Legal Support to
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication is available on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training And Doctrine Digital Library at www.adtdI.army.mil
1 March 2000
Legal Support to
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. *This publication supersedes FM 27-100,3 September 1991.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Role of the Judge Advocate ………………………………………………………………… 1.1
1.1 THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS MISSION ……………………..1.
1.2 PERFORMING TRADITIONAL ROLES ………………………………………………… 1.1
1.2.1 Mission…………………………………………………………………………………………. 1-2
1.2.2' Service…………………………………………………………………………………………… 1-2
1.2.3 Legitimacy……………………………………………………………………………………. 1-2
1.2.4 The Military General Practitioner ……………………………………………………… 1-3
1.2.5 The "Judge" Function …………………………………………………………………… 1-4
1.2.6 The "Advocate" Function ……………………………………………………………… 1-5
1.2.7 The "Ethical Adviser" Function ………………………………………………………… 1-5
1.2.8 The "Counselor" Function ……………………………………………………………….. 1-5
1.3 IN A CHALLENGING NEW ENVIRONMENT ……………………………………… 1-6
1.3.1 More Missions ………………………………………………………………………………. 1-6
1.3.2 Command and Control Relationships ………………………………………………. 1-7
1.3.3 International Operations ………………………………………………………………… 1-7
1.3.4 Fluid Operations …………………………………………………………………………….. 1-7
1.3.5 Technological Advancements …………………………………………………………… 1-8
1.4 CHALLENGES FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES IN THE 21ST CENTURY …….1-8
1.4.1 Mission………………………………………………………………. …………………….1-8
1.4.3 1.4.2 Service………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1-9
1.5 SUMMARY………………………………………………………………………………………. 1-10
Chapter 2 Organization to Support Army Operations ……………………………………………. 2-1
2.1 JUDGE ADVOCATE ORGANIZATIONS ………………………………………………-2-1
2.1.1 Office of The Judge Advocate General ………………………………………………-2-1
2.1.2 Field Operating Agencies ……………………………………………………………….. -2-3
2.1.3 The U.S. Army Legal Services Agency …………………………………………….. -2-3
2.1.4 The Judge Advocate General' s School, U.S .Army …………………………….. -2-5
2.1.5 Army National Guard Legal Organizations ………………………………………… 2-6
2.1.6 U.S. Army Reserve Legal Organizations ……………………………………………. 2-7
2.1.7 Staff Judge Advocate Offices …………………………………………………………. 2-10
2.1 8. Command Judge Advocates ………………………………………………………….. -2-14
2.2 JOINT LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS …………………………………………………….. -2-14
2.2.1 The Office of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ..2.15
2.2.2 Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Unified Command Staff Judge
Advocates ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2-15
2.2.3 Joint Task Force Staff Judge Advocate ……………………………………………. -2-15
2.3 MULTINATIONAL FORCE LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS ………………………. 2. 15
2.4 PROVIDING .ARMYLEGAL SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS ………………… 2. 16
2.4.1 Overview of Operational Law Support…………………………………………….. 2-16
2.4.2 Tailoring Operational Law Support…………………………………………………. 2-19
5.3.1 Command & Control. Sustainrnent. Personnel Service Support ……………..5-4
5.3.2 Command and Control (C2)…………………………………………………………….-5-4
5.3.4 Personnel Service Support ………………………………………………………………. -5-6
5.4 THE CORE LEGAL DISCIPLINES IN WAR …………………………………………..5-7
.4.1 Administrative Law 5,
5.4.3 Civil Law ……………………………………………………………………………………….5-8
5.4.4 Military Justice ………………………………………………………………………………. 5-8
5.4.5 International Law ……………………………………………………………………………. 5-8
5.4.6 Legal Assistance ……………………………………………………………………………..5-9
5.5 ORGANEATION FOR WAR ……………………………………………………………….-5-9
5.5.1 Theater Legal Structure ……………………………………………………………………5-9
5.5.2 Army Service Component Command …………………………………………………5-9
5.5.3 Command Posts …………………………………………………………………………….5-10
5.5.4 Judge Advocate Disposition ……………………………………………………….5-11
5.5.5 Brigade Command and Control Facilities …………………………………………5-22
5-6 MATERIEL IN WAR …………………………………………………………………………-5-24
5.7 TRAINING FOR WAR ………………………………………………………………………..5-25
Chapter 6 Legal Support to Military Operations Other Than War ……………………………6-1
6.1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………….. -6-2
6.2 STRATEGIC CONCEPT ……………………………………………………………………… -6-3
6.3 THEATER CONCEPT ………………………………………………………………………… -6-3
6.3.1 Political Objectives ………………………………………………………………………….6-4
6.3.2 Legal Complexity …………………………………………………………………………..-6-4
6.3.3 Mission Complexity ………………………………………………………………………. -6-4
6.3.4 Command and Control ……………………………………………………………………-6-4
Interagency Coordination ………………………………………………………………..-6-5
6.4 THE ARMY'S ROLE IN MOOTW ………………………………………………………… 6-5
6.4.1 Arms Control……………………………………… :…………………………………………6-6
6.4.2 Combating Terrorism ……………………………………………………………………..-6-6
6.4.3 Counter-Drug Operations ……………………………………………………………….. -6-6
6.4.4 Enforcement of Sanctions and Exclusion Zones …………………………………..6-6
6.4.5 Humanitarian Assistance ………………………………………………………………… -6-7
6.4.6 Nation Assistance …………………………………………………………………………… 6-7
6.4.7 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations ……………………………………………….6-7
6.4.8 Peace Operations ……………………………………………………………………………. 6.7
6.4.9 Recovery Operations ………………………………………………………………………..6-8
6.4.10 Show of Force Operations ……………………………………………………………….. 6-8
6.4.1 1 Strikes and Raids ……………………………………………………………………………. 6-8
6.4.12 Support to Insurgencies …………………………………………………………………… 6-9
6.4.13 Operations Under Armistice Conditions …………………………………………….. 6-9
6.5 ORGANEATION OF MGAL SUPPORT ………………………………………………. 6-9
6.6 LEGAL ASPECTS OF C2. SUSTAINIVENT. AND SUPPORT OPS …………..6-9
6.6.1 Legal Basis for the Operation …………………………………………………………. 6-10
6.6.2 Status of Forces ……………………………………………………………………………6- 10
6.6.3 International& Interagency Relationships ………………………………………..6-11
6.6.4 Use of Force & Rules of Engagement (ROE) …………………………………….6-11
6.6.5 Treatment of Civilians …………………………………………………………………..-6- 12
6.6.6 Fiscal Responsibility ……………………………………………………………………..6-13
6.6.7 Intelligence Oversight …………………………………………………………………..-6- 14
6.7 LEGAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS ………………………………………………..-6- 14
6.8 LEGAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS …………………………………………….-6- 15
6.9 SUMMARY……………………………………………………………………………………… 6-15
Chapter 7 The United States as a Theater ……………………………………………………………. 7-1
7.1 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………… 7-1
7.2 Organizing and Equipping Judge Advocates ……………………………………………. 7-2
7.3 Tramng Judge Advocates …………………………………………………………………….. 7-2
7.4 Military Support to Civil Authorities ……………………………………………………..7-3
7.4.1 General ……………………………………………………………………………………….7-3
7.4.2 Authorization for Military Support ………………………………………………….7-3
7.4.3 Lead Agency Concept and Role of Military ………………………………………..7-4
7.4.4 Rules for Use of Force ……………………………………………………………….7-5
7.5 Military Support to Law Enforcement ………………………………………………….. 7-6
7.5.1 Civil Disturbance Operations ……………………………………………………………7-6
7.5.2 Counter-Drug Operations ………………………………………………………………..-7-9
7.6 Emerging Threats in the Continental United States (Terrorism) …………………7-12
Chapter 8 Rules of Engagement ……………………………………………………………………….8-1
8.2 ROE DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS ………………………………………..8-2
8.2.1 Commander's Responsibility …………………………………………………………….8-2
8.2.2 Purposes of ROE …………………………………………………………………………….8-2
8.2.3 Drafting Considerations ………………………………………………………………….8-3
8.2.4 Situation Considerations -METT-TC ………………………………………………..8-4
8.2.5 Definitions and Key Concepts …………………………………………………………..8-5
8.2.6 Types of ROE …………………………………………………………………………………8.6
8.3 CJCS Standing ROE ……………………………………………………………………………..8-7
8.4 THE I-D-D-T METHODOLOGY ……………………………………………………………8-9
8.4.2 Draft ……………………………………………………………………………………………8-10
8.4.4 Train…………………………………………………………………………………………… 8-13
Legal support to operations encompasses all legal services provided by Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGC) personnel in support of commanders, units, and soldiers throughout an area of operation and across the spectrum of operations. This support includes Operational Law and the six Core Legal Disciplines, which support command and control, sustainment, and personnel service support. Legal support to operations promotes the operational mission, provides quality legal services. and preserves the legitimacy of operations.
Field Manual 27-100, Legal Support to Operations, is the Army's capstone legal doctrinal manual. It describes the missions and operations of JAGC organizations, units, and personnel supporting Army operations. Legal support to operations must be thoroughly integrated into all aspects of operations to ensure compliance with law and policy and to provide responsive, quality legal services. This manual does not provide comprehensive treatment of the Law of War or Geneva Conventions. For information on these topics, refer to Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.
The purpose of this manual is to provide authoritative doctrine and guidance on all legal support to Army operations. It also provides the basis for legal training, organizational, and materiel development. It contains guidance for commanders, Staff Judge Advocates, staffs, and other JAGC personnel. It implements relevant Joint and Army doctrine, incorporates lessons learned from recent operations, and conforms to Army keystone doctrine.
The proponent of this publication is The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S.
Army. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 to Commandant, The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, ATTN: JAGS-CDD, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903-1 78 1.
Unless otherwise stated, specific gender pronouns include men and women.
Mission of The Judge Advocate General's Corps and Purpose of FM 27-100
The mission of judge advocates and supporting legal personnel is to provide professional legal services at all echelons of command throughout the range of military operations.' The purpose of Field Manual (FM) 27-100 is to describe how the Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGC) will provide legal support to operations and how commanders should integrate legal support in operationai planning and training.
Legal Support to Operations and Functional Areas
Legal support to operations encompasses all legal services provided by judge advocates and other legal personnel in support of units, commanders, and soldiers throughout an area of operations and across the spectrum of operations. Legal support to operations falls into three functional areas: command and control, sustainment, and personnel service support (or support for short). The following are illustrative examples of the types of legal support within these functional areas. Command and control functions include advice to commanders, staffs, and soldiers on the legal aspects of command ' authority, command discipline, the application of force, and the Law of War (Low). Some examples of judge advocates' command and control responsibilities are interpreting, drafting, and training commanders, staffs, and soldiers on rules of engagement; participating in targeting cells; participating in the military decision-making process; participating in information operations; applying the LOW; and advising commanders on policies prescribing soldier conduct and ensuring discipline (e.g., jurisdictional alignment, convening authority structure, and authority to issue General Orders). Generally, issues directly affecting the commander's operational decision-making process on the battlefield fall within command and control functions. Sustainrnent functions include negotiation of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements and status of forces agreements (SOFAS), combat contingency contracting, fiscal law, processing claims arising in an operational environment, and environmental law. Personnel service support functions include soldier discipline advocacy services (courts-martial, nonjudicial punishment, and other routine matters in the administration of military
justice), legal assistance services, and basic soldier-related claims issues.
Operational Law is that body of domestic, foreign, and international law that directly affects the conduct of operations. The practice of Operational Law consists of legal services that directly affect the command and control and sustainment of an operation. Thus, Operational Law consists of the command and control and sustainment functions of legal support to operations. Support functions are an integral part of legal support to operations; however, they are treated separately from this discussion of Operational Law.
Core Legal Disciplines
The six core legal disciplines are administrative law, civil law (including contract, fiscal, and environmental law), claims, international law, legal assistance, and military justice. Functional areas of legal support to operations contain some core legal disciplines in their entirety, and cut across others. For example, foreign claims are a sustainment function, while personnel claims are a personnel service support function. Functional areas of legal support are intended to describe better what combat (operational) functions are supported by particular legal services. While some traditional judge advocate functions are associated with Combat Service Support (CSS), legal support to operations goes beyond traditional CSS functions, and often impacts substantially on a commander's command, control, and sustainment of an operation. Further, providing critical legal support requires the presence of judge advocates and other legal personnel far forward and in key operational headquarters, centers, and cells.
Doctrine to Train and Operate
The United States Army is doctrine-based, and FM 27-100 contains the doctrine for legal support to operations. Doctrine within the military profession is the authoritative guide to how forces fight wars and conduct operations.' Doctrine builds on collective knowledge. It reflects wisdom that has been gained in past operations. It incorporates informed reasoning about how new technologies may best be used and new threats may best be re~isted.~ Doctrine, in this and other field manuals, records a shared and reasoned vision that can serve as the basis for planning operations, organizing and structuring forces, training soldiers and units, leading, developing tactics, and procuring weapons and equipment. The military professional who studies doctrine knows the principles that officially guide these essential functions of United States forces: doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS).
Effective doctrine is not dogma. It is not doctrinaire. It is not static. Effective doctrine is dynamic, adapting to changes on the battlefield and in the world. It is also balanced, reconciling the need for precision to achieve unity of effort with the need for flexibility to achieve decentralized appli~ation.~
FM 27-100 links JAGC roles and missions to current Army keystone doctrine, recorded in FM 100-5, Operations, and to developing doctrine. FM 100-5 and developing doctrine, in turn, link the Army's roles and missions to the National Military Strategy and the National SecuriQ Strategy. Developing doctrine takes the force projection concept enunciated in the 1993 FM 100-5 to a new level with the concept of strategic preclusion-moving so fast (strategic maneuver), with such lethality (strategic fires), that enemies cannot set forces and operate at an ad~antage.~This requires the ability to project fighting forces into more than one theater and to sustain those forces from support and staging bases that may or may not be in close proximity to the supported forces.
Changes in the strategic situation since the end of the Cold War, and the development of the Force XXI Army, require a new model of legal support to operations. Past doctrine must change to meet the demands of the significant increase in the number and types of Army missions, joint and combined operations, fluid operations, complex command and control relationships, and technological advancements. Thus, in addition to implementing FM 100-5 and national strategic documents, this manual implements or considers applicable portions of several joint doctrinal manuals, as well as FM 100-6, Information Operations; FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Amy in Theater Operations; FM 100-11, Force Integration; FM 100-15, Corps Operations; FM 100-16, Amy Operational Support; FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeploymen!, Demobilization; FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations; FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict; FM 100-23, Peace Operations; FM 100-25, Doctrine for AmySpecial Operations Forces; and other current Army manuals.
Judge advocates must be trained and prepared to operate independently across the spectrum of core legal disciplines and the spectrum of conflict, standing by the commander's side. To succeed in today's operational environment, judge advocates must be master general practitioners; effective in their roles as lawyer, ethical advisor, and counselor; increasingly knowledgeable as soldiers and lawyers; constantly aware of the operational situation; and proactively working to promote the mission, serve Army personnel and their families, and enhance the legitimacy of Army operations. Doctrine in this manual reflects that judge advocates are increasingly operating individually, or in smaller teams, in order to better support split-based operations and the specialized operational cells and headquarters required to run mobile, tailored forces.
Supporting legal personnel (warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers) must be proficient in battle-staff and legal tasks, and managing a legal office in the field. Legal specialists (enlisted soldiers and noncommissioned officers with military occupational specialty 71D) must spot potential legal issues and raise them for resolution. Legal specialists must operate under JA supervision across the range of core legal disciplines and the spectrum of conflict. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) must also perform traditional functions-training and taking care of troops. In addition to legal, staff, and office skills, all JAGC personnel must train to proficiency in soldier common tasks.
Accordingly, commanders, with the Staff Judge Advocate, are responsible for training and supporting judge advocates and their subordinates to ensure robust legal support to operations. Training must be conducted according to the Army's training principles, such as those found in FM 25-1 00, Training The Force, and FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training. Staff Judge Advocates must develop a training plan and Mission Essential Task Lists (METL), to include establishing conditions and standards, training objectives, and selection of battle tasks. The training plan must include training that integrates and trains JA personnel with the units they support in a variety of environments, settings, and exercises. Without active training, judge advocate personnel will not develop the soldier and lawyer skills needed to provide legal support to operations.
Operational law training and practice in all components must reflect that military operations are inevitably joint and increasingly combined. Army National Guard legal support is embedded in National Guard organizations, including the National Guard Bureau, State Area Commands, and subordinate guard units. U.S. Army Reserve legal support is embedded in Reserve units, such as the U.S. Army Reserve Command, and contained in Judge Advocate General Service Organizations (JAGSO). The recent advent of Active Component-Reserve Component (AC-RC) Divisions, with their teaming and training associations, dissolves some of these historical boundaries, meshing active and reserve component soldiers into a standing division headquarters with subordinate National Guard enhanced brigades.
Finally, the modern training and practice of operational law must recognize that digital and information technologies have profoundly altered the pace of operations and the manner in which judge advocates locate legal authority and introduce legal considerations into the conduct of military operations. The materiel required to provide legal support to operations derives from the three functional areas-command and control, sustainment, and personnel service support. A judge advocate must be able to shoot, move, communicate, and research on the battlefield. Thus, judge advocates must have vehicles, sophisticated automation equipment-to include the Rucksack Deployable Law Office and Library (RDL), communications equipment, and access to key communications modes, nodes, and nets. Current operations are more legally intense than ever before. They involve vast numbers of government, non-government, and private organizations. The judge advocate's ability to reach back through technical channels for research and support is'critical.
Legal Support to Operations
Chapter 1 Role of the Judge Advocate
1.1 THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS MISSION
The mission of the Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAW) is to provide professional legal support at all echelons of command throughout the range of military operations. This support includes Operational Law and the six Core Legal Disciplines, which support command and control, sustainment, and personnel service support.
Throughout the history of the United States Army, the JAGC has performed this mission by supporting the Army mission; providing quality legal services to commanders, staffs, personnel, and family members; and promoting the legitimacy of the Army both in American society and throughout the world.
As the 21StCentury dawns, the JAGC transitions along with the Army. The JAGC will capitalize on new information technologies, strengthen its technical support network, obtain new warfighting capabilities, master the legal issues affecting operations, and develop the Soldier-Lawyer-Leaders who will perform the JAGC's traditional roles in a challenging, new environment.
1.2 PERFORMING TRADITIONAL ROLES
Traditionally, judge advocates have mastered many fields of law, and performed several legal roles (judge, advocate, and counselor), all in support of three fundamental objectives: mission, service, and legitimacy.
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS' MISSION …… 1-1
The Military General
Practitioner…………………….. 1-3 The "Judge" Function …………. 1-4 The "Advocate" Function …….. 1-5 The "Ethical Adviser" 1-5
The "Counselor" Function ……. 1-5
IN A CHALLENGING NEW
ENVIRONMENT…………………………. 1-6 More Missions …………………….. 1-6 Complex Command & Control 1-7 International Operations ………. 1-7 Fluid Operations …………………. 1-7 Technological Advancements 1-8
CHALLENGES FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES IN THE 21st
Leg~t~macy SUMMARY………………………………… 1-10
"Mission" means protecting and promoting command authority, preserving Army resources, and ensuring fair military systems, especially the military justice system. Judge advocates promote command authority in several ways. They participate in the key military decision-making processes, becoming involved early to identify and resolve legal issues before they become command problems. They create efficiencies and improve unit effectiveness by leveraging legal solutions to accomplish Army missions in lawful ways. They add value to the organization as soldiers and individuals, applying their skills and energy to solve legal and non-legal problems. They administer the military justice system, which promotes the discipline that makes units effective. They provide advice on other Army procedures that promote organizational discipline, such as investigations, reports of survey, standards of conduct, and environmental compliance.
"Service" means meeting the legal needs of commanders, staffs, personnel, and family members. Judge advocates provide these clients legal advice based upon a thorough understanding of the situation, an analysis of lawful alternatives, and their individual professional judgment. They enhance C2, sustainrnent, and support operations by providing operational law advice and legal services in all core legal disciplines (military justice, international law, administrative law, civil law, claims, and legal assistance) during peacetime, war, and operations other than war.
"Legitimacy" means engendering public respect and support, promoting justice and ethical behavior. Judge advocates must be "competent, confident, caring, and courageous . . . grounded in values, and totally integrated into the arm^."^ They enhance the Army's legitimacy by integrating society's values into Army programs, operations, and decision-making processes.
To promote legitimacy, judge advocates must be well-grounded in Army and constitutional values. Frequently, there is tension between the military mission and civilian control that the judge advocate must resolve for the command. This tension existed in America before the Revolutionary war.. .
Prior to his assumption of command of the Continental Army, Washington had been deeply concerned with the administration of military justice. As early as 1756, when Washington was engaged in the French and Indian war, , he protested the enactment of the "act governing mutiny and desertion" which required a commander to obtain permission from the Governor of Virginia to hold a general court-martial and to obtain a warrant from Williamsburg, the colonial capital, before execution of
Legal Support to Operations
sentence. It was his opinion that if good discipline was to be maintained, justice had to be meted out expeditiously.'
…and continues to modern times.
The diflerences between the military and civilian communities result from the fact that it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise . . . . [T]he military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian, and . . . the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of
discipline and duty . . .
Judge advocates are able to reconcile these tensions for the command because of their status and specialized training as soldiers and lawyers. They serve as soldiers in every operational contingency; therefore, they appreciate Army values -Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Co~rage.~They are members United States Supreme Court
Parker v. Levys
of the legal profession; therefore, they appreciate American constitutional values, including civilian control.
Finally, to promote legitimacy, judge advocates must help the Army conduct operations in ways that will win public support.
The responsibility for the conduct and use of military forces is derived from the people and the government. The Army commits forces only after appropriate direction from the National Command Authorities (NCA). In the end, the people will pass judgment on the appropriateness of the conduct and use of military operations. Their values and
expectations must be met..
The Militarv General Practitioner
Judge advocates must not only display professional values and well- honed skills as a judge, advocate, and United States Army
Field Manual 100-5, Operationdo
counselor, but also have broad legal expertise. During the Spanish-American War, then Lieutenant Colonel Enoch Crowder served in the Philippines, where he worked on the arrangement for the Spanish surrender, headed the Board
of Claims, served on the Philippine Green assisted in drafting martial law Supreme Court, and drafted the documents and served as the executive Philippine Criminal Code." During to the Military Governor in Hawaii. World War II, then Colonel Thomas
"In a deployment, they've got to be ready to shift into 4-5 functional areas on any given day. They'll touch crim. law, operational law, fiscal law, foreign claims, personnel law, ethics … all in one day."
–LTC Michele M. Miller'2
Today, deploying judge advocates must be capable of providing comprehensive legal advice and services in all core legal disciplines (military justice, international law, administrative law, civil law, claims, and legal assistance) and, in addition, have general knowledge of legal sub-disciplines (e.g., contract law, fiscal law, environmental law, or intelligence activities law).
When practicing these core legal disciplines, a judge advocate must be an effective lawyer, which includes the roles of "judge" and "advocate," ethical advisor, and counselor. Recognizing the applicable function is of the utmost importance; the function must be appropriate to the task at hand.
1.2.5 The "Jud~e"Function
True to their title, judge advocates perform the function of "judge." They are routinely called upon for opinions or rulings on whether a law is applicable, a legal obligation exists, or a legal right must be respected.
This function is not limited to military judges and magistrates who participate in courts-martial and other proceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It applies also. to judge advocates rendering legal opinions, serving as legal advisors on official investigations, ruling on whether claims are cognizable, and reviewing the legality of procurement actions. As "judge," the judge advocate does not interpret the law on the basis of personal views or policy preferences, but rather on the basis of a careful reading of the authoritative rule and objective reasoning.
The judge function demands distinct skills: legal research and interpretation, reconciliation of facially contradictory precedents, and extensive knowledge of which legal authorities have precedence. It requires impartiality, diligence, independence, moral courage, and intimate knowledge of the facts. It requires prudence in refraining from activities that could cast doubt upon impartiality. It requires wisdom, care, sound judgment, and a judicious temperament.l3
Legal Support to Operations
1.2.6 The "Advocate" Function
Also true to their title, judge advocates perform the function of "advocate." They are commonly relied upon to make arguments about what a legal rule means or whether it applies, to present evidence, or to persuade.
Judge advocates frequently perform this function within a structured, adversarial proceeding, in which they prosecute or defend a particular client's interests. The client may be the command or an individual soldier. Advocacy skills may also be needed outside the courtroom: in liaison with environmental compliance agencies, non-governmental organizations or a host nation; or in formulating command policy, as a full understanding often requires the ability to see issues from different points of view.
Advocacy requires many important skills. These include careful study of substantive rules, applicable procedures, and decision-makers; conducting investigations; interviewing and examining witnesses; formulating theories; and composing arguments. Sometimes advocates use their persuasive skills to seek changes in the law. Ethical performance of the advocate function requires zealousness, but also candor and fairness.14
1.2.7 The "Ethical Adviser" Function
Judge advocates perform the additional function of advising commanders whether their actions are ethical. This includes appraising conduct in light of laws and regulations governing the conduct of government officials, but also includes consideration of other ethical precepts, including officer ethics and Army values.
1.2.8 The "Counselor" Function
Judge advocates also perform a "counselor" function in which they advise commanders whether proposed actions, while legal and ethical, are prudent.
Judge advocates functioning as counselors provide advice early in the decision-making process to enable the command to accomplish missions. They seek to be proactive and to confront problems before the problems confront the command.
When a judge advocate acts in any of these functions, they identify issues; formulate courses of action and evaluate their strengths, weaknesses, and legal consequences; anticipate potential legal attacks; consider ethical and prudential concerns; provide their personal recommendations to decision-makers; and frequently execute command decisions.
A variety of skills are required to perfom these functions. As a military staff officer, the judge advocate must plan, train, and coordinate, all with an understanding of the Army, its history, and operational art. Judge advocates must work constantly and tirelessly to acquire an intuitive and reasoned grasp of the command's interests and objectives. As a lawyer, the judge advocate must research, analyze,
negotiate, and mediate. By combining 1.3 IN A CHALLENGINGNEW
legal and military knowledge and skills, ENVIRONMENT
the judge advocate enhances decision-
making processes and contributes to Judge advocates must perform their
effective, ethical, and lawful mission traditional roles in a challenging, new
accomplishment. environment, described by Joint Vision 201 0 in this way:
Accelerating rates of change will make the future environment more unpredictable and less stable, presenting our Armed Forces with a wide range of plausible futures. Whatever direction global change ultimately takes, it will afSect how we think about and conduct joint and multinational operations in the 21'' century. How we respond to dynamic changes concerning potential adversaries, technological advances and their implications, and the emerging importance for information superiority will dramatically impact how well
our Aimed Forces can perform its duties in 2010."
The new environment will consist of Missions will increase not only in more missions, complex command and number, but also in diversity. The control relationships, international National Security Strategy requires operations, fluid operations, and military forces "to effectively deter technological advancements. aggression, conduct a wide range of
peacetime activities and smaller-scale
1.3.1 More Missions contingencies, and . . . win two overlapping major theater wars."lg
Missions are increasing in number Supporting national military objectives and type. "The US military will be include promoting peace and stability, called upon to respond to crises across and defeating adver~aries.~~ To the full range of military operations, accomplish these objectives, the Army from humanitarian assistance to fighting envisions a full spectrum of missions, and winning major theater wars . . ."I6 including defending or liberating Between 1990 and 1996, the Army territory, intrusions in support of "deployed 25 times -an increase in counterdrug and counterterrorism missions by a factor of 16."" During the operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, same period, the Army has become national and theater missile defense, smaller. Between 1989 and 1999, the multilateral military exercises, military-Active Army reduced from 781,000 to to-military exchanges, and humanitarian 468,000, and the Total Army from relief.21 1,960,000 to 1 ,068,000.18
Legal Support to Operations
1.3.2 Command and Control Relationships (.Joint, Multinational, and Interapencvl
Command and Control relationships will become increasingly complex. Operations will be joint and multinational, requiring improved interoperability among the services and with allied and coalition partners.22 Additionally, U.S. forces must "enhance their ability to operate in consonance with other U.S. government agencies, and with Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in a variety of settings."23 These relationships will require much of future leaders.
Our future leaders at all levels of command must understand the interrelationships among military power, diplomacy, and economic pressure, as well as the role of various government agencies and non-governmental actors, in achieving our security objectives. They will require a sophisticated understanding of historical context and communication skills to succeed in the future. The evolution of command structures, increased pace and scope of operations, and the continuing refinement of force structure and organizations will require leaders with a knowledge of the capabilities of all four services.24
1.3.3 International O~erations
U.S. Armed Forces will continue to be involved in international operations for several reasons. First, threats to United States security interests are international; they include regional conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, ethnic disputes, and international organized crime.25 Second, responding to these threats will require international cooperation. "We are continuing to adapt and strengthen our alliances and coalitions to meet the challenges of an evolving security en~ironment."~~
'This. will require military forces to act in cooperation with other nations' forces. Third, responding to these threats will require the full spectrum of military operations to shape the international environment, respond to international crises, and to deter and resolve international conflicts."
1.3.4 . Fluid Operations
Military forces will be required to be flexible, versatile, and responsive in changing missions and locations, and to do this as it restructures. "[Olur military must also be able to transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global engagement –from substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well as multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingen~ies."~~"AU organizations must become more responsive to contingencies, with less 'startup' time between deployment and employment. Because we rely on the total force to provide the full range of military capabilities, we also require responsive reserve components that can rapidly integrate into joint organization^."^^ The Army's "ability to project power is greater today than at any time in our Nation's history. . . . Today, we can deploy a heavy armored brigade in 96 hours. .. . our ability .. .will be further enhanced, thus making our forces even more versatile . .
This era will be one of accelerating technological change. Critical advances will have enonnous impact on all military forces. Successful adaptation of new and improved technologies may provide great increases in specific capabilities. Conversely, failure to understand and adapt could lead today's militaries into premature obsolescence and greatly increase the risks that such
forces will be incapable of eflective operations against forces with high te~hnology.~' 1
1.3.5 Technological Advancements
For judge advocates, the most significant technological advancement will occur in information systems. This will change operations in three important ways; it will accelerate the tempo of operations, allow fusion of information in distinct staffing cells, and empower decision-making at lower echelons than in the past.32
1.4 CHALLENGES FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
While judge advocates will continue to perform their traditional roles, the new environment will greatly affect how they pursue their three fundamental objectives -mission, service, and legitimacy.
Pursuing the mission in the 21st Century will challenge judge advocates in three distinct ways. First, judge advocates must become increasingly refined as soldiers and lawyers. Judge advocates must understand how the Army will accomplish its various missions, and how to identify and resolve legal issues arising during these missions. They must understand the command and control relationships involved in each operation, and provide advice concerning the authority and responsibility of relevant agencies. They must be thoroughly grounded in all core legal disciplines to be effective in a fluid operational environment. They must be increasingly knowledgeable in international law as the Army cooperates with other nations' forces to secure United States interests world-wide.
Second, judge advocates must become more involved in the military decision-making process in critical planning cells, and at lower levels of command. As information technology increases the speed of decision-making and allows fusion of information in distinct cells, it becomes critical for judge advocates to be located where the relevant picture of the battlefield is received, evaluated, resolved, and affected. Otherwise, legal advice will not be timely or effective. To be proactive, the judge advocate must be present. As information technology empowers decision-makers at lower
Legal Support to Operations
levels of command, judge advocates must be present there.
Third, judge advocates must be capable of expanding the level of legal support to meet the mission demands of a force projection army. Projection creates surges in demand for legal services: deploying forces require legal support; the power projection platform requires temporarily increased legal support during mobilization, and augmented legal support in the event of deployment of tenant units and their organic judge advocates; the home station continues to require legal support. Judge advocates, in both the active and reserve components, must plan for the legal resources to meet these demands, and must be prepared to provide services with the deploying unit, the power projection platform, or home station.
Providing effective service to commanders, staffs, personnel, and family members in the new environment will challenge judge advocates in four ways. First, judge advocates must maintain connectivity with operational and tactical networks and legal information sources in a fluid and technologically advanced environment. Of paramount importance will be the ability of the Rucksack Deployable Law Office and Library (RDL) to interface with Maneuver Control System -Phoenix (MCS-P), Global Combat Support System -Army (GCSS-A), Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS), and Legal Automated Army-Wide System (LAAWS). As future systems develop, judge advocate connectivity must continue.
Second, judge advocates must provide technical supervision (supervision of legal operations by a Staff Judge Advocate) and technical support (direct legal expertise from JAGC organizations) to deployed judge advocates in every contingency. The variety of legal issues arising from diverse missions is a tremendous legal challenge to a deployed judge advocate. This can be especially challenging in joint and multinational operations. In joint operations, service specific regulations and policies apply. In multinational operations, troop contributing nations must still comply with their national laws. Legal supervision and support must be effective to ensure quality legal service to commanders and staffs. RDL connectivity will be critical to providing this support.
Third, judge advocates must be mobile. They must move, not only with the supported unit, but also independently to investigate claims and potential war crimes, to be at the commander's side at key meetings, and to perform other legal missions. A judge advocate's ability to collect evidence first-hand is frequently the reference point from which a claim is adjudicated fairly, and the truth about a potential war crime is learned. Responsive service in a fluid operational environment requires dedication of transportation in support of the judge advocate.
Fourth,' judge advocates must provide professional legal services to personnel and families, most importantly during deployments and split-based operations. Expanding the level of legal support during demanding times will be the most significant challenge. Also important, however, will be allocating adequate legal resources: the trained personnel and facilities required to provide the professional atmosphere expected by clients.33 This contributes substantially to good quality of life, which in turn, retains quality people.
The future environment will challenge judge advocates in several ways. First, judge advocates must be well-grounded in constitutional and international law and values. Their understanding of, and ability to reconcile, those laws and values will be instrumental in promoting effective coalitions and international public respect for U.S. Army operations. Second, as the U.S. seeks to promote democracy abroad,34 the international community will expect U.S. Army operations to be consistent with democratic values. Therefore, the judge advocate's traditional role of assisting commanders to integrate democratic values into Army operations must continue. Finally, as the U.S. military "serves as a role model for militaries in emerging democracies around the
judge advocates must personally serve as teachers, trainers, and mentors for their counterparts.
The judge advocate in the 21St Century must adapt the traditional role to a more demanding, complex, fluid, international, and technological environment. The judge advocate must continue to be a master of all core legal disciplines, and must be effective in the roles of judge, advocate, ethical advisor, and counselor. The judge advocate will succeed in the new environment by becoming increasingly knowledgeable as soldiers and lawyers, maintaining constant awareness of the operational situation and communication with technical supervision and support, and integrating constitutional and international democratic values into. military operations.
Legal Support to Operations
The Assistant Judge Advocate General (TAJAG) supervises the organization, administration, and functioning of OTJAG; the Field Operating Agencies of OTJAG; the procurement and professional training of members of the Judge Advocate Legal Service; the proficiency of reserve component judge advocates; and the operations of the judge advocate Guard and Reserve Affairs Department, Regulatory Law and Intellectual Property Division, Legal Technology Resources Office, and Standards of Conduct Offi~e.~'
The Assistant Judge Advocate General for Civil Law and Litigation (AJAG/CLL) supervises or oversees Contract Law Division, Litigation Division, Procurement Fraud Division, Contract Appeals Division, Environmental Law Division, Defense Appellate Division, and Trial Defense Servi~e.~~
The Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law and Operations (AJAG/MLO) supervises or oversees Criminal Law Division, Administrative Law Division, International and Operational Law Division and the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO), Legal Assistance and Policy Division, Labor and Employment Law Division, and Government Appellate Di~ision.~~
The Army National Guard Special Assistant to TJAG is the principal advisor to TJAG concerning all niatters affecting judge advocates in the Army National Guard.
The Assistant Judge Advocate General for Operations is an Individual Mobilization Augmentee, and the principal advisor to TJAG concerning all matters affecting judge advocates in the
U.S. Army Reserve.
2.1.2 Field O~eratin~ A~encies
Certain enduring and specialized legal missions demand significant synergy or independence from the SJA sections that support various echelons of command. The Judge Advocate General's Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) are organizations designed to meet this institutional need.
2.1.3 The U.S. Armv Legal Services A~encv
The primary mission of USALSA is to deliver legal services to the Department of the Army in coordination with OTJAG; support and deliver legal services to field activities; and consolidate delivery of legal services by military judges and defense counsel to guarantee their independence. The organization is depicted in Figure 2-2.
Legal Support to Operations
Members of the JAGC in the Army National Guard serve in a unique status. Each is a full member of the JAGC and also a member of the particular state guard unit. Army National Guard judge advocates support their units' federal mission to maintain properly trained and equipped units that are available for prompt mobilization, and state mission to provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise required by the state.
The Army National Guard judge advocate's dual status can be useful. For example, an Army National Guard judge advocate in state status could be permitted to provide assistance to civilian authorities when a judge advocate in federal status might be precluded from providing assistance due to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act.
Military judges in the Army National Guard are trained and certified by TJAG similarly to the military judges in the Army and Army Reserve. While in state status, an Army National Guard military judge may, when authorized by applicable state law, preside over courts- martial convened under state law. Upon mobilization and federalization of an Army National Guard military judge, the Chief Trial Judge will review the Army National Guard military judge's training, background, experience, and qualities (demonstrated mature judgment and high moral character) to determine the officer's suitability to serve as a member of the Army Trial Judiciary. Army National Guard officers who qualify for such service may be assigned, as needed, to the Army Trial Judiciary.
2.1.6 U.S. Armv ' Reserve Le~al Or~anizations
Legal support in the U.S. Army Reserve consists of support embedded in
U.S. Army Reserve units, such as in the judge advocate sections of Garrison Support Units (GSUs) designed to provide legal services to power projection platforms, and in Judge Advocate General Service Organizations (JA GSOs).
JAGSOs are legal units that provide legal services to troops not otherwise provided organic legal support. Additionally, JAGSOs provide CONUS sustaining base support for mobilization, mobilization sustainment, and demobilization operations. JAGSOs consist of judge advocates, warrant officers, and enlisted legal personnel.
JAGSOs consist of modular teams that provide legal services in all core legal disciplines. JAGS0 teams are an integral part of the Total Force and must maintain high standards of professional proficiency and military readiness. TJAG is responsible for the technical supervision, training, and assignment of JAGS0 personnel. Training associations between active component and reserve component legal elements ensure quality training and seamless integration during mobilization.
Each type of JAGS0 has specific capabilities. The Legal Support Organization (LSO), which is commanded by a judge advocate, provides operational control and technical supervision for as many as four Legal Services Teams &ST). An LSO will be assigned primary duties as a
Legal Support to Operations
(MAJ), and a legal NCO (SSG). The Trial Defense Team (TDT) performs duties as defense counsel in proceedings before administrative boards, under Article 15, UCMJ, and in courts-martial. It is capable of providing defense services on the basis of one team per 12,000 soldiers. A TDT, which currently exists separately from the RTDT, consists of a senior defense counsel (MAJ), three defense counsel (CPT), and one legal NCO (SSG). To maintain their independence, when not mobilized, regional and trial defense teams assigned to defense legal support organizations operate under the technical supervision of the Chief, U.S. Army Trial Defense Service. Upon mobilization, defense teams organic to LSOsMSOs will be under operational control of the U.S. Army Trial Defense Service.
The Senior Military Judge Team performs judicial duties and supervises Military Judge Teams. Its members preside at general and special courts- martial, perform duties as military magistrates, and serve in various other judicial capacities. The team consists of a senior military judge (COL) and a legal NCO (SSG), and is capable of providing judicial services on the basis of one team per 15,000 soldiers. The Military Judge Teams, which currently exist separately, consist of a military judge (LTC) and a legal NCO (SGT). Upon mobilization and IAW 10 U.S.C. 826(c), military judge teams organic to LSOs/MSOs will be reassigned to the
U.S. Army Trial Judiciary, will come under the supervision and control of the USALSA, and will be employed as directed by the Chief Trial Judge and attached, as required.
