nnd \ye'ye got more importtIllt things to <]0." Soon aftel'\Ynrds the man callIe 0\'('1' am] ate his chow. Tl]('n he lW2:an to come out of his shell. nnd soon he oyercame his "giYe-up-itis." "It \\"ns shock trentllH'nt," psplaine<] tlw Chipf aftpl'\\"al'(]s, "and it \\'orke<1. He h;)(] pnssed the stage \I'1Jere ];ind words or sYllIpntlly would ha \'(~ helped hill!." Apart from "gi\'(~-up-itis." thpre \\"ill be mallY cases in nn:,' P()\\' camp where illdh'idunl prisoners dislike one nnutlll'r, But lW llIattpr \ylwt your fecdillg's as a prisoner
llW~'  be.  nil  disa~2:J'('PIlIPnts  llIust  be  resol\'('(l  \yithill  the  
P(J\\,  group.  

"Behind-the-barracks" settlement of personal feuds is extremely risky in a prison camp. For one thing, injuries do not heal easily in the absence of decent food and medical facilities. Furthermore, such incidents are difficult to conceal from the ever-watchful eyes of the captors. COIll­munist camp administrators like nothing better than op­portunities to remonstrate with prisoners for their "bad attitudes" toward each other and to "counsel" them on their conduct. Such incidents provide the best possible opportunity for the enemy to aggravate discord and sow seeds of distrust.
Remember how essential teamwork was on your high school or college football team? You wouldn't slug your worst enemy if he was on yom: team. You'd cover up your own personal feelings and guard him while he was carrying the ball for YOU1" team.
How much more vital it is, then, for you to keep faith with your fellow fighting men!
eWhen questione6, shOuGS 9 become a yrisonet'ifwar, ~ am boun6 to give on~ name) Tan"k, service number an6 6ate eff birth. gwaf eua6e answertng..JUrther:..questions to the utmost~:fm~ abi(f~.gwillma(ze no oraror written statements 6isCO.,galto m~ countr.!:3 an6 its allies or harm.ful to their cause.
When q'uestioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to g'i'De only na'me, 1'ank, se1'vice nttmber and date of birth. I Ifill evade answeT'ing further quest'ions to the 'ntrnost of my ability, I u;ill malce no O1'al 01' written statements disloyal to my COli ntry and Us allies 01' harmflll to the'ir cause.
-Article Y, 'l'he U.S, Fighting Man's Code.
very fighting man possesses some military information of potential value to the enemy, By revealing it to the enemy he might bring death to his comrades or dis­aster to his unit. Indeed, one man may have some small, seemingly unimportant bit of lmowledge that coulll com­plete a composite intelligence picture for the enemy and enable the enemy to defeat major forces of his own country. The length of time he has been in service; how "lOng and where he was trained; how long in combat-'1l1Y such information will serve to improve the enemy's avvraisal of our fighting strength and potential.
If you become a prisoner of war, there is an obvious need for some communication with your captors. To fulfill their obligations under the Geneva Convention, your cap­tors need to know who you are. Moreover, they need to identify you so unmistakably that you will not be con­fused with any other member of our Armed Forces. This is in your interest as well as in theirs, since you will want your Service and your loved ones to know what has happened to you.
For this reason, you are bound by the Code and the Geneva rules to give your name, rank, service number, and date of birth if captured. (For those who wonder
wby tbe date of lJirtb is required, it is simply to establish yOll!' identity more eompletely.) If you refuse to give tllis information, you may be denied privileges you otller­wise might enjoy.
By tile same token, you are exvect:ed to help identify any of your comrades who may be too badly wounded or too ill to identify tllC'mselves. In so doing, you will apply the same restrictions that you would if you \vere being questioned about yourself.
Assume your captors al'(~ Communists. You know tbey will honor their obligations under tile Geneva COllvention only if it senes their elHls. 'WIly, then, you may ask yourself, should you give tbem any informatioll '! Why shoulcl you give tilem e\"(~n your name when they probably will try to use it for propaganda purposes?
'rhis is a risk you must tal,e. ,Yllen you give the Com­munists personal information they can relay to your Gov­
ernment and your loved ones, you have no guarantee they will not misuse it. However, in spite of this possibility, you could not afford to give your Communist captors a bona fide excuse for not relaying word of your capture to your Government.
Remember, finally, that we Americans honor our obli­gations. Under the Code and the Geneva rules, you are obligated to give your name, rank, service number, and date of birth. 'i'his you can and should do in good conscience.