The Army assigns JAGS0 teams to theater armies, theater army area commands, corps, corps support commands, and other organizations as required. To prepare and train for operational missions, it is important for active component SJAs to establish close relationships with supporting JAGSOs. The gaining organization SJA, therefore, is responsible for planning for the employment of JAGS0 team personnel. Except for regional and trial defense teams and senior and military judge teams, JAGS0 teams fall under the technical supervision and administrative control of the SJA of the organization to which a JAGS0 team is assigned. The JAGS0 teams may augment the SJA section or may work as a remote detachment. The active component SJA is responsible for tasking the JAGS0 to perform operational missions.
Upon mobilization, JAGS0 teams depend on the unit to which they are assigned for all logistical and administrative support. Personnel services, finance, communications, transportation, maintenance, automation equipment, and supply are all areas of support needed by the JAGSOs to enable them to deliver the operational law services for which they are designed.
While not on active duty, JAGS0 team duties depend on the units to which they are assigned (regional support command or regional support group) for all support and administrative functions. Typical areas of heavy support include maintenance, unit reporting requirements, common soldier skill training, and transportation.
Each LSO and LST is designated to provide legal services in support of either mobilization or other military operations. When supporting mobilization, the LSO or LST provides legal services to United States Army Reserve, National Guard, federal, and state agencies affiliated with mobilization. It assists Continental United States Army (CONUSA) SJAs in premobilization planning and in coordinating use of legal assets within the CONUSAs. It coordinates with regional support commands (RSC) or regional support groups (RSG) to provide required legal services, such as Soldier Readiness Processing, to expanded troop populations. It coordinates with RSC, RSG, STARCs, and installations to provide responsive legal services to family members and other authorized personnel. It assists in the re-acquisition of federal property for installation expansion, helps develop or revise Department of Army civilian work rules as required, and provides advice and assistance on acquisition matters while monitoring streamlined acquisition procedures for possible fraud or abuse.
Upon mobilization, one LSO and at least one TDT will be assigned to FORSCOM subordinate commands (most likely the CONUSAs) in each of the ten standardized federal regions to perform mobilization support and CONUS srrsiaimnent base missions. Twenty LSTs will be assigned to these missions and will be assigned as needed under the supervision of the ten mobilization support LSOs.
2.1.7 Staff Judpe Advocate Offices
The Ofice of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) is organic to units commanded by a general court-martial convening authority. An organization with a General Officer in command may also be assigned an OSJA, even if there is no general court-martial convening authority. OSJA provides all legal services to the organization except those which must be provided independently. The OSJA normally is composed of a Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), a Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (DSJA), Division Chiefs, judge advocates, a Legal Administrator, a Chief Legal Noncommissioned Officer (CLNCO), legal specialists, and federal civilian legal support staff.
The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), the senior judge advocate, is a member of the commander's personal sW and, as such, communicates directly with the commander to provide legal advice for all matters affecting morale, good order, and discipline of the command. Additionally, the SJA is a member of the commander's special staff.41 As such, the SJA serves under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, provides legal services to the staff, and coordinates with other staff members to provide responsive legal services throughout the organization.
The SJA, as a field representative of TJAG, provides technical supervision over all JAGC personnel and legal services in the command, including planning and resourcing legal support, conducting and evaluating training, and assignment and professional development of JAGC personnel
in a tactical operations center (TOC) or other headquarters structure. They must also perform traditional NCO functions-training and taking care of troops. In addition to legal, staff, and office skills, 71 D personnel must train to proficiency in soldier common tasks. They must be able to survive on the battlefield, and be able to help other soldiers survive.
Finally, legal specialists maintain a deployment legal office package (forms, supplies, equipment, references, etc.) ready to deploy in support of the legal office and the command. When required, the legal specialist provides administrative support during Soldier Readiness Processing (SRPs), and Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDREs), and to any other mobilization preparation process.
Civilian Legal Support StafS may include paralegals, court reporters, legal clerks, legal secretaries, and other supporting staff who provide paralegal and administrative support under the supervision of the SJA, Division Chiefs, judge advocates, and civilian attorneys.
2.1.8 Command Jud~e Advocates
A Command Judge Advocate (CJA) is the senior judge advocate in a legal office serving a commander who is not a general court-martial convening authority, anci who is not otherwise authorized an SJA. The CJA is the commander's personal legal advisor for all matters that affect the morale, good order, and discipline of the command and is a member of the commander's special staff. The CJA's relationship to the commander, subordinate commanders, and staff is similar to that of an SJA. The Regimental Judge Advocate of the Ranger Regiment is an example of a CJA.
The CJA supervises the legal specialists. With their assistance, the CJA provides legal support in required legal disciplines to the commander and the staff. Normally, the host installation OSJA will provide legal support in the disciplines of legal assistance, military justice, and claims. Nevertheless, a CJA may provide such services in accordance with the policies of the commander and the SJA of the host installation or the next higher command, and consistent with professional responsibility requirements.
Law Center Officers in Charge (OICs)
An OIC of a Law Center is a judge advocate responsible for supervising the provision of all legal services in a designated military community. The Law Center is a branch ofice of a senior headquarters SJA office. Law Centers are particularly common in Europe. Unlike CJAs, OICs typically are responsible to provide legal support in all core legal disciplines and to supervise legal services provided by law center personnel. The OIC typically advises the installation and tactical commanders in that community.
2.2 JOINT LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS44
Legal organizations are embedded in each joint organization, including the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, each unified, specified, and
Legal Support to Operations
subordinate unified command; and each joint task force. A&~ legal organizations support army organizations designated as a component command, or otherwise a part of a joint organization.
2.2.1 The Office of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Office of the Legal Counsel advises the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the legal basis for conducting operations, rules of engagement, and other international and domestic law affecting operations.
2.2.2 Unified, S~ecified, and Subordinate Unified Command Staff .ludee Advocates
SJA offices in these commands provide legal support to the command. Their specific organization and functions vary according to the mission of the Unified, Specified, or Subordinate Unified Command. Nevertheless, these offices are composed of an SJA or Legal Advisor, judge advocates with required specialities from various services, legal specialists, and civilian employees. These offices provide legal advice in international and operational law, law of the sea, air and space law, military justice, administrative law, civil law, claims, legal assistance, and any other required areas of law.
2.2.3 Joint Task Force Staff Judee Advocate
When a Combatant Commander forms a Joint Task Force (JTF), the combatant command SJA designs and staffs the JTF SJA office based on the JTF mission and organization. The JTF SJA provides the legal services required by the JTF, supervises legal services in organizations subordinate to the JTF, and coordinates additional legal support through the combatant command SJA. The JTF SJA will receive technical supervision from the combatant command SJA and will exercise technical supervision over legal personnel in organizations under JTF operational control.
2.3 MULTINATIONAL FORCE LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS
Legal organizations may be embedded in multinational headquarters to provide legal advice and support to multinational military operation^.^^ These multinational headquarters may derive their authority from the United Nations, a regional alliance, a bilateral or multilateral international agreement, an ad hoc coalition agreement, or a combination thereof.46 Regardless of the applicable international legal authority,
U.S. Forces and personnel remain subject to the U.S. National Command Authorities (NCA) and domestic law.
Legal organizations in multinational headquarters provide advice concerning command authority, the legal basis for operations, rules of engagement and the use of force, the status of multinational forces, and other issues. Legal advisors in multinational headquarters must find legal solutions that satisfy the legal standards of the international community and each troop contributing nation, or must forward issues to
superior national and international authorities for resolution.
2.4 PROVIDING ARMY LEGAL SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS
All the legal organizations described above provide legal support to operations in the deployment theater and at home station throughout all stages of the mobilization and operation. Organic legal organizations provide support to unit C2, sustainment, and support operations. JAGSOs and other reserve component judge advocates, such as the judge advocate sections GSUs, augment organic legal support in required core legal disciplines. SJAs of superior commands provide technical legal supervision and support to subordinate units. OTJAG, the Field Operating Agencies (USALSA & TJAGSA), and CLAM0 provide additional required technical legal support.
The challenge for the SJA is to provide legal support to operations that meets the organization's mission-specific requirements. The SJA meets this challenge by detailing operational lawyers (judge advocates) to each key operational cell (e.g., G-3 Plans, G-3 Operations, Information Operations, targeting cells, tactical command posts, civil military operation centers, and Brigade main CPs), providing all core legal disciplines at each division or corps command post and home station, and coordinating technical legal supervision, technical legal support, and augmentation requirements.
2.4.1 Overview of Operational Law Support
Operational Law (OPLAW) is that body of domestic, foreign, and international law that directly affects the conduct of operations. OPLAW tasks support the command and control and sustainment of military operations, including the military decision-making process and the conduct of operations. OPLAW supports the commander's military decision-making process by performing mission analysis, preparing legal estimates, designing the operational legal support architecture, wargaming, writing legal annexes, assisting in the development of Rules of Engagement (ROE), and reviewing plans and orders. OPLAW supports the conduct of operations by maintaining situational awareness; advising and assisting with targeting, ROE implementation, and information operations. Judge advocates performing OPLAW also provide or facilitate support in the core legal disciplines. Therefore judge advocates performing OPLAW must be well-versed in all core legal disciplines, skilled in managing legal operations, and effective in
relations with military commanders and staffs. The general OPLAW support concept is depicted in Figure 2-3, below.
Legal Support to Operations
Legal Support to Operations
The diagram also depicts communication and automation linkages from the company area to the CONUS sustaining base. Each Judge advocate must be linked to the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), particularly to Maneuver Control System -Phoenix (MCS-P), to Global Combat Support System -Army (GCSS-A), and to legal information networks through the kgai Automation Army-Wide System (LAAWS). Only then will judge advocates know the situation and have the complete and current legal information required to provide the proactive, timely, and accurate legal advice that will empower and sustain the force.
Not depicted in the diagram, but vital to effective legal support, are the equipment and transportation requirements. Legal organizations must be as capable as the units they support. The OSJA element in a corps, division, or brigade Command Post must have the workspace, communications and automation capabilities, and transportation assets to function in coordination with the staff. Other critical equipment requirements include radios linked with tactical nets, global positioning devices, and the RDL. (The RDL and its components are discussed in Chapter 4.) In addition, many legal functions require mobility: the SJA must travel to supervise legal services (as must the DSJA when managing legal services at another command post); foreign claims and war crimes investigation teams must travel to investigate claims and potential war crimes; judge advocates must attend Joint Military Commission meetings and meetings with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations; trial and trial defense counsel must travel to counsel commanders or clients and investigate cases.
2.4.2 tailor in^ Operational Law Su~port
The SJA begins tailoring legal support to an operation by analyzing METT-TC (mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, time available, and civilian considerations) to determine the potential legal issues, the extent of support required within each core legal discipline, and the legal resources available. Substantial and helpful information is available to assist the SJA in this analysis in the Operational Law Handbook, which is published annually by the International and Operational Law Department at TJAGSA, and in lessons learned on file with CLAMO.
Next, the SJA must design the legal support architecture for the operation. There are two requirements: first, judge advocates, and any required legal specialists, must deploy with each key operational cell; second, the SJA must provide support in all core legal disciplines to both the deployed force and home station, even if support in some disciplines is not deployed. These requirements place significant demands upon the legal organization. SJAs must consider the need for augmentation and address concerns through legal technical channels.
To meet these two requirements, there are two complementary strategies. First, the SJA may deploy a legal organization equipped to provide support in all legal disciplines. This structure may contain a proportionate slice from each division. (Significant efficiencies are obtainable by deploying personnel skilled in multiple legal disciplines. Therefore, SJAs must ensure that judge advocates and legal specialists are trained in multiple disciplines.) Second, the SJA may deploy legal support in a particular legal discipline, while providing other legal support from the home station or other location. (For example, if a commander deploys an organization to perform a mission of brief duration and likely to involve claims issues, the SJA may deploy all or part of the claims division.) These approaches are not mutually exclusive; they may be blended to meet mission requirements.
Finally, the SJA must coordinate technical legal supervision and support. Judge advocates receive technical legal supervision (i.e., guidance, direction, and assistance in the discharge of their duties) from TJAG and SJAs of superior commands.48 Judge advocates may receive technical legal support (i-e., legal information or expertise) from any Army legal organization. Technical legal supervision and support normally follow the chain of command. In joint operations, or when Army units are operationally controlled by other Army organizations, technical supervision follows operational control; superior parent and supported headquarters should both provide required technical support. Nevertheless, technical supervision and support arrangements must be coordinated for each specific core legal discipline. For example, military justice supervision and support could either lie with the parent
command or the joint headquarters. In allied or coalition legal organizations, technical legal supervision will be dual (national and international). SJAs supporting allied or coalition organizations must coordinate thoroughly to define the parameters of technical legal supervision, as well as to resolve the myriad legal concerns arising during operations.
TJAG heads and directs all legal services in the Army, and provides legal support for operations at all levels of command. Embedded legal organizations (OSJAs or CJAs) in the active and reserve components and in joint organizations provide operational law and core legal discipline support to their parent organizations. Special legal units (JAGSOs) augment legal support as required by the mission. Judicial and trial defense services are provided by independent legal organizations in order to preserve the integrity of the military justice system. Joint and multinational legal organizations provide operational law support and supervise legal operations of subordinate units within the parameters of international and domestic law.
SJAs tailor, or task organize, legal support for each specific operation, by detailing judge advocates and any required legal specialists, to all key operational cells, providing support in all core legal disciplines to the deploying force and home station, and ensuring effective technical legal supervision and support. The result is responsive, proactive, flexible, and expandable legal support in every operational contingency.
Legal Support to Operations
Chapter 3 OPLAW and Core Legal Disciplines Supporting Army Operations
The last chapter described legal organizations supporting operations, and how SJAs tailor, or task organize, to provide legal support to operations. This chapter describes OPLAW and the core legal disciplines (military justice, international law, administrative law, civil law, claims, and legal assistance) that Army legal organizations provide. Subsequent chapters will provide information about legal support to specific types of military operations.
As discussed in the previous chapter, legal support to each operation must consider the organization's mission-specific requirements, and include legal support in OPLAW and each core legal discipline. OPLAW and the core legal disciplines contribute directly to the command and control (C2), sustainment, and personnel service support required by the organization. Different aspects of a core legal discipline may support C2, sustainment, or personnel service support. For example, foreign claims are a sustainment function, while personnel claims are personnel service support. It is important that SJAs tailor legal support (OPLAW and core legal disciplines) to the organization' s mission-specific requirements. Therefore, this chapter will describe OPLAW and the core legal disciplines, what tasks are performed, where they are performed, and how they support each phase of an operation from premobilization through demobilization.
MILITARY JUSTICE …………………….
INTERNATIONAL LAW ………………..
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ……………….
CIVIL LAW ………………………………
LEGAL ASSISTANCE ………………….
OPLAW is that body of domestic, foreign, and international law that directly affects the conduct of operations.
OPLAW supports the command and control of military operations, to include the military decision-making process and the conduct of operations. OPLAW supports the military decision-making process by performing mission analysis, preparing legal estimates, designing the operational legal support architecture, wargaming, writing legal annexes, assisting in the development and training of Rules of Engagement (ROE), and reviewing plans and orders. OPLAW supports the conduct of operations by maintaining situational awareness, and advising and assisting with targeting, ROE implementation, and information operations. OPLAW also involves the provision of core legal disciplines that sustain the force.
SJAs normally provide OPLAW support at each Brigade Headquarters (Main CP), and at each key operational cell at every higher level of command (TAC CP, Main CP, Rear CP, G-3 Plans, G-3 Operations, Information Operations, and Targeting Cell). OPLAW support is also provided at each joint and multinational headquarters. Some missions will also require BPLAW support at battalion level, or in specialized units or operational cells. This is increasingly the case in peace operations and disaster relief.
As OPLAW directly affects the conduct of military operations, its tasks must generally be performed throughout all phases of any operation, from before mobilization through demobilization. Nevertheless, the OPLAW Judge Advocate's (OPLAW JAYs) focus will change during these phases. The focus during premobilization, mobilization, and predeployment will be on OPLAW military decision-making functions. The focus shifts toward tasks related to the conduct of operations from deployment through demobilization. During all phases, however, the OPLAW JA must provide or facilitate support in core legal disciplines required to sustain the organization.
Before mobilization, OPLAW JAs and legal specialists should conduct contingency planning, deployment preparation, and training. OPLAW JAs must proactively develop staff skills and relationships at all times, not merely before deployment. Deployment preparation, a cooperative effort between the OPLAW JAY the CLNCO, the Legal Administrator, and other key personnel, should include developing SOPS, identifying deploying personnel, marshaling resources, and establishing liaisons. Training before mobilization should develop legal personnel in their soldiering and legal skills, provide mission-related legal information to unit personnel, integrate legal personnel into unit training events, and establish relationships with reserve component legal personnel who will support legal operations upon mobilization.
During mobilization and predeployment, OPLAW JAs, with the assistance of legal specialists, should receive and integrate mobilized legal personnel who are supporting deploying and non-deploying units; conduct
Legal Support to Operations
mission briefings for deploying personnel regarding ROE, general orders, code of conduct, law of war, and other appropriate legal topics; conduct final mission planning; and coordinate legal support for individual deployment readiness.
During deployment and entry, OPLAW tasks related to the conduct of operations become more critical. OPLAW JAs must maintain situational awareness to provide effective advice about targeting, ROE, and legal aspects of current operations (including information operations). For this reason, judge advocates should deploy with their RDLs, vehicles, radios, and global positioning devices in a sequence that ensures their presence in key operational cells at all times. Deploying legal specialists help the OPLAW JA maintain situational awareness during the operation by attending briefings, monitoring email traffic, tracking the battle, and providing other required assistance. Upon entry, OPLAW JAs must organize and coordinate the delivery of legal services in all core legal disciplines in accordance with the legal annex to the OPLAN or OPORD. Finally, even during fast-paced operations, OPLAW JAs must continue to perform OPLAW military decision- making process functions in support of the staff's operational planning.
During redeployment and demobilization, OPLAW JAs and legal specialists must perform several recovery tasks: assist the redeployment of legal personnel and equipment, participate in the command's after-action reviews and lessons learned processes, and catalogue and retain legal files and journals. SJAs should forward after action reports and all pertinent legal documents, memoranda, email, et cetera, to the CLAMO, and integrate them into future contingency planning, deployment preparations, and training.
3.3 MILITARY JUSTICE
Military justice is the administration of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and the disposition of alleged violations by judicial (courts-martial) or nonjudicial (Article 15,UCMJ) means. The purpose of military justice, as a part of military law, is '"to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United
TJAG is "responsible for the overall supervision and administration of military justice within the Army."5o The commander is responsible for the administration of military justice in the unit, and must communicate directly with the SJA about military justice matters.51
There are three components of military justice, each with its distinct functions. First, the SJA is responsible for military justice advice and services to the command. The SJA advises commanders concerning the administration of justice, the disposition of alleged offenses, appeals of nonjudicial punishment, and action on court-martial findings and sentences." The SJA supervises the administration and prosecution of courts-martial, preparation of records of mal, the victim-witness assistance program, and military justice training.53
Second, the Chief, United States hy Trial Defense Service "exercises supervision, control, and direction of defense counsel services in the Army."54 Judge advocates assigned to the Trial Defense Service advise soldiers and represent soldiers before courts-martial. These judge advocates also represent soldiers in adverse administrative hearings.
Third, the Chief Trial Judge, United States Army Trial Judiciary provides military judges for general and special courts-martial, supervises military judges, promulgates rules of court, and supervises the military magistrate program.55 Military Judges assigned to the Trial Judiciary preside over courts- martial, exercise judicial independence in the conduct of courts-martial, conduct training sessions for trial and defense counsel, and perform or supervise military magistrate functions.56 Military magistrate functions include the review of pretrial confinement and confinement pending the outcome of foreign criminal charges; and the issuance of search, seizure, or apprehension authorization~.~'
Military justice services are semi-centralized to facilitate timely, e*cien? delivery. Noranally, courts-martial are processed at theater, corps, division, or other headquarters commanded by a general court-martial convening authority. Joint Force Commanders, and Army Brigade and Battalion' Commanders also have court-martial convening authority, and may require support to conduct courts-martial. Trials may be held at the main or rear command post. The convening authority may designate where the court- martial will meet IAW Rules for Courts- Martial (RCM) 504(d) and RCM 906(b)(ll) and consistent with rulings of the military judge. SJAs provide military justice advice to general court- martial convening authorities, including Joint Force Commanders with general court-martial authority. Other judge advocates provide military justice advice to subordinate commanders. Legal specialists in battalion, squadron, and higher headquarters prepare and manage military justice actions, and provide other technical legal and administrative support for military justice. As the situation requires, LSTs specializing in criminal law may assist theater, corps, or division military justice operations. In multinational organizations, each troop contributing nation is responsible for the discipline of its military personnel. Thus, the U.S. element of the multinational organization will require military justice support.
Trial defense and judiciary services are provided on an area basis under the independent supervision and control of the U.S. Army Trial Defense Service and
U.S. Army Trial Judiciary, respectively. Trial Defense Counsel will normally be located with SJA sections at theater, corps, and division, from where they travel throughout the operational area to provide advice and services as far forward as required. Military Judges are normally collocated with SJA sections at theater, corps, and division, depending upon judicial workloads. As the situation requires, LSTs specializing in trial defense or judiciary services assist
wherever needed in the theater. The Chief, U.S. Army Trial Defense Service, and Chief Trial Judge, U.S. Army Trial Judiciary, supervise Defense Teams and Military Judge Teams, respectively.
Military justice support must transition through the phases of military operations smoothly, providing continuity in jurisdiction and responsive support to the deployment theater and home station. Critical to success are prior planning, mission training, and staff augmentation.
Before mobilization, the primary focus is planning. The SJA's planning for military justice operations should include the preparation of key personnel for deployment, the identification and marshaling of resources and personnel to support split-based operations, the identification and alignment of court-martial convening authorities, the guidance for disposing of pending cases upon deployment, the selection of court- martial panels in the deployment theater, the content of a general order for the operation, the strategy for supporting military justice in the deployment theater and at the home station, and the coordination of support for trial defense and judiciary services.58 The supporting Regional Defense Counsel (RDC) must develop an operation support strategy, prepare personnel for deployment, and marshal resources. Of particular importance are the RDC's plans for mobility in theater and technical supervision of deployed Defense Counsel. The supporting Chief Circuit Judge must likewise plan for operations.
During mobilization and predeployment, the SJA must execute
Legal Support to Operations
the military justice transition and conduct mission training. Transition tasks may include aligning the convening authority structure for the deployment theater and home station, ensuring units and personnel are assigned or attached to the appropriate organization for the administration of military justice, requesting or accomplishing required designations of home station convening authorities, transferring individual cases to new convening authorities when necessary, and publishing a general order for the ~peration.~~Mission training will include briefings to deploying and home station commanders concerning military justice operations, and briefings to deploying soldiers concerning the terms of the general order for the ~peration.~"
During deployment and entry, the SJA must ensure the military justice support arrangements are in place and operating properly. The SJA should ensure orders assigning units and personnel clearly indicate which commander has nonjudicial punishment and court-martial authority. Rear detachment commanders at the home station will require military justice training, which should emphasize the commander's autho~ity and responsibility, and the prevention of unlawful command infl~ence.~~
Finally, the SJA should expect an increase in the home station military justice workload, and must ensure that resources are properly allocated between the deployment theater and home station.62
During redeployment and demobilization, the SJA transitions back to the original home station military justice structure. This will
normally include returning to the original convening authority structure, ensuring units and personnel are assigned or attached back to the appropriate organization for the administration of military justice, revoking the designations of home station convening authorities established for the operation, transferring individual cases, and rescinding the general order for the operation.
3.4 INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law is the application of international agreements, international customary practices, and the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations to military operations and activities. Within the Army, the practice of international law also includes foreign law, comparative law, martial law, and domestic law affecting overseas, intelligence, security assistance, counter-drug, and civil assistance a~tivities.~~
The SJA's international law responsibilities include: implementation of the DoD Law of War (LOW) Program, including LOW training, advice concerning the application of the LOW (or other humanitarian law) to military operations, the determination of enemy prisoner of war (EPW) status, and supervision of war crime investigations and trials; assistance with internationai legai issues relating co U.S. forces overseas, including the legal basis for conducting operations, status of forces agreements, and the impact of foreign law on Army activities and personnel; the monitoring of foreign trials and confinement of Army military and civilian personnel and their dependents; assistance with legal issues in intelligence, security assistance, counter-drug, and civil assistance activities; advice to the command concerning the development of international agreements; and legal liaison with host or allied nation legal a~thorities.~~
Normally, the SJA provides international law support at the main and rear command posts in Army of Excellence divisions and corps, and main command posts in Force XXI divisions and corps, TAACOM or TSC headquarters, Theater Army headquarters, and each joint and multinational headquarters. In addition, international law support may be required at brigade and battalion headquarters.
International Law tasks will vary from phase to phase, but are designed to ensure operational capability and support international legitimacy throughout all phases of an operation.
Before mobilization, international law planning is preeminent. The SJA and international law attorneys must thoroughly understand the contingency plan and the international law affecting the planned operation. They must ensure the contingency plan complies with international legal obligations, including obligations to EPWs and civilians. They must also identify and obtain relevant international agreements (e.g., status of forces agreements, exchanges of diplomatic notes, and acquisition and cross-servicing agreements), identify requirements for additional agreements, and forward these requirements through higher headquarters to the proper negotiation authority. International law planning objectives include informing the commander and staff of the international legal obligations on the force, minimizing legal obligations or their effects on the force, protecting the legal status of unit personnel, ensuring rights of transit, and providing responsive and economical host nation support. At the same time, international law attorneys are responsible for training unit personnel on the LOW and other international law affecting potential operations.
During mobilization and predeployment, establishing liaison and briefing deploying personnel are the principal international law tasks. The SJA should establish liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the country team for the area of operations, legal officials in the host nation, and other government, nongovernmental, international, and private voluntary organizations, as directed by the commander. The purposes of this liaison are to establish productive relationships that will help sustain the operation; coordinate the legal aspects of the deployment and entry; confirm understanding of agreements concerning status of forceP, rights of transit, basing, and host nation support; and provide assurance of compliance with international legal requirements. Briefings to deploying personnel should cover the legal basis for the operation, the legal status of deploying personnel, relevant country law, guidance on the treatment of civilians in the area of operation^,^^ and the applicability of the LOW or other humanitarian law.
Legal Support to Operations
During deployment and entry, the SJA's principal international law tasks are advising the command and managing legal processes. These tasks require continuous liaison with the country team, host nation legal officials, the ICRC, and other agencies related to the operation; and effective integration into the headquarters staff. Advice to the command may involve the law of war, including advice to the EPW team; interpretation of international agreements; treatment of civilians or foreign diplomats; assistance to international organizations, U.S. or host nation government organizations, non-government organizations (NGOs), or private volunteer organizations (PVOs); civil affairs; and other international legal matters. Legal processes include the investigation and trial of war crimes, Article V tribunal proceedings, foreign criminal trials of U.S. personnel, foreign civil or administrative proceedings, and proceedings conducted under occupation or martial law.
During redeployment and demobilization, the SJA's international law priority is to resolve legal issues remaining from the deployment or relating to redeployment. Significant tasks may include coordinating the legal aspects of base closures, resolving host nation support issues, managing war crimes investigations, monitoring
Administrative law is the body of law containing the statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions that govern the establishment, functioning, and command of military organizations. The practice of administrative law includes advice to commanders and litigation on behalf of the Army involving many specialized legal areas, including military personnel law, government information practices, investigations, relationships with private organizations, labor relations, civilian employment law, military installations, and government
Administrative law attorneys perform the following functions: advise commanders, review actions, and litigate cases involving military personnel law; advise Army officials regarding their obligations under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act; advise investigating officers, review investigations for legal sufficiency, and advise appointing authorities concerning investigative findings and recommendations; advise Army officials concerning support for and relationships with private organizations; advise Army officials concerning labor relations, including certifying and negotiating with labor unions, grievances and arbitration, and unfair labor practice allegations; advise Army officials concerning the recruiting, hiring, evaluating, and disciplining of employees, and represent the Army in litigation arising from employee ,gievances and discrimination complaints; advise installation commanders concerning the legal authorities applying to military installations; and advise Army personnel concerning government ethics, and supervise the command financial
disclosure and ethics training
Administrative law support is usually provided at brigade headquarters, main and rear command posts in Army of Excellence divisions and corps, main command posts in Force XXI divisions and corps, COSCOM headquarters, and at each higher army, joint, and multinational headquarters. Because of the vast scope of issues they face, administrative law attorneys, especially, must be capable of conducting specific technical legal research and writing.
Administrative law support must be provided during all phases of an operation. The legal research capabilities and technical support structure must be robust to provide specialized legal knowledge and the flexibility to resolve different issues as an operation moves through its phases.
Before mobilization, administrative law attorneys must identify the issues likely to arise in the operation and provide policy guidance in the OPLAN. Consideration of the likely legal issues must take into account the participating organizations -joint, allied or coalition, international, non-governmental, and private. The plan should include policy guidance concerning access by non-DoD personnel to unit facilities and ~ervices.~'
During mobilization and predeployment, administrative law attorneys must provide prompt guidance to commanders concerning military personnel issues that typically arise immediately before deployment, such as conscientious objection and family care plan failure^.^' They should also brief deploying personnel concerning issues arising in the theater, e.g., family care plans and foreign gifts.71
During deployment and entry, administrative law attorneys will provide advice and assistance with the legal issues that arise in theater. They should be prepared to spend considerable time and effort on command investigations, as these may have a significant impact on the unit and mission.72 They must also, even in a deployed environment, supervise the government ethics program, including the filing of financial disclosure forms.73
During redeployment and demobilization, administrative law attorneys will assist with issues that arise, and will continue to manage the legal aspects of ongoing investigations and other actions as they redeploy to home station.
3.6 CIVIL LAW
Civil law is the body of law containing the statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions that govern the rights and duties of military organizations and installations with regard to civil authorities. The practice of civil law includes contract law, fiscal law, environmental law, as well as many other specialized areas of law.74
Contract law is the application of domestic and international law to the acquisition of goods, services, and construction. The practice of contract law includes battlefield acquisition, contingency contracting, bid protests and contract dispute litigation, Legal Support to Operations
procurement fraud oversight, commercial activities, and acquisition and cross-servicing agreement^.^^
The SJAYs contract law responsibilities include furnishing legal advice and assistance to procurement officials during all phases of the contracting process, overseeing an effective procurement fraud abatement program; and providing legal advice to the command concerning battlefield acquisition, contingency contracting, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs), the commercial activities program, and overseas real estate and construction.
Legal counsel must participate fully in the acquisition process, make themselves continuously available to their clients, involve themselves early in the contracting process, communicate closely with procurement officials and contract lawyers in the technical supervision chain, and provide legal and business advice as part of the contract management team.76 To accomplish this, SJAs usually provide contract law support at the main and rear commarid posts in Army of Excellence divisions and corps, main command posts in Force XXI divisions and corps, COSCOM, Theater Support Command Headquarters, and each higher army and
joint headquarters. Contract law advice may also be required at brigade or battalion headquarters. SJAs should deploy a contract law attorney with contracting Early Entry Modules (EEM). OPLAW JAs supporting a DISCOM or COSCOM should be trained in contract law. Expertise may be required at the multinational command headquarters to advise concerning international
Fiscal law is the application of domestic statutes and regulations to the funding of military operations, and support to non-federal agencies and organizations.
The SJA's fiscal law responsibilities include furnishing legal advice on the proper use and expenditure of funds, interagency agreements for logistics support, security assistance, and support to non-federal agencies and organizations.
SJAs usually provide fiscal law support at the main and rear command 'posts in Army of Excellence divisions and corps, main command posts in Force XXI divisions and corps, DISCOM, COSCOM, TAACOM/ TSC headquarters, and each higher army and joint headquarters. Expertise may also be required at the multinational command headquarters to advise concerning international support agreements.
Environmental law is the body of law containing the statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions relating to Army activities affecting the environment to include navigable waters, near-shore and open waters and any other surface water, groundwater, drinking water supply, Imd surface or subsurf~ce~ez,~mbient air, vegetation, wildlife, and humans.77 Overseas, host nation law may also affect Army operations.
SJAs provide legal advice and services on all aspects of environmental matters, to include representing Army activities in environmental litigation and at hearings before local, state, or federal agencies in coordination with the Chief, Environmental Law Division, USALSA, and the Department of Justice (DoJ); monitoring state and federal environmental legislative and regulatory developments; providing advice concerning the appropriateness of any environmental enforcement activities; and reviewing all draft environmental orders, consent agreements, and settlements with Federal, state, or local regulatory officials before signature.78
SJAs usually provide environmental law support at the main and rear command posts in Army of Excellence divisions and corps, main command posts in Force XXI divisions and corps, DISCOM, COSCOM, Theater Support Command Headquarters, and each higher army and joint headquarters.
Civil lawyers must support all phases of an ~peration;~'nevertheless, the issues and requirements they face will change during each operational phase.
Before deployment, planning and training are the primary concerns. Contract lawyers assist the planning for contracting by identifying the legal authorities for contracting, obtaining relevant acquisition agreements or requesting their negotiation, helping the contracting team to define requirements and to establish procurement procedures for the operation, and reviewing the contracting support plan for legal sufficiency. Fiscal lawyers assist the planning by identifying funding authorities supporting the mission. Environmental lawyers assist the planning by providing legal advice concerning environmental reviews and environmental requirements in the area of operations, and by reviewing plans to ensure plans address environmental law and policy requirements. The environmental plan should address policies and responsibilities to protect the environment, certification of local
preservation, and the base field spill plan.80
During mobilization and predeployment, support to the contracting and real estate EEMs is important. A contract lawyer should deploy with the contracting EEM; an environmental lawyer should deploy with the real estate EEM. In preparation for deployment, these judge advocates or civilian attorneys must marshal resources, assist the EEM's final coordination to include confing warrants, funding sources and environmental legal requirements, and establish liaison with the country team in theater. Upon arrival in theater, the contract lawyer and environmental lawyer support the EEM missions of facilitating the deployment and entry of forces. The environmental lawyer should ensure an environmental survey is completed to provide a baseline against which later claims for damage may be as~essed.~'
During deployment and entry, civil law support must be responsive to force requirements. SJAs must plan for additional contract law and fiscal law support as the theater matures, because
Legal Support to Operations
contracting and fiscal issues will increase in number and comple~ity.~~ SJAs should encourage the use of Acquisition Review Boards, as these promote prudent management of resources and proactive resolution of logistical support issues.83 SJAs must maintain close coordination with the organization's environmental team and civil affairs section, and liaison with the country team and local environmental legal authorities.
During redeployment and demobilization, civil lawyers support force redeployment and close-out. Contracts for subsistence, temporary lodging, or transportation are required to allow logistics units to redeploy. During close-out, contract and environmental claims or disputes will arise. Civil lawyers help contracting and real estate officials resolve claims or disputes. When claims or disputes are not resolved, the civil lawyer will support the contracting and real estate personnel who are responsible for litigati~n.'~Civil lawyers are normally required until all forces leave the area, and therefore normally redeploy last. Even after redeployment, unresolved contractir~g and environmental issues may require legal support.
The Army Claims Program investigates, processes, adjudicates, and settles claims on behalf of and against the United States world-wide "under the authority conferred by statutes, regulations, international and interagency agreements, and DoD
directive^."^^ The Claims Program supports commanders by preventing distractions to the operation from claimants, promoting the morale of Army personnel by compensating them for property damage suffered incident to service, and promoting good will with the local population by providing compensation for personal injury or property damage caused by Army or DoD per~onnel.'~ Categories of claims include claims for property damage of soldiers and other employees arising incident to service, torts alleged against Army or DoD personnel acting within the scope of employment, and claims by the United States against individuals who injure Army personnel or damage Army property."
The Secretary of the Army (SA) heads the Army Claims System.'' TJAG supervises the Army Claims Program and settles claims in accordance with delegated authority from the SA." The
U.S. Army Claims Service (USARCS) administers the Army Claims Program and designates area claims offices, claims processing offices, and claims attorneys?' SJAs, or other supervisory judge advocates, operate each command's claims program and supervise the area claims office (ACO) or claims processing office (CPO) designated by USARCS for the command.g1 ACOs and CPOs are the normal claims offices at Army installations that investigate, process, adjudicate, and settle claims against the United States; and identify, investigate, and assert claims on behalf of the United States.92 Claims attorneys at each level settle claims within delegated authority and forward claims exceeding that authority to the appropriate settlement authority.93
Claims must be investigated and paid in an area of operation^.^^ In multinational operations, unless otherwise specified in applicable agreements, a troop contributing nation is generally responsible to resolve claims arising from its own operations. Foreign claims against the U.S. will normally be resolved by the service assigned claims responsibility for the area. Claims attorneys should consult DoD Directive 5515.8, Single-Service Assignment of Responsibility for Processing of Claims (June 1990). U.S. personnel claims will normally be resolved by the parent service. Amy claims services are normally provided in the main or rear command posts in Army of Excellence divisions and corps, main command posts in Force XXI divisions and corps, the Theater Support Command headquarters, and Theater Army headquarters. While claims services are centrally processed at these locations, claims personnel must travel throughout the area of operations to investigate, negotiate, and settle claims.
Before mobilization, commanders should appoint unit claims officers (UCO); UCOs document and report incidents to claims offices that might result in a claim by or against the United States.95 The SJA and Chief of Claims should develop the claims architecture for the planned operation, and provide training for deployable claims attorneys, legal specialists, and UCOs. The claims architecture should prescribe the technical chain of claims authority, identify additional required claims processing offices or foreign claims commissions, and describe the claims procedures applying during the operation. Claims architecture planning
Legal Support to Operations
factors include the type and duration of deployment, the area to which deployed, the existence of international agreements governing the presence of U.S. personnel and the processing of claims, host nation law, and service claims responsibility for the area.96 Claims procedures should describe how claims are received, investigated, processed, adjudicated, and paidag7 Training for claims personnel should cover foreign claims procedures, prevention of property damage and personal injury, investigative techniques, and documentation of preexisting damage.98
During mobilization and predeployment, SJAs and Chiefs of Claims should provide preventive law advice concerning home station storage of personal property, and information briefings to deploying personnel about theater claims policies, including policies concerning any types or amounts of personal property for which compensation will not be paid. SJAs and Chiefs of Claims should also coordinate with USARCS to facilitate the appointment of Foreign Claims Commissions or Claims Processing Offi~es.9~
During deployment and entry, claims personnel establish the claims operation and perform claims services. When establishing the claims operation, the senior claims attorney in theater should inform host nation authorities how claims will be processed, provide information to the local population about claims procedures, and obtain translation services and local legal advice.'@' Critical at this point are efforts by claims personnel and UCOs to document the existing condition of base camps, unit locations, or transportation routes; good documentation at the beginning of an operation will enable accurate payment of legitimate claims and prevent payment of fraudulent or inflated ~laims.'~' The digital camera that is a component of the RDL is very useful for this purpose. When performing claims services, the senior claims attorney should coordinate with UCOs to assist them with claims investigations; with Civil Military Operations (CMO) to facilitate liaison with local officials, learn about local customs, and provide CMO personnel information about claims procedures; and with military police and military intelligence personnel to share informati~n.'~~ Throughout the operation, claims perso~el must travel throughout the area of operations to receive, investigate, and pay claims.'03
During redeployment and demobilization, the senior claims attorney must ensure all filed claims are paid, closed, or transferred to a claims office with post-deployment responsibility for the area. Claims personnel at home station must be prepared to receive and process claims by deployed personnel for damage to property damaged in storage during deployment.
3.8 LEGAL ASSISTANCE
"Wherever you have judge advocates among soldiers, you will have the practice of Legal Assistance."'"
Captain Nicole Famer
Legal assistance is the provision of personal civil legal services to soldiers, their family members, and other eligible personnel.105 The mission of the Army Legal Assistance Program is "to assist those eligible for legal assistance with their personal legal affairs in a timely and professional manner by -(1) Meeting their needs for help and information on legal matters; and (2) Resolving their personal legal problems whenever po~sible."'~~ "From an operational standpoint, the mission of legal assistance is to ensure that the soldiers' personal legal affairs are in order prior to deployment, and then, in the deployment location, to meet the soldiers' legal assistance needs as quickly and as efficiently as possible."107 The Army Legal Assistance Program promotes morale and discipline, and thereby contributes directly to mission accomplishment.
Legal assistance attorneys, and legal staff working under their supervision, provide legal assistance in a variety of settings, including combat readiness exercises, premobilization legal preparation (PLP), soldier readiness
Program processing (SRP), demobilization briefings, noncombatant evacuation operations, client interviews, informal requests for assistance, federal and state income tax assistance, and preventive law programs.'08 They provide extensive legal services: ministerial and notary services, legal counseling, legal correspondence, negotiation, iegai document preparation and filing, limited in-court representation, legal referrals, and mediation.'0g They handle a wide variety of cases: family law, estates, real property, personal property, economic, civilian and military administrative matters, torts, taxes, and civilian criminal matter^."^
Legal assistance is provided at the Theater Army headquarters, Theater Support Command headquarters, main and rear command posts in Army of Excellence divisions and corps, and main command posts in Force XXI divisions and corps, and as required at brigade or lower echelons.lll While each service and each troop contributing nation is responsible to provide legal assistance for its personnel, some legal assistance may be required at joint or multinational headquarters.
Before mobilization, active and reserve component SJAs should conduct regular and proactive preventive law programs, resolve legal concerns of soldiers, their families, and other eligible personnel prior to deployment, and plan for mobilization and deployment processing. In conducting such programs, SJAs should coordinate with and involve the reserve component judge advocates (such as MSO JAGSOs or the judge advocate sections of GSUs) which will be assigned to assist their organizations upon mobilization, or with whom they have developed training associations. Preventive law programs provide information to service members and families that enable them to avoid legal problems, or to identify concerns and seek prompt assi~tance."~ Regular SRP processing, along with reserve component PLP, ensures soldiers and emergency-essential civilian employees have their legal affairs in order and are prepared for deployment. Because legal needs may not be met upon deployment, SJAs must plan to provide legal assistance to large numbers of personnel
Legal Support to Operations
preparing to deploy. SJAs must also plan to provide legal assistance to personnel in the deployment theater and family members at home station, mobilization stations, or elsewhere during the operation.l13 The MSOs and the judge advocate sections of the GSUs described in Chapter 2 provide SJAs the capability to provide this surge and sustainrnent legal assistance.
During mobilization and predeployment, the SJA and Chief of Legal Assistance should manage SRP processing, coordinate with the local bar and courts concerning current legal assistance issues or stays required by the mobilization or deployment, provide legal assistance briefings for family members, and resolve as many legal concerns as possible before deployment.'14 SRP processing should review, at a minimum, Soldiers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI) beneficiary designations, requirements for wills or powers of attorney, the existence of Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act issues or any pending civilian or military charges, the receipt of Geneva Convention briefings, and family care plan concerns.115Providing advance SRP packets to deploying soldiers enables them to consider their legal needs in advance, to come to the SRP with the information needed to process efficiently, and to leave with the legal products and advice they require.l16
During deployment and entry, SJAs must provide legal assistance both in the deployment theater and at home station. Due to the special attorney- client relationship and the possibility of conflicting interests between commanders and soldiers, the SJA
generally designates specific judge advocates as legal assistance attorneys. Because of the increased demand for legal assistance services during deployments, the SJA may allow judge advocates who are not legal assistance attorneys to provide legal assistance services when consistent with professional standards. The SJA will rely heavily on the judge advocates assigned to GSU supporting the installation and the MSO supporting the deployment. Also, the SJA may seek support from the Senior Defense Counsel, who may assign Trial Defense Counsel to provide legal assistance consistent with the Trial Defense ~nission."~In theater, legal assistance attorneys should be prepared to resolve the full range of legal assistance cases, and to provide federal and state income tax assi~tance."~The Chief of Legal Assistance in theater, should establish liaison with the U.S. Consulate, and ensure effective communication and courier service between legal assistance offices in theater and home station.llg At home station, in addition to providing legal assistance to the home station, the legal assistance office must provide required assistance to deployed legal assistance attorneys and provide legal assistance briefings to family members.'*O
During redeployment and demobilization, the SJA and Chief of Legal Assistance must resolve legal assistance matters in the deployment theater, or coordinate to ensure they are resolved after redeployment, and resolve matters at home station that arose or remained unresolved during the operation.
The JAGC provides comprehensive legal support to operations across the spectrum and throughout all phases of military operations. Staff Judge Advocates ensure OPLAW and core legal disciplinary support at each level of command from the theater through brigade, and at lower echelons as required. This chapter described, in general terms, what legal support is provided. The following chapters will describe how legal support is provided to specific types of operations.
Legal Support to Operations
Chapter 4 Legal Support in Theater Operations
THE THEATER …………………………
Key Terms and Distinctions ….. Communications Zone and
Combat Zone …………………….
Strategy…………..l ……………. Structures of Command and
Theater command structures and
campaign planning originated in World War II and have existed. with variations. ever since . In the 1980s. during digestion of the hard lessons of Vietnam. the services … adopted [the] concept of an intermediate level of war. between the strategy from Washington and the tactics of the battlefields. Operational art received its foml designation in the 1982 version of the Army's Field Manual 100.5. with the other services closely following . The present flowering of joint doctrine. still in progress. has been marked in Congress by the passage of thh Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 . At last. the United States has begun to place in print ideas and techniques in ferment since the time . of Lincoln and Grant …
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel K.Bolger
Command, Control, and Support Relatlonshlps ……….
PLANNING AND DECISION
Functions of Staffs ………………. The Military Decision Making
Decision Making in a Time- Constrained Environment ….. SJA Planning. Decision- Making. and Orders ……………
LEGAL SUPPORT IN THEATER …..
Overseas Presence and Force
Projection………………………… Legal Support in Theater ……… The United States as a
Technical Channels ………………
Legal Automation ………………
Principles of Training …………… Mission Essential Task Lists … Planning for Training ……………
LEGAL SUPPORT AND SPECIAL
Legal Support and Special
Legal Support and Civil Affairs
Though many Law of War problems arose, . . . judge advocates [in theater] also dealt with a signGcant number of other legal issues. . . .As so aptly stated by one judge
advocate involved, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, "You can only tell the C.O. that he can't shoot the prisoners so many times. You reach a point at which when the boss has run out of beans and bullets, has certain equipment requirements, and has the locals clamoring to be paid for property damage, you have to be prepared to provide the best possible legal advice concerning these issues as well. "
Lieutenant Colonel David E. Graham
Operational Law-A Concept Comes of Age1"
Operational art is best understood within the context of a theater, a geographical area outside the continental United States for which a Commander- in-Chief (CINC) of a unified command has been assigned military re~ponsibility.'~~ The theater is the setting within which United States commanders determine when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be committed. It is the setting into which forces are deployed and later inserted into or withdrawn from operations. It is the setting within which optimal effect can be made of the resources of personnel, materiel, and time because the commander is consciously employing them to achieve desired strategic ends.lZ4
Legal support to operations is the comprehensive set of professional legal functions and disciplines needed to support worldwide operations. Due to the modem national security structure of the United States, these worldwide operations involve military forces projected into and within theaters.
Accordingly, judge advocates must have a detailed understanding of the terms, distinctions, and structures of command and coordination associated with theater operations. They must also understand several separate but complementary relationships of command, control, and support that are exercised within theaters.
P4.1.1 Kev Terms and Distinctions
Theaters may be described as either continental, i.e., European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM) or Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), or maritime, i.e., Pacific Command (PACOM), or littoral based on their dominant geographic
characteristic^.'^^ A unified combatant commander who has a geographic area of responsibility-recall that the ClNCs
Command (STRATCOM), and Space Command (SPACECOM) do not-is also referred to as a theater commander.lZ6 United States Joint Forces Command (US JFCOM), formerly Atlantic Command (ACOM), maintains its Atlantic area of responsibility.
Because unified commands were created following World War II to integrate the separate services into an efficient warfighting tearn,lZ7 a CINC's theater is sometimes called a theater of war, regardless whether combat operations are taking place within it. This theater of war may be subdivided into subordinate theaters of operations, which may be further subdivided into areas of operations (AO). The CINC has great freedom to organize his theater, and he will frequently designate other areas of significance, such as joint operations areas (JOA), joint zones (JZ), and joint rear areas (JRA).
4.1.2 Communications Zone and Combat Zone
One traditional organizational device divides the theater of war into a
-communications zone (COMMZ) and a combat zone (CZ). The COMMZ and the CZ are contiguous and do not overlap.128 The COMMZ is the rear part of a theater of operations, and it contains the lines of communications, air and sea ports, establishments for supply, maintenance, field services, personnel support, health services and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. The COMMZ reaches back t6 &e. continental United States or to ano~;d~c's area of responsibility.
The CZ is the territory forwe of the COMMZ. In the European theater, the boundary line falls at the Army group rear boundary: that is, everything forward of the Army group rear Legal Support to Operations
boundary was the CZ. The CZ is the area required by operational and tactical forces for the conduct of operations. The depth of the CZ depends on the forces involved, the nature of planned operations, the lines of communications, the terrain, and enemy capabilities. Normally, the CZ is divided into corps and division areas.
Noncombat contingencies and contingencies that involve sporadic or isolated combat create the need for alternatives to the CZ device. A contingency is "[a]n emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations."129 Contingencies cause CINCs to designate areas of conflict (AOC), geographic areas where hostilities are imminent, and areas of assistance (AOA), areas where forces conduct humanitarian assistance or other support operations
Commanders, SJAs and other Army leaders deploying forces to a theater of operations must understand yet another distinction. A developed or mature theater is typically one in which the United States has an existing overseas presence, to include a support structure of communications, logistics, air defense, ports, etc. An undeveloped or immature theater lacks one or more of these features. When projecting force to an immature theater, leaders must choose between creating a support base in the theater or operating with external support.131
same service that are commanded by separate CINCs, such as Army mechanized infantry and Army special forces.
A joint task force (JTF) consists of elements of two or more services (Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines) operating under a single commander. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), as well as the CINCs, may establish JTFs, which are created to perform theater missions having specific limited objectives or missions of short duration.
There are other types of joint command. One of these is the subordinate unified command, which, unlike a JTF, has broader, enduring objectives or missions. Examples of subordinate unified commands are Alaskan Command (ALCOM), U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), and U.S. Force Korea (USFK), all of which fall within the area of responsibility of CINC PACOM. Another type of joint force that a CINC may create within a theater is the functional component command, which focuses on operational responsibilities that cut across service lines. The four types of functional component commands are the Joint force land component command (JFLCC), the Joint force air component command (JFACC), the Joint force maritime component command (JFMCC), and the Joint force special operations component command (JFSOCC).
The judge advocate will encounter a great number and variety of joint boards, cells, and other joint organs within a theater. For instance, land forces participate in the joint targeting process
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as defined by the Joint Force Commander (JFC), a generic term for a commander of the various joint forces outlined in the previous section of this chapter. JFCs may delegate targeting oversight functions to a subordinate commander, or they may establish a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) within their staff either as an integrating center for this effort or as a JFC-level review mechanism. While the JTCB maintains a campaign-level perspective-and thus is not involved in selecting specific targets and aim points or in developing attack packages-an OPLAW JA must serve on this board.
There are many other examples. For instance, the JFC may establish a series of joint logistics centers, offices, and boards to coordinate the joint logistics effort. Judge advocates may be called upon to furnish legal advice to these organizations, which include the following:
Joint Transportation Board.
Joint Movement Center .
Joint Petroleum Office.
Joint Civil-Military Engineering
Joint Facilities Utilization Board.
CINC Logistic Procurement Support
Theater Patient Movement
Joint Blood Program Office.
Joint Mortuary Affairs Office.
Joint Materiel Priorities and
184.108.40.206 Multinational (Combined)
The term multinational describes operations conducted by more than one
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Army doctrine calls upon commanders and staffs to revise estimates continuously-throughout the military decision making process-as factors affecting the operation change, as new facts are recognized, as assumptions are replaced by facts or are rendered invalid, or as the mission changes.
Staff estimates analyze the influence of factors within particular staff officers' fields of interest on the accomplishment of the command's mission. In coordination with other staff officers, the officer preparing an estimate develops feasible courses of action, and then analyzes and compares those feasible courses of action. The results are conclusions and recommendations.
These conclusions are presented to the commander, who thus may hear a personnel estimate, an intelligence estimate, an operation estimate, a logistic estimate, a civil-military operations estimate and any other desired staff estimates before arriving at his own estimate. The commander bases his estimate on the METT-TC, on personal knowledge of the situation, on ethical considerations, as well as on the staff estimates. The result is a decision, which can be incorporated into a plan or order and then executed by subordinate units.
Receipt of Mission. The parallel estimates developed by staff and commander are the heart of the elaborate decision-making process. The decision-making cycle begins upon receipt of a mission, which the higher headquarters assigns or the commander simply deduces from formal or informal communications with his senior commanding officer. Even before closely analyzing the mission, the commander at this point may seek more infomation about the current situation and about the mission itself, and he may or may not ask the staff to assist him at this early point.
Mission Analysis. The commander then conducts a rather formal mission analysis so as to obtain a clear understanding of what it is he is being asked to do. Mission analysis involves identifying the tasks that must be performed, the purpose to be achieved through accomplishing the assigned tasks, and the limitations on his unit's actions, if any. Some tasks will be specified in the operation plan or order received from higher headquarters. Other tasks may be implied. The limitations a commander may discern will include a variety of constraints upon either the operation or the planning process. Examples are phrases in a higher headquarters order that specify "Be prepared to . . . ," "Not earlier than . . . ," "Not later than . . ." Time is a frequent limitation.
Restated Mission. The restated mission is what results from the commander's mission analysis. It becomes the basis of the commanders and staff estimates. If these are written, it is paragraph 1. Later, when the commander issues the operation plan or order, this restated mission will be paragraph 2 of that document.
Planning Guidance. The commander may provide planning guidance to the staff when he announces his restated mission or at any other point in the process. The goal is to provide a common point of departure for the different staff elements without introducing bias into their estimates. He may, for instance, issue definite guidance on whether and how a particular weapons system will be used. He may request that a particular course of action be developed or eliminated altogether. The frequency, amount, and content of planning guidance will vary with the mission, time available, situation, information available, and experience of the commander and the staff.
Course of Action Development.
Relying upon the restated mission, any planning guidance, and estimates, the coordinating staff officers then prepare courses of action. The ongoing estimate process is interactive within a particular decision cy~1e.l~~ Staff officers exchange information while concurrently analyzing how relevant factors from their disciplines affect the courses of action. Furthermore, the development of courses of action itself is interactive. The operations officer (U-3/J-3/G-31s-3) will frequently sketch the tentative schemes of maneuver and supporting fires (see section below on plans and orders) he is considering as part of the operations estimate. The intelligence officer (U-2/J-2/G-2/S-Z) or logistics officer (U-4lJ-4lG-41s-4) might quickly identify one of these schemes of maneuver as not feasible,138 enabling another course of action to be developed before a series (usually three) of courses of action is formally incorporated into the staff estimates that are briefed to the commander.
Course of Action Analysis (War Gaming). The chief of staff or
executive officer ensures that staff estimates are coordinated, that differences of opinion are identified and resolved, and that only issues requiring the commander's personal attention are presented to him for decision. However, he must take great care not to gloss over or compromise genuine issues for the sake of presenting a common option to the commander. In some units, the Chief of Staff consolidates the various staff estimates and presents one overall staff estimate to the commander. The Courses of Action contained in the estimates are war gamed to determine strengths, weaknesses, and details.
Course of Action Comparison and Selection. The commander considers modifying the courses of action evaluated in the staff estimates and war gamed, and then, if necessary, returns them for another round of analysis and comparison by the staff. If satisfied with the courses of action as formulated, the commander is to compare all of the courses of action validated by the staff as feasible. Then he makes a decision by adopting the one he thinks is optimal.
Course of Action Approval. Having decided on a course of action to accomplish the mission, the commander announces his decision and concept to key members of the staff. Subordinate commanders may also be present. The concept is the commanders description of how he visualizes the conduct of the operation. The commander may announce his decision and concept orally and in sufficient detail so staff officers and subordinate commanders understand what they must do and, if necessary, can execute the operation without further instructions.
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for developing an OPLAN when time is relatively unconstrained. It remains the subject matter for baseline instruction on decision-making in the Army's system for leader development and reflects time-honored principles. However, the Army recognizes a modified version of the MDMP for use in decision cycles that occur after operations commence. Some refer to this as the "combat decision- making process" or "CDP," although the MDMP remains the only doctrinally recognized "process." The CDP is best understood as selectively shortening the MDMP without substantially changing it. In theory, the MDMP is not intended to be a rigid, lockstep approach to arriving at a decision;140 in practice, it may become unwieldy, particularly when faced with an enemy commander who may gain great advantage by shortening his decision cycle.
The CDP strives to prevent the commander-as military operations involve ever more technical and complex systems-from being submerged in vast oceans of information generated by the staff. The CDP seeks to give the commander the information he truly needs. It seeks to produce decisions that are "close enough" and have the virtue of being quickly made and passed onto subordinates for decentralized execution.
The CDP abbreviates the MDMP using four primary techniques. 141 The first is to increase the commander's involvement, allowing him to make decisions during the process without waiting for detailed briefings after each step.
The second technique is for the commander to become more direct in his guidance, limiting options. This saves the staff time by focusing members on those things the commander feels are most important.
The third technique, and the one that saves the most time, is for the commander to limit the number of COAs developed and war gamed. In extreme cases, he can direct that only one course of action be developed. The goal is an acceptable COA that meets mission requirements in the time available, even if it is not optimal.
The fourth technique is maximizing parallel planning. Parallel planning means that several echelons conduct the MDMP at the same time.'" Although parallel planning is the norm, maximizing its use in a time-constrained environment is critical. In a time-constrained environment, the importance of warning orders increases as available time decreases. A verbal warning order now is worth more than a written order one hour from now. The same warning orders used in the full MDMP should be issued when the process is abbreviated. In addition to warning orders, units must share all available information with subordinates, especially Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) products, as early as possible.
While the steps used in a time-constrained environment are the same, many of them may be done mentally by the commander or with less staff involvement than during the full process. The products developed when the process is abbreviated may be the same as those developed for the full
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the test ,through field application. Development is a constant and iterative process.
4.3 LEGAL SUPPORT IN THEATER
A solid gasp of the theater and associated concepts introduced in the first part of this chapter makes possible a more precise understanding of how legal support is practiced and delivered. When Army forces are not actually conducting operations in a theater, the JAGC supports the mission of the Army and its major commands within CONUS to prepare those forces for eventual employment by a CINC within a theater. That preparation is a massive job, and it consists of everyhng necessary to organize, train, and equip Army forces "primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land" and "for the effective prosecution of
The day-to-day mission of readiness-organizing, training, and equipping forces for operations-inevitably involves Army commanders and judge advocates in legal issues, questions, and cases that may seem only remotely "operational." Judge advocates serving throughout the major commands of the Army and in the FOAs of TJAG will often, properly, conceive of themselves as practicing within a narrow portion of a single legal discipline.
Hence the judge advocate defending the Army in multibillion-dollar environmental litigation is practicing "federal litigation" and "environmental law" within the Civil Law discipline. That judge advocate is also principally discharging the advocate role. Hence the judge advocate investigating a major allegation of procurement fraud may be practicing Contract Law within the Civil Law discipline while discharging principally a "judge" role. Hence the Staff Judge Advocate at a CONUS installation where advanced individual training is conducted may be counselor to the commander on detailed criminal law issues pertaining to improper relationships between instructors and trainees. In these and countless other examples from the daily legal practice of uniformed attorneys in CONUS, legal support reverts to its component core disciplines. These core legal disciplines also dominate the technical language used to describe that da. practice.
For the environmental litigator, the procurement fraud investigator, and the training installation SJA in these examples, the terms "legal support to operations" and "OPLAW" serve as reminders of the readiness challenge that underwrites all of their work. It also reminds them of the need to remain generally competent across all legal disciplines in case their next assignments are to theaters. All judge advocates must be prepared to deliver legal support to operations.
4.3.2 Overseas Presence and Force Proiection.
Force projection follows a general sequence, although stages overlap in time and space (for instance, mobilization and deployment may be continuous and occur simultaneously or sequentially). Force projection includes
every 15,000 to 30,000 troops receiving support in the COMMZ. The area an ASG supports depends on the density of military units and materiel requiring support, political boundaries, and identifiable terrain features.
Corps. Corps are the largest tactical units in the United States Army and are the instruments by which higher echelons of command conduct maneuver at the operational level. The Army tailors corps for the theater and the mission. Once tailored, corps contain all the combat, combat support, and combat service support required to sustain operations for a considerable period. Corps consist of a headquarters that plans, directs, controls, and coordinates the corps operations and the mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. The Army Service Component Commander may assign to the corps divisions of any type required by the theater and the mission. Corps possess support commands and are assigned combat and combat support organizations based on their needs for a specific operation. Nondivisional units commonly available to corps to weight their main effort and to perform special combat functions include armored cavalry regiments, field artillery brigades, engineer brigades, air defense artillery brigades, aviation brigades, and separate infantry or armored brigades. Military police brigades, civil affairs brigades, chemical brigades, and psychological operations battalions are combat support organizations often found in corps. Special
operations forces also may support corps combat operations as required, particularly when a corps is conducting an independent operation. Corps combat service support organizations are the personnel group, the finance group, the corps support command, and JAGSOs.
Corps. Support Command (COSCOM). The COSCOM is the corps' principal logistics organization. It provides supply, field services, transportation, maintenance, and medical support to the corps' divisions and nondivisional units. The COSCOM is not a fixed organization and contains a mix of subordinate units as required by the size and c~~guration
of the corps.
4.3.4 The United States as a Theater Pomestic O~erations).
This is addressed separately in Chapter 7.
4.3.5 Technical Channels.
, The command channel is the direct, official link through which one headquarters passes orders and instructions to subordinate headquarters.14' The command channel links one commanding officer to another. A technical channel is a link between two headquarters that transmits orders, instructions, advice, recommendations, and information inappropriate for the command channel because of their volume, specificity, or routine nature.150
Legal Support to Operations
The practice and delivery of legal support in operations rely heavily on technical channels. As described earlier, many modern legal problems are complex, demanding expertise and information that will only rarely reside at a single echelon of command. Technical channels-particularly when linked to expertise and information available at CLAM0 and TJAGSA- make synergy possible even for judge advocates facing problems in distant theaters.
Those judge advocates and their supported commands benefit from two separate channels, corresponding to the two branches of the chain of command for Army forces in a joint force. Recall from earlier in this chapter that one branch of that chain of command is for operations and the other for administration and logistics. Similarly, one technical channel carries information and legal expertise associated with operations (command and control functions); the other carries information and expertise associated with administration and logistics (sustainment and personnel services support functions).
For example, the SJA advising the 10th Mountain Division at the start of military operations in Haiti in September of 1994 used a technical channel that ran through the ASCC SJA (who was also the JTF SJA) to the USACOM (now USJTFCOM) SJA to the legal advisor for the CJCS. This channel provided valuable guidance on rules of engagement and other operational matters. The SJA of the 10th Mountain Division also used a technical channel that ran through the ASCC to FORSCOM and then to Army OTJAG. This channel provided valuable guidance on a wide variety of legal issues relating to administration and logistics.
Of course, legal issues sometimes will not fall neatly into command and control, sustainment, and personnel service support categories _Also,many complex legal issues will require expertise from several legal disciplines. In these situations, SJAs achieve synergy on a legal issue by tapping whichever channel contains the necessary information or expertise. Often, both channels must be consulted on the same issue. This approach is consistent with the JAGC operating as a single large legal organization, whereby its several members are expected to support each other with information and expertise necessary to assists their clients.
All legal personnel must be well equipped and highly trained in order to practice and deliver legal support in a theater of operations. The most critical categories of equipment are legal automation, mobility, and communications. Training of legal personnel, meanwhile, must be conducted according to the Army's principles of training.
4.4.1 Legal Automation
The JAGC requires a dedicated system of automation to provide responsive legal services at all echelons of command. That system is the Legal Automation Army-Wide System (LAAWS). LAAWS integrates legal
and the substantial increase of data that is required to be processed, manipulated, and transmitted in an ever decreasing amount of time. Specific details regarding hardware and software technical requirements can be located by contacting CLAM0 or the JAW Proponent, Combat Developments Department, Organization and Materiel Branch, located at TJAGSA, Charlottesville, Virginia. Its current configuration is as follows:
a laptop computer (with sufficient processor and memory capabilities to interact with ABCS, to conduct efficient research from electronic databases, and to store a large volume of required legal references and products with removable hard drive for secure storage of classified information. CD ROM reader (preferably internal) scanner-printer (battery backup) PCMCIA fax modem (cellular phone and satellite telephone up-linkable) digital camera digital audio card and microphone hard-shell case full range of software full range of legal references on compact disks andlor hard drive
RDL requirements are based upon staff functions, OPLAW (C2 and Sustainrnent) responsibilities, operations at key operational nodes, core legal discipline tasks, and mobility requirements.
The SJA, DSJA, Legal Administrator, and CL,NCO perform the staff functions of providing advice and organizing, sustaining, controlling,
Legal Supportto Operations
supervising legal services throughout the area of operations and training legal personnel. They each require an RDL to provide legal advice to the command, to access legal technical support, and to exercise legal technical supervision. OPLAW JAs designated to serve in a BOLT or the TAC CP (or other mobile or fixed command cells or command posts) and in planning and operation cells, each require an RDL. The RDL is required to access ABCS, LAAWS networks, and other secure or controlled communication systems, and to perform core legal discipline tasks in locations away from the main and rear CPs or apart from other legal sections located in the main or rear (based on organizational design and where the legal function is performed). Of utmost importance is the ability to interact with communication and network systems capable of transmitting privileged information or communications (e.g., defense counsel and client; legal assistance attorney and client), classified materials and matters of national security. Each element within the SJA section (as well as the military judge and trial defense elements) requires an RDL to perform tasks relating to its core legal discipline. Additional RDLs are required for judge advocates within divisions of the SJA section who must travel throughout the area of operations to provide services (e.g., claims judge advocates, trial counsel, and legal assistance attorneys).
LSOs and MSOs require RDLs to command the organization and supervise legal services. LSTs require RDLs to perform tasks related to core legal disciplines, and additional RDLs for each judge advocate who must travel throughout the area of operations.
CONUS based legal organizations which support mobilization operations, or which are part of the Base Engagement Force or Base Generating require RDLs to support operations. These organizations also include the legal training organizations of TJAGSA, legal NCOES, and legal sections of Division Training and Exercise elements, and Training Centers.
Finally, other judge advocates and legal specialists in all legal organizations require components of the RDL to perform their legal duties (one laptop computer per attorney and one computer for 80% of the legal specialists).
The RDL equips judge advocates deploying to theater with the basic load of legal references, country-specific materials, and forms necessary to spot and resolve the most common legal issues that will arise during a contingency operation. Digital databases, such as that maintained by the Joint Electronic Library and CLAMO, contribute to the achievement of this goal by furnishing current legal references and recent lessons learned from exercises, the Combat Training Centers, and deployments around the world. The availability of CD-ROM writing equipment at division and corps staff judge advocate sections makes possible the storage of massive amounts of material on compact disk in the days immediately prior to deployment to or within a theater. Much of this material may be obtained during the predeployment period from the exploding numbers of legal reference sites on the World Wide Web. When the deployed judge advocate element is incapable of resolving an issue, the RDL also provides the capability to request and receive advice in digital format from technical judge advocate channels.
Because it is a set of capabilities rather than a fixed package of hardware and software, the RDL permits the JAGC to continue to harness the rapid improvements in the marketplace. Because it is a standard set of capabilities, the RDL provides a common basis to permit training, organizing, and equipping OPLAW JAs and legal personnel.
Despite advances in information technology, legal personnel must always be prepared to provide operational support. Therefore, legal personnel should deploy with paper copies of required references and forms.
Embedded legal personnel depend on the units to which they are assigned or attached for transportation. Separate legal organizations, such as LSOs or MSOs, require organic transportation assets. Sufficient vehicles are required for legal personnel, i.e., the SJAICJA and his staff, military judges, and defense counsel. The number and type of vehicles will depend on the commander's requirements for legal services. Normally, however, a commander should dedicate four High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), one 5 ton truck, and four cargo trailers to a division or corps SJA section and one HMMWV and one cargo trailer to each CJA
advocates must use combat net radios (CNR), area common user (ACU) telephones, Army Data Distribution System (ADDS) equipment, and Broadcast System (BDCSTS) equipment, where necessary.
Principles of Training
Train As A Combined Arms And Services Team
Train As You Fight
Use Appropriate Doctrine
Use Performance-Oriented Training
Train To Challenge
Train To Sustain Proficiency
Train Using Multiechelon Techniques
Train To Maintain
Make Commanders The Primary Trainers
Staff judge advocates must have a training philosophy. Training affords staff judge advocates as well as commanders the opportunity to explore and surmount the variety of problems and challenges that will always confront them. When a staff judge advocate takes this attitude, most of his or her problems-and those of the section-will be met and solved in the course of regular training, and thus will cease to be problems. The same attitude wili prevail again over new problems.
Training must address both the soldier and the lawyer-tactical skills and legal skills. Soldier training should address common soldier skills, such as use and maintenance of weapons, NBC protection and decontamination, land navigation, first aid, and radio procedures-how to shoot, move, and communicate. Training applies just as crucially to legal research, writing, advocacy, case and project organization, automation, maintenance, and safety. Training is all-encompassing and should be related to everything lawyers and legal personnel do to support the commander on the battlefield.
The key to all successful training lies in raising the quality of individual skills and the teamwork of small sections or units. Success in everythng from a battle or other real world military operation to large scale legal representation is dependent on the coordinated effort of a number of small units of diverse types working together to accomplish a mission. Other things being equal, the military force with the best-trained small units will prevail, and the legal organization with the best-trained small teams will prevail. Even if other things are not equal, superior training at the individual and small section level will often carry the day.
Staff judge advocates prepare for operations in a theater by adhering to the Army's principles of training. There are nine.
Train As A Combined Arms And Services Team. "Combined arms and services" is a technical term referring to military actions that integrate combat functions (infantry, armor, and aviation), combat support functions (field artillery, air defense artillery, and engineers), and combat service support functions (logistics, personnel services, and health
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services).154 The example provided in Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force, is that of the division commander who trains regularly with his entire "slice" of "basic combat, combat support, and combat service support systems." SJAs recognize that this first principle mandates not only that they support the command's desire to conduct collective training with a full "slice" of judge advocate support, but also that the training of an SJA section itself must integrate claims, legal assistance, military justice, administrative law, civil law, international law, and all other aspects of legal support to operations. It also means that the SJA must coordinate with reserve component legal elements to have them participate in major exercises.
Train As You Fight. This principle demands that training take place under realistic conditions. Operations in Panama, the Persian Gulf, northern Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, and other places confirmed that legal issues are some of the most challenging the command and staff will face. They must be incorporated into collective training events, just as smoke, noise, chemical attacks, battlefield debris, loss of key leaders, and cold weather must be incorporated.
Use Appropriate Doctrine. Training must conform to Army doctrine. Recall that one of doctrine's roles is to reflect a shared vision that can serve as the basis for planning, organizing, leading, equipping, and training the force. We are a doctrine-based Army. Army
doctrine is contained in Field Manual 100-5, Operations and supporting doctrinal manuals, such as this one. Army training doctrine is contained in Field Manual 25-100 as well as in Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training. Judge advocates must be conversant in these references.
Use Performance-Oriented Training. Soldiers and lawyers learn best by doing, by putting their hands and minds on the implements they will be required to use when the real test of combat or deployment comes. The Army stresses use of a full range of training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS) to take the individual or unit being trained out of the sterile classroom and into a practical situation that reproduces the conditions under which they must be able to perform. The Army's four Combat Training Centers, with judge advocate observer-controllers or trainers at each, provide the most realistic training. An SJA invokes this principle whenever he and the Chief of the Criminal Law Team organize rehearsals of trial counsel's opening statements, examinations, motions arguments, or closing arguments. SJAs also invoke this principle when they insist that RDLs and other equipment are brought to the field and that every division generates its standard products during exercises.
Train To Challenge. SJAs and other judge advocate leaders never apologize for the challenging training they plan and execute. OPLAW demands tough, realistic
training that challenges legal personnel physically and intellectually. Such training builds competence and confidence by developing and honing skills. It inspires excellence by giving each individual a glimpse of how daily activities fit into the broader mission and by fostering initiative, enthusiasm and eagerness to learn.
Train To Sustain Proficiency. The SJA section must always be ready to deploy; it must be vigilant not to "peak" and then have proficiency drop as time passes, skills decay, and new people replace experienced people.
Train Using Multi-echelon Techniques. Field Manual 25-100 tells us that "[tlo use available time and resources most effectively, commanders must simultaneously train individuals, leaders, and units at each echelon in the organization during training events." This principle not only demands that legal specialists perform individual tasks (e.g., disassemble and assemble M16 rifle, fill in the blocks of a nonjudicial punishment form) but also demands that the claims division and the entire SJA section perform collective tasks (e.g., process, investigate, adjudicate, and pay a foreign claim; administer the military justice system, etc.). Quality training exercises are so rare that leaders must make them count on many different levels.
Train To Maintain. The upkeep of equipment and weapons is as much a part of training as using the equipment expertly. Legal personnel routinely perform virus checks and
other diagnostics, change printer cartridges, and protect our equipment by ensuring that atl work areas are kept clean and dry. They frequently draw and maintain all of the tentage, vehicles, weapons, and equipment they will need in real deployments to a theater of operations.
9. Make Commanders The Primary Trainers. Commanders are responsible for the training and performance of their units. They personally ensure that exercises are based on real world mission requirements, identify the applicable Army standards, assess the current level of proficiency, provide the required training resources, and develop training plans designed to create proficient individuals, leaders, and units. Similarly, SJAs-with command support-must be the primary trainers of their section.
4.5.2 Mission Essential Task Lists (METL)
Mission essential tasks are collective tasks in which an organization must be proficient to accomplish some portion of its mission in a theater. The Mission Essential Task List (METL) for an SJA section consists of the mission essential tasks on which the section focuses its training. The METL concept was conceived in recognition that units and organizations cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on every possible training task. "METL development" is not only applicable to corps and divisions and brigades; it also applies to subordinate elements, such as the staff, and-within
The METL development process then continues as the SJA and the DSJA help guide each of the separate division chiefs (operational law, claims, military justice, administrative law, civil law, legal assistance, international law)-to develop METLs for their elements. In addition, they guide the BOLTS in the development of the BOLT METLs. LSOiMSO commanders do the same for LSTs.
Throughout this process, S JAsDS JAs and LSOiMSO commanders mentor subordinates to ensure that the METLs and corresponding training objectives developed accurately reflect tasks that will be essential to mission accomplishment in wartime. Through leadership and personal example, they guarantee that METL development is a dynamic process and that all section training is directed toward METL tasks, conditions, and standards.
4.5.3 Planninp for Training.
Training Assessment. Once they have developed and received approval of a METL, SJAsDSJAs and LSOMSO commanders then conduct training assessments. They compare current proficiency with the standards listed for each mission essential task. They use all available evaluative material to make this comparison, to include consultations with the separate team chiefs. Then they develop a training strategy to achieve a "trained" proficiency level in each supporting collective subtask and individual task.
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Throughout this process, they consult the commander's training guidance documents, which identify major training events.161 In this way, they are able to incorporate Combat Training Center rotations and other major exercises into the training plan.
Training Guidance. Soon after taking command, a commander issues command training guidance and an up- to-date long-range training calendar for the unit. The SJA and the DSJA present and receive approval of the SJA section METLs during the one of the quarterly training briefs or semi- annual training briefs early in the commander's tour. This same process applies to the METLs of the LSOsMSOs, as well as RC units with embedded judge advocate sections; however, the training briefs by which their METLs are reviewed and approved may be presented to their peacetime chains of command in addition to, or in lieu of, presentation to the their wartime gaining commanders.
Training briefs produce a training contract between commanders and SJA or LSOMSO commanders. The commanders provide resources and protect the SJA sections or LSOsMSOs from unprogrammed taskings. SJAs and LSOMSO commanders then lock in and execute approved training plans. This shared responsibility helps maintain priorities, achieve unity of effort, and synchronizes actions to achieve quality training and efficient resourcing.
The training briefing is a highlight of the commander's leader development program. It provides the commander an opportunity to coach and teach subordinates on the fine points of his
> Assisting in the creation and supervision of military tribunals and other activities for the proper administration of civil law and order.
> Assisting civil administration activities, including:
> The establishment and operation of local judicial and administrative agencies.
> The closing and reopening of local courts, boards, agencies, and commissions.
> Defining the jurisdiction, organization, and procedures of local government institutions.
Legal Support to Operations Chapter 5 Legal Support in War
Whenever Amy forces are called upon to fight. they fight to win . Amy forces in combat seek to impose their will on the enemy … Victory is the objective. no matter the mission . Nothing short of victory is acceptable …
Field Manual 100.5. operation^'^^
In 1970. with all the [lst Cavalry Division] lawyers located at the division main headquarters. such activities as interviewing witnesses for trial. advising convening authorities located outside of Phuoc Vinh and. in some instances. actively conducting trials at firebases. required traveling by air. Additionally. troops normally did not come into headquarters for personal legal assistance or to file claims; judge advocates brought legal services to them … [Tlhanks to the division chief of staa Col. Edward C. Meyer. a helicopter was dedicated one-half day a week for use by the Amy lawyers . It was known as the "lawbird" on the days it flew .
Colonel Frederic L.Borch III
Judge Advocates in Combat'70
THE LIMITS OF WAR …………………. PHASEDANDNESTED
CONCEPT OF LEGAL SUPPORT
IN WAR ……………………………………..
Command and Control. Sustainment. Personnel Service Support ……………….. Command and Control ………….
Sustainment………………………… Personnel Service Supp~rt ……
THE CORE LEGAL DISCIPLINES
IN WAR ……………………………………..
Administrative Law ……………….
Civ~l Law ……………………………..
Military Justice …………………….
International Law ………………….
Legal Assistance ………………….
ORGANIZATION FOR WAR ………..
Theater Legal Structure ……… Army Service Component
Command Posts ………………….. Judge Advocate Disposition …. Brigade Command and Control Facilities ………………
MATERIEL IN WAR …………………….
I TRAINING FOR WAR ………………….
5.1 THE LIMITS OF WAR
In war, military force is the state's primary means to achieve victory. Among the categories of conflict between states, war is the most violent and the most dangerous. A modem nation at war-because of the enormity of the resources engaged and the destructiveness of the means employed-will frequently perceive the war as "total" and "absolute."171 For those fighting it, war will appear to spell victory or 'defeat, with no middle ground between those stark alternative^.'^^
A commander leads his forces to military victory in war by practicing operational art. He directs attacks against enemy centers of gravity.'73 He and the enemy commander are both constantly looking for an edge, for the opportunity to gain and maintain the initiative. Often it is the side that can adjust most rapidly that will gain this edge and go on to win. The commander seeks to outthink the enemy commander and thus give United States troops the advantage over their foes. This is often a matter of giving the enemy commander more problems to solve in a given time than he and his organization can possibly handle. It is a matter of exhausting the enemy's options, breaking the coherence of his operation, and forcing him to fight on our terms. Finally, it is a matter of physically defeating or destroying him.'"
Throughout history, a defining feature of wars has been that they include periods of intense, armed combat; soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines physically defeating enemy units by killing enemy soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in battles. For the individuals involved, sometimes reduced to fighting with bayonets or their bare hands, war is totally consuming. It absorbs every ounce of energy, will, and stamina, with nothing left in reserve. In such circumstances, war is absolute. It is life or death.