Ideally, if ever you become a POvV, you should give your captors no information other than name, rank, service number, and date of birth. Don't be stampeded into going beyond this.
There are instances on record where Americans, when summoned for interrogation, have been so terrified by their own unrealistic imagining of what would happen to them that it was not even necessary for their captors to question them. These men had frightened themselves so badly that they poured out any information they had. Other prisoners, almost as frightened, held out until the C6mmunists mentioned that "it would be better" for the POW if he talked. In the prisoner's frightened state, he thought this statement was a threat of all kinds of torture and unknown, mysterious outrages-so that this remark was all that it took to make him give in. In this way, by playing on fear and lack of knowledge, the Communists had their work done for them-the prisoners had defeated themselves.
Actually, the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War has never been able to verify even one case in which a POW was killed because he refused to answer questions. Keep this in mind!
Whatever you do, don't try to evade questioning by
making up a story. Sometimes highly trained and skilled persons can deceive a trained interrogator, but then for only a short period of time. Any improvised story, clutched by a desperate, confused, frightened prisoner of war, will probably be more of an aid to the enemy than a hindrance. The interrogator is always at an advantage, because the prisoner does not know exactly what information the interrogator has. The prisoner's answers are carefully screened by enemy intelligence experts, and false infor­mation is easily detected. After his story is destroyed, the prisoner is then at the mercy of his captors.
Playing stupid is something else. A POW who knows he cannot fool an interrogator with false information may evade answering further questions by appearing to know so little that the interrogator gives up.
This happened in the case of a Navy fighter-bomber pilot who was shot down behind enemy lines in Korea. After capture, his system was to be very polite, to be sorry that he didn't know this or that. He knew nothing about the new planes. He did not know where the bases were . . . nor did he know how long the runways were. This sort of game continued during most of his six months as a Po-W.
Just before the pilot was released, an interrogator told him he was a disgrace to his uniform . . . that he was the most ignorant naval officer he (the interrogator) had ever encountered.
Yes, the officer was dumb ... like a fox!
lIe had resisted successfully to the utmost of his ability.
On first thought, your pledge to make no disloyal state­ments seems merely an expression of fundamental decency. You find it hard to conceive of a situation in which you would break your pledge. Yet a number of American PO'V's signed germ-warfare confessions in Korea, and many othel'ssighed peace petitions that cast l'eflections
on lJnited States policy and ohjeetiycs. Tllese lllPn didnot intend to he disloyal. lJndoubtedly, they \yere )I]'('s­sured into signing. Yet the efIeet: of their statf'nl('nt"s \,":lSdefinitely harmful to our eountry.
'''hat led tlJelll to :Idas they did'! How can yon step] yourself now to \\"ith­st:llld sneh pressures if eyer you be('OIlle a pel\\' 'I
First, let it be understood that for en'ry Allleriean 11'110made a disloyal statement \\"hile he \\"as a 1'0\\' in Korea.there \\"ere lllany, lll:lny others who refused to do so.FolIo\\" the example of the majority.
Consider the ease of an Air Force c:I)ltain w]ws(' )llanewas struck by Comlllunist antiail'<'raf't firp OH'r Nol'! IJKorea on 8 April 1D52. IIp \\"as Pjected, and as ll(' fellinto range, a squad of Chinese COllllllllllists opell(,d fire.
On the ground, he saw stealthy figures running towardhim, still thing. "With lJis seniee .45, lJe killed t\\"o of
more than 200 Communists \\"ho eonyerge(] on hinl. ()yer­l!o\H'red, he \vas taken prisoner.
'l'he cavtain was charged with germ warfare and "mur­dering Chinese Communist volunteers" in his last ditch fight. Despite unrelenting pressure, he steadfastly re­fused to sign any statements disloyal to his country. After a midnight trial, he was confined in a camp for unde­sirables. As a member of the camp's escape committee, he tried three times to make it to U.N. lines. All three at­tempts failed. Finally, on 31 August 1953, he was re­patriated in" "Operation Big Switch."
Courage and faith sustained the captain through his ordeal. 'l'hey can sustain you also if ever you are pressured to make a disloyal statement.