Yet the popularized notions of "total war," "absolute war," and "unlimited war" are misleading. As Peter Paret, one of Clausewitz' modem interpreters, has written, "If war .were one short, uninterrupted blow; preparations for it would tend toward totality, because no omission could ever be rectified." But in reality war is always a longer or shorter succession of violent acts, interrupted by pauses for planning, the concentration of effort, the recovery of energy-all on the part of two or more antagonists, who interact. A variety of elements within the opposing societies, the "free will1' of the leadership, which may or may not conform to the objective realities, and the political motives of war, will determine the military objective and the amount of effort to be expended. "War is merely the continuation of policy by other
Thus, the term "unlimited war" does not accurately describe even prolonged large-scale conflicts in which forces suffer heavy casualties. To be sure, as Clausewitz says, war is "an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force." But "[iln the real world, the absolute is always modified …
Legal support in war involves the study and application of those limits our
Legal Support to Operations
government formally imposes on the waging of war. In conjunction with national policy, law regulates when, where, how, and against what commanders and soldiers we may employ weapons. Law creates the procedures and military courts by which good order and discipline are maintained within the force, within the ranks of captured enemy prisoners of war, and throughout occupied territories. Law ensures that supplies and equipment are procured in a manner that frustrates waste, fiaud, and abuse of public moneys. Law governs the mobilization of the reserve component. Lawful regulations articulate formal policies for everytlung from the taking of war trophies by United States forces to the conduct of official investigations. The law, even in war, continues to treat each soldier as an individual person, capable of drawing a Last Will and Testament, making contracts, incurring debts, getting married, paying child support, or filing an income tax return.
5.2 PHASED AND NESTED OPERATIONS
Military operations during war are not uniformly intense through time. This fact bears heavily upon the intensity of demand for the different functional areas and legal disciplines. The preconflict and postconflict phases of wartime operations will often resemble military operations other than war (MOOTW) in the character of legal issues generated.
Commanders use phasing because operational art requires them to shift emphasis fiom one operational category to another.'" For example, elements of the Third U.S. Army deployed to Saudi Arabia in 1990 primarily as a show of force to deter aggression against that country. The Third Army's operational focus shifted to the defense when enough forces arrived to make that possible. It shifted to the offensive when it launched a ground attack to destroy the Iraqi Army. Following the successful offensive, the Third Army's operational focus shifted to post-conflict operations designed to restore essential infrastructure in Kuwait. Branches and sequels in the plan account for the need to shift emphasis as a mission unfolds.
In addition to conducting different categories of operations over time, units sometimes conduct different categories of operations simultaneously. One headquarters may have subordinate units focused on different categories of operations, all operating in the context of the higher commander's intent. The larger the unit, the more this nesting of unlike operations is likely to occur. For example, a corps conducting offensive operations may have several brigade- sized units engaged in offensive operations while the rest of the corps conducts defensive operations. Some of its other units may be conducting support operations to aid battlefield refugees.
The smaller the unit, the more likely the entire force will focus on the dominant operation. A division conducting a mobile defense, for example, may employ one brigade to conduct delaying actions (defensive operations) ,and two brigades to strike the decisive blow (offensive operations). On the other hand, a company in the attack often employs all assets in the offense.
Some units may conduct roughly the same activities regardless of the category of operation they are conducting. This is particularly true for combat service support forces and certain combat support forces such as signal elements. Others may have to perform significantly different tasks. An infantry company conducting a movement to contact executes a different set of tasks than it does when conducting a disaster response.
In this regard, the distinction between war and MOOTW should not be relied upon by SJA sections to create two wholly separate approaches to training and operations. While large scale deployments to prosecute wars will more likely involve classic offensive and defensive operations, they will also frequently include stability and support operations. As the next chapter explains, stability and support operations, whether during war or MOOTW, may present particularly tough and sustained challenges to operational law assets.
5.3 CONCEPT OF LEGAL SUPPORT IN WAR
5.3.1 Command & Control, Sustainment, Personnel Service SIlDDort
Legal support in the preparation for and execution of war will cut across all three functional areas and vary in proportion throughout an operation. After the initial surge of personnel support during the mobilization and deployment of forces, the practice of OPLAW-the C2 and sustainment functions described in Chapter 3-in war will dominate the legal landscape. The issues are fast-paced, require constant situational awareness, and can affect a commander's options by expanding or limiting his courses of action. This is not to say, however, that legal personnel services are any less critical to providing legal support in operations. When delivered properly, legal personnel services may appear transparent to the commander. A loss of discipline, or morale failure where soldiers are overly concerned about problems at home, however, would not.
5.3.2 Command and Control (C2).
The American way of war is to employ overwhelming force at the decisive point, but it is also to respect legal limits. In order to achieve the former, commanders and staffs must know the precise extent of the latter. In the early phases of an operation (mobilization and predeployment), the SJA must deliver operational law advice by introducing information about the legal aspects of command authority and the legal limitations on war into the MDMP. Judge advocates serve as counselor, providing recommendations about how missions can be accomplished within the law and, frequently, dispelling misconceptions that a law or treaty precludes various effective courses of action. OPLAW JAs participate in targeting and information operations cells; implement, draft, and train soldiers on ROE; advise commanders on policies relating to conduct and discipline; ensure war plan compliance with the Law of War and
customary international law; and ensure soldiers have a basic understanding, in the treatment of non-combatants, protected markings, and other particulars of the Law of War.
Defining General Courts-Martial Convening Authorities both in the theater of operations and in garrison must be done early and with precision. Transferring pending actions to new or different convening authorities will require extensive technical channel communication. In split-based operations, commanders must decide to either leave their flag at the garrisons, take the flag command with them, or seek out a new rear provisional convening authority. Certainly in war, SJAs must plan on incorporating the reserve component into the convening authority process. In the future, federalized National Guard or United States Army Reserve Commanders may lead active component units into battle. Such an order of battle may necessitate Secretary of the Army action defining and designating new convening authorities such that the commander can ensure good order and discipline for all
U.S. forces under his command in theater.
As the Army moves through deployment and into offensive or defensive operations, judge advocates continue to provide critical sustainment and personnel service support. During actual combat operations, however, OPLAW JAs will focus most of their attention on C2 legal support-targeting, ROE, Information Operations (IO), dealing with enemy prisoners of war (EPW), use of mines, the applicability of the Chemical Weapons
Legal Support to Operations
Convention, fratricide investigations,
and so forth.
At the conclusion of or during extended pauses in combat operations, judge advocates will continue to provide legal support in all three functional areas. The main effort of legal support, however, will turn back to sustainment and personnel service support. -4fier the U.S.'s successful prosecution of armed conflict, commanders and judge advocates may have to deal with the enormous obligations that accompany the law of occupation or implementing international agreements or mandates that will follow conflict. Commanders can also again return their attention to taking care of soldiers and redeployment to home station.
The DoD Dictionary defines sustainment as "[tlhe provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national ~bjective."'~~ This is the second prong of operational law. For legal support to operations, sustainment includes legal issues that cut across most of the legal disciplines. Like C2, failure to recognize and resolve-proactively if possible-sustainment issues can limit a commander's options on the battlefield. Complicating virtually every aspect of sustainment is the joint and multinational nature of modem military operations. The very presence of multiple coalition partners spread across several sovereign states, requires commanders and judge advocates to look at sustainment issues not only from an international law perspective, but also in light of the often restrictive domestic law.
During all phases of an operation, OPLAW JA must know and understand the privileges and immunities that exist or do not exist for U.S. forces and the civilians that accompany the force. War plans may call for Intermediate Staging Bases stretching across several international boundaries, command posts in various countries, or deployment directly into a hostile territory. In all of these cases, judge advocates must seek out and understand applicable Status of Forces Agreements, Stationing Agreements, of other applicable treaties or international agreements. Moving personnel and supplies into the theater of operations may require multiple transiting agreements.
Even though fiscal and contract constraints in war will be less onerous than in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), U.S. domestic law is not waived. Even in war, commanders are still stewards of taxpayers' money and subject to strict scrutiny-sometimes long after the end of hostilities. In virtually any theater of operations, commanders will need immediate contracting capability to hire local nationals and purchase items such as water, fooci, iumber, fuel, and lubricants. Coalition partners may require extensive support from U.S. forces, thus creating a need for Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs). Every judge advocate, regardless of the type of operation, must have an understanding of what money is available, when, and for what purpose. With reliance on today's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), and contractors on the battlefield, commanders must address everything from their status on the battlefield to handling discipline with a large civilian force. Before deployment, OPLAW JAs must develop a foreign claims process that will protect both the U.S. and the claimant. Judge advocates must help the commander resolve issues concerning federalizing National Guard forces, mobilizing the USAR, and dealing with non-governmental and private organizations in the theater of operations.
5.3.4 Personnel Service Susport
There can be little doubt that the main effort of legal support to operations during mobilization and predeployment lies with the routine administration of military justice and the provision of legal assistance through Soldier's Readiness Programs. While the nuts and bolts of the administration of justice or the provision of legal assistance services may remain in abeyance during offensive or defensive operations, the limited character of war implies an important role for deployed lawyers serving as judges in courts-martial or within the context of other proceedings and procedures. It also implies an important role for lawyers serving as advocates for the Army or for individual soldiers charged with crimes or in need of personal legal assistance.
While the operational law support during the early phases of an operation are critical to the success of the mission, proactive work in the administration of
Legal Support to Operations
justice will ensure that the foundation of the American Army-good order and discipline-is scrupulously managed allowing commanders. to fight and win our nations wars.
While still at home station, whether this is from a CONUS or OCONUS installation, legal assistance services for our soldiers and family members will consume the majority of judge advocate resources. In recognition of the importance of legal assistance to the deploying force, the Army is committed to ensuring that every soldier that needs or desires a Last Will and Testament or Power of Attorney has one. Answering questions about taxes, providing legal help for family members during deployment, participating in the set up and success of the command's family support group network, and helping reserve component soldiers with legal issues arising from mobilization are just a few areas that encompass legal support to operations during mobilization and deployment. The delivery of these key and essential services result in enhanced soldier morale as our soldiers worry less about concerns at home. This immense amount of work will occur only through the extensive legal support provided by the reserve component. While the Legal Support Organization (LSO) has a warfighting mission and will primarily deploy with the Staff Judge Advocate into the theater of operations, the Mobilization Support Organization (MSO) will provide "surge support" legal services to mobilization stations during all phases of the operation (mobilization, predeployrnent, deployment, combat operations, post- conflict, and redeployment). They provide this support by supplementing
the capabilities of their installation legal offices, as augmented under their MOBTDAs and by the judge advocate sections or assigned GSUs. Furthermore, they will provide supplemental legal services to other installation legal offices in support of their area responsibilities to provide legal services to the dependents of deployed AC mQRC soldiers Finally, they will provide legal services at other locations, such as STARC offices and ARNG installations, RSC offices and installations, and elsewhere.
5.4 THE CORE LEGAL DISCIPLINES IN WAR
Contrary to the popularized notion that legal complications wither away during wartime, unit histories and after- action reports attest that issues will arise in all six core legal disciplines. Perhaps the only generalization that may be stated about legal support in wartime, particularly OPLAW, is that a number of legal provisions in diverse disciplines will become clearly applicable without the need for drawing elaborate analogies that is present during many MOOTW. This is so because these provisions hinge on the existence of "war" or "combat" or "international armed conflict," though the legal definitions of these and related terms vary from document to document. It remains useful for judge advocates to use the legal discipline structure as it enhances professional educational training and reflects the most efficient delivery of legal services in the garrison environment. A unique characteristic of being a judge advocate is that the legal mission continues, both in garrison and the deployed environment.
5.4.1 Administrative Law
Administrative separations, conscientious objector applications, implementation of general orders, the handling of war trophies, official investigations into fratricides and other incidents, and distribution of medical care are among the many issues that will arise.
While claims arising from damage occumng as a result of combat will not generally be cognizable, claims nevertheless may still be payable in some circumstances under the Foreign Claims Act, the Military Personnel Claims Act, and a variety of other statutes and international agreements. Prompt and correct processing, adjudication, and payment of foreign claims will be necessary to maintain good will toward United States forces by local civilians.
5.4.3 Civil Law
Unless provisions are exempted or relaxed, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) still applies, including rules concerning full and open competition. Similarly, the basic fiscal controls on appropriated funds-namely those constraining availability of appropriations as to purpose, time, and amount-still apply. Environmental considerations will include documenting environmental conditions and changes thereto in areas of operations, reporting improper modification of environmental conditions as a method or means of warfare, and ensuring environmental safety and integrity for the well being of soldiers.
5.4.4 Militarv Justice
The need for an efficient and just disciplinary system will never be more urgent than in war. This core competency of OPLAW JAs will be heavily practiced, as non-judicial punishment, courts-martial of all types, and perhaps even military commissions will be convened. The "time of war" provisions of the Uniforrn Code of Military Justice will be in effect, increasing the feasibility of courts-martial in forward areas.
5.4.5 International Law
Common Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions will be triggered by the state of "international armed conflict" that exists during a true war. This will cause a great number of provisions in the law of war to become clearly applicable to the conduct of United States and enemy forces. Commanders and staffs will require interpretations of many nuances of the law of war as they relate to the targeting of objectives and the treatment of the wounded and sick, captured prisoners, and civilians. Soldiers will directly apply the "soldier's rules" which they learn in basic training.179 Although the law of war, and in some circumstances United States military law, will displace portions of the law of the foreign country where our forces have deployed, most of the default legal rules will be those of the foreign country. If the United States is fighting the war within a coalition, domestic legal issues associated with security assistance will
Legal Support to Operations
likely arise. War Powers Resolution reporting may be necessary. Other federal statutes, executive branch materials, and court decisions relating to national security may be applicable.
United States soldiers in war will continue to hail from all fifty states and the Temtories. They will continue to require wills and to face taxation, divorces, indebtedness, child custody and support disputes, and a wide range of lawsuits, many of these aggravated by long deployment. Some reserve component soldiers will be wrongly fired by employers. Legal assistance attorneys will use a wide variety of tools available under federal and state law on behalf of their soldier-clients.
5.5 ORGANIZATION FOR WAR
5.5.1 Theater Le~al Structure
As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the Theater SJA distributes available legal resources to facilitate delivery of the full spectrum of legal services. The SJA achieves economies of scale and specialization and maintains the flexibility to shift priorities of legal
Component Command (ASCC), the theater army area commands (TAACOMs) or theater support commands (TSCs), area support groups (ASGs), Army special operations commands, and other units and functional commands (e.g., personnel commands, medical commands, engineer commands, etc.) in theater.
Legal support to operations will take place during war within a theater. A unified combatant commander in chief (CINC) will command all United States forces in the theater and may also serve in a separate capacity as the commander of multinational forces. The CINC, through his SJA or legal advisor, will also establish policy for the employment of all operational legal assets in the theater, which are typically assigned, attached, or serving in direct support of several different echelons.
The CINC has this policy-setting authority as a matter of law, but the underlying rationale is rooted in an age-old principle for effective warfighting. This principle is known as unity of command; it holds that forces should be under a single responsible commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose.'80
5.5.2 Armv Service Com~onent Command
The CINC's legal advisor will coordinate closely with the TJAGs of the separate services, with the SJA for the ASCC, and with the SJAs for the corps and divisions within the ASCC to devise a concept for employment of operational law resources. With the exception of providing trial judges and trial defense counsel-which are detailed centrally from USALSA-the SJA sections for the divisions within the ASCC are responsible for practicing operational law and providing legal support to operations across all legal disciplines in assigned geographic areas.
5.5.3 Command Posts
The practice and delivery of operational law in a division requires understanding of the command post (CP). The CP of a division is the principal facility employed by the commander to command and control combat operations. A division's command post is frequently spoken of in the singular, but a division commander normally deploys his command post in three echelons or facilities. These are the tactical command post, the main command post, and the rear command
post. Note, emerging doctrine in the Force XXI digitized divisions may use only two command posts-a tactical command post (sometimes referred to as the DTAC or TAC1) and a main CP. Both of these CPs are larger than their Anny of Excellence Division tactical CP and main CP counterparts. The digitized division, however, may have no rear CP. Judge advocates in command posts provide operational law support and provide or facilitate support in core legal disciplines required to sustain the organization, as described in Chapter 3.
CPs are organized and set up to operate on a 24-hour basis. This includes operating while displacing. Shifts must be established that provide enough personnel to operate the CP and also the required expertise to make decisions. There should not be a "first team" and "second team" approach. Both shifts must be capable of efficient CP operation. Command group personnel are not included in the shifts.
The shift officer-in-charge (0IC)-also referred to as the "battle captainM– is the focal point for information management. He controls all information going in and out of the command post. In addition to managing informational flow, the battle captain is responsible for updating the current operations, maps, and charts. To accomplish his duties, the OIC must have guidance from the commander, XO, and S-3, a thorough knowledge of the TAC SOP, current orders, the synchronized matrix, execution checklist, and other command and control tools, and subordinate unit plans and graphics. The shift OIC is assisted by the shift noncommissioned officer-in- charge (NCOIC). The shift NCOIC supervises all updating of maps and charts to ensure all information is exchanged. He supervises monitoring radios and maintenance. He ensures journals are properly prepared and prepares all reports for the OIC's approval.
The tactical CP (sometimes called "TAC CP;" or, in rapidly deployed divisions, the "Assault CP;" or in Airborne and Air Assault Divisions the Joint Airborne and Communications Center Command Post, or JACCICP; or as TACl in the Digitized Division) is the forward echelon of the Division's CP. The concept behind the TAC CP is that it is close to the brigade commanders' CPs so that the division commander can directly influence current operations. The rule of thumb is that the TAC CP should be within FM radio range of the committed brigades. The Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver (ADC-M) normally leads the TAC CP. This is a lean apparatus,
Legal Support to Operations
typically consisting of about a dozen officers and a few NCOs operating out of a few vehicles or tents.''' Judge advocates in the TAC CP provide advice regarding ROE, LOW, and other OPLAW matters. They also maintain situational awareness to identify and resolve legal concerns before they become distracters.
The main CP is the primary division CP. Whereas the TAC CP focuses on commanding and controlling current operations, the main CP focuses on sustaining current operations and on planning future operations. It should be located out of enemy medium artillery range so that the enemy must take a special effort to knock it out if it is able to find it. The officer in day to day charge of the main CP is the Division Chief of Staff. The Division Commander normally commands from the main CP, though he will frequently travel to the TAC CP, to the rear CP, to subordinate unit CPs, or wherever he can best exercise his will. The main CP is a much bigger operation than the TAC CP, consisting of more than 50 officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers. The Division Headquarters Company moves the main CP when it has to move, and it secures the main CP from attack. The Digitized Division's Main CP, while having various cells to include an Jnformation Operations cell, can be an extended distance from the DTAC or TAC1 making appropriate mobility and communication capabilities a must to maintain situational awareness.
The rear CP focuses on everyttung else-essentially the massive job of sustaining current and future operations-and remains prepared to control current operations if the TAC CP or main CP cannot function. The rear CP's main concerns are synchronization/direction of combat service support; terrain management; security of the rear area; and movement of tactical units, personnel, mail, and logistics. The Assistant Division Commander for Support (ADC-S) normally leads the rear CP, which is collocated with the CP of the Division Support Command (DISCOM), the brigade-sized element dedicated to logistical support of the division. The rear CP is in the division's rear area, though this does not imply it will be spared enemy attack. To the contrary, a division's rear area contains many of the division's most lucrative targets. The rear CP does not exist in the Digitized Division.
5.5.4 Jud~eAdvocate Dis~odtion
Frequently, when direct, immediate legal advice is required, the OPLAW JA will deploy with the TAC CP (or, in rapidly deployable divisions, with the assault CP). Division commanders will elect to use an augmented TAC CP or assault CP when split-based operations are necessary. Split-base operations involve a forward and a rearward CP separated by great distances and linked by reliable communications. These communications enable the passing of staff work electronically from a secure area (the location of the rearward CP) to a combat zone (the location of a forward CP) and back again. The forward and rearward CPs are designed based on METT-TC by beginning from the TAC CP/ assault CP and rear CP models and then dividing functions from the main CP model. When the TAC CP is thus augmented, the OPLAW JA frequently deploys with it. In the digitized division, OPLAW JAs are positioned in the DTACITACl to render immediate OPLAW advice, particularly within the C2 function.
As a general rule, however, Army doctrine for division operations locates the OPLAW JA in the main CP. Because the Division Commander normally commands the division from the main CP, the SJA will locate himself there, with the OPLAW JA. The SJA and the OPLAW JA will normally divide operational law duties in the main CP, which include participation in the Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC).
Each of these judge advocates is a member of the DOCC, which identifies and plans attacks on deep, high-payoff targets and whose members include the Division Artillery (DIVARTY) Commander, the Deputy Fire Support Coordinator (DFSCOORD), the Deputy G-3 for Plans, and a G-2 representative. Within the main CP, these judge advocates will locate themselves with the G-3 plans element. Note, emerging doctrine may push the DOCC forward to the TAC CP; this would require a judge advocate in the TAC.
OPLAW duties in the main CP (or, when appropriate, in the TAC CPI assault CP) involve the counselor function and the core legal disciplines supporting the command and control, and sustainment of battlefield operations. Judge advocates provide legal support to combat service support and personnel service support operations from the rear CP or other support location. The SJA and CJA introduce relevant operational law considerations into DOCC planning and the MDMP by interpreting ROE.
The DOCC uses a methodology known as decide-detect-deliver-assess. This methodology is explained in detail in Field Manual 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for The Targeting Process.182 This manual is essential reading for the OPLAW JA and SJA.
The bulk of the SJA section deploys with the combat service support cell of the rear CPlg3 The SJA will position himself with this element as necessary to ensure the provision of professional legal services, but the DSJA normally supervises the performance of legal duties in the rear CP (or sustainment cell). These duties comprise both OPLAW functions (C2 and sustainment), personnel service support, and all six legal disciplines. While all legal personnel in the SJA section must be capable of resolving issues across this entire range of duties, the practice and delivery of OPLAW from within the combat service support cell will be marked by significant division of labor. The volume of legal issues arising and the number of judge advocates available will compel and permit particular judge advocates to concentrate on certain functions and disciplines. In this way, the section will take advantage of special expertise of judge advocates.
The remainder of the division SJA section deploys with the command posts of subordinate brigades, brigade-sized commands, or separate battalions. The SJA will determine which subordinate commands are directly supported by judge advocates serving as Chiefs of Brigade Operational Luw Teams (BOLTs). In making this determination, the SJA will consider ME'IT-TC and the principles of tailoring in Chapter 2. BOLTs are discussed later in this chapter.
Army Service Component Command. The Army Service Component Command (ASCC) OSJA structure must be tailored to support C2, sustainment, and support operations for the deployed force. Army legal personnel serve at several levels within a theater. The Army Service Component Command (ASCC) includes an SJA section. The corps, divisional, and separate brigade commands subordinate to the ASCC also include SJA or CJA sections, or BOLTs, as do various supporting theater army area commands (TAACOMs) or theater support commands (TSCs), area support groups (ASGs), Army special operations commands, and other units and functional commands (e.g., personnel commands, medical commands, engineer commands, etc.) in theater. The SJA is the senior judge advocate in the ASCC. The SJA is assisted by the DSJA, other judge advocates, a legal administrator (warrant officer), the CLNCO, and legal specialists. Judge advocates are also located in theater command, group, regiment, and brigade headquarters. Legal specialists are also located in theater command, group, regiment, brigade, and battalion or squadron headquarters. Continuous, reliable communication networks, both secure and non-secure, and RDL linkages with the tactical command and control network and the unclassified Internet (including LAAWS) are essential to provide legal support
Legal Support to Operations
throughout the theater. Accurate and timely OPLAW advice to the commander depends on tactical communication linkages. For example, in a digitized headquarters, operational attorneys must have immediate access to MCS-Phoenix. Judge advocates must be diligent to comply with information and operational security requirements when using these resources.
The ASCC SJA is a member of the ASCC commander's personal and special staffs. The TAACOWTSC SJA is the senior JA within that structure and a member of the TAACOWTSC commander's personal and special staff. In their respective organizations, they provide advice on all aspects of law and military operations. They supervise the delivery of legal services throughout the theater of operations and are a technical channel conduit. The SJA requires dedicated transportation assets/support to perform these funpions throughout the area of operations.
Judge advocates in the ASCC's Early Entry and Operations/Intelligence Modules support the commander and staff in the conduct of military operations. On a twenty-four (24)-hour per day basis, they integrate proactive legal support into all aspects of the conduct of operations. They support current operations and plans. Judge advocates in the TAACOWTSC Early Entry Module (EEM) provide similar support to TAACOWTSC early entry operations. This includes the critical role of providing legal review and advice for contracting actions.
Judge advocates in the ASCC Main Module provide specialized legal knowledge, training, and experience in support of theater-wide operations. They provide centralized services, along with any additional support requirements unable to be filled by judge advocates located in subordinate units. Judge advocates of the TAACOM/TSC provide similar support throughout the TAACOMITSC and its subordinate units. Judge advocates in the ASCC Rear Module support rear operations and assist contracting officers in the theater rear.
Legal specialists in the ASCC and TAACOWTSC headquarters work in support of the SJA section and OPLAW JAs. They work under the supervision of judge advocates, collect information, conduct research, and prepare documents. They support judge advocates and commanders and assist in the delivery of legal services. Some legal specialists are specially trained court reporters, who compile verbatim records of judicial and other proceedings. The CLNCO supervises and trains legal specialists throughout the theater of operations. Legal specialists in battalion, squadron, group, regiment, and brigade headquarters provide professional and ministerial support of legal actions. Under the supervision of judge advocates, they provide the critical forward assistance for the judge advocates and facilitate the delivery of legal services and the judge advocates' legal advice.
Corps. The SJA is the senior judge advocate in the corps. The SJA is assisted in the corps headquarters by the DSJA, other judge advocates, a legal administrator (warrant officer), the CLNCO, legal specialists,, and JAGC civilian personnel. Judge advocates support the corps support command (COSCOM), and each group, regiment, and separate brigade headquarters. METT-TC dependent, the SJA can task organize legal support below separate brigades. Legal specialists support each group, regiment, separate brigade, and battalion or squadron headquarters. Continuous, reliable communication networks, both secure and non-secure, and RDL linkages with the tactical command and control network and the unclassified Internet (including LAAWS) are essential to provide legal support throughout the theater. Accurate and timely OPLAW advice to the commander depends on tactical communication linkages. For example, in a digitized corps, OPLAW JAs must have immediate access to MCS-Phoenix. Judge advocates must be diligent to comply with information and operational security requirements when using these resources.
The SJA is a member of the corps commander's personal and special staffs. The SJA provides legal advice to the commander on all aspects of law and military operations. The SJA supervises the delivery of legal services throughout the corps and exercises operational control over all JAGC personnel assigned to the corps. The SJA provides technical supervision and provides support as necessary to division, separate brigade, and armored cavalry regiment judge advocates within the corps. The SJA exercises operational control over additional legal assets, legal organizations, or legal teams that are assigned to the corps area, except military judges who perform independently under the U.S. Anny Trial
Legal Support to Operations
Judiciary, and Defense Counsel who perform independently under the U.S. Army Trial Defense Service. The SJA task organizes legal assets to provide responsive legal support throughout the corps areas of operation, and as far forward on the battlefield as necessary. The SJA requires dedicated transportation assets/support to perform these functions throughout the area of operations.
The DSJA acts for the SJA, administers the full range of legal services throughout the area of operations, mentors legal personnel, supervises legal operations in the Army of Excellence Corps Rear Command Post, or at other separate locations, and plans collective training.
Judge advocates in the corps tactical command post advise the corps commander and the battle staff on legal issues associated with the conduct of military operations. On a twenty-four hour per day basis, they integrate proactive legal support into all aspects of the conduct of operations.
Judge advocates located at the corps main command post provide specialized knowledge, training, and experience in support of corps-wide operations. They provide operational law and core legal discipline support at the main CP. They support group, regimental, command, and brigade judge advocates.
Judge advocates in the corps G3 plans and operations sections, information operations, or other operational cells provide legal advice and assistance in support of plans, targeting operations, and current operations in the corps main command post.
Judge advocates at the Army of Excellence corps rear command post, or other support location, provide specialized knowledge, training, and experience in support of corps rear operations. They are prepared to assume the mission of the corps main legal section. They provide centralized legal services relating primarily to personnel support operations, but they also assist the SJA with C2 and sustainrnent legal support as required.
Legal specialists in the corps headquarters work in support of the OSJA and OPLAW JAs. They work under the supervision of judge advocates, collect information, conduct research, and prepare documents. They support judge advocates and commanders and assist in the delivery of legal services. Some legal specialists are specially trained court reporters who compile verbatim records of judicial and other proceedings. The CLNCO supervises and trains legal specialists throughout the corps.
Judge advocates in the COSCOM, group, regiment, and separate brigade headquarters provide legal support to the commanders in all functional areas (to include subordinate commanders at all levels), staffs, leaders, and soldiers of the unit. In addition to OPLAW duties, the COSCOM judge advocate may be tasked to provide or coordinate for contract law advice in support of the COSCOM.
Legal specialists in the COSCOM, group, regiment, brigade, battalion, and squadron headquarters support the processing of legal actions. Under the supervision of judge advocates, they provide the critical forward assistance for the judge advocates and facilitate the delivery of legal services and the judge advocates' legal advice.
Division/Separate Brigade/Armored Cavalry Regiment.
The division SJA section is the lowest-echelon, organic, full-service element of legal support to operations. It is modular-capable of being tailored to provide legal support for specific missions that may be undertaken during a war. It also features significant synergy-a product of bringing together diverse, techcally skilled legal professionals and providing them the informational and legal research infi-astructure necessary for tackling complex legal issues.
Each division receives the organic full- service operational legal support of a complete SJA section because divisions are depended upon. to fight battles and engagements (the tactical level) in such a way as to achieve success at the operational level. An Army corps is two or more divisions. An Army division is a unit that combines in itself the necessary arms and services required for sustained combat.
There are different types of divisions-armored, mechanized, light infantry, airborne, and air assault, -and not all of these types are exclusive. For instance, airborne divisions are capable of all missions assigned to light infantry divisions.
The essence of a combat division is that it trains and fights as a team, and it has the necessary equipment to fight for a significant time.. Although Army doctrine designates the corps as the largest tactical organization, the division is the largest organization that regularly trains as a team. A typical light infantry division has three infantry brigades (each comprising three battalions), an aviation brigade, a brigade-sized artillery element, a brigade-sized logistical support element, and a number of separate battalions. In rough terms, it consists of about 18,000 soldiers equipped with rifles, machine guns, mortars, anti-tank missiles, bridging equipment, air defense missiles, artillery tubes, helicopters, and other weapons and equipment.
A typical mechanized infantry division has two mechanized and one armored brigade (sometimes referred to as "maneuver brigades"), an engineer brigade, an aviation brigade, a brigade- sized artillery element, a brigade-sized logistical element, and a number of separate battalions. The maneuver brigades will include, as a whole, five mechanized and five armored battalions, task organized by the division commander according to METT-TC. A typical armored division features the same capabilities as the mechanized infantry division except that it has two armored brigades and one mechanized brigade. These maneuver brigades in the armored division will include, as a whole, six armored and four mechanized battalions task organized into brigades according to METT-TC.
This manual focuses on division SJA section deployment during war or other
Legal Support to Operations
prolonged operations because the division is the focus of Army warfighting doctrine. However, the division SJA section model also provides a guide for achieving the proper balance of modularity and synergy in SJA sections that support corps, TAACOMsITSCs and other large commands. Although military operations other than war (MOOTW) sometimes require the deployment of entire division SJA sections, military operations in war invariably require such deployment. In war, the division SJA is the ultimate practitioner of OPLAW. He positions himself at all times to support the division commander, who must constantly strive to link the employment of soldiers and materiel to strategic aims. The division SJA organizes the section as necessary to provide professional legal services at all subordinate echelons of command.
The SJA is the senior judge advocate in the division. The SJA is assisted in the division headquarters by the DSJA, other judge advocates, a legal administrator (warrant officer), the CLNCO, and legal specialists. Judge advocates support each brigade to include the division artillery (DIVARTY), the Engineer Brigade, and DISCOM headquarters. Legal specialists also support each brigade, battaIion, or squadron headquarters. Continuous, reliable communication networks and RDL linkages to C2, sustainment, and support systems and LAAWS are essential to provide legal support throughout the division. Particularly in digitized divisions, where brigades may have extraordinary lines of communication, brigade judge advocates must be prepared to provide all functional areas of legal support across all six legal disciplines. For this to occur, the OPLAW JA must have access to the commander and continuous secure and non-secure communication and automation capabilities. Judge advocates must be diligent to comply with information and operational security requirements when using these resources.
The SJA is a member of the division commander's personal and special staffs. The SJA provides legal advice to the commander on all aspects of law and military operations. The SJA supervises the delivery of legal services throughout the division and exercises operational control over JAGC personnel assigned to the division and its subordinate units. The SJA requires dedicated transportation assets/support to perform these functions throughout the area of operations.
The DSJA is normally the second most senior judge advocate. The DSJA acts for the SJA, administers the full range of legal services throughout the area of operations, mentors legal personnel, supervises the brigade judge advocates, and plans collective training.
Judge advocates in the OSJA provide specialized legal knowledge, training, and experience in support of division C2, sustainment, and support operations. They provide centralized services and augment brigade judge advocates. The JAGC provides OPLAW support and comprehensive legal services in core legal disciplines throughout all phases of military operations. Mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians (METT-TC) impact the precise location for delivery of services. OPLAW support is provided as part of an overall plan for delivery of comprehensive legal services. OPLAW support is generally provided at the division tactical operations center, division G-3 plans and operations sections, division information operations cell, targeting cell, and each brigade headquarters. Based on mission requirements, OPLAW support may be provided to battalion and smaller-sized organizations.
Legal specialists in the division headquarters work in support of the SJA and OPLAW JA. They work with, and under the supervision of, judge advocates, ,collect information, conduct research, and prepare documents. They support judge advocates and commanders and assist in the delivery of legal services. Some legal specialists are specially trained court reporters who compile verbatim records of judicial and other proceedings. The CLNCO supervises and trains legal specialists throughout the division.
Judge advocates in the division's TAC CP advise the division commander, the assistant division commander, and the battle staff on legal issues associated with the conduct of military operations. On a twenty-four (24)-hour per day basis, they integrate proactive legal support into all aspects of the conduct of operations.
Judge advocates in the division G3 plans, operations, or information operations sections provide legal advice and assistance in support of plans, ROE, targeting operations, and current operations in the division main CP. The commander or SJA may task organize his judge advocate support to optimize situational awareness, such as providing dedicated legal support to the emerging information operations (10)cell.
Legal Support to Operations
2 JAs (12 Hour Shifts) in DOCC 1 MCS Terminal
Sustainment Cell: SJA, Legal Admin (cW3)~ CLNCO 6 JAs: Chfs, LA, MJ, AdAnt'l Law 2 MCS Operators (71 Ds) 3 Plans/Exercises Cell (PLEX): 9 71 Ds
The above diagram depicts one model of judge advocate organization to support provide legal support to the emerging digitized division. Judge advocates are task organized to maximize situational awareness given the potentially enormous division battlespace made possible by technological advances. Note that the BOLT may be hundreds of kilometers from the Division Main.
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 1st Brigade Army of Excellence Division 3d Brigade
1JA, 1NCOlC (71 D) NColC (71D) 3-5 Bn 71 Ds 2d Brigade 3-5Bn 71 Ds
1JA, 1NCOlC (71 D)
1JAY 1 NCOlC (7lD)
3-5 Bn 71 Ds
Division Support CMD -Engineer Brigade (DISCOM) Division Main 1JA, 1 NCOlC (71D) 1 JA, 1NCOlC (71D) SJA + 2 JAs 3-5 Bn 71 Ds 3-5 Bn 71 Ds 2 71Ds
7 JAs: DSJA, Chiefs of Operational Law, Claims,
Intn'l Law, Admin Law, Legal Assistance, Military Justice
1Legal Administrator (Warrant Officer), 1Chief Legal NCOIC, 22 71 Ds
Another model of judge advocate organization based on the Army of Excellence.
Legal Support to Operations
The Brigade Operational Law Team (BOLT). The SJA task organizes OPLAW support to commanders, staffs, and soldiers of a brigade combat team (BCT) or brigade task force. The SJA identifies early, the Brigade Judge Advocate, who serves as Chief of the BOLT. This judge advocate is usually the trial counsel for that brigade while in ganison. The BOLT also includes the legal specialists assigned to the supported BCT. The legal issues facing brigade judge advocates may extend across the full spectrum of OPLAW and the core legal disciplines. Although it is trained and equipped to identify issues across all three functional areas and the six disciplines of legal support to operations, the challenge for the BOLT is always to achieve requisite synergy to resolve complex legal questions within particular disciplines. Often, this synergy can be achieved only by communicating with the division SJA section and other judge advocates in technical channels.
The division SJA, in consultation with the DSJA, determines which subordinate units within the division will be directly supported by BOLTs. The SJA considers METT-TC in making this determination, paying particular attention to the likely complexity and volume of legal issues the subordinate unit will face and to the ability of the unit to receive OPLAW support from assets located with division command posts. The legal specialists that comprise the BOLT are under the supervision of the brigade judge advocate and provide the critical forward assistance for the brigade judge advocate and facilitate the delivery of legal services across the brigade combat team. The provision of timely and accurate legal support requires the combined team of the legal specialist and the brigade judge advocate. There are instances, however, when a brigade judge advocate is required to support more than one brigade. Further, a judge advocate deploying with the brigade may have requirements to support other organizations within the area of operations. These variables emphasize the brigade judge advocate's need for mobility and cornmurlication capability.
The DISCOM BOLT should have training or experience in contract law. In addition to other legal duties, the DISCOM brigade judge advocate may be tasked to provide or coordinate for contract law advice in support of the DISCOM.
Judge advocates and legal specialists serving in BOLTs must understand the capabilities and role of brigade-sized units in the Army. The brigade is the first unit in the infantry or armored soldier's upward chain of command that includes a full range of soldiers who do tasks very much different from his own. A brigade task force includes interrogators, counterintelligence operatives, attack helicopter pilots, howitzer crew chiefs, Marine Corps air and naval gunfire liaisons (ANGLICO), heavy anti-tank weapon gunners, bulldozer operators, air defense gunners, fuel bladder technicians, engine repairmen, water purifiers, ambulance drivers, physicians, and graves registrars. The brigade is the smallest unit in the Army that must integrate all of the seven battlefield operating systems-intelligence, maneuver, fire support, mobilitylsurvivability, air
defense, combat service support, battle command-into a potent whole. Brigade task forces that deploy with BOLTs and brigade surgeons are also the smallest units in the Army that have their own legal and medical professionals in the field. For a more detailed explanation of brigades and how they are organized and fight, see, e.g., DEP'TOF ARMYFIELD MANUAL 7 1 -3, THE ARMOREDAND MECHANIZED INFANTRY (8 Jan. 1996); DEP'T
BRIGADE OF ARMY FIELD MANUAL 71-123, TACTICS AND TECHNIQUESFOR COMBINED ARMS HEAVY FORCES: ARMORED BRIGADE, BATTALION TASK FORCE,AND COMPANYTEAM (30 Sep. 1992).
The BOLT must be present in the TOC or TAC, have access to the commander, and have the training, mobility, secure communications and equipment to provide the right answers at the right time and place. Legal support to operations contributes to several other battlefield operating systems in addition to combat service support. The most prominent of these is the command and control system, but intelligence, maneuver, fire support, mobility1 countermobilityl survivability, and air defense also require OPLAW support. In serving within these other systems, the BOLT must be prepared both to identify and resolve the full range of legal issues-across the legal functional areas and core legal disciplines-by inserting sound analysis and recommendations into the brigade's MDMP.
Legal support to operations must be managed with careful attention to what can and must be done at each echelon of command. Accordingly, the BOLT cannot and does not attempt environmental litigation, legal representation in foreign legal systems, review of high dollar-value contracts, convening of general courts-martial, conclusion of international agreements, drafting of inter vivos trusts, review of Foreign Military Sales cases and other highly technical services. The BOLT seeks to practice preventive law and to identify the full range of legal issues that need to be raised to higher echelons.
5.5.5 Brigade Command and Control Facilities
Judge advocates serving as Chiefs of BOLTs must understand the brigade command and control facilities. They are adept at obtaining information from the flow of messages into and out of these facilities, at inserting important information into that flow, at helping the brigade staff determine what ingredient the decision process needs, and in supplying the needed ingredient.
The brigade has four types of command and control facilities: the command group, the tactical CP, the main CP, and the rear CP. Like the command posts discussed at division level in Chapter 5, the brigade CP must be able to ensure that the commander is continually abreast of the developing situation that subordinate commanders are provided with the means to accomplish their assigned missions.
The brigade command group is a temporary organization consisting of the brigade commander and other soldiers and equipment required to perform command group functions. The primary
Legal Support to Operations
function of the command group is to influence the immediate action through the commander's personal presence. Other functions include observing the battlefield, synchronizing the battle, and providing planning guidance. The command group moves forward from the tactical CP. The command group sometimes operates from a command and control helicopter.
The tactical command post (TAC CP) fights current close operations, provides the commander with combat critical information, and disseminates the commander's decisions. It is supervised by the brigade S-3 and is usually as far forward as the battalion main CPs. The TAC CP should strive to have redundant abilities in personnel and equipment at the main command post.
The main command post monitors the current battle, executes planned deep attacks, and plans future operations. It coordinates operations throughout the brigade sector and keeps higher headquarters informed. It is supervised by the brigade executive officer (XO) and includes staff personnel representing all facets of brigade operations. The tactical operations center (TOC)is the operations cell within the main command post.
The forward support battalion (FSB) commander supervises the rear command post, which is collocated with the forward support battalion CP. The rear CP is responsible for administrativeflogistic functions. The rear CP or the direct support artillery battalion main CP is usually designated as the brigade alternate CP. The forward support battalion commander is responsible for fighting rear operations.
An infantry brigade must maintain continuous, synchronized operations. To establish the necessary "battle rhythm" to make this happen, the brigade makes optimal use of scheduled conference calls, shift change briefings, and battle update briefs (BUBs). The brigade commander conducts conference calls with his subordinate commanders at regular intervals shortly after the division conference calls. The shift change brief is supervised by the outgoing TOC shift OIC and is designed to exchange information between the outgoing and incoming shifts. It can also serve as a commander's update, but the primary audience is the incoming shift. Battle Update Briefs are called on an as-needed basis to update the TOC on current and significant events.
Occasionally, when he can be expected to make a direct contribution to current operations, the brigade judge advocate will deploy with the TAC CP or accompany the brigade command group. As a general rule, however, the brigade judge advocate will deploy with the main CP. Because the brigade commander normally commands the brigade from the main CP, this is the optimal position for the brigade judge advocate. The brigade judge advocate, supported by the brigade legal specialist, will provide OPLAW support in the main CP, which will include participation in the brigade's targeting process. When in the TOC at the main CP-as opposed to the TAC or assault CP-the brigade judge advocate or legal specialist should locate themselves
adjacent to the PSYOP and civil affairs elements.
The brigade level legal specialists of the BOLT deploy with the rear CP, at the adminiswative and logistics operations center (ALOC). They are supervised in their OPLAW duties by the BOLT element in the main CP. The brigade judge advocate and legal specialist communicate regularly with the remainder of the BOLT in the rear CP. They also periodically travel there to provide leadership and guidance, to provide legal assistance and complete other tasks that cannot be attempted in the main CP, and to ensure that legal specialists are utilized in support of the operational law mission.
The present manual identifies the BOLT as the model of modular legal support to an Army unit smaller than division size. Many of the organizational principles defining the BOLT can be applied to good effect in the modular legal support teams that deploy with special operations elements. For example, the SJAs of United States Army Special Operations Command and United States Army Special Forces Command face the same challenges in generating synergy around the legal challenges that confront the Group Judge Advocates and OPLAW teams that deploy with special forces groups. Although the unique mission of special forces groups will inevitably raise distinct legal questions (see the discussion of special operations in Chapter 4), these judge advocates and teams, like BOLTS, must be able to identify a broad range of legal issues, and coordinate those issues with higher technical channels, while focusing on a
band of issues critical to sound decision- making by command and staff.
5.6 MATEREL IN WAR
The practice and delivery of legal support in war may be marked by heavy and persistent demand for administrative law, contract, or fiscal law opinions, foreign claims adjudication, for advice on United States obligations under treaty or foreign legal provisions, and for interpretations of domestic security assistance statutes. It will likely require the convening of courts-martial. It will require the provision of a high volume of legal assistance services. As discussed earlier, critical legal support within the personnel service support function will surge during predeployment, then remain at a relatively constant volume once in theater. OPLAW-C2 and sustainment-will surge upon entry into the theater with command and control issues dominating legal support during combat operations and sustainment issues just before and after combat operations. As communications improve and weapons lethality continues to increase the battlespace, judge advocates must be linked into the tactical and non-tactical communication systems. To effectively provide OPLAW advice to the commander at the critical time and place on the battlefield,
judge advocates must remain aware of the tactical situation and have access to the commander.
The materiel that accompanies the division SJA section must be sufficient in types and quantities to meet these requirements. Chapter 4 described in general terms the automation, mobility,
Legal Support to Operations
and communications equipment necessary for OPLAW elements to accomplish their missions.
The materiel requirements of the SJA section in prolonged, large-scale operations are not limited to automation, mobility, and communications equipment. CD ROM and hard copy books and forms are also needed to back up essential references, or for frequent use or consultation.
The need for courts-martial to maintain good order and discipline will require the establishment of a courtroom, judge's chamber, deliberation room, and private locations suitable for interviewing witnesses or the accused by counsel. The frequency of reference to reported case precedents may justify the deployment of hard copy case reporters to augment the cases contained on compact disk. Also, adequate furniture, lighting, court reporter equipment, supplies for the creation of exhibits, and a means for photocopying key documents will be essential to the achievement of justice and due process close to the forward line of troops.
In war, the adequate provision of professional legal services at all echelons of command (to include the companies, battalions, brigades, divisions, and corps making up the tactical level) requires courts-martial to be conducted in theater. Discipline in a combat zone is ill-served by courts-martial conducted far away from the dangers of war.
5.7 TRAINING FOR WAR
The training challenge in today and tomorrow's military is immense. Judge advocates must balance the ever-present mission in garrison with the need to deploy and provide our commanders and soldiers with the full range of legal support in operations. Like their non- legal counterparts, legal personnel must be aware of and train with emerging technologies-global positioning devices (GPS), night vision devices, vehicles, communication means, and automation software and hardware. All legal personnel should be well read on emergng joint and army doctrine and train on individual soldier skills at every opportunity (e.g., S JA section leader development programs, unit exercises, deployment to the Army's Combat Training Centers).
The division SJA, in conjunction with the DSJA, CLNCO, and Legal Administrator, trains the SJA section for wartime deployment using Army training doctrine, the application of which to OPLAW was described in Chapter 4.
The SJA section's METL is the single most important product for conducting battle focused training. The SJA and DSJA must use the process described in Chapter 4 to develop and assess METLs of LSOsMSOs andlor the judge advocate sections of other RC units within their subordinate wartrace chain of command. This process should be part of the training association relationships between SJA sections and RC units, such as the training relationships created and fostered pursuant to FORSCOM Regulation 27-1, Judge Advocate Training Association Program (15 Jun 1998).
In planning training to develop proficiency on a mission essential tasks, Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) rotations should be given special emphasis. The BCTP is the only combat training center with the specific mission of providing stressful and realistic training to corps and division staffs on their METLs. SJAs and DSJAs, in conjunction with CLAM0 and judge advocate observer- controllers detailed to the BCTP, must ensure that OPLAW issues are fully and realistically integrated into BCTP rotations. Integration of legal issues that have arisen during deployments is essential not only for the effective training of the SJA section; it is essential for the effective training of the command and staff.lp4
Legal Support to Operations
Chapter 6 Legal Support to Military Operations Other Than War
United States military operations in the Republic of Haiti in 1994 and 1995 represented a comprehensive and stunningly successful application of law to fluid and challenging circumstances. Many Americans will recall the tense beginning. when a large combat force entered Haiti peacefully on terms negotiated in the ll? hour by duly empowered civilian representatives of the United States. Many Americans also will recall how these operations soon achieved the ouster of a dictator. the return to power of an elected Haitian president. and the removal of a threat to regional peace and security. These aspects of the Haiti deployment not only reafirmed the rule of law. they also held a symbolic and political importance that aroused great popular interest .
Yet other signijicant applications of law took place day.to.day. at the individual and unit level . Infantry privates balanced initiative with restraint under the rules of engagement while confronting potentially hostile Haitians . Supply clerks distributed food and other items that had been purchased strictly in accordance with acquisition and appropriations laws . Military policemen treated Haitian detainees pursuant both to internal rules and to standards derived from international treaties . Investigating oficers pe73'ormed their duties thoroughly and fairly in gathering evidence about incidents of alleged misconduct. Soldiers, sailors. airmen. and marines remained undistracted by personal concerns. enjoying a sense of security provided by statutory programs of life insurance and legal assistance. With very few exceptions. these men and women in uniform also scrupulously followed orders given by their chain of command. justzfying a disciplinary system acknowledged by Congress and the courts to be essential to mission accomplishment.
Center for Law and Military Operations
Law and Military Operations in Haiti. 1994-1 995 18'
STRATEGIC CONCEPT ……………….
THEATER CONCEPT ………………….
Political Objectives ……………….
Legal Complexity ………………….
Mission Complexity ………………
Command and Control …………. Interagency Coordination …….. THE ARMY'S ROLE IN MOOTW ….. Arms Control ………………………. Combating Terrorism …………… Counter-Drug Operations ……… Enforcement of Sanctions and
Exclusion Zones ………………..
Humanitarian Assistance ……… Nation Assistance ………………… Noncombatant Evacuation
Peace Operations …………………
Recovery Operations …………….
Show of Force Operations …….
Strikes and Raids …………………
Support to Insurgencies ………. Operations under Armistice
ORGANIZATION OF LEGAL
LEGAL'ASPECTS OF C2. SUSTAINMENT. AND SUPPORT
Legal Basis for Operation …….. Status of Forces ………………….. International and lnteragency
Relationships……………………. Use of Force and Rules of
Engagement (ROE) …………….
Treatment of Civilians …………..
Fiscal Responsibility …………….
Intelligence Oversight ………….. LEGAL TNG REQUIREMENTS LEGAL EQUIP REQUIREMENTS …. SUMMARY…………………………………
The last chapter described legal support to operations in war. This chapter describes legal support to military operations other than war (MOOTW) outside the United States. The next chapter describes military operations within the United States.
MOOTW are "[o]perations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war."186
Although MOOTW and war may often seem similar in action, MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace while war encompasses large- scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests. MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations and often the military may not be the primary player. More restrictive ROE and a hierarchy of national objectives are followed. MOOTW are initiated by the National Command Authorities and are usually, but not always, conducted outside of the United States.18'
There are many types of MOOTW, several having multiple components: arms control, combating terrorism, support to counter-drug operations, enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and raids, support to insurgency, and operating under armistice ~onditions.'~~
MOOTW present significant legal challenges to judge advocates. First, they must understand and relate the national and international political and legal frameworks affecting the specific operation. These frameworks affect command authority, ROE, and the success of operations more than they do in war. Second, they must frequently advise commanders concerning the relationships between international forces, joint forces, non-governmental agencies, private voluntary organizations, and U.S. governmental agencies. Third, they must forge consensus among joint, international, government, and private organizations on legal issues, thereby promoting unity of effort and mission legitimacy. Fourth, they must identify and resolve technical legal issues in specialized, fluid, and uncertain operational situations.
To assist judge advocates who support MOOTW, this chapter will describe the strategc and theater concepts common to MOOTW, the Army's role in MOOTW, unique considerations for organizing legal support for MOOTW, prominent legal issues affecting command and control, sustainment, and support operations in MOOTW, and legal training and equipment requirements. Judge advocates should also read current joint and army doctrinal publications on MOOTW.~~~
6.2 STRATEGIC CONCEPT
United States security strategy calls for U.S. leadership abroad -"we must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home …"Ig0 As a result, the U.S. "must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actor^."'^' This leadership requires engagement with
political, economic, and military power to shape the international environment and to promote democracy.lg2
engagement will be multinational and multidisciplinary. "Durable relationships with allies and friendly nations are vital to our security. A central thrust of our strategy is to strengthen and adapt the security relationships we have with key nations around the world and create new relationships and structures when nece~sary."'~~
The United States will use an integrated approach to address threats, including superior military forces, a strong diplomatic corps, and foreign assistance program.'94 Frequently, military operations will be in a supportive role or will support a lead agency.lg5
"[Olur national military objectives are to Promote Peace and Stability and,
include peacetime engagement and deterrence,lg7 and may involve any of a variety of military activities. Military activities such as international exercises,
Legal Support to Operations
Partnership for Peace, foreign military sales, and military-to-military contacts promote stability, build coalitions, enhance interoperability, and promote democracy.Ig8 Counterdrug and counterterrorism operations protect Americans and other nationals, and fight drug and terrorist organizations through international cooperation, intelligence and technical support, and nation assi~tance.'~~Peacekeeping operations support peace agreements and facilitate long term settlements through deployment of military units to monitor and perform other assigned tasks.200 Arms control prevents conflict and reduces threat through treaty verification, weapons security, and weapons seizure, dismantling, or destru~tion.~~' Noncombatant evacuation operations protect American citizens abroad and other selected persons by extracting them from a dangerous location to a safe haven.202 Sanctions enforcement of U.S. policy decisions and UN Security Council resolutions includes military operations to interdict movement, prohibit activities in a specific area, or ensure freedom of navigation.*03 Peace Enforcement operations apply military force to maintain or restore international peace and security.204 Military activities also support diplomatic activities such as peacemaking, peace building, and preventive dipl~macy.'~~
6.3 THEATER CONCEPT
There are several unique aspects of the MOOTW theater: the primacy of political objectives, legal complexity, mission complexity, command and control, and interagency coordination.
6.3.1 Political Obiectives
"Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tacti~al."~~ Political directives will authorize and prescribe military
operation^.^^' Political organizations frequently take the lead role.208 Political considerations affect how the military conducts operations.209 Political implications may affect the success of the military operation, or require changes in the operation.z10 "Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions which may have adverse political effects. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implication^."^^'
MOOTW theaters are legally complex for three reasons. First, units conducting MOOTW cannot rely solely on traditional law of war rules regarding the use of force, but must develop ROE that accomplish the mission and protect the force consistent with international law and political directives.212 Second, MOOTW frequently involve national, multinational, and international legal authority.'13 Reconciling the legal concerns of each nation, or concerns between the U.S. and an international organization, is a challenging task.214 Third, the legal issues arising during MOOTW may be specialized and widely varied. Commanders will require legal advice in international law, host nation law, fiscal law, security assistance, command authority, and other issues.215
6.3.3 Mission Com~lexitv
MOOTW missions occur simultaneously and sequentially, and involve extensive contact with civilians. "Noncombat MOOTW may be conducted simultaneously with combat MOOTW, such as HA [humanitarian assistance] in conjunction with PEO [peace enforcement operations]. It is also possible for part of a theater to be in a wartime state while MOOTW is being conducted elsewhere within the same theater."216 Commanders must plan to transition from war to MOOTW, or from MOOTW to combat.217 The mission in Haiti transitioned from sanctions enforcement to peacekeeping, and included plans for simultaneous noncombatant evacuation and either forced or semi-permissive entry into Haitia218
MOOTW missions are complex also because of their impact on civilians. Commanders must be prepared to collect human intelligence concerning political, cultural, and economic factors affecting the operation,219 to conduct public affairs, civil affairs, and psychological operations,220 to provide humanitarian a~sistance,~~' develop that
to ROE protect the force without causing civilian ca~ualties,2~~
to process civilian detainees,223 to process requests for temporary refuge or asylum,224 and to perform other tasks as the mission requires.
6.3.4 Command and Control
In MOOTW, Theater C2 must account for multinational forces and myriad other organizations. National Command Authorities (NCA) and Joint
Legal Support to Operations
Command and Control (C2) over the
U.S. military remain generally the same as in war.225 The President will never "relinquish .. .command authority … but …may . . .place U.S. forces under the temporary operational control of a competent. . .
Multinational forces may employ several C2 options: the lead nation option, in which one nation provides most of the forces and exercises operational control of the multinational force; the parallel option, in which a mandating organization selects a commander, each nation contributes proportionally to the staff, and each nation provides the commander some degree of operational control; and the regional alliance option, in which an existing multinational headquarters exercises C2.2" The United Nations Mission in Haiti is an example of the parallel 0ption.2'~ Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia is an example of the regional alliance 0ption.2~~
6.3.5 Intera~encv Coordination
Coordination with U.S. agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations is essential to understand the situation and society involved, 230 and to ensure unity of effort.u1 "For MOOTW outside the United States, the lead agency will normally be the Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Ambassador will coordinate U.S. activities through an established Country Team with representation from all U.S. departments and agencies in that country, including
mD.,,232 A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) can provide effective coordination with nongovernmental and
private voluntary organizations.233 Forty nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations were in Haiti;234 four- hundred were in Bosnia.235 Because there are so many agencies and organizations, each with its unique authority and capabilities, judge advocates should consult the references in footnote 189 of this chapter for more specific information.
6.4 THEARMY'S ROLE IN
The Army's role in MOOTW outside the United States is to perform specific DoD missions, normally as part of a joint force, normally under the lead of DoS, and in coordination with U.S. government, nongovernmental, and private voluntary organization^.^^^ These missions involve myriad legal concerns, the most important of which are addressed later in this chapter.
The doctrine on the types of MOOTW, and the interrelationships between them is developing. This section will describe common Army MOOTW missions outside the United States: arms control, combating terrorism, counter-drug operations, sanctions enforcement, humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, recovery operations, show of force, strikes and raids, support to insurgencies, and operations under armistice conditions. Because doctrine is developing, judge advocates should consult the current doctrine when planning or conducting an operation.
6.4.1 Arms Control
Arms control is a plan, based upon international agreement, that governs the numbers, types, or characteristics of weapon systems, or the strength, organization, equipment or employment of armed f0rces.2~~ Potential army missions include verifying treaty provisions, seizing weapons of mass destruction, escorting weapon deliveries, or disposing of weap0ns.2~~ The army may also participate in confidence building measures, including inspections, base visits, and equipment demon~trations.~~~
6.4.2 corn bat in^ Terrorism
Combating terrorism includes antiterrorism and counterterrori~rn.~~~ Antiterrorism involves "defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individual and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces."241 Antiterrorism programs are comprehensive; they include threat analysis, vulnerability assessments, information security, operations security, personnel security, physical security, crisis management planning, tactical measures to contain or resolve incidents, training, and public affairs.242 "A well-planned, systematic, all-source intelligence and counterintelligence program is es~ential."~~ Counterterrorism is a special operations mission that involves "offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrori~rn."~ Response measures "include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations."245
6.4.3 Counter-Drug O~erations
While counter-drug operations primarily support U.S. law enforcement agencies,246 they also support the national drug control strategy goal of breaking foreign sources of Counter-drug support to foreign nations is provided through security assistance programs and civil-military ~perations.~~ Security assistance programs provide equipment needed to meet the drug threat, services related to the equipment, and training in drug enforcement when granted exceptions to restrictions on police trai11ing.2~~ Civil- military counter-drug operations in foreign countries include providing information about the host nation drug culture, cooperative programs to reduce drug trafficking, providing collateral intelligence to host nation authorities, and assisting host nation information
6.4.4 Enforcement of Sanctions and Exclusion Zones
Sanctions and exclusion zone enforcement are coercive measures to enforce decisions of competent national or international a~thorities.~~' The military objectives are to establish barriers to the flow of goods, or to prohibit certain activities in specific geographic areas.252 Operations SUPPORT DEMOCRACY off Haiti in 1993, SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq in 1992, and DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia in 1993 are examples of sanctions and exclusion zone enf~rcement.~'~
Legal Support to Operations
6.4.5 Humanitarian Assistance Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are "provided in conjunction
Humanitarian Assistance operations with military operations and exercises, "relieve or reduce the results of natural and must fulfill unit training or manmade disasters or other endemic requirements that incidentally create conditions such as human pain, disease, humanitarian benefit to the local hunger, or privation in countries or populace."261 This assistance may take regions outside the United state^."^" the form of medical, dental, and Military support is intended to veterinary care, and rudimentary supplement other agencies, and may include command and control, operational planning, intelligence, 6.4.7 Noncombatant Evacuation logistics, or Operations
6.4.6 Nation Assistance Noncombatant evacuation operations evacuate U.S. citizens and selected non-
"Nation assistance is civil or military U.S. persons from a foreign country.263 assistance (other than HA [humanitarian These operations normally include assistance]) rendered to a nation by U.S. "swift insertions of a force, temporary forces within that nation's territory occupation of an objective, and a during peacetime, crises or emergencies, planned withdrawal upon completion of or war, based on agreements mutually the mission."264 Depending upon the concluded between the United States specific mission and situation, these and that nation."256 Nation assistance operations may require medical and includes security assistance, foreign dental support, combat search and internal defense, and humanitarian and rescue, mortuary affairs, public affairs, civic assistance programs provided psychological operations, and command under Title 10 U.S. Code Section 401 .257 and control Evacuee Security assistance provides defense processing may occur in country or in a articles, training, and services under the safe haven,266 and may involve searching Foreign Military Sales Program, Foreign and segregating personnel, inspecting Military Financing Program, for restricted items, providing logistical, International Military Education and medical, and chaplain support, and Training Program, Economic Support requests for asylum or temporary Fund, and Arms Export Control Act refuge.267 sales.258 Foreign Internal Defense is a Special Operations mission that enables 6.4.8 Peace Operations foreign nations to fight subversion and insurgency.259 These missions include Peace operations "support support to security assistance, joint and diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term
combined exercises, exchange programs, . political settlement and [are] categorized civil-military operations, sharing as peacekeeping operations . . . and intelligence and logistical support, and peace enforcement operations."268
combat operations when approved by Military operations such as preventive National Command A~thorities.~~" deployment, military-to-military contacts, or other MOOTW may also support preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, or peace building.269
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) are "military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement .. . and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term solution."270 PKO tasks are specific to the mission and may include observing and monitoring compliance, investigating alleged violations, negotiating and mediating with the parties, supervising cease-fires or other aspects of the agreement, and assisting civil authorities.271 PKO planning considerations include, but are not limited to, compliance with the international mandate, terms of reference (TOR), and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); coordination with nongovernmental organizations and private voluntary organizations; coordinating the sources and funding responsibilities for logistical support; methods for collecting information; developing rules of engagement restrictive enough to comply with the mandate and robust enough to protect the force; procedures for addressing foreign claims; and procedures for handling dislocated civilian^.^"
Peace Enforcement Operations (QEQ) "are the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order."273 PEO tasks are also mission specific and may include "enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of HA,
operations to restore order, and forcible
separation of . . . parties" and
conducting internment or resettlement
considerations are similar to PKO, but
also include more emphasis on
intelligence collection, fire support,
mobility and survivability; and ROE that
enable the use of force to compel
compliance while minimizing collateral
6.4.9 Recovery O~erations
"Recovery operations are conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national They may occur in either friendly or denied areas.277
6.4.10 Show of Force Operations
Show of force operations demonstrate U.S. resolve through increased visibility of military forces to influence respect for U.S. interests or defuse a situation.278 These operations may include formation of a joint task force, repositioning of forces, patrolling, or conducting exercises.279
6.4.11 Strikes and Raids
"Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes. . . .An example of a strike is Operation URGENT FURY, conducted on the island of Grenada in 1983."280 "A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. . . . An example of a raid is Operation EL DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in response to the terrorist bombing of U.S. Service members in Berlin."281
6.4.12 Support to Insur~encies
Support to Insurgencies includes
U.S. logistic and training support, but normally not combat operations, for an organized movement to overthrow a constituted government.282 An example was U.S. support to the Mujahadin resistance in Afghanistan 'during the Soviet invasion.283
6.4.13 Operations Under Armistice Conditions
An armistice suspends military operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties. If its duration is not defined, the belligerent parties may resume operations at any time, provided always that the enemy is warned within the time agreed upon, in accordance with the terms of the armistice.284 For example, the Korean Armistice Agreement signed on 27 July 1953, shapes the conduct of military operations on the Korean peninsula and there are specific Armistice Rules of Engagement for the Korean theater. Consequently, judge advocates stationed in the Republic of Korea must be familiar with the Korean Armistice Agreement and other sources of international law dealing with armistice agreements.
6.5 ORGANIZATION OF LEGAL SUPPORT
The legal support organization for MOOTW is generally as described in
Legal Support to Operations
Chapter 2. Nevertheless, because each MOOTW is unique, SJAs must tailor legal support, and must coordinate technical legal supervision, technical support, and augmentation requirements for the specific situation and mission. When tailoring legal support for MOOTW, SJAs should consider mission-specific requirements for legal duties and skills. MOOTW require judge advocates to perform additional mission-specific duties.28s During operations in Haiti, for example, legal personnel supported refugee operations in Panama and Cuba, the Joint Interrogation Facility, the Joint Logistics
Support Command, and the United Nations Mission in Haiti headquarters.286 In Bosnia, judge advocates supported each Battalion Task Force, a level of command lower than normal, and served as advisors to Joint Military Co~nmissions.~~~ During both operations, split-based operations generated requirements for additional legal resources.288
6.6 LEGAL ASPECTS OF C2, SUSTAINMENT,AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
While S JAs must always provide support in OPLAW and the core legal disciplines described in Chapter 3, SJAs should pay special attention to the following prominent legal concerns arising in MOOTW outside the United States. Although this section outlines only the principal concerns, the potential MOOTW missions, situations, and corresponding legal issues are myriad. Therefore, legal personnel should consult the Operational Law Handbook289and other legal sources for detailed information about the legal aspects of various types of MOOTW.
6.6.1 Lepal Basis for the O~eration
The legal basis for an operation derives from international and domestic law, and the decisions of competent
It may be expressed in U.N. Security Council Resolutions, regional security organization resolutions, international agreements, U.S. National Command Authorities decisions, orders, mandates, terms of reference, or other forms. While U.S. National Command Authorities consider international and domestic legal authority when ordering military operations, judge advocates advising military commanders must know the legal basis for the operation for two important reasons.
First, a clear understanding of the legal basis promotes the legitimacy of the operation. "A clear, well-conceived, effective, and timely articulation of the legal basis for a particular mission will be essential to sustaining support at home and gaining acceptance abroad."291 Therefore, OPLAW JAs must understand the legal basis and brief commanders, enabling them "to better plan their missions, stsucture public statements, and conform their conduct to national Commanders' statements and conduct contribute to legitimacy by demonstrating adherence to law and authority.293 Co~nmanders and judge advocates must also educate the soldiers about the operation's purpose and legal basis. Informing the soldiers will help their morale and improve their ability to communicate and cooperate with local civilians, other
nations' forces, and nongovernmental
Second, the legal basis of the operation guides the commander in many ways. It may affect the operation's sc0pe,2~~ timing,296 and ROE;297 the status of
the command' s relationships with military and non-military organization^;^^^ and the applicable funding authorities.300 Therefore, OPLAW JAs must obtain and study all relevant international organization resolutions and international agreements, the mandate, the terms of reference, and higher command orders. Furthermore, OPLAW JAs must be diligent throughout the planning and conduct of the operation to incorporate legal guidance from these documents into the relevant portions of all operations plans and orders.
6.6.2 Status of Forces
The status of forces is of critical concern to commanders during MOOTW overseas.301 Because the jurisdictional default to the Law of the Flag does not normally apply in MOOTW, numerous legal issues affecting the success of the operation must be resolved, including host nation criminal and civil jurisdiction, authority to conduct law enforcement activities including trials by courts-martial, claims against the U.S. or U.S. personnel, authority for U.S. forces to carry arms and use force, force protection, entry and exit requirements, customs and tax liability, contracting authority, authority to provide health care without a local medical license, vehicle registration and licensing, communications support,
Legal Support to Operations
facilities for U.S. forces, hiring of local personnel, authority to detain or arrest, and provisions for transferring custody.302 These issues can become significant issues for the SJA and the entire command.303
SJAs and OPLAW JAs must identify and resolve status of forces issues beginning early in the planning process and continuing throughout the operation. There are several strategies available to resolve status concerns. First, look to existing agreements, which should be available at the Unified Command, Component Command, or International and Operational Law Division, 0TJAG.304 Second, consider the need for additional agreements and inform the proper authority under Army Regulation 550-51 of any req~irements.~'~ Agreements can be negotiated during or after operations.306 Third, consider whether conventions on the status of United Nations personnel apply and are adequate.307 Fourth, consider whether an agreement is unnecessary because the Law of the Flag applies or there is a jurisdictional
Finally, where compliance with host nation law is required, inform the command of these requirements and consider measures to mitigate the impact on the operation.
6.6.3 International & Interagency Relationshim
Information describing the basic relationships existing between military organizations, and with non-military agencies and organizations is provided earlier in this chapter, and in references cited in footnote 5. Commanders will encounter three general concerns involving international and interagency relationships that require judge advocate support: questions concerning command authority,309 requirements for legal liaison co~rdination,~'~
and and conflicting legal concerns.311
SJAs and OPLAW JAs must perform several important tasks relating to these concerns. They must advise commanders about their legal authority in relation to other commands, agencies, and organizations. They must coordinate legal advice and actions with all relevant commands, agencies, and organizations.312 They must perform liaison as directed by the commander, which may include liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross and legal officers in other troop contributing nations, participating in the Civil-Military Operations Center, and giving briefings for the Joint Military Comrni~sion.~~~
Finally, they must take the initiative to find innovative solutions to conflicting legal concerns.314
6.6.4 Use of Force & Rules of Enga~ement(ROE)
The general principles and judge advocate tasks relating to the interpretation, drafting, dissemination, and training of ROE discussed in Chapter 8 and the Operational Law Handbook apply in MOOTW.315 The general purposes of ROE-to accomplish the mission and protect the force-also remain valid.316 U.S. forces will always retain the inherent right of self-defense.317 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Standing ROE (SROE) will generally, but not always, apply in MOOTW.318
Nevertheless, there are several unique ROE concerns in MOOTW. "ROE in MOOTW are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war . . ."3'9 Restrained, judicious use of force is necessary; excessive force undermines the legitimacy of the operation and jeopardizes political objectives.320 MOOTW ROE considerations may include balancing force protection and harm to innocent civilians or non-military areas,321 balancing mission accomplishment with political
consideration^,^^' protecting evacuees "while not having the authority to preempt hostile actions by proactive military measures,"323 enabling soldiers to properly balance initiative and restraint,324 determining the extent to which soldiers may protect host nation or third nation civilians,325and the use of riot control agents.326 In multinational operations, developing ROE acceptable to all troop contributing nations is imp~rtant.~" Being responsive to changing ROE requirements is also
SJAs and OPLAW JAs will be much more involved in ROE interpretation, drafting, dissemination, and training during MOOTW.329 Interpretation must consider not only the SROE or other applicable higher headquarters ROE, but also the legal authority for the operation, mandate, and specific political objectives.330 Drafting must address considerations such as those discussed in the previous paragraph, and account for the specific concerns of each troop contributing nation.331 Dissemination must be prompt and responsive throughout all levels of command, from the appropriate political authority to the individual soldier.332 Training should include vignettes, in which soldiers role- play expected situations and train to respond in accordance with the ROE.333
6.6.5 Treatment of Civilians
SJAs and OPLAW JAs face significant challenges regarding the commander's legal obligations toward civilians: determining an individual's status, identifying the specific legal rules that apply, and applying legal rules in a wide variety of operational situations. Generally, while the law of war will not normally govern MOOTW, DoD Dir. 5100.77 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01 require U.S. forces always to apply the principles of the law of war in MOOTW as a matter of Beyond this, however, the issues become complex.
The legal complexity relates to the three challenges identified above. The status of civilians encountered may include U.S. civilians, host nation civilians, third country civilians, diplomats, media, criminals, host nation civilian officials, armed civilian groups, international organization employees, non-governmental and private voluntary organization personnel, refugees, contractors on the battlefield, and other
The applicable law will always include the principles of the Law of War, and may also include the customary international law of human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights treaties, provisions of Protocols I & It, or host nation The operational situations may include maintaining public order,337 applying military force,338 providing humanitarian assistance,339 processing
Fourth, recommend that the commander establish multidisciplinary logistics and acquisition boards; provide legal advice to these boards.360 Fifth, consider innovative solutions learned from recent experiences.361
6.6.7 Intelligence Oversight
MOOTW require "multi-disciplined, all-source, fused intelligence;" human intelligence may be the most useful component.362 Intelligence support is critical to all types of MOOTW.363 Intelligence collection in MOOTW focuses on "political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation" rather than on an enemy's military capability.364 As a result, intelligence collection and counterintelligence operations involve substantial contact with non-government organizations, private voluntary organizations, the local populace, and allied or coalition ~artners.3~~
Because of sensitivities that exist when working with nonmilitary organizations or in
U.N. operations, it is frequently appropriate to use the term "information gathering" rather than "intelligence
Many intelligence organizations have organic legal support; nevertheless, SJAs and OPLAW JAs must provide intelligence law advice to their own organizations in the development and oversight of operations.367 Therefore, SJAs and OPLAW JAs must be familiar with the legal rules relating to intelligence operations,368 have the security clearances required to access relevant information,369 and be prepared to resolve sensitive intelligence law i~sues.~'' Technical legal support from SJA, U.S. Army Intelligence and Secu,rity Command can assist SJAs and OPLAW JAs with these issues.
6.7 LEGAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
The general training principles and procedures in Field Manual 25-100, Field Manual 25-101, and chapter 4 of this manual apply to MOOTW t~-ai1ing.3~' In particular, SJAs must always ensure all legal personnel are proficient in individual skills such as land navigation, handling classified material, first aid, weapons qualification, et~.,~~~that
and legal organizations are proficient in collective tasks relating to OPLAW and the core legal disciplines. Training for MOOTW, like training for war, requires legal personnel to receive and provide individual and collective training, and to train with the units they
Nevertheless, MOOTW require mission-specific skills. First, judge advocates must have political-military skills.374 In Bosnia, the legal advisor to the Joint Military Commission advised the commander on the application of the Dayton Accords and drafted correspondence to the military and political faction^.^" Other judge advocates coordinated multinational ROE, provided advice concerning persons indicted for war crimes, and communicate with government and non- government organization^.^'^ Second, deployed legal organizations must have host nation expertise -an understanding of the local law, and the ability to communicate in the local language.377'? Third, deployed legal personnel may
Legal Support to Operations
require specialized expertise. Special Operations units, which conduct many MOOTW missions, require legal advisors who know special operations missions, structure, doctrine, and
In Haiti, experts in civilian legal and judicial functions were required to assist the newly restored Aristide government.379
SJAs should emphasize the following aspects of MOOTW individual training: situational training exercises involving ROE, individual readiness training for the specific operation, and interagency and international cooperation.380 Training in interagency and international cooperation should improve cultural awareness, understanding of the roles of various organizations, and consensus-building ~kills.3~~
SJAs should become heavily involved in MOOTW mission rehearsal exercises (MRE). First, SJAs must become involved early in MRE planning to ensure the legal aspects of the specific mission are integrated into the mission rehearsal exercise scenario. Second, SJAs should ensure the scenario addresses training needs of two audiences: the command and staff at all echelons, and their legal personnel. Third, SJAs should ensure that deploying legal personnel participate in the exercise with their supported units.382 Fourth, SJAs should ensure that experienced and well-trained legal personnel act as observer-controllers. SJAs of superior commands must provide or coordinate the technical support required to ensure the success of the MRE.
6.8 LEGAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
The facilities and equipment generally required to provide legal support described in Chapter 2 are sufficient for legal support to MOOTW. Recent experience in MOOTW confirms the requirements for the RDL, Internet access, electronic legal research capabilities, connectivity with tactical command, control, and communication systems, secure communication and storage capabilities, and dedicated vehicles.383 SJAs and OPLAW JAs must ensure that RDLs are pre-loaded with the software packages and research materials required for the operation, that battle boxes are adequately supplied, and that other military equipment and office supplies are on hand, and ready for u~e.3'~
MOOTW present significant challenges to judge advocates. They must master the complex political and legal frameworks common to MOOTW, provide competent advice concerning the roles of various organizations involved in an operation, forge consensus among numerous military and non-military organizations, and resolve technical legal issues. Thorough understanding of the strategic and theater concepts, diligent participation in the planning and conduct of MOOTW, and mastery of the prominent legal issues are essential to accomplishment of the military mission and political objectives.
Legal Support to Operations
Chapter 7 The United States as a Theater
Although a theater of operations, as discussed in Chapter 4, is technically defined as an area "outside the continental United States," emergencies or other circumstances may arise in which a senior commander must provide support within the United States. That is, he must determine when, where, and for what purpose tactical forces, equipment, or other support will be committed in support of strategic aims. Judge advocates supporting operations taking place in the U.S. practice OPLAW and provide legal support to these operations much the same as judge advocates deployed overseas do for foreign operations. Statutes, numerous Department of Defense Directives, and other materials define the parameters of military support to domestic operations. Judge advocates that provide legal support to these operations must have a detailed understanding of the various programs, and their underlying legal authorities, that make up the domestic support arena. This chapter applies to operations in the U.S., including Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories and possessions.
Generally, domestic operations fall into three categories: military support to civil authorities (e.g., disaster relief); military support to law enforcement (e-g., civil disturbances, counterdrug operations); and military support to terrorism response (to include those involving weapons of mass destruction) (described later in this chapter as Emerging Threats in the Continental U.S.). This chapter will address each of these categories with a view toward the specialized nature of training and preparation legal personnel require for these operations.
Commanders and their judge advocates must understand that the DoD plays a support role in domestic operations. DoD acts in support of another federal, state, or local government or agency, known as the lead agency. Judge advocates must prepare to work closely with all appropriate organizations and agencies to help the commander stay within the restrictive boundaries of law and policy characteristic of military support in the United States.
ORGANIZING AND EQUIPPING
JUDGE ADVOCATES …………………. 7-2
TRAINING JUDGE ADVOCATES …. 7-2 MILITARY SUPPORT TO ClVlL AUTHORITIES…………………………… 7-3
Authorization for Military 7-3
Lead Agency and Military Role 7-4
Rules on the Use of Force …….. 7-5 MILITARY SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT………………………… 7-6
CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPS ……. 7-6
General……………………………….. 7-6 Authorization for Military Support……………………………. 7-7 Lead Agency and the Role of the Military ……………………….. 7-7 Rules on the Use of Force …….. 7-8
COUNTER-DRUG OPS ………….. 7-9
General……………………………….. 7-9 Authorization for Military Support…………………………… 7-10 Lead Agency and the Role of theMilitary……………………….. 7-11 Rules on the Use of Force …….. 7-11
7.2 ORGANIZING AND EQUIPPING JUDGE ADVOCATES
For an SJA, organizing and equipping judge advocates to deliver legal support to domestic operations is no different than it is for war or operations other than war. Based on the MElT-TC model (the variance being that the enemy could be an actual disaster, potential threats to force protection in a civil disturbance, or terrorists), the SJA will task organize his legal support to support the command and troops in the operation. The SJA should develop formal or informal training associations with Legal Support Organizations, Reserve Support Commands, or the Army National Guard to obtain the benefit of the experienced reserve component support embedded therein. The National Guard (non-federalized in a Title 32 status) will likely play a significant role in all domestic operations; therefore, S JAs involved in domestic support operations should develop such training associations with National Guard judge advocates. SJAs can expect small task force-sized units that are logistically heavy in terms of troops and mission. Despite the potentially small size of
units that may be called upon to provide assistance, any domestic operation will be legally intensive. While operations covered in other chapters in the publication focus mostly on judge advocate support to brigades and larger organizations, judge advocates should expect to support battalion-sized and smaller units in domestic operations.