In the face of experience, it is recognized that you, if you should become a POiV, may be subjected to an extreme of coercion. Still, you must resist to the limit of your ability. Don't expect to fall back to successive lines of resistance. Once you have gone beyond the first-your name, rank, service number, and date of birth-in almost any respect whatever, you have taken the first step that leads to collaboration. On the first line you must endeavor to stand to the end.
owilt lleUeeSo~et that 0 am. au. American J9hti~ man, Te~on5i6[eJOr m~ actions, an6 6e6icate6 to theyrinciPces which.""u1a6e m~ count~ ftee. 0 will trust in m~ Gob anb in ihe UniteS States ifAmerica.
Chapter 17
I wUl never fm"get that I am an American fighting man, responsilJle for 'my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my connt1'y free. I 1ciU trust inlny God and in the UniteiZ States of America.
-Artide VI, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.
American is responsible and accountable for his
n actions. Prisonel'-of-war statns doesn't change this nor does it change the obligation to remain faithful to the United States and to the llrinciples for which it stands. Throughout his cavtiYity, a vrisoner shoulc1 look to his God for strength to elHlure whaten'r may befall. He should remember that the United States of America '''ill neither forget nor forsake him, and that it will win the ultimate victory.
TIle life of a prisoner of war is hanI. He must never give up hope. He must resist enemy indoctrination. Pris­oners of war who stand firm and united against the enemy will aid one another in surviving their ordeal.
If you become a PO'V, you will be fighting for your country in a new arena.
Keep this constantly in mind. Never let yourself be lulled into a feeling that you are "out of the war" . that your only problem is to survive until you can be repatriated.
When you face a Communist interrogator, you are under fire--just as trUly as if bullets and shell fragments were flying around yOU. In trying to make you c10 his bic1ding, the enemy is attacking the United States of America and
our  way  of  life.  If you  succumb,  your  country  is  the  

Disarmed and unable to pnt up physical resistaJl('e, yon will tight with yonI' mind ami yonI' spirit:. If yon J'ield no military information, you help safeguard your conntry's fighting strength. If you remain faithful to your fellow POlY'S, you help l,eep up a united front in this new arena of war. Resist eyery attempt at indodrination, and you bea t back a Commtwist oft'ensin~. 'I'urn back eyery Com­munist effort to use you for propaganda, and yon help protect the good name oj' your country and maintain your own l,ersonal integrity as well.
Remember always that the Communists are waging a relentless war to oyerthrow our eountry and our way of life. YonI' role may ehange, but you are neyer out of the conflict as long as yon remain aliYe.
NiTer forget that you are an American fighting man.
YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR YOUR ACTIONS '1'lJe proYisions oJ' the Uniform Code of Military .Justice continue to apply, whenen~r appropriate, to members of
the Armed Forces while they are prisoners of war. Keep this in mind if you become a POW. The circumstances of your capture and your conduct during the period of your detention are subject to examination, with due re­gard for your rights as an individual amI consideration for the conditions of your captivity.
Still, you are a fighting man, and your Government ex­pects you to act like one.
Any man may face odds that overwhelm him despite his best efforts. If this explains your callture, your Gm'ern­ment will be understanding.
While you are a PO'V, your conduct will be weighed by your fellow prisoners. You will weig;h your own conduct. You will know in your own mind whether or not you are acting as a responsible fighting man.
If your conduct as a prisoner of war requires official examination, your guilt or innocence will be determined not by sentiment but by the actual facts. In short, your conduct will be judged by what could reasonably be ex­pected of a loyal, dedicated fighting man under the con­ditions you are called uIJon to endure.
Acquit yourself with honor, and you will have won the undying gratitude of your fellow countrymen!
For inspiration, look to the records of those heroes \vho stood up against staggering odds while prisoners of war in Korea. There were weaklings, of course, and much has been written about them. More important, there were many heroes-from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps-and too little has been written about them!
Major 'Valter R. Harris, USMCR, for example, won the Legion of Merit for his adamant resistance. As the rec­ognized leader of a prisoner group in North Korea, he welded the prisoners into a disciplined military organi­zation and conducted educational and religious programs. He did his best to helll those who attempted to escape and
macle certain they knew the probable punishment if recaptured.
'When Major Harris' influence among the prisoners came to the attention of his captors, they tried to force him to sign compromising statements. This he refused steadfastly to do, in spite of solitary confinement, loneliness, hunger, and llhysical torture.
We llOld these trllths to be selt-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are en­(101Oe(Z by tli cir 01'eat01' 10ith certain 1tnalien­able Rights, tlwt among tllcse a1'e Lite, Liberty and the lJ1Wsuit ot Ha.ppiness. That to seCU1'e these rights, Govcr'nments a1'e instituted antony .iIIen, deriving tlleir just pOlOers tro111 the con­scnt ot the f/ovcrne(l ...