7.3 TRAINING JUDGE ADVOCATES
Most judge advocates have little experience or training in domestic operations. This, coupled with the legally intensive nature of military support to domestic operations, is the reason that this chapter focuses on training. TJAGSA's Operational Law Handbook and CLAM0 are two training resources for domestic operations. The general training principles described previously in chapters 4 and 5 remain the same. Lessons learned from past operations indicate a need for judge advocates to plan, develop legal expertise, and train for the use of the military to respond to domestic events- disasters, civil disturbances, and terrorist threats. That added need is the focus of this chapter.
understanding of the limitations and exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act.
7.4.4 Rules for Use of Force
The Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) do not apply to domestic disaster relief operations. Commanders and their judge advocates must pay particular attention to any guidance on the Rules for Use of Force (the term "ROE" is not used for domestic operations) in the execute order or in any subsequent orders or directives. While most disaster relief operations will occur in a non-hostile environment, soldiers need to know the applicable Rules for Use of Force. DoD Directive 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DoD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties (25 February 1992), provides guidance pertaining to the authorized use of deadly force which may be applicable. A situation where soldiers might be confronted with use of
Legal Support to Operations
force situations might include a civil disturbance (e.g., looting) that occurs during disaster relief operations. Other state and local agencies, and perhaps non-federalized National Guardsman, are responsible for law enforcement functions-not federal troops. Again, the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the non-federalized National Guard. Commanders must be mindful, however, of force protection and the welfare of their soldiers. Proper training will ensure soldiers understand the rules on the use of force in domestic operations.
Finally, commanders must abide by and consider specified laws and policy on intelligence restrictions, election support restrictions, chaplain activities, payment of claims, debris removal, donated property, environmental compliance, support to relief workers, and the use of volunteers when planning and executing disaster relief and other types of military support operations in the United States.
7.6 EMERGING THREATS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (TERRORISM)
Due to our military superiority, potential enemies, whether nations or terrorist groups, may be more likely in the future to resort to terrorist acts or other attacks against vulnerable civilian targets in the United States instead of conventional military operations.
A National Security Strategy for a New Century The White House- October 1998
The federal government, in concert with state and local governments and agencies, will respond to acts of terrorism occumng in the United States. In general, the federal government's response will include the restoration of order and delivery of emergency assistance. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, signed in June 1995, establishes U.S. policy, and assigns responsibilities, concerning domestic terrorism. PDD 62, signed in May 1998, lays out the Executive Branch's vision and the corresponding assignment of responsibilities for a coordinated U.S. response to acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). PDD 62 directs the Department of Justice (DoJ), acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to take the lead responding to acts of tenorism using WMD. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supports the FBI in preparing for and responding to the consequences of such an incident.
As part of the Domestic Terrorism Program, the Department of Defense (DoD), along with many other agencies, will provide specified capabilities and assets in support of the FBI, FEMA, and other federal, state, and local governments as part of an integrated consequence management program. As part of this Program, the DoD will maintain units to assist in WMD consequence management and to help train emergency response personnel. This training may include exercises or other forms of training. Further, the DoD will help train the Army National Guard and other reserve assets for their role in assisting local authorities in managing the consequences of a WMD attack.
Again, like other forms of military support to domestic operations, judge advocates must have a detailed understanding of the laws, regulations and policies addressing terrorism and the roles of federal and state agencies. Judge advocates must recognize that a terrorist attack on the United States involving WMD will likely entail a massive, joint, and inter-agency response that will cross federal, state, and local government lines. Time to respond may be of the essence and command and control lines may be unclear or confused. Further, a well-organized, trained, and equipped military may have the tendency to step in and take "charge." Absent direction from the NCA (akin to a declaration of
Legal Support to Operations
martial law), federal military commanders must remember that DoD remains in a support role to assist DoJ, the FBI, FEMA or other lead agency with primary responsibility and overall control of the mission.
Legal Support to Operations
Chapter 8 Rules of Engagement
War is tough, uncompromising, and unforgiving. For soldiers, the rigors of battle demand mental and physical toughness and close-knit teamwork. Between the anxiety of battle, soldiers spend long hours doing routine but necessary tasks in the cold, wet weather and mud, moving from position to position, often without hot meals, clean clothes, or sleep. In war, the potential for breakdown in discipline is always present. The Army operates with applicable rules of engagement (ROE), conducting war$are in compliance with international laws and within the conditions specified by the higher commander. Army
forces apply the combat power necessary to ensure victory through appropriate and disciplined use of force.
Field Manual 100-5, Operations
It is not uncommon in MOOTW, for example peacemaking, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications.
Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War
I CONTENTS PAGE
Commander's Responsibility.. 8-2
Purposes of ROE ……………….. 8-2
Drafting Considerations ………. 8-3
Situation Considerations …….. 8-4
Definitions& Key Concepts …. 8-5
Types of ROE …………………… 8-6
CJCS STANDING ROE ……………….. 8-7
THE I-PDT METHODOLOGY …….. 8-9
OPLAW provides vital links between the strategic and tactical levels of conflict. The strongest of these links are often rules of engagement (ROE). ROE enable mission accomplishment, force protection, and compliance with law and policy. While ROE are always commanders' rules, the interpretation, drafting, dissemination, and training of ROE are also the business of OPLAW JAs.
Every chapter of this manual records the importance of ROE to the practice of OPLAW. ROE integrate many of the six disciplines of legal support to operations and epitomize the counselor function of OPLAW JAs. Development of expertise with ROE is a prominent duty and responsibility of S JAs. Involvement with ROE places judge advocates fdy within the command and control of operations. Theater operations implement the ROE established by Commanders in Chief (ClNCs) of combatant commands. Corps and Division Deep Operations Coordination Cells (DOCCs), or Information Operations Cells of the future, rely upon OPLAW JAs to incorporate ROE considerations into the targeting process. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) tend to be characterized by ROE demanding greater restraint in applying combat power, a factor that creates great challenges for judge advocates deployed with forward brigade task forces.
8.2 ROE DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS
8.2.1 Commander's Res~onsibilitv
ROE are commanders' rules for the use of force. Operations personnel are principally responsible to ensure that the ROE further operational requirements. OPLAW JAs assist the commander to interpret, draft, disseminate, and train ROE because all ROE must conform to international law, because a Department of Defense Directive and service regulations give military attorneys a role in ROE compliance, and because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has directed that attorneys will review all operations plans and participate in targeting meetings of military staffs.
Also, the Hague and Geneva Conventions contain dissemination provisions that encourage the involvement of judge advocates in ROE matters. A provision of the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions-which though not ratified by the United States is considered declarative of customary international law on this point–expressly mentions the role of "legal advisors."
8.2.2 Purposes of ROE
ROE are driven by three sets of considerations: policy, legal, and military. An example of a policy-driven rule is Executive Order 11850, which prohibits first use of riot control agents and herbicides without Presidential approval. An example of a legal-driven rule is the prohibition, "hospitals, churches, shrines, schools, museums, and any other historical or cultural sites will not be engaged except in self-defense." An example of a military-driven rule is the commonly encountered requirement for observed indirect fires for the purpose of effective target engagement. ROE are not the same as fire control measures. Fire control measures are implemented by commanders based on tactical considerations. An example of a fire control measure serving tactical purposes is the common requirement in ground operations that the artillery tubes organic to a unit will not fire beyond a designated fire support coordination line (FSCL); this ensures an efficient division of labor between fires controlled at one level and those controlled by higher levels of command. Moreover, it helps prevent fratricide by indirect fire.
The purposes of ROE quite often overlap; rules implementing strategic policy decisions may serve an operational or tactical military goal while simultaneously bringing U.S. forces in compliance with domestic or international law. As a result, troops in the field may not always appreciate the reasons why a leader fashioned a particular rule.
ROE must evolve with mission requirements and be tailored to mission realities. ROE should be a flexible instrument designed to best support the mission through various operational phases and should reflect changes in the threat.
8.2.3 draft in^ Considerations
Operational requirements, policy, and law define ROE. ROE always Legal Support to Operations
recognize the soldier's right of self-defense, the commander's right and obligation to self-defense, and America's national right to defend itself and its allies and coalition partners against aggression. In the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) for U.S. Forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide baseline guidance and procedures for supplementing this guidance for specific operations. Effective ROE are enforceable, understandable, tactically sound, and legally sufficient. Further, effective ROE are responsive to the mission and consistent with unit initiative.
In all operations, ROE may impose political, operational, and legal limitations upon commanders. Withholding employment of particular classes of weapons or exempting the territory of certain nations from attack are examples of such limitations. At the tactical level, ROE may extend to criteria for initiating engagements with certain weapon systems (for example, unobserved fires) or reacting to attack.
Effective ROE comply with domestic and international law, including the body of international law pertaining to armed conflict. Thus, ROE never justify illegal actions. In all situations, soldiers and commanders use force that is necessary and proportional.
Effective ROE do not assign specific tasks or drive specific tactical solutions; they allow a commander to quickly and clearly convey to subordinate units a desired posture regarding the use of force. In passing orders to subordinates, a commander must act within the ROE received. However, ROE never relieve
multiplying the effectiveness of our operations.
8.2.5 Definitions and Kev Conce~ts
ROE are defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as "directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered." A few examples illustrate the broad range of rules that fall within this definition: requiring an F-111 crew to confirm that all target acquisition systems are operable to bomb a Libyan barracks abutting a civilian population center; prohibiting entry by U.S. Navy ships into territorial seas or internal waters of a neutral nation; or authorizing an infantryman at a guard post to use deadly force against saboteurs of mission-essential equipment.
Wartime Versus Standing ROE. In general, ROE differ in wartime to reflect the increased justification for using force. Wartime ROE permit U.S. forces to open fire upon all identified enemy targets, regardless of whether those targets represent actual, immediate threats. By contrast, the SROE, which will be discussed later in this chapter, merely permit engagement in individual, unit, or national self-defense. Most legal grounds for intemational use of force during peacetime are traceable to self- defense. Wartime ROE are familiar to units and soldiers because battle focused training concentrates on wartime tasks. Individual Army privates and officer trainees in all occupational specialties receive instruction and undergo evaluation on basic wartime rules, such as "attack only combat targets" and "do Legal Support to Operations
not destroy property unless required by the necessities of war." In war, national leaders will seek to make the ROE no more restrictive than international law.
Necessity and Proportionality. The principles of necessity and proportionality help define the peacetime justification to use force in self-defense and are thus fundamental to understanding ROE for MOOTW. The necessity principle pennits friendly forces to engage only those forces committing hostile acts or clearly demonstrating hostile intent. This formulation-a quite restrictive rule for the use of force-captures the essence of peacetime necessity under international law. In 1840, Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated the essence of the necessity rule. He wrote that use of force in self-defense is justified only in cases in which "the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." The rule of necessity applies to individuals as well as to military units or sovereign states.
Definitions of "hostile act" and "hostile intent" complete the meaning of "necessity." A hostile act is an attack or other use of force. Hostile intent "is the threat of imminent use of force." The precise contents of these definitions become sensitive when the ROE describe specific behaviors as hostile acts or equate particular objective characteristics with hostile intent. For instance, the ROE might define a foreign uniformed soldier aiming a machine-gun from behind a prepared firing position as a clear demonstration of hostile intent, regardless of whether
specified circumstances; however, only the NCA may authorize the exercise of collective self-defense.
The SROE distinguish between the right and obligation of self-defense-which is not limited-and use of force for the accomplishment of an assigned mission. Authority to use force in mission accomplishment may be limited in light of political, military or legal concerns, but such limitations have no impact on the commander's right and obligation of self-defense.
Once a threat has been declared a hostile force, United States units and individual soldiers may engage without observing a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. The basis for engagement becomes status rather than conduct. The authority to declare a force hostile is given only to particular individuals in special circumstances. A~~endix to Enclosure A of the
A SROE contains guidance on this authority.
8.4 THE I-D-D-T METHODOLOGY
Legal Support to Operations
Commanders and staffs at all echelons use the Interpret-Draft-Disseminate-Train (I-D-D- T)
methodology to incorporate ROE into the conduct of military operations. OPLAW JAs participate in all four facets of this methodology. Each facet is connected with and influences the others, and together the facets describe a process of continuous refinement and revision. The facets in the ID-D-T methodology are interactive rather than sequential.
In joint task forces and at higher joint echelons, the I-D-D-T methodology is conducted by an ROE Planning Cell. The ROE Cell consists of the 5-3, the J- 2, the J-5,and the SJA or designated representatives, in addition to other special staff officers as appropriate. The Joint Task Force 5-3 is responsible for ROE in crisis action planning, and the ROE Cell provides a formal planning structure through which the J-3 can effectively perform this responsibility.
At corps and divisions, the I-D-D-T methodology is conducted by the members of the Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) and any Information Operations Cell, in conjunction with their duties in the targeting process. At brigade level, the Brigade Judge Advocate coordinates throughout the military decision-making process with the S-3 and with all staff officers engaged in targeting to ensure that the I-D-D-T methodology is conducted.
At the operational and tactical levels of conflict, commanders and staffs must interpret the ROE issued by higher headquarters. At the theater level, the CINC and his staff must interpret the SROE and any mission-specific ROE that may emanate from CJCS or the National Command Authorities. Interpretation of ROE demands skills that are well-honed in the legal profession and specifically cultivated within the "judge" function of legal support to operations. Thus, while the commander will ultimately determine what a rule issued by higher headquarters demands of his command, OPLAW JAs will provide expert assistance.
The interpretive expertise of the OPLAW JA begins from a thorough familiarity with the SROE. It relies upon aggressive research to find all operations plans, orders, messages, standing operating procedures, treaties and coalition documents, directives, and regulations that purport to establish or change the ROE. It demands careful organization of these documents (chronologically, by issuing headquarters) to determine which is authoritative on which point. It requires skill at reconciling two rules that appear to contradict by considering broader imperatives contained in the text of the rules or other guidance as well as clearheaded reasoning from any available precedents as to how the contradictory rules have been interpreted in the past. It presumes intimate knowledge of the "facts" of the military operation and sufficient knowledge of staff organization and procedures to gather information from those who can provide additional needed facts.
The OPLAW JA's contribution to the interpretation of ROE sometimes requires more than the skills of textual construction and factual analysis, however. In some situations, the OPLAW JA will be the sole member of the ROE Planning Cell, the DOCC, or the staff possessing the necessary training in objectivity and impartiality to state unpleasant interpretations of a higher headquarter's ROE. This requires constant situational awareness made possible through secure and nonsecure communication nodes, mobility, the commander's task organization of placing OPLAW JAs in command posts as discussed in earlier chapters.
In some operations, ROE will be top-driven, meaning that a higher echelon commander-for instance a CINC-establishes ROE that must be disseminated verbatim to all lower echelons. The preference of military doctrine, because it preserves lower echelon initiative, is for ROE to be top-
fed, meaning that a higher-echelon commander establishes rules for immediate subordinate echelons. These subordinate echelons in turn disseminate ROE that are consistent with those of higher headquarters but tailored to the particular unit's mission. These methods may also coexist within a particular operation, as some rules may be top-driven while others may be subject to discretion on the manner of dissemination and thus top-fed.
When the rules are not top-driven, commanders and staffs from theater level down to brigade draft ROE for
Legal Support to Operations
their commands. At theater and JTF levels, the drafting of ROE results in Appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) of the operations plan (OPLAN) or operations order (OPORD), in accordance with the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Joint Publication 5-03. At corps, division, and brigade level, the drafting of ROE results in Annex E to the OPLAN or OPORD in accordance with Army doctrine. Army doctrine also calls for the integration of ROE in the coordinating instructions subparagraph of paragraph 3 (Execution) of the body of the OPLAN or OPORD.
JOPES and Army doctrine provide minimal guidance as to the contents and format of these ROE documents. Standing operating procedures (SOPS), which exist in part to enable OPLANs and OPORDs to be brief, frequently provide extensive content and format guidance. This guidance, in turn, typically draws heavily upon the SROE, incorporating both standing rules and supplemental rules according to a command-specific format that is periodically updated and continuously trained. Appendix E to Enclosure B of the SROE contains a message format by which CINCs request and receive supplemental ROE.
The drafting of ROE in the context of multinational operations presents additional challenges. The SROE state that United States forces assigned to the operational control (OPCON) of a multinational force will follow the ROE of the multinational force unless otherwise directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA). The SROE further state that United States forces will be assigned and remain OPCON to a multinational force only if the combatant commander and higher authority determine that the ROE for that multinational force are consistent with the policy guidance on unit self- defense and with the rules for individual self-defense contained in this document. When U.S. forces, under United States OPCON, operate in conjunchon with a multinational force, reasonable efforts will be made to effect common ROE. If such ROE cannot be established, U.S. forces will exercise the right and obligation of self-defense contained in the SROE while seeking guidance from the appropriate combatant command.
Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by varying national obligations derived from international agreements; i-e., other members in a coalition may not be signatories to treaties that bind the United States, or they may be bound by treaties to which the United States is not a party. United States forces still remain bound by U.S. treaty obligations even if the other members in a coalition are not signatories to a treaty and need not adhere to its terms.
A multinational partner's domestic law, policy, and social values may also effect mu1 tinational planning at the strategic and operational level. Lessons learned from recent multinational exercises and operations reflect significant differences in how various countries understand and view the application of military force through the ROE. These factors can severely limit -or expand a Multinational Commander's ability to use a national contingent's capabilities. Legal advisors at all levels
advocates disseminate and train ROE to all lowest levels. All training opportunities should reinforce ROE and teach soldiers how to apply the basic rules of self-defense. Individual and unit preparation for specific missions must incorporate training that challenges soldiers to apply mission-specific ROE. In crisis response situations, ROE training may consist of leaders and soldiers receiving and training on the mission-specific ROE en route to the departure airfield. Jn that case, the knowledge gained on the basic rules of self-defense and scenario-specific, situational ROE during past scheduled training enables commanders and soldiers to better understand and adhere to the crisis situation ROE. When preparing for missions such as peacekeeping or disaster relief, commanders should remember that these missions normally require soldiers to use greater restraint and discipline than in offensive or defensive operations.
ROE should always include situational training. This situational training should challenge soldiers in employing weapons, levels of force, and other ROE. Situational training exercises (STXs) focus on one or a small group of tasks-within a particular mission scenarieand require that soldiers practice until the tasks can be executed to some pre-established standard. Trainers refer to these scenarios unofficially as "vignettes," and to this type of training as "lane training." To conduct STXs on ROE, a commander, judge advocate, or other trainer places a soldier in a particular simulated operational scenario and then confronts him with an event, such as the crashing of a traffic checkpoint barrier by a speeding vehicle. The trainer evaluates the soldier's response, and afterward discusses alternative responses available within the ROE. The STX brings to life abstract rules contained in written ROE, giving the soldier concrete tern of reference within whch to determine his response. In this way, the soldier achieves the balance between initiative and restraint so important to success, particularly in MOOTW. The SJA must be prepared to assist in providing ROE training, including vignette-driven training, and to ensure that subordinate SJAs are involved in providing similar assistance for ROE training.
The SROE articulate baseline principles that are useful in conducting soldier training within STXs, prior to a deployment. These principles can be restated within an acronym that permits individual common task training (CP) by establishing a standard against which to evaluate the soldier's response during the STX. One training device that captures the baseline SROE principles is the mnemonic RAMP. The box below outlines the elements of R-A-M-P, which when used within a context of repetitive and varied situational training, inculcates effective responses under conditions of stress. Because R-A-M-P principles incorporate necessity and proportionality, RAMP training provides a solid framework upon which mission- specific ROE training can build. Nevertheless, legal personnel must assist soldiers in understanding that R-A-M-P self-defense principles are not a substitute for mission-specific ROE training.
Legal Support to Operations
In all ongoing operations, but particularly in volatile and rapidly changing peace operations, commanders must conduct continuous refresher training. Commanders in Bosnia effectively developed and updated situational ROE training based on actual recorded events that took place in the theater of operations from previous weeks. In the gray zone surrounding ROE in peace enforcement operations, commanders, with their OPLAW JAs, must continually hone their soldiersy ability to balance initiative and restraint.
R -Return Fire with Aimed Fire. Return
force with force. You always have the right
to repel hostile acts with necessary force.
A -Anticipate Attack. Use force if, but
only if, you see clear indicators of hostile
M -Measure the amount of Force that
you use, if time and circumstances permit.
Use only the amount of force necessary to
protect lives and accomplish the mission.
P -Protect with deadly force only human
life, and property designated by your
commander. Stop short of deadly force
when nrnterti nu nther nrnnertv
ABCS AC-RC ACCA ACO ACOM
ADCON ADDS AGCCS ADC-M ADC-S AJAG AJAGICLL AJAG/MLO
ALCOM ALOC ALLS AMOPES AMOPS ANGLICO A0 AOA AOC AOE
ARFOR ARNG ARNG Spec Asst
ASCC ASG AS1 Assault CP ATCCS
BCT BCTP BDCSTS
Legal Support to Operations
Army Battle Command System
Active Component-Reserve Component
Army Court of Criminal Appeals
Area Claims Office
Atlantic Command (ACOM will be redesignated USJFCOM on or
about 1 Oct 99)
Acquisiti.on and Cross-Servicing Agreement
Area Common User
Army Data Distribution System
Army Global Command and Control System
Assistant Division Commander-Maneuver
Assistant Division Commander-Support
Assistant Judge Advocate General
Assistant Judge Advocate General for Civil Law and Litigation
Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law and
Assistant Judge Advocate General for Operations, a United States
Army Reserve Individual Mobilization Augrnentee
Administrativebgistics Operations Center
Army Law Library Service
Army Mobilization Planning and Execution System
Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System
Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
Area of Operations
Areas of Assistance
Areas of Conflict
Army of Excellence
Army National Guard
The Army National Guard Special Assistant to The Judge
Army Service Component Commander
Area Support Group
Additional Skill Identifier
Assault Command Post, a TAC CP in a rapidly deployed division
Army Tactical Command and Control System
Brigade Combat Team Battle Command Training Program Broadcast System BDE BN BOLT BUB
C2 C21 CA CAAF CENTCOM CCE CD CDD CDP CD-ROM ClMIC CINC CJA CJCS CJCSI CJCS SROE CLAM0 CLE CLEA CLNCO CMO CMOC CNR COA COCOM COL COMMZ CONUS CONUSA COSCOM COTS CP CPO CPT CTC CTT
DAD D-D-D-A Brigade Battalion Brigade Operational Law Team Battle Update Brief
Command and Control Command, Control, and Information Civil Affairs Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces Central Command Commanders' Critical Information Requirements Compact Disc; Counter Drug Combat Developments Division, TJAGSA Combat Decision-Making Process Compact Disc, Read-Only Memory Civil-Military Information Center Commander in Chief Command Judge Advocate Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement Center for Law and Military Operations Continuing Legal Education Civilian Law Enforcement Agency Chief Legal Noncommissioned Officer Civil-Military Operations Civil-Military Operations Center Combat Net Radios Course of Action Combatant Command Colonel Communications Zone Continental United States Continental United States Army Corps Support Command Commercial-off-the-shelf Command Post Claims Processing Office; Civilian Personnel Office Captain Combat Training Center Common Task Training Combat Zone
Defense Appellate Division Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess
Legal Support to Operations
DEP'T DFSCORD DIRLAUTH DISCOM DIVARTY DOCC DoD DoD Dir. DoJ DBMS DOS DSJA DTAC DTLOMS
EEM ESF EPW EUCOM
FAR FJ3CB2 FBI FCA FCC FEMA
FOIA FORSCOM Force XXI
FSB FSCL FSCORD FSOP
Deputy Fire Support Coordinator
Direct Liaison Authorized
Division Support Command
Deep Operations Coordination Cell
Department of Defense
Department of Defense Directive
Department of Justice
Director of Milit&y Support
Department of State
Deputy Staffl Judge Advocate
Division TAC CP
Doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldiers
Early Entry Modules
Emergency Support Functions
Enemy Prisoner of War
Federal Acquisition Regulation
Force XXI Battle Command-Brigade and Below System
Federal Bureau of Investigations
Foreign Claims Act
Foreign Claims Commission
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Freedom of Information Act
Force Twenty-One, the digitized Army
Forward Support Battalion
Fire Support Coordination Cell
Fire Support Coordinator
Field Standard Operating Procedures
Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, Information Management Government Appellate Division General Court-Martial GCMCA GCSS-A GPS
I-D-D-T IMA IMO IPB
J A J AGC JAGCNet JAGS0 JAW JCS JFACC
JFCOM JFLCC JFMCC JFSOCC
JO A JOPES JP
JSCP JSOTF JTCB General Court-Martial Convening Authority Global Combat Support System-Atmy Global Positioning System
Humanitarian Assistance Humanitarian and Civil Assistance High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
In Accordance With
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Organization; Information Operations; Investigating
Individual Mobilization Augmentee
Information Management Officer
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Manpower & Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff Command, Control, Communications, Computer Systems Directorate of a Joint Staff Judge Advocate Judge Advocate General's Corps Judge Advocate General's Corps Network (www.jagcnet.army.mi1) Judge Advocate General Service Organization Judge Advocate Warfighting Experiment Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Forces Air Component Command Joint Force Commander Joint Forces Command (the successor organization to ACOM) Joint Forces Land Component Command Joint Forces Maritime Component Command Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command Joint Inter-Agency Task Force joint Military Commission; Joint Movement Center Joint Operations Area Joint Operations Planning and Execution System , Joint Publication I Joint Rear Areas 1 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Joint Special Operations Task Force Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF JTTP JZ
LAAWS LDP LOGCAP LOW LSO LST LTC
MACDIS Main CP MAJ MCS MCS-P MDMP METL ME'IT-TC
MNF MOB MOBTDA MOOTW MOS MPCA MRE MSG MSO
Legal Supgloat to Operations
Joint Task Force Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Joint Zones
Legal Automated Army-Wide System Leadership Development Program Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Law of War Legal Support Organization Legai Support Team Lieutenant Colonel
Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances Main Command Post Major Maneuver Control System Maneuver Control System -Phoenix Military Decision Making Process Mission Essential Task List Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, Time Available, and Civilian Considerations Multinational Forces Mobilization Mobilization Table of Distribution and Allowance Military Operations Other Than War Military Occupational Specialty Military Personnel Claims Act Mission Rehearsal Exercise; Meals Ready to Eat Master Sergeant Mobilization Support Organization
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear, Biological and Chemical National Command Authorities Noncommissioned Officer Noncommissioned Officer in Charge National Guard Non-governmental Organization National Guard Regulation National Military Strategy National Security Strategy
Observer-Controller Outside the Continental United States Officer in Charge OOTW OPCON OPLAN OPLAW OPLAW JA OPORD OSJA OT OTJAG
PDD PEO PFC PKO PLEX PLP PPTO PROE PSYOP PVO
RCM RDC RDL Rear CP ROE RSC RSG RTDT
S-i S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5 SA SECDEF SFC
Operations Other Than War Operational Control Operations Plan Operational Law Operational Law Judge Advocate Operations Order Office of the Staff Judge Advocate Observer-Trainer Office of the Judge Advocate General
Pacific Command Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (modem and network cards for notebook computers) Presidential Decision Document Peace Enforcement Operations Private First Class Peace Keeping Operations Plans/Exercises Cell Premobilization Legal Preparation Personnel, Plans, and Training Office Peacetime Rules of Engagement (superseded by the JCS SROE) Psychological Operations Private Voluntary Organization
Learning device for ROE training. Return Fire with Aimed Fire- Anticipate Attack-Measure the Amount of Force-Protect with Deadly Force only Human Life and Property Designated by the Commander Rules for Courts-Martial Regional Defense Counsel Rucksack Deployable Law Office and Library Rear Command Post Rules of Engagement Regional Support Command Regional Support Group Regional Trial Defense Team
Training and Operations Officer
Civil Affairs Officer
Secretary of the Army; Security Assistance
Secretary of Defense
Sergeant First Class
Legal Support to Operations
SGLI SGT SIPRNET S JA
SOCOM SO1 SOF SOFA SOP SOUTHCOM SPACECOM SPC SROE SRP SSCR SSCRA SSG SSORD STANAG STARC STRATCOM STX
TAACOM TAC CP TACCl TACON TACSOP TADSS TAJAG TDA
TOA TOC TOE TOR TJAG TJAGSA TRANSCOM TSC TTP
UCMJ UCO Soldiers' Group Life Insurance Sergeant Secret Internet Protocol Router Network Staff Judge Advocate Standards of Conduct Office Special Operations Command Signal Operation Instructions Special Operations Forces Status of Forces Agreement Standard Operating Procedures Southern Command Space Command Specialist Standing Rules of Engagement Soldier Readiness Program Processing Single-service Claims Responsibility Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Staff Sergeant Service Support Order Standardization Agreement State Area Commands Strategic Command Situational Training Exercises
Theater Army Area Command Tactical Command Post Tactical Command Post in a Digitized Division Tactical Control Tactical Standard Operating Procedures Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations The Assistant Judge Advocate General Trial Defense Service Trial Defense Team Transfer of Authority Tactical Operations Center Table of Organization and Equipment Terms of Reference The Judge Advocate General The Judge Advocate General's School, Army Transportation Command Troop Support Command Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Uniform Code of Military Justice Unit Claims Officers UCP UN USACAPOC
USACCA USAID USALSA USAR USARCS USASOC US ATDS USC USCA USJFCOM
WARN0 WMD Unified Command Plan
United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals
United States Agency for International Development
United States Army Legal Services Agency
United States Army Reserve
United States Army Claims Service
United States Army Special Operations Command
United States Army Trial Defense Service
United States Code
United States Code, Annotated
United States Joint Forces Command (the successor organization
United States Force, Japan
United States Forces, Korea
Warning Order Weapons of Mass Destruction
Legal Support to Operations
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.' AR27- 1. Judge Advocate Legal Services. February 1995. AR27-3. Legal Assistance. March 1989. AR27-10. Military Justice. June 1996. AR27-20. Claims. December 1997. AR27-26. Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers. May 1992. AR200- 1. Environmental Protection and Enhancement. February 1997. AR500-5. Anny Mobilization. June 1998. AR 600-20. Army Command Policy. April 1988. CJCSI 3 12 1-01. Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces. October 1994. CJCSI 5810.01. Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program. August 1996. DA Pamphlet 27-1 -1. Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. September 1979. DA Pamphlet 27-162. Claims. April 1998. DoDD 5 100.77. DoD Law of War Program. December 1998. FM6-20-10. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. May 1996. FM25-100. Training the Force. November 1988. FM 25-101. Battle Focused Training. September 1990. FM27-1 00. Legal Operations. September 1991. FM 33-1. Psychological Operations. July 1987. FM 41 -10. Civil AfSairs Operations. January 1993.
FM 7 1-1 00. Division Operations. August 1996.
FM 100-5. Operations. June 1993.
FM 100-7. Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations. May 1995.
FM 100- 1 1. Force Integration. January 1995.
FM 100- 17. Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization. October
1992. FM 100-20. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. December 1990. FM 100-23. Peace Operations. December 1994. FM 100-23-1. Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance. October
1994. FM 100-25. Doctrine for Amy Special Forces. December 1991 FM 10 1-5. StafS Organization and Operations. May 1997. JP 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces. February 1995. JP 1-02. Department oLDefense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
December 1989. JP 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. February 1995. JP 3-05..Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. October 1992. JP 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. June 1995. JP 3-07.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal
Defense (FID). June 1996. JP 3-07.2. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism. March 1998. JP 3-07.3. Joint ~actics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.
JP 3-07.4. Joint Counterdrug Operations. February 1998.
JP 3-07.5. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant
Legal Support to Operations
Evacuation Operations. September 1997. JP 3-07.6. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations. To be published. JP 3-53. Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine. February 1987 ST 100-9. The Tactical Decision-Making Process. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
United States Army Command and General Staff College, July 1993. STP 21-1-SMCT. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1. October
1994. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. The White House, 1998. A Study of War. Quincy Wright. 1942. "American Strategy from its Beginnings through the First World War." Russell F.
Weigley. Makers of Modem Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. 1986. Army Vision 2010. Department of the Army. Code of Judicial Conduct. American Bar Association, 1972.
Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Major Paul H. Herbert. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1988.
Hague Convention (N)Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Convention. 1 Bevans 63 1. 1907
In the Operations Center: A Judge Advocate's Guide to the Battle Command Training Program. Charlottesville, Virginia: Center for Law and Military Operations, 1996.
Into the Storm: A Study in Command. Tom Clancy and General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret). 1997.
Joint Vision 201 0. Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Judge Advocates in Combat. Colonel Frederic L. Borch.
Knowledge and Speed: Battle Force and the U.S. Army of 2025, The 1998 Annual Report on The Army Aper Next Project to the Chief of StafSof the
Amp Fort Monroe, Virginia; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1998. Law and Military Operations in Haiti, 1994-1 995. Charlottesville, Virginia: Center for Law and Military Operations, 1995. Law and Military Operations in the Balkans, 1994-1 998. Charlottesville, Virginia: Center for Law and Military Operations, 1998. Legal Guide to Peace Operations. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1998. "Legal Issues in Peace Operations." Captain Glenn Bowens. Parameters. Winter 1998- 1999. Legal Services Study Report. Washington, DC: Office of The Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, 1998. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States. 1998. "Napoleon and the Revolution on War." Peter Paret. Makers of Modem Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. 1986. National Military Strategy of the USA. Washington,, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997. One Team -One Fight -One Future. Department of the Army, 1999. "Operational Law (OPLAW): A Concept Comes of Age." Lieutenant Colonel David E. Graham. The Amy Lawyer. July 1987.
Operational Law Handbook. Charlottesville Virginia: International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, 1998.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s. Daniel K. Bolger. 1995.
Tackling the Contingency Deployment: A Judge Advocate's Guide to the hint
Readiness Training Center. Charlottesville, Virginia: Center for Law and
Military Operations, 1996.
The Amy Lawyer: A History of The Judge Advocate General's Colps, 1775- 1975. Washington, DC; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
Legal Support to Operations
The Army Lawyer. August 1995: 40-41.
The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War. Timothy T. Lupfer. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 198 1.
The Judge Advocate Warfighting Experiment (JA WE): Final Report.
Charlottesville,Virginia: Center for Law and Military Operations, 1997. The Management of Security Assistance. Defense Institute of Security
Assistance Management. 1998. Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 401,1044, & 3062. 1998. Uniform Code of Military Justice. Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 47. 1998. United Nations Charter.
ABCS 2- 19,4-26,4-27
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements -3-9,5-6
Administrative Control. 4-7,4-8,410
Administrative Law .v, 2-3, 1,5-8
Advocate -i, iii, v, vii, ix,x, 1-1, 1-4, 1-9,2-1,2-2,2-
4-33,4-40, i, 5-7,5-11,s-21,523, 5-25,8-9, 1-2,
1-3, 1-4, 1
Agency -iii,vi, 2-1,2-3,4-6, 7-1,7-5,7-8,7-12,7-13
MAG 2-3, 2-4, 2-5
Area Support Group .4-23
Arms Control .v, 1,6-7
Army Battle Command System. 2-19,4-26,4-30
Army Law Library Service .2-5, 2-12
Army National Guard -iii,x, 2-1,2-3, 2-6,2-7,7-3,7-
Army of Excellence .3-6,3-8,3-9,3-10,3-12.3-14,
Army Reserve iii,x, 2-1,2-3,2-7,2- 10,5-5
Army Service Component Command -v, 4-23,4-24,1,
Assistant Judge Advocate General -2-3,2-4,2-5
Automation iv, 2-19, 1,4-25,4-26
Battle Command Training Prograrn -5-26
Brigade -v, 2-13,2-16,3-2,3-4, 1,5-12,5-16,5-17,
Brigade Judge Advocate -5-21,5-23,8-9
Brigade Operational Law Team. 2-13,5-12,5-21
C2 -iii,,v,vi, 1-2, 1-6,2-16,3-1,426,4-27, 1,5-4,5-
5,5-12,5-13, 5-15,5-17,5-22,5-24, 1,6-5,6-6,6-
Center for Law and Military Operations .2-3,2-5,2-
16,2-18,2-19, 3-3,4-25,428,5-26, 1,7-3
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2- 15,4-4,6- 12,
6-13,7-11,8-2,s-7, 1, 1-6, 1-7
Chemical Weapons Convention .5-5
Chief Legal Noncommissioned Officer -2- 10,2- 12
Legal Support to Operations
Civil Affairs .iv, 1,4-38, 4-39, 6-14
Civil Disturbance .vi. 7-7. 7-9. 8-7
Civil Law .v, 2-3,2-5,4-21, 1,5-8
Civil Military Operations .3-13
Civil Military Operations Center -4-6, 6-6
Civilian. 2-12,2-14,4-41,7-8, 8-4
CJCS vi, 4-7,4-25,6-12,7-4,7-8,7-9, 1, 8-7, 8-8,
Claims. V, 1-3,2-1,2-2,2-5,3-11,3-12,3-13,4-33,
CLAM0 2-3,2-5,2-16,2-18,2-19, 3-3,4-25,4-28,
CLNCO -2-8, 2-10, 2-12, 3-2, 4-27, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15,
Combat Service Support .viii, 1-9
Combat Service Support Control System -1-9
Combat Zone iv, 1,43
Command. iii, iv, v, vii, x, 1-1,3, 1-6,2-1,2-8,2-11,
2-14,2-15,2-19, 3-9, 3-10,3-12,3-14, 1,4-2,4-4,
5-24,5-26, 1, 6-3,6-5,6-8,6-10,6-11,6-12,6-15,
7-5,7-12, 8-10, 8-1 1, 1
Command and Control. iii, v, vi, 1-2, 1-6,2-16,3-1,
4-26,4-27, 1, 5-4,5-5,5-12,5-13,5-15,5-17,5-
22, 5-24, 1, 6-5,6-6, 6-10
Command Judge Advocate .iii, 2- 1,2- 14
Command Post .V,2-11,2-19, 3-2,4-27, 1,5-10,5-
11,5-12,5-15,5-18,5-22, 5-23, 5-24
Commander vi, 2-4, 2-15,4-5,4-11,4-20,4-23,4-
24,4-34, 5-10,5-11,5-12,7-9, 1,8-2, 8-8,8-11, 8-
Communications Zone iv, 1,4-3
Continental United States Army. 2-10, 2-18
Contract Law .2-3,4-21
CONUS 2-6, 2-7,2-10, 2-18,2-19,4-21,4-28,4-33,
Core Legal Discipline .i, viii, 1-1
administrative law .viii, 1-2, 1-4,2-8,2-15,3-1, 3-
civil law .viii, 1-2, 1-4,2-8, 2-15, 3-1, 3-9,3-11,4-
31, 4-35, 4-42, 7-5
claims vii, viii, 1-2,4, 1-4, 1-9,2-2,2-5,2-8,2-11,
2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 2-19,2-20,3-1,3-11,3-12, 3-
13,4-27,4-29,4-31,4-32, 4-35,4-41, 1,5-6, 5-
8,5-24, 6-9, 6-1 1,7-6
international law -vii, viii, 1-2, 1-4, 1-8, 1-10,Z-2,
2-16, 3-1, 3-2, 3-6, 3-7, 3-9,4-22,4-31,4-35,4-
38,4-39, 5-4,5-5, 6-5,6-10,6-13, 1, 8-2,8-3,8-
legal assistance vii, viii, 1-2, 1-4,2-8,2- 11,2-12,
31,4-35,4-38, 1,5-6,5-7,5-24, 1
military justice. vii, viii, 1-2, 1-4, 2-1, 2-8, 2-11,2-
12, 2-13,2-14, 2-15, 2-20, 3-1, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5,4-
Corps. i, vii, ix, 1-1,2-5,2-11,4-4,4-24,4-39, 5-14,
5-15, 5-21,7-12, 8-2, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4
Corps Support Command. 4-24
COSCOM .3-8, 3-9, 3-10,4-24, 5-14, 5-15
Counsel. iii, 2-1,2-8,2-15,3-4,3-5,3-15,5-14
Counselor .iii, 1-1, 1-5
Counter-Drug .v, vi, 1, 6-7, 7-10
Countertenorism. 4-36, 6-7
Country Team -4-6,6-6
CP -3-2,4-27, 5- 10,5- 11,5- 12, 5- 15, 5- 18, 5-22, 5-
CSS viii, 4-15
CSSCS . 1-9
Deep Operations Coordination Cell. 5-12, 8-2, 8-9, 8-
Department of Defense .2-2, 2-1 1, 2-18, 3-6, 3- 11, 3-
12,4-38,4-41, 5-5, 6-6,6-13,7-1, 7-4,7-5, 7-6,7-
8,7-9,7-10, 7-11, 7-12,7-13, 7-14, 8-2,8-4
Department of Justice .3-10,7-8,7-13,7-14
Department of State .6-6
Deputy StaffJudge Advocate .2-10, 2-11, 2-13, 2-19,
4-20,4-27,4-33,4-34,4-35,5-12, 5-13, 5-14,5-
Digitized Division .5- 10,5- 1 1
DOCC .5-12,8-9, 8-10
DoD -2-2, 2-1 1, 2-18, 3-6, 3-1 1, 3-12,4-41, 5-5, 6-6,
6- 13, 7- 1, 7-4,7-5,7-6,7-8, 7-9, 7- 10, 7- 11,7- 12,
DoD Law of War Program. 2-2,2- 11
DoJ .3-10, 7-8, 7-13, 7-14
DoS .6-6, 7-1 1
DSJA .2-10, 2-11,2-13, 2-19, 4-20, 4-27,4-33,4-34,
4-35, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-17,5-21,5-25
Environmental Law. 2-3, 3-10
Exclusion Zones -v, 1, 6-7
Federal Emergency Management Agency. 7-5,7-13
FEMA .7-5, 7-13, 7-14
Field Operating Agencies .iii, 2-1, 2-3, 2-16
Fiscal Law .2-5
Force Projection .iv, 1, 4-21
Force XXI ix,3-6,3-8,3-9,3-10,3-12, 3-14, 4-26,
Foreign Claims .3-13,5-8
FORSCOM .2-6, 2-10, 2-18, 4-25, 5-25, 7-9
FRAGO .4- 15
Functional Areas .vii
GCSS-A . 1-9,2-19
General Order .vii
Geneva Conventions .i, 4-33, 5-8, 8-2, 8-13
Humanitarian Assistance .v, 1, 6-7
Information Operations. ix, 2-16, 3-2, 5-5, 5-1 1.5-18,
Intelligence .vi, 4-19, 5-13, 1, 6-15
Interagency iii, v, vi, 1-6, 4-6, 1, 6-6, 6-12, 8-4
International. iii, v, vi, 1-1, 1-7,2-3,2-5, 2-19, 3-6.3-
7,4-6,4-41, 1, 5-8, 1, 6-8, 6-12
International Committee of the Red Cross .3-7, 6-12
International law .3-6
I0 .5-5, 5-18
JAGC .i, viii, ix, 1-1, 1-9, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-10, 3-15, 4-
21, 4-25,4-28,5-9, 5-14, 5-17, 7-12
JAGS0 X, 2-7,2-8,2-9, 4-40
Joint Chiefs of Staff. iii, 2-1, 2-14,2-15, 4-4, 6-12, 6-
13, 7-4, 7-8,7-11, 8-2,8-3, 8-7, 1, 1-6, 1-7
Joint Command .6-6
Joint Force 3-4, 4-2,4-5,4-23, 1-7
Joint Force Commander. 3-4,4-5,4-23
Joint Military Commission. 2-19, 6-10, 6-12, 6-15
Joint Operations. 4-6,4-12, 8-11
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan .4-7
Joint Task Force .iii, 2-1,2-15,4-5,4-23,4-25,4-36,
7-11, 7-12, 8-9, 8-10
JTF 2-15,4-5,4-25, 4-36,7-11, 8-10
Judge. i, iii, v, vi, vii, ix, x, 1-1, 1-2, 3, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5,
1-6, 1-8, 1-9.2-1,2-2, 2-3,2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-9,
3-4, 3-5, 3-15, 4-4,4-5,4-8, 4-20,4-21,4-23, 4-26,
4-29, 4-31,4-33,4-36,4-38,4-40,1, 5-4, 5-6, 5-7,
5-10, 5-11, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14,5-15, 5-17, 5-18, 5-
21, 5-22,5-23, 5-24, 5-25, 6-3, 7-1, 7-3, 7-5, 7-13,
8-9, 8-13, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1
Judge Advocate. i,iii, v, vi, vii, ix, x, 1-1, 1-9, 2-1, 2-
2,2-3, 2-5,2-6,2-7, 2-10, 2-11, 2-14,2-15, 3-2,3-
40, 1, 5-7,5-11,5-12, 5-13, 5-17,5-18, 5-21,5-23,
5-24, 5-25,7-3, 8-9, 8-10, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1
Judge Advocate General Service Organization. x, 2-7,
Judge Advocate General's Corps -i, viii, ix, 1-1, 1-9,
2-6,2-7,2-10, 3-15,4-21,4-25,4-28,5-9,5-14, 5-
Judge Advocate General's Corps .1-1,2-5
LAAWS . 1-9,2-19,4-26,4-27, 5-13, 5-14, 5-17
Law of the Flag 6-1 1,6-12
Law of War i,vii, 2-2,2- 11, 3-6,3-7, 2,4-15, 5-4, 5-
Lead Agency .vi, 7- 1,7-5,7-8,7- 12
Legal Administrator -2-10, 2-12, 2-13,3-2,4-27,5-25
Legal Assistance .v, 2-2, 2-3, 3-13, 3-15,4-33, 1, 5-9
Legal Automated Anny-Wide System. 1-9,2-19,4-
Legal Organizations .iii, 2-1, 2-6, 2-7
Legal Specialist .2-8, 2- 13
Legal Support Organization 2-7,2-10,2-18, 4-33,4-
Legal Support Team. 2-7,2-8,2-10
Legitimacy.iii, 1-1, 1-2, 1-10
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. 3-9,5-6,6- 14
LOW. vii, 3-6, 3-7,4-15, 5-11
LSO .2-7,2-10, 2-18,4-33,4-34,4-35,4-36,5-7,7-3
LST .2-7,2-8, 2-10
Main CP .3-2,5-11
Maneuver Control System. 1-9,2-19
MDMP -iv, 1,4-12, 4-18,4-19,4-20,5-4, 5-12
METL -iv, ix, 1,4-32,4-33,4-34,4-35, 5-25
METT-TC .vi, 2-19,4-4,4-13,5-11,5-12,5-14,5-
Military Decision Making Process 4-18,4-19,4-20,
Military Decision-Making Process -4- 18
Military Justice v, 1-4,2-1, 2-4,2-11, 3-3,4-29,4-
Military Operations Other Than War -v, 5-3, 5-4,5-6,
12,6-13,6-14, 6-15,6-16, 1, 8-2, 8-5,8-14, 1
Military Support to Civil Authorities .vi, 7-4
Mission -iii, iv, v, vii, ix, 1-1, 1-2, 1-8, 3-5, 1,4-6,4-
Legal Support to Operations
Mission Essential Task List. iv, ix, 1,4-32,4-33,4-34,
Mission Rehearsal Exercise .6- 16
Mobility. iv, 1,4-28
Mobilization Support Organization .2-8, 3-14, 3-15,
MOOTW .V,5-3,5-4,5-6,5-7,5-17, 1,6-3,6-4, 6-5,
6-6, 6-8, 6-10, 6-1 1, 6-12, 6-13, 6-14,6-15,6-16,
1, 8-2, 8-5, 8-14, 1
MSO .2-8,3-14, 3-15,4-33,4-34,4-35,4-36,5-7
Nation Assistance .v, 1,6-8 National Command Authorities. 3,2-15,4-4,4-41,6-
3, 6-5, 6-8, 6-11,7-5, 7-12, 7-13,8-8, 8-10, 8-11
National Guard Bureau .x, 2-6,7- 11
National Military Strategy .viii, 4-4, 1-6, 1-7
National Security Strategy. viii, 1-6,4-3,4-4,7-13, 1-
– NCA. 3, 2-15,4-4,4-41, 6-3,6-5, 6-8,6-11, 7-5, 7-
12,7-13, 8-8, 8-10, 8-11
Office of the Judge Advocate General 2-1,2-3,2-16,
Office of The Judge Advocate General .iii, 2- 1
OPCON .2-6,4-8,4- 17, 4-36, 4-40, 8-1 1
Operation .vi, 2- 18,4- 16, 1,6-6, 6-9, 6-1 1
Operation Plan .3-3, 3-8,4-15,4-18,4-19, 8-1 1, 8-13
Operational Control .2-6,4-8, 4- 17,4-36,4-40,8- 11
Operational Law .i, iii, vii, 1-1, 2-1,2-3, 2-5, 2-13,2-
16, 2-19, 2,4-29, 5-12, 5-21, 6-10, 6-12, 6-14, 7-3
Operations Law .iv, 2-16,2-18, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-9, 3-
32, 4-36,4-38,4-39,4-40, 5-4, 5-6,5-7, 5-8, 5-1 1,
5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15,5-l7,5-18,5-21, 5-22,5-
6-16,7-1, 8-2,8-9, 8-10, 8-15
Operations Order. 3-3,4-15,4-16,4-17,4-18,4-20,
OPLAN .3-3,3-8, 4-15,4-18, 4-19, 8-11,8-13
OPLAW. i, iii, iv, vii, 1-1, 2-1, 2-3,2-5,2-13,2-16, 2-
18,2-19, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-9, 3-15,2,4-5,4-15,4-
4-38,4-39,4-40, 5-4, 5-6,5-7, 5-8, 5-11,5-12, 5-
13, 5-14, 5-15,5-17,5-18, 5-21, 5-22, 5-24, 5-25,
5-26,6-10, 6-11, 6-12,6-13,6-14,6-15, 6-16,7-1,
7-3,8-2, 8-9, 8-10, 8-15
OPLAW Judge Advocate -3-2
OPORD .3-3,4-15,4-16,4-17,4-18,4-20,8-1 1,8-
Order .4- 16, 8-2
OTJAG .iii, 2- 1,2-3,2- 16,2-18,4-25, 6- 12
Overseas Presence .iv, 1,4-21
PDD .7- 13
Peace Enforcement .6-4,6-9
Peace Operations. v, ix, 1,6-8
Personnel Claims .5-8
Personnel Service Support v, 4-29, 1,5-4,5-6
Planning .iv, 2- 18, 1,4 1 1,4- 12,4 13,4-20,4-22,4-
Presidential Decision Directive -7-13
Private Voluntary Organizations .1-7
PSS .V,4-29, 1, 5-4,s-6
RC 4-33,435, 5-7,5-25
RDL .X, 1-9,2-13,2-19,3-13,4-26,4-27,4-28,4-38,
Rear CP .3-2
Recovery Operations .v, 1, 6-9
Regional Support Commands -2-10,2-18,5-7
Reserve Component -433,435, 5-7,s-25
ROE .vi, 2- 16,3-2,3-3,4-15, 5-5,5- 11, 5-12,5- 18,
1,6-3,6-5,6-9,6-10,6-11, 6-12,6-13, 6-14, 6-15,
6-16,7-6,7-12, 1,8-2,8-3, 8-4,8-5,8-6,8-7, 8-8,
Rucksack Deployable Law Office and Library .x, 1-9,
Rules of Engagement. vi 2-16,3-2,3-3,4-15,s-5,5-
11,5-12,5-18, 1,6-3,6-5,6-9,6-10, 6-11,6-12,6-
5, 8-6,8-7,8-8,8-9, 8-10, 8-ll,8-12, 8-13, 8-14,
SECDEF .4-4,4-5,4-7, 7-4,7-10, 7-1 1, 7-12
Secretary of Defense -4-4,4-5,4-7,7-4,7-10,7-11,
Secretary of the Army. 2-1,2-2,3-12,4-7,5-5,7-4
Service .iii, v, viii, x, 1-1, 1-2,3, 1-9,2-1,2-2, 2-3, 2-
5, 2-7,2-8,2-9, 2-12,3-4, 3-12,4-18,4-23,4-24,
Show of Force .v, 1,6-9
SJA. i,iii, iv, ix, 1-$2-1, 2-3.2-6, 2-9,2-10, 2-11,2-
5, 3-6, 3-7,3-9,3-10,3-12,3-15, 1,4-20,4-21,4-
5-9,5-12, 5-13,5-14, 5-15.5-16,5-17, 5-18,5-21,
5-24, 5-25,s-26,6-12,6-14,6-15,7-3, 8-9, 8-13,
Soldier Readiness Processing -2-10, 2-14,2-18, 3-14,
SOP. 4-16, 4-18,4-20, 5-10, 8-13
Special Operations .iv, ix, 1,4-2,4-36,4-37,4-38,5-
24, 6-8, 6-15
SROE. 6-12, 6-13, 7-6,7-12, 8-3, 8-5, 8-7, 8-8, 8-9,
8-10, 8-11, 8-12, 8-14
SRP .2-10, 2-14, 2-18, 3-14, 3- 15
Staff Judge Advocate .i, iii, iv, ix, 1-9, 2-1,2-3,2-6,
2-9,2-10, 2-11, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15,2-16,2-19,
2-20, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7,3-9,3-10, 3-12, 3-15,
1, 4-20,4-21,4-23,4-25,4-26,4-27,4-28,4-29, 4-
4-41,s-4,s-7,s-9, 5-12,s-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-
7-3, 8-9, 8-13, 8-14, 1
Standing Operating Procedure -4-16,4-18,4-20,5-
STARC .2-6,2-18, 5-7
State Area Command x, 2-6
Status of Forces .vi, 5-6, 1, 6-9, 6- 1 1
Status of Forces Agreement .6-9
Status of Forces Agreements -5-6
Strikes .v, 1,6-9
Sustainrnent .v, vii, 4-27, 1, 5-4,s-5
TAACOM 3-6, 3-10,4-23,4-24,s-13, 5-14
TAC CP 3-2,4-27,s-10,5- 11,5-12,5- 18, 5-23
Tactical Control. 4-8
Tailoring .iii, 2- 1, 2- 19
TAJAG * 2-3
TDS .2-3, 2-5,2-9, 3-4, 5-15
Technical Channel .iv, 1,4-24
Terrorism. v, vi, 1,6-7,7-13
The Assistant Judge Advocate General 2-3
The Judge Advocate General's School 2-1,2-5,2-6,
Theater .iv, v, vi, ix,3-6, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12,3-14, 1,4-5,
4-6, 4-23,4-24, 1,s-9, 6-5, 7-1, 8-2
TJAG .i, iii, vii, 2-1,2-3,2-5, 2-6,2-7,2-10, 2-20, 3-
3, 3-12, 4-21
TJAGSA . 2-1,2-5,2-6,2-16,2-18,2-19,4-25,4-28,
Training. iv, vi, ix,2-6, 2-7,3-2, 3-12, 1,4-25,4-28,
Trial Defense Service ~2-3,2-5,2-9, 3-4,5- 15
Trial Judiciary. 2-1,2-4,2-7,2-9, 3-4,s-14
Legal Support to Operations
U US Army Legal Services Agency. 2-1,2-3,4,2-4, 2- 9,2-16,2-18,3-10,5-9 USAR 2- 18,5-6
Unified Command Plan -Uniform Code of Military Justice .1-4, 2- 1,2-4,2-9,
2-11, 3-3,4-29,4-33, 5-8 W
United Nations .2-15,6-6,6-10.6-12, 8-12
War Powers Resolution. 5-9
US Army Claims Service 2-1,2-5,2-18,3-12,3-13
Weapons of Mass Destruction .7-13
foreign criminal proceedings, coordinating with the ICRC repatriation of prisoners of war. and for
3.5 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
water sources, waste management,
hazardous material management,
protection of flora and fauna,
archeological and historical
of Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM), Special Operations
Command (SOCOM), Strategic
theater support as necessary. JAGC
personnel are embedded in the
requirements and authorization
documents of the Army Service
Aviation Brigade 1 JAY 1 NCOIC (71 D) Office of the Staff Judge Advocate Digitized Division Division Artillery 1 JAY 1 NCOlC (71 D)
3-5 Bn 71 Ds 1 st BCT 2d BCT 3-5 Bn 71 Ds
1 JAY 1 NCOlC (71 D) 1 JAY 1 NCOIC (71 D)
3-5 Bn 71Ds 3-5 Bn 71 Ds
when necessary, Adversaries."lg6 The requires MOOTW. to fmt Defeat of these
Components of these objectives
Legal Support to Operations
'In this manual, "operations" include war and MOOTW, but not garrison operations. See DEP'T OF ARMY, FTELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS
at v (1993).
3 See generally MAJOR PAUL H. HERBERT,COMBATSTUDIESINS^, LEAVENWORTHPAPERNO. 16, DECIDINGWHAT HAS TO BE DONE: GENERAL WILLIAME. DEPUY AND THE 1976 EDITION OF FM 100-5, OPERATIONS
3-9 (1988) (describing the function of doctrine in an army and charting the modem practice of publishing doctrine in manuals).
4 TIMOTHY T. LWFER, COMBATSTUDIES INSTTTUTE, LEAVENWORTH
PAPER NO. 4, THE DYNAMICS OF DOCTRINE: THE CHANGES TACTICAL DOCTRINE DURING ?'HE FIRST WORLD W.4R 55 ( !981).
KNOWLEDGE AND SPEED: BA'ITLE FORCE AND THE U.S. ARMY OF 2025, THE 1998 ANNUAL REPORTON THE ARMY AFTER NEXTPROJECT
TO THE CHIEFOF STAFFOF THE ARMY, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Docbrine Command, (7 December 1998). Major General Walter B. Huffman, Address at the Judge Advocate General's Corps World Wide Continuing Legal Education Plenary Session (October 1997). THE ARMYLAWYER: A HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SCORPS, 1775-1 975, 12- 13 (1 975). 417 U.S. 733,742 (1974) (quoting United States ex re]. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955), Orloff
v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83,93 (1953), and Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)).
DEP'TOF ARMY, ARMY VISION 2010,2. Represented by the acronym LDRSHIP. lo DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERA~NS
l1 See THEARMY LAWYER: A HISTORY OF THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS, 1775-1975,105
l2 LTC Michelle M. Miller, Former Task Force Eagle Staff Judge Advocate, 1998-1999.
13 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CODE OF JUDICIAL at Canons 1 to 7 (1972).
CONDUCT 14 See DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 27-26, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at Rules 3.1 to 4.4 (1
FOR LAWYERS May 1992). 15 CHAIRMANOFTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010,8. l6 CHAIRMANOF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY OF THE USA, Executive
STRATEGY Summary, The Strategy, Elements of Strategy, Responding to the Full Spectrum of Crises (1997).
l7 DEPARTMENT 2010,5.
OF THEARMY, ARMY VISION l8 See DEPARTMENT ONE FIGHT ONE FUTURE, 8; Search of Requirements
OFTHE ARMY, ONE TEAM –Document System, Department of the Amy (21 Sep 1999).
THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL ESTRATEGY 7 (October 1998).
S ~ FOR A NEW CENTURY, 20 See CHAIRMAN MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, EXECUTIVE
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL SUMMARY,
Executive Summary, The Strategy, National Military Objectives (1997). 21 See DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY, ARMY VISION 2010,8,9 22 See CHAIRMAN OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILFARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, The Joint
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS Force, Characteristics of a Full Spectrum Force (1997); CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010, 9.
23 CHAIRMANOF THE JOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF, NATIONAL STRATEGY
MILITARY OF THE USA, The Joint Force, Characteristics of a Full Spectrum Force, Interoperable (1997).
25 See CHAIRMAN MILITARY STRATEGY
OF THE JOINT CHEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL OF THE USA, Executive Summary, The Strategic Environment -Opportunities and Challenges (1997).
26 TIIE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL STRATEGY 13 (October 1998).
SEC~~ FOR A NEW CENTURY, 27 See THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECW STRATEGY
FOR A NEW CENTJRY, 14-22 (October 1998). "THE WHITEHOUSE, A NATIONAL STRATEGYFOR A NEW CENTCTRY,
SE~Y 22 (October 1998). 25' CHAIRMAN CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT VISION 20 10,3 1.
OF THE JOINT 30 DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY,ONETEAM-ONE FIGHT -ONE FUTURE, 13. 31 CHAIRMAN CHEFSOF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010, 11.
OF THE JOINT 32 See CHAIRMANOF rnJOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010, 13- 15. 33 See DEP'TOF ARMY, REGULATION27-3, LEGAL ASSISTANCE, –
Paragraph 2-3 Legal Assistance Offices (10 March 1989).
34 See THE WH~IEHOUSE, A NATIONAL SEC~ FOR A NEW CENTURY,
STRATEGY 2 (October 1998). 35 THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL STRATEGY 13 (October 1998).
SEC~ FOR A NEW CENTURY,
36 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES. Paragraph 2-1 -The Judge Advocate General (3 February 1995). 37 See DEP'TOF ARMY. REGLTATION27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE Paragraph 2-2 –
LEGAL SERVICES, The
Assistant Judge Advocate General (TAJAG) (3 February 1995).
38 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-3 -The
Assistant Judge Advocate General for Civil Law and Litigation (AJAGICLL) (3 February 1995).
39 See DEP'TOF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-4 -The
Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law and Operations (AJAGIMLO) (3 February 1995). 40 See 10 U.S.C. section 806b; Dep't of Army, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations at 2-3 &4-32 (3 1 May 1997).
41 Dep't of Army, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations at 2-3 &4-32 (31 May 1997).
42 See 10 U.S.C. section 806b; Dep't of Army, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations at I-
3 (31 May 1997).
43 See DEP'TOF ARMY, REGULATION 27- 1, JUDGEADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES,
paragraph 5-2, Responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates (3 February 1995).
44 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (24 February
1995); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support of Military Operations (detailing the organization and responsibilities of joint and joint legal organizations) (to be published).
45 See, e.g., ARMY LAW., August 1995, at 40-41 (describing the multinational headquarters and legal staff of the United Nations Miqsion in Haiti): and ~FNTF,RFOR T AW AND MTIJTARYOPE RAT TON^ TAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1994- 1998, at 210-2 13 (diagramming multinational legal organizations in IFOR and SFOR) (1 3 November 1998).
46 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 43-53; Army Law., August 1995, at 40-42; Center for Law and Military Operations, Law and Military Operations in Haiti, 1994-1995, at 16,45, & n.32 (1 1 December 1995); and Center for Law and Military Operations, Law and Military Operations in the Balkans, 1994-1995, at 43, & 209-21 3 (1 3 November 1998).
47 See DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 500-5, ARMY MOBILIZATION, (19 June
ANNEX L, LEGAL SERVICES 1998).
Legal Support to Operations
48 DEP'TOF ARMY, REGULATION27- 1, JUDGE ADVOCATE SERVICES,
LEGAL Paragraph 2- 1 v -Responsibilities for assignment and direction of members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, and 3- 2b, Use of judge advocate officers (3 February 1995).
49 MANUALFOR United States (1995 edition), Part I (Preamble), Paragraph 3.
50 DEP'TOF ARMY, REGULATION27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, Paragraph 1-4 -Responsibiiities (24 June
51 See 10 U.S.C. A. section 806b (West 1998).
52 See 10 U.S.C. A. section 806,834, and 860 (West 1998); DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION
27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, Paragraph 3-3 -Action by the superior authority (24 June 1996).
53 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION JUSTICE, Chapter 5 –
27-10, MIL~ARY Procedures for Courts-Martial; Paragraph 18-6 -General; and Paragraph 19-7 -Course development and Instruction (24 June 1996).
54 DEP7TOF ARMY, REGULATION27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, Paragraph 6-3 -Organization (24 June 1996).
55 SeeDEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION JUSTICE, Chief Trial Judge;
27-10, MIL~ARY Paragraph 8-ld -Paragraph 8-6 -Detailing of military judges; Paragraph 8-8 -Rules of court; Paragraph 9-4 –Supervision of military magistrates (24 June 1996).
56 SeeDEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION 27-10, MILITARY Paragraph 8-4 Functions and duties of
JUSTICE, -military judges (24 June 1996).
57 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE,Paragraph 9-3 -Powers of military magistrates (24 June 1996).
58 SeeINTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL Chapter 20 (1998); CENTER
LAW HANDBOOK, FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, OPERATIONS 1995-1998, at 170-181 (1998).
LAWAND MILITARY IN THE BALKANS
59 SeeINTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S UNITEDSTATES 20-1 through 20-3 (1998); CENTER
ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK FOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, OPERATIONS
LAWAND MILITARY IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998, at 170-173 (1998).
SeeINTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, UNITEDSTATES LAW HANDBOOK FOR LAWAND MILITARY
ARMY,OPERATIONAL 20-2 (1998); CENTER OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN THE BALKANS1995-1998, at 173-174 (1998).
61SeeCENTERFORLAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN THE BALKANS 1995-1998, at 173-174 (1998).
62 SeeCENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS
OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY 1995-1998, at 178 (1998).
63 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATELEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1 g -International and Operational Law responsibilities (3 February 1995).
SeeDEP'T OF ARMY,REGULATION ADVOCATE Paragraph 2- 1 g –
27- 1, JUDGE LEGAL SERVICES, International and Operational Law responsibilities (describing TJAG's international law responsibilities); Paragraph 5-2a -Responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates (stating in subparagraph a -General, that "the supervisory JA has responsibilities generally corresponding to those discharged by TJAG with relation to HQDA," and describing in subparagraph a(7) the international law responsibilities of the supervisory JA) (3 February 1995); DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS, Paragraph 1-9e -AND OPERATIONAL
International Law (3 September 1991); INTERNATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL, STATESARMY, OPERATIONALLAW
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S UNITED HANDBOOK 2-1 (1998); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS
OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998, at 76 (1 998).
65 SeeCENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY LAW AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998, at 79 (1998).
66 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS
OPERATIONS, LAWAND MIL~TARY 1995-1998, at 121 (1998).
67See DEP'T OF ARMY REGULATION 27-1, JUDGEADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, The Judge
Paragraph 2-1 -Advocate General, subparagraph e (3 February 1995).
SeeDEP'TOFARMY REGULATION 27-1, JUDGEADVOCATELEGALSERVICES, –
Paragraph 2-1 The Judge Advocate General, Paragraph 2-12 -Ethics responsibilities, and Paragraph 5-2 -Responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates (3 February 1995).
69 See CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,
1995-1998, Page 184 (13 November 1998).
70 SeeCENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS, LAW OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, Page 182 (concerning family care plans) (1 3 November 1998).
7' SeeCENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARYOPERA'IIONS IN THE BALKANS,
1995-1 998, Page 185 (concerning foreign gifts) (1 3 November 1998).
72 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN'THE BALKANS,
1995-1998, Page 185-6 (13 November 1998).
73 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY LAW AND MILITARY IN THEBALKANS,
OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS 1995-1998, Page 186 (13 November 1998).
74 See DEP'TOF ARMY REGULATION 27-1, JUDGEADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, -The Judge
Paragraph 2-1 Advocate General, subparagraphs h, i, k, m,n, o, and w, (describing patents, copyrights, inventions, trade secrets, procurement fraud, trademarks, and regulatory law, in addition to contract, fiscal, and environmental law) and Paragraph 5-2 -Responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates (3 February 1995).
75 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE Paragraph 5-2a(3)(a)
ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, -Contracts (stating that the supervisory judge advocate's contract law responsibilities include "acquisition planning, contract formation, bid protests, contract performance, contract dispute litigation, fiscal law, procurement fraud and oversight of procurement fraud programs, taxation, government furnished property (GFP), labor standard compliance, real property, non-appropriated funds (NAFs), commercial activities and bankruptcy.") (3February 1995); OFFICE OF THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEP'TOF ARMY,LEGAL SERVICESSTUDYREPORT,Volume I1 -Subcommittee Reports, Section C -Contract and Fiscal Law, Paragraph 6 -Functional Tasks (March 1998).
76 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION27-1, JUDGEADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Principles
Paragraph 15-4 -of contract law practice (3 February 1995).
77 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION 200- 1, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENHANCEMENT, Glossary
PROTECTION (citing the elements of the environment) (21 February 1997).
78 See DEP'TOF ARMY REGULATION 27-1, JUDGEADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES,Paragraph 2- 1 -The Judge Advocate General, subparagraph w, and Paragraph 5-2 -Responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates (3 February i995); DEP'TOF ARMY, REGULATION 200-1, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT,Paragraph 1.17 -The Judge Advocate General (21 February 1997).
79 See, e.g., DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1,JUDGEADVOCATELEGALSERVICES, –
Paragraph 15-1 General (stating, "it is important that commanders and their contracting officers receive the best possible legal support in planning, executing, and administering these contracts, from definition of the requirement through contract close-out, including disputes and contract litigation.") (3 February 1995).
Legal Support to Operations
See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONALLAW DEPARTMENT,THEJUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL Page 14-10 (1998) (citing DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
LAW HANDBOOK, JOINT PUEi. 4-04, JOINT DOCTRINE SUPPORT,
FOR CIVIL ENGINEERING 11-8 (26 September 1995)).
81 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS
1995-1998, at 168 (1998).
82 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS
1995-1998, at 53 and 142-154 (1998).
83 See CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS
1995-1998, at 143-144 (1998).
See, e.g., DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE Paragraph 15-5a
LEGAL SERVICES, -Disputes support (3 February 1995).
85 DEP'TOF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-1 -Purpose (quoted language relating to the purpose of the Army Claims System) (31 December 1997); see also OFFICEOF THEJUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL,DEP'TOF ARMY, LEGAL SERVICESSTUDYREPORT, Volume I1 -Subcommittee Reports, Section B -Claims, General Description of Function, subparagraph a (March 1998); DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS,
Paragraph 1-9b -Claims (3 September 1991).
86 SeeINTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL,
THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 23- 1 (1 998).
87 See OFFICEOF THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,DEP'TOF ARMY, LEGAL SERVICES
STUDY REPORT, Volume I1 -Subcommittee Reports, Section B -Claims, General Description of Function, subparagraph b (March 1998).
88 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-5 -Command and organizational relationships (31 December 1997).
89 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Claims
27-1, JUDGE Paragraph 2-lj -responsibilities (3 February 1995); DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-5 -Command and organizational relationships (3 1 December 1997).
90 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Claims
27-1, JUDGE Paragraph 2-lj -responsibilities (3 February 1995); DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-9 -The Commander, USARCS (31 December 1997).
91 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION ADVOCATE –
27-1, JUDGE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 5-2 Responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates (3 February 1995); DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-17 -Operations of claims components (31 December 1997).
92 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-17 -Operations of claims components (31 December 1997).
93 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-17 -Operations of claims components (31 December 1997).
94 See OFFICE OF THEJUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL, SERVICES
DEP'TOF ARMY, LEGAL STUDY REPORT, Volume I1 -Subcommittee Reports, Section B -Claims, Environment in Which Services Are Performed, subparagraph a (March 1998).
95 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION
27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 2-2d(l)(a) (3 1 December 1997); DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET27-162, CLAIMS, Paragraph 2-2c(4) -Unit Claims Oficers, and Paragraph 2-34a -Unit Claims Officer (1 April 1998); INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 23-6,18 (1998).
96 SeeINTERNATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
AND OPERATIONAL THE JUDGE GENERAL'S UNKED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK,
Page 23-19 (1998).
97 SeeINTERNATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
AND OPERAIIONAL THE JUDGE GENERAL'S UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Pages 23-4,7, & 20 (1998); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN THE BALKANS, 1995- 1998, Pages 154-5,9 (describing the effect of international agreements concerning Bosnia on the investigation, processing, and adjudication of claims during Operation Joint Endeavor), and Page 162 (recommending establishment of policy concerning what property will be deemed reasonable to possess in theater for purposes of the Personnel Claims Act) (1 3 November 1998).
98 SeeINTERNATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
AND OPERATIONAL THE JUDGE GENERAL'S UNITEDSTATES LAW HANDBOOK,
ARMY, OPERATIONAL Page 223-6,18 (1998).
99 SeeINTERNATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
AND OPERATIONAL THEJUDGE GENERAL'S UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL Page 23- 19 (1 998).
loo SeeINTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONALLAW DEPARTMENT, THEJUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, UNITEDSTATES LAW HANDBOOK,
ARMY, OPERATIONAL Page 23-19,20 (1998).
101 SeeCENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN THE BALKANS,
1995-1998, Page 161 (13 November 1998).
lo2SeeINTERNATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
AND OPERATIONAL THE JUDGE GENERAL'S UN~D FOR LAW
STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 23-18 through 20 (1998); CENTER AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, Page 158 (13
LAWAND MILMY OPERATIONS November 1998).
'03 SeeINTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
THE JUDGE GENERAL'S UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, FOR LAW AND
Page 23-8 (1998); CENTER MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN THE BALKANS, 1995- 1998, Page 157-8 (1 3 November 1998).
lo4 CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995- 1998, Page 181 (quoting CPT Nicole Farmer, Chief of Legal Assistance, 1" Armored Division Fwd) (13 November 1998).
lo5See 10 U.S.C.A. section 1044 (West 1998).
'06 DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE Paragraph 2- 11-
LEGAL SERVICES, Legal assistance responsibilities (3 February 1995); see also DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION
27-3, ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCEPROGRAM,Paragraph 2- 1 a -General (10 September 1995).
lo7INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
THE JUDGE GENERAL'S UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 22- l(1998).
lo8 See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION27-3, ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM,Paragraph 3-2 -Types of legal assistance services (10 September 1995).
lo9SeeDEP'TOF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. Paragraph 3-7 -Types of services (10 September 1995).
"O See DEP'TOF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, ARMYLEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, Paragraph 3-6 -Types of cases (10 September 1995).
l'' See CENTER OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY
FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, Page 181 (13 November 1998).
See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION27-3, ARMY LEGALASSISTANCE Paragraph 3-3 –
PROGRAM, General, and Paragraph 3-4 -Preventiv~ law measures (10 September 1995).
Legal Support to Operations
'I3 See DEP'TOF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, ARMYLEGAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM, Paragraph 2-1 b(1) -Readiness (10 September 1995).
114 See INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, UNITEDSTATES HANDBOOK,
ARMY, OPERATIONALLAW Pages 13-3 and 13-10 (1998).
'I5 See INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL,
TI-E JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S UNITEDSTATES'ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Pages 22- 1 through 22-8 (1998).
l6 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS M THE BALKANS,
1995-1998, Page 183 (13 November 1998).
'See DEP'TOF ARMY,REGULATION 27-3, ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, raragrapn 1-4c -(lU September 1995); see CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 2995-1998, Page 181 (noting Trial Defense Counsel support for legal assistance) (13 November 1998).
'I8 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS,LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, Page 183 (noting an extensive tax program despite the availability of filing extensions) (13 November 1998).
'I9 See INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
LAW DEPARTMENT, GENERAL'S UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 22-9 (1 998).
lZ0 See INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
GENERAL'S UNITEDSTATESARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 22-9 (1998).
121 Daniel K. Bolger, Savage Peace: Americans At War In The 1990s 92 (1995).
Lieutenant Colonel David E. Graham, Operational Law (OPLAW):A Concept Comes of Age, Army L., Jul. 1987, at 9.
lZ3Unless otherwise noted, the terms used in this chapter are defined at various places in the following references. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUB. 1-02., DEP'T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY
OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS (1 Dec. 1989) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 1-02]; DEP'T OF DEFENSE, JONT PUB. 3-0, DOCTRWEFOR JOINT OPERATIONS
(1 Feb. 1995) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 3-01; DEP'T OFARMY,FIELD MANUAL 100-7, DECISIVE FORCE: THE ARMY IN THEATER OPERATIONS(1995). There are frequently minor differences in the definitions cited, and the decision to side with one definition or another has been made based on factors such as specificity of context and currency of the publication or definition.
See generally FM 100-7, Chapter 1, supra note 123.
125 The dominant geographic characteristic of a littoral theater is a peninsula or coastline. See FM100-7, supra note 123, at 2-18; 90mT PUB. 3-0, supm note 3> at IV-17.
126 See FM 100-7, supra note 123, at v.
lZ7See generally FM 100-7, Chapter 2, supra note 123.
See JOINTPUB.1-02,supra note 123, at 89. The 1991 version of FM 27-100 discussed the COMMZ and the CZ in Chapter 5. See DEP'T OF ARMY,FlELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS (1991) [hereinafter FM 27- 1001.
JOINTPUB 1-02, DEP'T OF DEFENSE OF MILITARY TERMS at 117 (23
DICTIONARY AND ASSOCIATED March 1994, as amended through 6 April 1999).
See FM 100-7, supra note 123, at 2-21.
This essential distinction appears in Chapter 7 of the May 1996 Draft FM27-100. See THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL'SSCHOOL, DEVELOPMENTS, DOCTRINE, DEPARTMENT,
AND LITERATURE FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGALSUPPORT 7-2 (May 1996) (Draft) [hereinafter MAY 1996 DRAFT].
13' This summary is adapted from FM 100-7, supra note 123, at 2-3.
133 See discussion of the METT-TC factors in FM100-7, Chapter 3 supra note 123.
134 See generally DEP'T OF DEFENSE, JOINTPUB. 0-2, UNIFIED ACTIONARMED FORCES (24 February 1995).
'35 JOINTPUB1-02, DEP'T OF DEFENSE OF MILITARY TERMS at 86 (23 March
DICTIONARY AND ASSOCIATED 1994, as amended through 6 April 1999).
136 Since the 1950s, Presidents have declared what is now enshrined as law in 22 U.S.C. 8 3927, namely that the Ambassador is in charge of all elements in the United States Government in a host country (excluding military forces under command of a United States military commander, such as military units in Korea and Germany). Some Ambassadors invoke this principle more aggressively than others, but almost all utilize the management device of the "country team." The country team, with the Chief of Mission at its head, is the principal means by which a mission bonds itself together as a cooperative, coordinated, well- informed staff: In its broadest sense, the "team" is all the elements-and all the men and women-of the American mission in a foreign country. More narrowly, it is a management tool-a council of senior officers, heads of the various sections of the mission, working together under the Ambassador's direction to pool their skills, resources, and problems in the national interest. United States Foreign Service Institute, The Team: The Ambassador Sets the Pace 1 (undated 3 page information paper widely disnibuted to individuals receiving Foreign Service training). No formal directive delineates the composition or functions of the Country Team. The Ambassador determines the type of team that best suits the needs of a particular country. Typical membership at large posts includes the Deputy Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, the chiefs of the political and economic sections of the embassy, the Security Assistance Offlcer, the Agency for International Development mission, and the United States Information Service (USIS). It also usually includes one or more of the military attaches and the agricultural attache. See generally DEFENSEINSIITIZTTE EASSISTANCE THEMANAGEMENT E
OF S ~ MANAGEMENT, OF S ~ ASSISTANCE
105-06 (18th ed., 1998) [hereinafter Management Of Security Assistance]; DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL OPERATIONS CO~ICT
100-20, MILITARY IN LOW INTENSITY (5 Dec. 1990).
'37 A simplistic view of the cycle conceives a circle consisting of four iterative stages: information; planning; decision; and execution. SEEUNmD STATES ARMYCOMMAND STAFF COLLEGE,
AND GENERAL STUDENTTEXT 100-9, THE TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS at 1-1 (July 1993) [hereinafter ST 100-
13* A course of action is defined as feasible if it will accomplish the mission, can be supported with available resources, and is consistent with ethical standards of warfare.
13' See FM 101-5, DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATION H-33
AND OPERATIONS, and H-34 (1997).
140 See ST 100-9, supra note 137, at 1-3 to 1-5.
141 See FM 101-5,supra note 139, at 5-27 to 5-28.
142 See FM 101-5,supra note 139, at 5-5.
143 See FM 101-5, supra note 139, at 5-7 to 5-8.
144 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE,82~AIRBORNEDIV., SOLDIER'S HANDBOOK
AND OFFICE METL (13 June 1997); CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW, V CORPS, DEPLOYMENT STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE (1989); OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, 25T~ INFANTRY DMSION (LIGHT), DEPLOYMENT STANDING AND OPERATIONALLAWHANDBOOK
OPERATING PROCEDURE (1987); OFFICE OF THESTAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, ~O~STAIRBORNEDMSION (AIR ASSAULT),DEPLOYMENT STANDARDSAND PROCEDURES:A HANDBOOK THE TRANSITION
TO GUIDE TO WAR(17 Sept. 1992); OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, 1ST CAVALRY
DMSION, DEPLOYMENT HANDBOOK (1993).