The Declaration of Inclependence contains the essence of our democratic faith. It was meant to give form to the sentiments of the colonists, to provide a common statement of a new Kation's reasons for carrying on the fight for freedom. The principles expressed in the Declaration heartened the soldier in the Revolutionary War, and those same principles sene as a time-tested standard for the American fighting man toclay.
If you become a PO,,, of the Communists, you will expect intensive indoctrination in atheistic communism, which rejects the idea of individual liberty expressed in the Declaration of Indepenc1eilce. It is your duty as a fighting man to carryon the battle in the prison camp by resisting Communist indoctrination efforts with all your ability. Your best answers to the Communists lie in the basic principles that have made our country great and free. Your best weapon is an appreciation of the true meaning of these principles.
Your steadfast adherence to the principles of, freedom and democracy ,,'Hl help both you and-YOl.n' fellow l)l:isoners.
The Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War found that when a few American POW's signed peace petitions and peddled Communist literature it had far­reaching results.
So long as the principles that have made our country free claim our love and respect, so long will our free and representative government endure and be a source of hope to those who seek human freedom and who believe in the dignity and worth of every human being. Such princillles are worth fighting for-on the battlefield or in a POvV camp.
Most religions consider valor and patriotism virtues of the highest order. The person with firm religious con­victions, whatever his religion, and the courage to defend those convictions at any cost, is _able to defend himself and to maintain his integrity as a man and as a fighting man.
If you are a devoutly religious man you do not need to be reminded that your faith is a source of courag-e and strength in time of peril. Men who recognize the existence of God and believe in the importance of a man's soul recognize also that there are worse things than death; as a result, the idea of death does not appall them. 'l'hey may not always understand why things are happening as they are, but they believe with firm conviction that God will not forsake the man who trusts Him and lives by His commandments. When death ends this earthly struggle, it opens the door to everlasting life.
The United States, when still a young, hard-pressed Nation, proudly proclaimed its position to the world in its slogan, "In God We Trust." This heritage helps ex­plain why there are few atheists in the Armed Forces. Even those men who do not subscribe to a formal creed of any kind generally recognize a God who rules the world with justice and mercy.
Centuries ago, a soldier wrote the 23rd Psalm. Its message has echoed in the minds and hearts of other soldiers in each succeeding generation:
Yea, though I walle tTwough the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil; for thOtl art with mc; thy rod and thy staff, they comfort mc.
Your country expects you, as a member of the Armed Forces, to support it to the utmost of your ability. In return, you may expect your country to support you.
In times of war, communications sometimes break down. Messages from home' may neyer reach you. Undoubtedly, you will worry about your family.
If you are a prisoner of war, these worries and fears will be aggraYated. Meantime, you will be subjected to a steady onslaught of propaganda and lies about the defeat' of American forces and the victories of the enemy.
In such circumstances, remember this: The United States of America will win the war, and she will not forget you-no matter what the enemy says.
In signing the Executive Order that put the Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces into effect, the President of the United States declared:
No American prisoner of war will be forgotten by the United States.
Every available means will be employed by our govern­ment to establish contact with, to support and obtain the release of all our 11risoners of war.
Furthermore, the laws of the United States provide for the support and care of dependents of members of the Armed Forces including those who become prisoners of war. I assure dependents of such prisoners that these laws will continue to provide for their welfare.
The U.S. Fighting Man's Cocle sets a high standard for members of the Armed Forces of the United States. But it is a reasonable standard-one based on principles and ideals that have made America free and strong, on moral qualities found in all men of integrity and character. And
it is a standard that every member of the Armed Forces of the United States is expected to meet. Complete and loyal support of the Code is to the best interests of the American fighting man, his comrades, the United States, and the free world.
The written Code of Conduct is a direct outgrowth of the Korean conflict. But the Code's importance extends far beyond the limits of a single war or a single group of Americans.
Every American citizen-whether in or out of uniform­must share the responsibility for preserving our freedom and our way of life. For in modern warfare, the home front is but an extension of the fighting front. There are no distant front lines, remote no-man's lands, far-off rear areas. Courage and loyalty are expectecl of every American. And every American might well adopt as his own personal code the Code of Conduct for the serviceman.
Scientific advances have resulted in weapons so for­midable that they stagger the imagination of mankind. Less tangible but no less formidable are the psychological weapons the Communists have devised. Their method of treating captives is but one of the weapons they use in their unending, worldwide war for the minds and hearts of men.
vVe cannot take freedom for granted. Threats to Amer­ican security must be met with appropriate Amerkan weapons.
The physical weapons of war are assured by American enterprise, science, and industry.
The mental and moral weapons are supplied by the strength, will, and minds of the American people.
So long as the weapons, whatever they be, are wielded by men of honor and integrity, who believe in-and practice-­the principles upon which this Nation was founded, so long will our Nation be free and invincible.
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"The Korean Prisoner-of-",Var Issue." Paul H. Douglas. TTital Speeches, 1 July 1953, 19: 568-70.
"A Line Must Be Drawn." Time,29 Aug. 1955, 66: 16-17. "Marines to the Rescue." Reporter, 8 Sep. 1955, 13: 2-4. "From the Ordeals of Prisoners of War in Korea-Moral
Mandate for All Americans." Lite, 27 Aug. 1955, 39: 31-4. "The New Code for War Prisoners." Christian Century, 7 Sep. 1955, 72: 1012. "Operation Persuader Backfires." America, 31 Oct. 1953,
90: 115.
"Ordeal in the Desert; Teaching Men How to Resist Brain­washing." P. Wyden. Newsweek, 12 Sep. 1955, 46: 33-5. Discussion, 19 Sep. 1955, 46: 36-8.
"Prescription for Our P.O.W.'s." W. Keempffert. Science Digest, Dec. 1953, 34: 29-30.
"Prisoners of War." Ch'ristian Century, 4 Nov. 1953, 70: 1254-6.
"The Prisoners." Commonweal, 16 Oct. 1953, 59: 25-9.
"Prisoners Swayed-Didn't Fall .. ." (Interview with C. B. Peterson). U.S. News & World Report, 28 Aug. 1953, 35:
28. "The Prisoners Who Broke." U.S. News&; World Report, 1
Aug. 1953, 35: 30-31. "Pro-Communist Twenty-Three." America, 10 Oct. 1953, 90 :
35. "Pros on Trial." Ame'l'ica, 29 Aug. 1953, 89: 511. "The, Rats." Newsweek, 24 Aug. 1953, 42: 30. " 'Reactionaries.''' Time, 7 Sep. 1953, 62: 32.
"Real Story of Returned Prisoners." GIs back from Korea.) UB. News May 1953, 54-63.  (Tape recordings of <f World Report, 29  
505596°--59----11  ISS  

"Red Torture Broke Few GI's." U.S. News ((; World Report, 26 Aug. 1955, 39: 38-9. "Resistance to the Death by P''i''s.'' America, 3 Oct. 1953,
90: 1. "Riots and Repatriation Rules." Newsweek, 12 Oct. 1953,
42: 36. "The Roots of Courage." Colliers, 30 Sep. 1955, 136: 106. "The Second Humiliation." Time, 9 Nov. 1953, 62: 26. "Snafu at Valley Forge." Newsweelc, 18 May 1953, 41:
44--46. "A Soldier's Soldier." Time, 7 Dec. 1953, 62: 27-30. "Story of GI Turncoats." U.S. News ((; World ReZJOrt, 28
June 1957, 42: 58-64. "Terror and Torture: Five Prisoners' Stories." Newsweek, 17 Aug. 1953, 42: 32. "Terrors of Brain-'Vashing Ordeal." Harold 'V. Rigney. Vital Speeches, 1 June 1956, 22: 504-9. "They CllOse Freedom." ScllOlastic, 28 Oct. 1953, 63: 12.
"They Refuse To Go Home." Scholastic, 7 Oct. 1953, 63: 17.
"To a Young Progressive." Time, 19 Oct. 1953, 62: 32.
"Torture Techniques of ComIllunist Prosecutors in Iron Curtain Countries." Scholastic, 15 Mar. 1950, 56: 22.
"Tough Prisoners." Time, 21 Sep. 1953, 62: 28-9.
"Train Pilots To Resist Brain Washing." Science Digest, Jan. 1955, 37: 30.
"Training by Torture." Time, 19 Sep. 1955, 66: 21; Dis­cussion, 10 Oct. 1955, 66: 8.
"A Turncoat Comes Home." L. Bergquist. Loole, 25 June 1957, 21: 125-8.
"Valley Forge GIs Tell of Their Brainwashing Ordeal." William Brinkley. Life, 25 May 1953, 108-24.
"We Can Baffle the Brainwashers!" D. V. Gallery. Satur­drty Evening Post, 22 Jan. 1955, 227: 20.
"What a Man Must Do; Servicemen's Code." Newsweek, 29 Aug. 1955, 46: 18.
"What About Reds Among Freed U.S. Prisoners?" N(!'/IJs­week, 17 Aug. 1953, 42: 21.
"What Communists Did to Americans in Korea: Official Report." U.S. News & World Report, 26 Aug. 19G5, 39: 40-8.
"What Is Brainwashing?" F. 0. Stockwell. Christian Century, 28 Jan. 1953, 70: 104-5.
"What To Do About Brainwashing." U.s. Ne1D.~ &; 1For7cl RepoTt, 8 JUly 1955, 39: 24-5.
"'Vhy Did Many GI Cavtives Cave In?" Interview with Maj. William E. Mayer. U.S. News & WOTld Report, 24 Feb. 1956, 40: 50-72.
"Why Did Some GIs Turn Communist?" B. Stavleton and T. D. Harrison. CollieTs, 27 Nov. 1963, 132: 25-8.
"Why PO'Vs Collaborate." Science News LetteT, 11 May 1957, 71: 301.
"Why Some GIs Stay with Reds: Interview." S. S. Dickenson. U.S. News & 'WoTld Report, 13 Nov. 1953,
35: 33. "Without Honor." Ne1csLceek, 13 July 1D53, 43: 30.
Biderman, A. D., Herman, Louis lVI., and Howard, Harwell.
Reading 1J1ateTials in Ch'inese Communist IndoctTination Attempts Against American Prisoners ot War. Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Lacklancl Air Force Base, Texas.
Communist Explo-itation and IndoctTination ot POW's. Air University Library, Svecial Bibliographies, 1956.
Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation, BehaviOl'al Science Section. PO,V Research Project, Unclassified B'ibli­ography, 30 Sep. 1966.
6 August 1959
THE U.S. FIGHTING MAN'S CODE (DOD Pam 1-16). This official Department of Defense publication is for the use of per· sonnel in the military Services.
Genenll, United States Army,
 OFFICIAL: Chief of Staff.
R. V. LEE,
Major     General, United States Anny, The Adjutant General.
Vice Admiral, United States Navy, OFFICIAL: Chief of Naval Personnel.
Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
 Assistant Vice Admiral of Naval Operations/
 DiTector of Naval Administration.
OFFICIAL: Ohief of Staff, United States Air Force.
Oolonel, United States Air Force, Director otAdministrative Services.
General, U.S. Marine Oorps, OFFICIAL: Oommandant Of the Marine Oorps. WALLACE M. GREENE, JR.,
Major General, U.S. Marine Oorps, Deputy Ohief of Staff (Plans).
Active Army:
3 Copies per each 100 Military Personnel: Plus: ASA (CMA) (2) TJAG (2) ASA (FM) (2) TPMG (2) ASA (LOG) (2) TAG(XO) (2) ASA (MP&RF) (2) OJfCh (2) ASA (2) Tech Stf, DA (2) CofS (2) USCONARC (15) DCSPER (2) US ARADCOM (15) ACSI (2) US ARADCOM Rgn (15) DCSOPS (2) OS Maj Comel! (15) DCSLOG (2) OS BaseComd (5) '&CSRC (2) Log Comd (5) CAMG (2) MDW (15) CoA (2) Armies (15) except CUSARROTC (2) First US Army (17)
CofF (2) Corps (5)
 CINFO (30) Div (10)
~"CNGB (2) USATC (10) CLL (2) Brig (5) DRD (2) Regt/Gp/Bg (5) CRD (2) Bn (5) CMH (2) Co/Btry (2) TIG (2) Inst! (5)
USMA (75) PMST Mil Sch Div Units
 USACGSC (20) (2)
 USAWC (20) Rct Dist (2)
 Dr Svc Sch (20) RMS (2)
 Specialist Sch (10) MAAG (2)
 PMST Sr Div Units (2) Mil Msn (2)
 PMST Jr Div Units (2) ARMA (2)
NG: State AG (3); Div (3)'; Brig (1); RegtjGp
(2) ; Bn (1) ; CojBtry (2). USAR: Div (3) ; Brig (3); RegtjGp (3) ; Bn (3); CojBtry (2).
For     explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.
Air Force:





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