145 22 10 U.S.C. 8 3062.
146 This summary is adapted from FM100-7, supra note 123, at 6-15, and DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL 100-1 1, FORCE INTEGRATION, CHAPTER2, SECTION IV, Force Projection Operations (15 Jan. 1995).
Legal Support to Operations
147See genrnlly DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 500-5, ARMY MOBILIZATION
(7 June 1996). See also DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-17, MOBILIZATION, REDEPLOYMENT, (28 Oct.
DEPLOYMENT, DEMOBILIZATION 1992).
Variations of this statement appeared in Chapter 6 of both the 1991 version and the 1996 draft version
of FM 27-100.
See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATION at 1-2 and 1-3
150See id;DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND
POLICY, para. 2-2 (29 Apr. 1988) [hereinafter AR 600-201.
15' For further information on the material in this section, see generally CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS, ADVOCATE (JAWE): FINAL REPORT (1997).
THE JUDGE WARFIGHTING EXPERIMENT
152 Compare material in this part to DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL 27-100, Training the Force, Chapter 6
(15 Nov. 1988).
153 Material in the next three sections has been adapted from the following sources: DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 25-100, TRAINING THE FORCE (15 NOV. 1988); DEP'T OF ARMY,HELD MANUAL 25-101, BAT~LE FOCUSED TRAINING (30 Sep. 1990); LIEUTENANT ARTHURS. COLLINS, JR., COMMON
GENERAL SENSE TRAINING (19??~~); FOR LAWAND MILITARY A JUDGE
CENTER OPERATIONS, IN THE OPERATIONS CENTER: ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO THE BATTLE COMMAND PROGRAM (1996); CENTER
TRAINING FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, TACKLING DEPLOYMENT: A JUDGE GUIDE TO THE
THE CONTINGENCY ADVOCATE'S JOINT READINESS
TRAINING CENER (1996).
154 Do not confuse "combined" in this sense with the term "combined operation," which "involves the
military forces of two or more nations acting together in common purpose." See, e.g., DEP'T OF ARMY,
FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERA~ONS
5-1 (1993) [hereinafter FM 100-51. The lines of command for combined task forces created pursuant to formal, stable alliance relationships between nations will generally follow principles predetermined by the alliance agreement. The lines of command for combined task forces arising from a temporary coalition follow no set principles and are negotiated on an ad hoc basis. See id.
'" See to DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL27-100, Training the Force, at 2-4 (15 Nov. 1988).
156 See the discussion of the DSJA in THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
SCHOOL, DEVELOPMENTS, DOCTRINE, AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT, OPERATIONS, Chapter
FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT 2 (May 1996) (Draft).
lS7 See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
U.N. Doc. ,41321144, art. 82, reprinted in DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET27-1-1 [hereinafter DA PAM 27-1-1, PROTOCOL
I], also reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 ("The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict in time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces in this subject.").
See BEP'T OF DEFENSE, DR. 5100.77, DOD LAWOF WAR PROGRAM (9 Dec. 1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,CHAIRMANOF THE JOINT 58 10.0 1, IMPLEMENTATION
CHIEFSOF STAFF INSTRUCTION OF THE DoD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM
(12 Aug. 96); Memorandums, Joint Chiefs of Staff, MJCS 59-83 (1 June 1983) and MJCS 01 24-88, (4 Aug. 1988);subject: Implementation of DoD Law of War Program; Message, 2920302 OCT84, FORSCOM, subject: Review of Operations Plans.
159DEP'T OF ARMY,REG. 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICE,paras. 2-1,3-2,4-2,5-2a(7) (1995).
160 A list of thirteen of these references appears at INT'L AND OPERATIONAL L. DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL, UN~D ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 1-2 (JA422) (7th
GENERAL'S STATES ed. 1998) [hereinafter OP. LAW HANDBOOK].
161 These training guidance documents ~lso freqliently describe the following: Commander's training philosophy, mission esseiltial task list and associated battle tasks, combined arms training, major training events and exercises, leader training, individual training, mandatory training, standardization, training evaluarion and feedback, new equipment training and other force integration considerations, resource dlocation, and Eaining management. See FM 25-100, supra note 153, at 3-5 to 3-6.
162 Id. at 3-17.
'63 The material contained in this section is closely adapted from the following sources: FM100-5, supra
note 154 at 2-20; JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, PLTBLICATION 3-05, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT SPECIALOPERATIONS
(Oct. 1992); DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 33- 1, PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS (Ju~. 1987); JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, PUBLICATION (Feb. 1987); DOCTRINE FOR
3-53, JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE JOINTSPECIAL (Oct. 1992); DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL
OPERATIONS 41- 10, CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS (1 1Jan. 1993); DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-25, DOCWE FOR ARMY SPECIAL FORCES(12 Dec. 1991).
164 "Depth" is one of the five tenets of Army operations. It is "the extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose.". What is "most important" about depth is "that in any operation the Army must have the ability to gain information and influence operations throughout the depth of the battlefield." See genemlly FM100-5, Chapter 3, .supm note 154.
165 Compare the material in this section with the 1991 Version of FM 27-100, DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD
MANUAL27- 100, LEGAL OPERATIONS.
166 Compare the material in this section with the 1991 Version of FM 27-100, DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL
27- 100, LEGAL OPERATIONS.
167 DEP'TOF DEFENSE, DIR. 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, paragraph 5.3.1 (9 Dec 98); CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFINSTRUCTION, 5810.01, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM
(12 Aug 96).
168 Memorandum From Hays Parks to the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General (1 Oct 90).
16' DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-6 (June 1993).
170 Colonel Frederic L. Borch 111, Judge Advocates in Combat.
171 PETERPARET, NAPOLEON OF MODERN FROM
AND THE REVOLUTION IN WAR,IN MAKERS STRATEGY MACHUVELLI
TO THE NUCLEAR AGE 123, 129, 136 (Peter Paret ed. 1986) [hereinafter Makers of Modem Strategy] ("In [Napolean's] hands all conflicts tended to become unlimited, because openly or by implication they threatened the continued independent existence of his antagonists.").
17' QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 1322 (1 942).
'73 See, e.g., DEP'TOF ARMY,FIELDMAIWAL at 6-7 and 6-8 (June 1993).
174 This paragraph closely follows the language of General Fred Franks in TOM CLANCY
AND GENERAL FREDFRANKS, JR. (RET.), INTO THE STORM:A STUDY IN COMMAND148 (1997).
175 PETER PARET, Clause~~it~, OF MODERN supra note 171, at 186,200 (quoting Carl
in MAKERS STRATEGY, vuuZI~USCWILL, bk. I, cii. I, PI).87 (i8i8) (Peter Paret ana Niichael Howard trans. and ed. 1984).
176 Id. at 199. See nlso RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY,American Strategyfrom its Beginnings through the First World War, in MAKERS OF MODERNSTRATEGY, supra note 17 1, at 408,409- 10 ("Just as the limitations of eighteenth-century European war can be exaggerated, however-testimony about the restrained conduct of troops marching through a district does not often come from inarticulate peasants-so conversely, historians may tend to exaggerate the readiness of early Americans to tun toward absolute war. Colonial American sermons and political tracts reflect an awareness and acceptance of the European conception of the just and therefore limited war, which was becoming increasingly codified in such works AS EMERICH
DE VATTEL'SDROITDESGENS of 1758. On occasion, the standards of jus ad bellum andjus in bello were applied to even Indian wars, as when the Connecticut government refused to assist Massachusetts in an
Legal Support to Operations
Indian conflict that Connecticut judged unjust. If it was much more common to consider the Indian
outside the protection of the Christian laws of wx, the Americans nevertheless explicitly acknowledged
those laws as applicable to their own conflicts with Europeans, even amid the violent emotions of the
177See FM 100-5, DEP'TOFARMY, 6-9 (June 1993).
FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS,
178THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARYAND ASSOCIATED TERMS, 452 (As amended through 29 June 1999).
179See DEP'TOF ARMY, STP 21-1-SMCT, SOLDIER'S OF COMMON
MANUAL TASKS, SKILL LEVEL 1 546 (1 Gc;. :9S4) (Tzsk YJi;. 181-906-1505: ("Ccndnct Combat G~erztinns.According to the Law of War")
Ia0See FM 100-5, DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS, 2-5 (June 1993).
18' See DEP'TOF ARMY,FIELD MANUAL 7 1- 100, DIVISION at 3-5 (28 Aug. 1996).
See DEP'TOFARMY,FIELD MANUAL6-20- 10, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,AND PROCEDURESFOR THE TARGETING PROCESS at 4-16 (8 May 1996) ("During certain operations, personnel and agencies that will support the targeting process could include the following: staff judge advocate. . . ").
'83 See FM 71-100, DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 71- 100, DMSION OPERATIONS,
at 3-13 and 3-14 (28 Aug. 1996).
The final five paragraphs of this part of the chapter paraphrase observations made by BG John Altenburg, then Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law and Operations, "Training, Mentoring, and Teambuilding Within the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate," Presentation to the World-Wide Continuing Legal Education Conference, at The Judge Advocate General's School in Charlottesville, Virginia, in Oct. 1996.
CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
GENERAL'S U.S. LAWAND MILITARY IN HAITI,1994-1995, 1-2 (1 1 December 1995) (footnotes omitted).
THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT OF DEFENSE AND
PUB.1-02, DEPARTMENT DICTIONARY OF MILITARY ASSOCIATED TERMS, 300, (23 March 1994, as amended through 7 December 1998).
Ig7 THE JOINT DOCTRINE OPERATIONSOTHER THAN
CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT FOR MILITARY WAR, vii (16 June 1995).
lS8 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THANWm, Chapter 111 (16 June 1995) (describing current joint doctrinal types of MOOTW); Compare
with U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS,
2-32 & 33 (Revised Final Draft of 23 March 1998) (describing emerging, but not approved Army doctrine that titles these operations Stability Operations and Support Operations).
189 See generally, e.g. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONSOTHER THAN WAR (1 6 June 1995); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGNINTERNALDEFENSE(FID) (26 June 1996); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM (17 March 1998); THE JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS TECHNIQUES CHIEFSOF STAFF,
AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS (12 February 1999); THE JOINT JOINTF'UB.3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG
OPERATIONS (17 February 1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINTPUB.3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, EVACUATION
TECHNIQUES,AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS(30 September 1997); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS (14 June 1993) (pending revision); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-20, MILITARY OPERATIONSIN LOW IN TENS^ CONFLICT(5 December 1990) (pending revision); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FlELD MANUAL100-23, PEACEOPERATIONS 100-23-
(30 December 1994) (pending revision); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 1, HA MULTISERMCE ASSISTANCE (31 October 1994).
PROCEDURES FOR HUMANITARIAN Ig0 THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL STRATEGYSECURITY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 1 (October 1998).
lgl THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECWUTY 1 (October 1998).
STRATEGY FOR A NEWCENTURY,
lg2 See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL S ESTRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY,
~ 1-14 (October 1998).
Ig3 THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITYSTRATEGYFOR A NEW CENTURY, 2 (October 1998).
lg4 THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL STRATEGY 7 (October 1998).
SECURITY FOR A NEW CENTURY,
lg5 See, e.g., THE WHm HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECm STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 8 (October
1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT m.3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), 1-4
(26 June 1996); THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM,III-2,3 (17 March 1998); THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT OPERATIONS,
COUNTERDRUG 1-8 (Figure 1-3) & IV-6 (17 February 1998); THE JON CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS, vii (30 September 1997).
lg6 CHAIRMAN CHIEFSOF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, Executive
OF THE JOINT Summary, The Strategy, National Military Objectives (1997).
lg7 CHAIRMAN STRATEGYOF THE USA, Executive
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY Summary, The Strategy, Elements of Strategy (1997).
Ig8 See CHAIRMAN CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL
OF THE JOINT MILRARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, The Strategy -Shape, Respond, Prepare Now, Elements of the Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now, Promoting Stability (1997).
lg9 See THEWHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY FOR A NEW CENT~Y,
STRATEGY 15-18 (October 1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, RTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, 111-1,2 (17 March 1998); THE JOINTCHIEFS OPERATIONS,
OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG I-2,3 (17 February 1998).
200 See JOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-12 (16 June 1995).
'01 See CHAIRMAN CHIEFSOF STAFF, NATIONAL STRATEGYOF THE USA, The
OF THE JOINT MILITARY Strategy -Shape, Respond, Prepare Now, Elements of the Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now, Preventing or Reducing Conflicts and Threats (1997); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT FWB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, HI- 1,2 (1 6 June 1995).
202 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THANWAR, 111-11 (16 June 1995); see also Headquarters, Department of the Army, Joint Plan for DoD Non-combatant Repatriation (1 1 August 1999).
203 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MaITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-4 (16 June 1995).
204 See THEJOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT m.3-07, JOINTDOCTRINE FOR MILITMY OPERATIONS OTHER THANWAR, 111-4 (16 June 1995).
205 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL100-23, PEACE OPERATIONS
(30 December 1994) (pending revision).
Legal Support to Operations
"I6 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR,1-2 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).
207 See, e.g., CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY SCHOOL,OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
U.S. ARMY,LAWAND MILrrARY OPERATIONS
IN H-m, 1994-1995, 12 (1 1 December 1995) (quoting the UN Security Council Resolution 940, authorizing member states "to form a multinational force . . .to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership . . . the prompt return of the legitimately elected President . . . and to establish and maintain a secure,and stable environment . . . "
S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49Ih Sess., S/RES/940 (1994)); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, OPERATIONS IN THE
U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY BALKANS, 1995-1998,39-42 (13 November 1998) (describing the Dayton Peace Accord and UN Security Council Resolution 103 1 applicable in the Balkans).
'Ox See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 1-2 (16 June 1995) (noting DoD's supportive role to DoS in Humanitarian Assistance); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT 111-2 (17 Mach 1998) (stating
m.3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, that DoS is the lead agency for terrorism outside the U.S.); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINTCOUNTERDRUG 1-8 (Figure 1-3) (17 February 1998) (noting DoS as lead agency for
OPERATIONS, coordinating US supply reduction strategies); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS, 1-2 (30
EVACUATION September 1997) (noting that the Ambassador is the senior U.S. authority responsible for the evacuation).
'09 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), 111- 9,10 (26 June 1996) (noting as military planning considerations host nation sovereignty, the requirement to identify political threats, and the impact of political concerns on rules of engagement).
See THEJOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 1-2 (16 June 1995).
'I1 THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 1-2 (16 June 1995).
'I2 See THEJOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARY
CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT OPERATIONS OTHER THANWAR,1-2 (16 June 1995) ("A single act could cause significant military and political consequences . . .Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective.").
See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, IV-9 (16 June 1995); see also CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995,12-24 (11 December 1995) (describing the Multinational Force and UN Mission in Haiti); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE J~GE SCHOOL,
ADVOCATE GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 1995-1998,41-42 (13 November 1998) (describing the framework and
IN THE BALKANS, composition of the Implementation Force in Bosnia).
2'4 See, e.g., CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL,
U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY IN THE BALKANS,
OPERATIONS 1995-1998,58-61 (13 November 1998) (describing efforts to reconcile concerns between nations in the rules of engagement for the Implementation Force in Bosnia).
"5 See, e.g., THEJOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF,JOINT m.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, IV-9 (16 June 1995); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT Pm. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGNINTERNAL (FID), 11-8 & App A (26 June 1996); THE JOINT CHIEFS
DEFENSE OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINTCOUNTERDRUG 1-8, IV-5, & App B (17 February 1998).
216 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS 071IER THAN
DOCTRINE WAR, 1-6 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted); seealso, THE JOlNT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN (FID), 1-5 to 1-14 (26 June 1996) (describing various types of
INTERNAL DEFENSE MOOTW that may support foreign internal defense).
217 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, ix, x, 1-7, & I- 1 1 (16 June 1995).
See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY THE JUDGE SCHOOL,U.S.
OPERATIONS, ADVOCATE GENERAL'S ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN HAITI, 1994-1995,12-24 (1 1 December 1995).
"9 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER
THAN WAR, IV-2 (16 June 1995).
"O See THE JOINT OF STAFF, JOINT OPERATIONS OTHER
CHIEFS PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY THAN WAR, IV-6 & 7 (16 June 1995).
221 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, IV-11 (16 June 1995).
222 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGNINTERNALDEFENSE(FID), LU-7
(26 June 1996).
223 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT VI-6 (17 March 1998);
PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT OPERATIONS,
COUNTERDRUG 1-10 (17 February 1998).
224 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT Pm. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS,TECHNIQUES,AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS,
EVACUATION VI-9 (30 September 1997).
225 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY
OPERATIONS OTHER THANWAR, vii & ix (16 June 1995) ("MOOTW are initiated by the National Command Authorities . .." "Command and control are overseen by the joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates . . ."); see also THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), viii & ix (26 June 1996); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT
EVACUATION OPERATIONS, 11-6 (30 September 1997).
226 THE WHlTE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SEC~TY FOR A NEW CENTURY,
STRATEGY 21 (October 1998).
227 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THANWAR, TV-5 (1 6 h~ne1995).
228 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S U.S.
OPERATIONS, SCHOOL, ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN HAITI,1994- 1995,22-23 (1 1 December 1995).
229 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY IN THE BALKANS,
OPERATIONS 1995-1998,41 (13 November 1998).
230 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OPERATIONS OTHER
OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY THANWAR, ix (16 June 1995).
-Legal Support to Operations
''I See THE JOINT OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JO~NT FOR J\/IILITARY ~PER.~TIOI\IS
CHIEFS DOCTRINE OTHER THAN WAR. 11-3 (16 June 1995).
'"THE JOINT CHEFS OF STAFF, JONT P1,B. 3-07, JO.LWT DOCTRINEFOlc MIL~TARY
Oi'ERATiDNS OTH'HER THAN WAR, IV-8 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).
"3 See THE JOINT CHEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JONr DOCTRINE OTHER
FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS THAN WAR, IV-7 (16 June 1995); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MJLITARYOPERATIONS11\1 HAITI, 1994-1995, 93-4 (11 December 1995); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY ADVOCATE
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE GENERAL'S SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MIJJTARY IN TFEBALKANS,
OPEMTIONS 1995-1998,44 (13 November 1998) (discussing the Civil-Military Cooperation Tearn, or CIMIC, which performed the CMOC function).
234 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPEMrIONS W HAITI, 1994-1995,297-8 (1 1 December 1995).
'35 See CENTER OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ABVOCATE GENERAL'S U.S.
FOR LAWAND MILITPXY SCHOOL, ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY IN THE BALKANS,
OPERATIONS 1995-1998,43-4 (13 November 1998). 236 See THE JOINT CHIEFS DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OTHER
OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT OPERATIONS THAN WAR, ix & IV-8 (16 June 1995).
237 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
DOC~NE OTHER THANWAR, 111-1 (16 June 1995).
2'8 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE OTHER
FOR MILrI'ARY OPERATIONS THAN WAR, 111-2 (16 June 1995).
239 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, III-2 (16 June 1995).
240 See THE JOINT CHEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOEVT OPERATIONS
DOCTRINEFOR MILITARY OTHER THAN WAR, 111-2 (16 June 1995); THE JOINTCHEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, I- 1 (17 March 1998).
'41 THE JOINT CHEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTIERRORISM, 1-1 (17 March 1998).
242 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT FUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM,
IV-1,2 (17 March 1998).
'43 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT V-1 (17 MXC~
PUB.3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, 1998).
'44 THE JOINT CHEFS OF STAFF, JOINT FUB.3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, 1-2 (17 March 1998); THE JON CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT FOR MIL~~ARY
PUB. 3-07, JOJNT DOCTRINE OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-3 (16 June 1995).
245 THEJOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT OPERATIONS OTHER THAN
PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRJNEFOR MILITARY WAR,111-2 (16 June 1995).
'46 See THE JOINT CHIEFS FOR MILITARY OTHER
OF STAFF, JOINT RJJ3.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE OPERATIONS THAN WAR, 111-3 (16 June 1995).
247 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, 1-3 (17 February 1998).
248 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT OPERATIONS, 1-14 (17
PUB.3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG February 1998).
249 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFS OPERATIONS,
OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINTCOUNTERDRUG 1-14 (17 February 1998).
250 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT OPERATIONS,
COUNTERDRUG IV-7,8 (17 February 1998).
251 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-3,4 (16 June 1995).
'"SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB, 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-3,4 (16 June 1995).
253 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, UI-4 (16 June 1995).
254 THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-4 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).
255 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOC= FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-4 through 8 (16 June 1995); see also THE JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINTPUB. 3-07.6, FOREIGNHUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS,
ASSISTANCE (to be published) (The draft describes the types of missions as relief missions, dislocated civilian support missions, security missions, and technical assistance and support functions.).
256 THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, III-9 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).
257 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MlLITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-9 (16 June 1995).
258 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT OPERATIONS
DOCTRINEFOR MILITARY OTHER THAN WAR, 111-9 (16 June 1995).
259 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE OPERATIONS OTHER
FOR MILITARY THANWAR, 111-9 (1 6 June 1995).
260 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGNINTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), viii (26 June 1996).
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR,111-10 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).
262 See 10 U.S.C.A. section 401 (West 1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOClliINE FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-1 0 (16 June 1995).
Legal Support to Operations
See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-1 1 (16 June 1995); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES OPERATIONS, vii (30 September 1997).
FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION
264 THE JOINT CHEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR
EVACUATION vii (30 September 1997).
265 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS, V-12 through 14 (30 September 1997).
266 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF,JOINTPUB.3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR ;NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS,
EVACUATION x (30 September 1997).
'267 See generally, THE JOINT CHIEFS PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
OF STAFF, JOINT AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS,
EVACUATION Chapter VI (30 September 1997).
268 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,JOINTPUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN
WAR, 111-12 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted); see also THE JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF,JOINTPUB.3-07.3,
JOINTTACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, I-6,7 (12 February 1999).
269 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER
THAN WAR, 111-13,14 (16 June 1995); see also THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, vii (12 February 1999).
270 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS,TECHNIQUES,AND PROCEDURES FOR
PEACE OPERATIONS, 1-6 (12 February 1999) (emphasis omitted).
271 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, 11-1 1 through 14 (12 February 1999).
272 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PLB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR
PEACE OPERATIONS, 11-17 through 24 (12 February 1999).
273 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS,TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR
PEACE OPERATIONS, 1-7 (12 February 1999) (emphasis omitted).
274 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT l'Ul3.3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS,TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS,
I114 (12 February 1999) (emphasis omitted), and 111-4 through 6 (describing each task and including internment and resettlement operations).
275 SeeTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, AND PROCEDURESFOR
TECHNIQUES, PEACE OPERATIONS,
In-7 through 13 (12 February 1999).
276 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE
FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR,ILI-14 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).
277 See THEJOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF,JOINT IJUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARY
OPERATIONS OTHER THANWAR, 111-14 (16 June 1995).
278 See THEJOINTCHIEFS FOR MIL~ARY
OF STAFF,JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-14,15 (16 June 1995).
279 See THEJOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER
THAN WAR, 111-14,15 (16 June 1995).
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCm FOR MILRARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-15 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 111-15 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).
282 See THE JOINT CHIEFS FOR MILITARY OTHER
OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTR~NE OPERATIONS THAN WAR, III-15 (16 June 1995).
'83 See THEJOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER
THANWAR, 111-15 (16 June 1995).
HAGUECONVENTION OFWAR ON LAND,ANNEXTO THE
(IV RESPEC~GTHE LAWS AND CUSTOMS CONVENTION,
1 Bevans 631 (signed Oct. 1907 at the Hague).
285 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PLTB.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARYOPERATIONSO m
THANWAR, ix (16 June 1995); See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.6, FOREIGN
HUMANITARIAN x (to be published).
286 See CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY SCHOOL,
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN HAITI,1994-1995,25-30 (1 1 December 1995).
'87 See CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY THEJUDGE SCHOOL,U.S.
OPERATIONS, ADVOCATE GENERAL'S ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN THE BALKANS, 1995- 1998,50 & 82-84 (1 3 November 1998).
See CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY IN HAITI,1994- 1995,25 (1 1 December 1995) (noting the
OPERATIONS requirement for reserve component legal personnel to deploy, and describing requirements for home station support to emergency operations centers, predeployment legal assistance, and technical support to deployed legal personnel); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY,LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,82 & 187-9 (13 November 1998) (noting the need for full-time legal support to the Joint Military Commission, for a permanent deputy staff judge advocate in Bosnia, and for reserve augmentation to perform the home station mission).
289 INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL,
UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Chapter 14 (1998).
seeINTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, UNITEDSTATES LAW HANDBOOK,
ARMY, OPERATIONAL Chapter 2 & Page 8-10 (1998).
:NTE&~ATIONHL AND OPERATIONALLAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, UNITEDSTATES LAW HANDBOOK,
ARMY,OPERATIONAL 2-1 (1998).
'92 INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL'S UN~IEDSTATES LAW HANDBOOK,
ARMY,OPERATIONAL 2-1 (1 998).
'93 See THEJOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PLB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, II-5 (16 June 1995).
Legal Support to Operations
294 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995,48 (1 1 December 1995) (citing Security Council Resolution 940 as authorizing the multinational force to restore the Aristide government and establish a secure environment).
295 See THE JOINTCHEFSOF STAFF,JOLNT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINTTACTICS,TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACEOPERATIONS,
1-21 (12 February 1999) ("In PO [peace operations], the force generally conducts operations based on a mandate that describes the scope of operations."); CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATEGENERAL'S SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN THEBALKANS, 1995-1998,76 (13 November 1998) (listing legal authorities and operational documents defining the scope of the Bosnia mission).
296 See CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY SCHOOL,
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN HAITI, 1994- 1995,48 (1 1 December 1995) (regarding the timing of deployment); CENTER THEJUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S
FOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, SCHOOL, OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,76 (13 November
U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY 1998) (regarding timelines for action).
297 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAWDEPARTMENT, SCHOOL,
THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S UNITEDSTATESARMY, OPERATIONALLAWHANDBOOK, 8-9 (1998); CENTERFOR LAWAND MLITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, AND MILITARY
U.S. ARMY, LAW OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,76-7 (13 November 1998) (noting that the GFAP provided broad justification for the use of force, and rules for controlling entity armed forces).
See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAWDEPARTMENT,THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, UNITEDSTATESARMY, OPERATIONAL LAWHANDBOOK, 8-9 (1998); CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY IN
THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OPERATIONS THEBALKANS,1995-1998,76-7 (1 3 November 1998).
299 See THE JorNT CHIEFSOF STAFF,JOINTPUB.3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS,
7-22 (12 February 1999) (noting that terms of reference describe command relationships and coordination requirements); CENTERFOR LAWAND MLITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAlTI, 1994-1995,48-9 (1 1 December 1995) (describing the Carter-Jonassaint agreement's provision regarding the relationship between U.S. forces in Haiti and the Haitian military and police); CENTERFOR LAWAND MILlTARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS PI THE BALKANS,1995-1998,76-7 (13 November 1998) (stating that the GFAP had provisions regarding the status of police forces, and mandating joint military commissions).
300 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONALLAWDEPARTMENT,THEJUDGEADVOCATEGENERAL'SSCHOOL, UNITEDSTATES LAWHANDBOOK, 8-9 (1998).
301 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRWEFOR MILlTARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHANWAR,IV-9 (16 June 1995) (citing the prominence of logistics elements in MOOTW and their obligation to adhere to applicable status of forces agreements); THEJOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF,JOINTPUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN (ED), V-3 (26 June 1996) (noting the application of status of
INTERNAL DEFENSE forces agreements to foreign internal defense operations); THE JOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINTTACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, 1-21 (1 2 February 1999) (noting the status of forces agreement as a key document in peace operations); THEJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT Pmi. 3-07.4, JOINTCOUNTERDRUG 1-10 (17 February 1998) (describing the affect of the
OPERATIONS, status of forces agreement on jurisdiction, taxation, and claims arising during counter-drug operations); THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF,JOINTPUB.3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS,TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS, B-1,2 (30 September 1997) (describing the affect of status of
EVACUATION forces agreements on jurisdiction, procurement, and customs issues arising in noncombatant evacuation
302See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT,THEJUDGEADVOCATEGENERAL'SSCHOOL, UNITEDSTATES LAWHANDBOOK, 12-9 to 12-26 (1998).
303 See CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THEJUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S.
ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN HAm, 1994-1995,50-51 (1 1 December 1995) ("As soon as . . . the Aristide government had resumed power, some agreement became necessary to define the legal status of United States troops. . . Otherwise, these troops would be subject to Haitian laws that could impede their activities and frustrate the . . . objectives that impelled their deployment."); CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY,LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN THE BALKANS,1995-1 998,15 1 (13 November 1998) ("In Hungary . . . the demand for contractor compliance with host nation law was strong enough to cause the creation of a legal advisor position to the USAREUR liaison team. In response to Hungarian income tax claims, the contractor held five million dollars . . . Ultimately, the Hungarian government refunded the money . . .") (footnotes omitted).
See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL,
THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S UNITEDSTATESARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 12-1 (1998).
305 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONALLAWDEPARTMENT,
THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, UNITED STATESARMY, OPERATIONAL LAWHANDBOOK, 12- 1 (1 998) (citing DEP'TOF ARMY, REGULATION 550-5 1, FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATING,
AND NATIONAL:AUTHORITY CONCLUDING, AND DEPOSITING (1 May 1985)).
FORWARDING, OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
306See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONALLAW DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL,
THEJUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S UNmD STATESARMY, OPERATIONAL 12- 1 (1 998) ("SOFAS were concluded with
LAWHANDBOOK, Grenada and Kuwait after combat operations in those countries."); CENTERFOR LAW AND ~BLITARY OPERATIONS, THEJUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN HPsn,1994-1995,52 (11 December 1995) (noting that the SOFA with Haiti was concluded three months after the operation began); CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY ADVOCATE
OPERATIONS, THEJUDGE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,151 (13
U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY November 1998) (noting the resolution of contractor liability for income taxes through the Omnibus Agreement).
307 SeeINTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S
SCHOOL, UNITEDSTATESARMY, OPERATIONAL 8- 1 1,12 (1 998).
308 SeeINTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT,THEJUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL'SSCHOOL, UNITED STATESARMY, OPERATIONALLAWHANDBOOK, 8-1 1 & 12-1 (1998).
309 See,e.g., THE JOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANT~BRORISM, L-2 (17 March 1998) (containing a table listing the jurisdictional authorities for responding to terrorism at various phases of an incident); THEJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,JOINTPUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS,TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT
EVACUATION OPERATIONS, 1-2 (30 September 1997) (describing the relative roles of the Ambassador and JTF Commander in noncombatant evacuation operations); CENTER FOR LAWAND M~ARY SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S MILITARYOPERATIONS
INTHE BALKANS,1995- 1998,76-77 (1 3 November 1998) (describing the IFOR commander's authority in relation to the Entity Armed Forces).
310 See,e.g., THE JOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF,JOINTPUB. 3-07.3, JOINTTACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, X, 1-14 & 15, (12 February 1999) (noting coordination and liaison
Legal Support to Operations
requirements in peace operations with military organizations, international organizations, non-government
organizations, private voluntary organizations, & Department of State agencies); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF,JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, AND PROCEDURES
TECHNIQUES, FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION V-5, & B-1 (30 September 1997) (describing liaison and coordination
OPERATIONS, requirements with embassy and local officials, higher headquarters, Department of State agencies, non-government organizations, private voluntary organizations, and host nation government agencies).
311 See, e.g., US ARMY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTE, LEGALGUIDETO PEACE OPERATIONS, 25 (1 May 1998)
(describing guidance to U.S. commanders supporting U.N. operations who receive orders that may violate
U.S. or international law); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY THE JUDGE
OPERATIONS, ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, OPERATIONS
U.S. ARMY,LAWAND MILITARY IN Hm, 1994-1995,43,91,& 96-97 (1 1 December 1995) (describing concerns about consistency of rules of engagement with each nation's policies, fiscal constraints on logistical support for U.S. government agencies, and guarantees of loyalty from U.S. commanders to the U.N.); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY IN THE BALKANS,
OPERATIONS 1995-1998,61 (13 November 1998) (describing concerns participating nations may have about riot control agents and the definition of hostile intent).
31' See CENTER OPERATIONS, SCHOOL,U.S.
FOR LAWAND MILITARY THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY INTHE BALKANS,
OPERATIONS 1995-1998, 127-128 (13 November 1998) (describing the value of JAGC technical chain coordination, and innovative methods for effecting coordination of legal matters among all troop contributing nations -publishing the Joint Military Commission Handbook, weekly meetings of Judge Advocates, legal specialist work exchanges, and exchange of liaison officers).
313 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MIL~TARY ADVOCATE SCHOOL, U.S.
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE GENERAL'S ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN HAITI,1994-1995,94-95 (1 1 December 1995) (noting Judge Advocate participation in Civil-Military Operations Centers and the value of Judge Advocate liaison with the ICRC); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,60-61 & 131 (13 November 1998)
OPERATIONS (recommending Judge Advocate liaison with legal personnel of other troop contributing nations, and describing Judge Advocate participation in Joint Military Commission meetings).
314 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY THE JUDGE SCHOOL,U.S.
OPERATIONS, ADVOCATE GENERAL'S ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI,1994- 1995,43-44 (1 1 December 1995) (recommending the Judge Advocates take the initiative in developing acceptable rules of engagement); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY ADVOCATE SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE GENERAL'S OPERATIONS
IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,59-62,112-114,& 153 (13 November 1998) (describing innovative methods for developing workable rules of engagement, procedures used to resolve questions about the legality of local entity checkpoints, and the solution for repairing vehicles used to support NATO).
315~TERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
LAW DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL
LAW HANDBOOK, Chapter 9 (1998).
316 See Captain Glenn Bowens, Legal Issues in Peace Operations, PWTERS, 58 (Winter 1998-1999).
317 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION
3 121.0 1, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR US FORCES, Enclosure A, paragraph 2a (1 October 1994).
31QSee THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT COUNTERDRUG 1-10 (17
PUB.3-07.4, JOINT OPERATIONS, February 1998) (stating that counter-drug operations are conducted under the Standing ROE); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION A-1 (30 September 1997) (noting the applicability of the Standing ROE in
OPERATIONS, NEO, as well as the existence of a specific section in the ROE on NEO); but see CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,58 (13 November 1998) (stating that the Standing ROE were not in effect for U.S. Forces in IFOR in Bosnia).
319 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 11-4 (16 June 1995).
320 See THE JOINT CHIEFS DOCTRINE OPERATIONS OTHER
OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07, JOINT FOR MILITARY THAN WAR, 11-4 (16 June 1995); see also THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGNINTERNALDEFENSE(FID), 1-14 (26 June 1996) (stating the requirement for judicious use of force in foreign internal defense missions); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS,THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN HAlTI, 1994-1995,34-35
GENERAL'S (1 1 December 1995) (noting that either over-tentativeness or over-aggressiveness can hinder the mission); CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY ADVOCATE SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY,
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE GENERAL'S LAWAND MILITARY IN THE BALKANS,
OPERATIONS 1995-1998,57 (1 3 November 1998) ("The ill-advised use of force could eliminate this perception of impartiality and re-ignite the conflict.").
321 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT Fm.3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), IV-
24 (26 June 1996); THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND
PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, 1-8 & 111-1 1 (12 February 1999).
322 See THE JOINTCHIEFS TECHNIQUES, FOR
OF STAFF,JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, AND PROCEDURES PEACE OPERATIONS,
1-22 (12 February 1999).
323 THEJOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS,TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS,
EVACUATION 1-2 (30 September 1997).
324 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S.
ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,57 (13 November 1998).
325 See Captain Glenn Bowens, Legal Issues in Peace Operations, PARAMETERS,
59 (Winter 1998-1999); CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. AIUvlY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN HAITI,1994-1995,37-39 (1 1 December 1995).
326 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, FOR
TECHNIQUES,AND PROCEDURES NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS,V-5 (30 September 1997); CENTER
EVACUATION FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY IN
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL, OPERATIONS THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,69-70 (13 November 1998).
327 See Captain Glenn Bowens, Legal Issues in Peace Operations, PARAMETERS,
59-60 (Winter 1998- 1999); THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, AND PROCEDURES FOR
TECHNIQUES, PEACE OPERATIONS, 1-22,23(12 February 1999); CENTER OPERATIONS,
FOR LAW.AND MILITARY THE JUDGEADVOCATE SCHOOL, OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994- 1995,
GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY 43 (1 1 December 1995); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY,LAWAND MILITARY IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,61 (13 November
328 See Captain Parker, JAG Integration into OOTW TOC Operations (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <httv://cdl.annv.miUcdVnftf/feb94/~t3feb.h; CHIEFS PUB.3-07.3, JOINT
THE JOINT OF STAFF, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACEOPERATIONS,1-22 (12 February 1999); CENTER FOR
Legal Support to Operations
LAWAND MILIT~Y THE JUDGE GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAW AND
OPERATIONS, ADVOCATE SCHOOL, MILITARY IN HAITI, 1994- 1995,36-39 (1 1 December 1995).
"'See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY ADVOCATE SCHOOL,U.S.
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE GENERAL'S ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN HAITI, 1994-1995,35 (1 1 December 1995) (citing Major Mark
S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lnwyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 27,52-54 (1994); Colonel W.H. Parks, USCMR, No More Vietnams, UNITEDSTATESNAVAL INSTITUTE 27-28 (March 1991)).
'"See :;;T"cZ:AX3;:X AX3 ~;'EPIAXC?JAL LAY; 3E?A?TKST, TIE JL9SE ?.DI!(?C,A.T 5E3EIl.lL9S SCII-OOL, UNITEDSTATES 8-9 (1998); CENTER
ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEJUDGEADVOCATE SCHOOL,
GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,76-7 (13 November 1998) (noting that the GFAP provided broad justification for the use of force, and rules for controlling entity armed forces).
See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY SCHOOL,
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY IN HAITI, 1994- 1995,43-45 (1 1 December 1995) (encouraging
OPERATIONS Judge Advocates to take the initiative in multinational ROE development); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 1995-1998,59-62 (13 November 1998) (describing concerns about specific
IN THE BALKANS, issues and definitions, and discussing a strategy of developing agreeable general ROE and allowing contributing nations to apply more restrictive provisions).
j3' See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY ADVOCATE GENERAL'S U.S.
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE SCHOOL, ARMY,LAWAND MILITARY IN HAITI, 1994-1995,36-39 (1 1 December 1995) (recounting an
OPERATIONS incident in Haiti in which delay was tragic:
[ROE] [clards containing the additional guidance [concerning protection of civilians, approved on 6 September] were not issued until 21 September. In the meantime, ROE had jumped into news headlines around the United States. . . . on 20 September Haitian police and militia brutally beat demonstrating Aristide supporters. Among the persons beaten was a coconut vender, who died after about five minutes of continuous clubbing, in view of United States soldiers, and after some of the fatal attack had been videotaped. Networks and newspapers in the United States widely reported the killing and the decision of the soldiers not to intervene.
footnotes omitted); CENTER FOR LAWAND MIL~ARY THE JUDGE GENERAL'S
OPERATIONS, ADVOCATE SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,60,62,71 (13 November 1998) (recommending use of ROE matrices, ROE cards in each soldiers language, and ROE Battle Books as means to ensure responsiveness).
333 See Captain Parker, JAG Integration into OOTW TOC Operations (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <https://call.mv.mil/call/nftf/feb94/~t3febht;CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY THE
OPERATIONS, JUDGEADVOCATE SCHOOL, OPERATIONS 1994-1995,
GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY,LAWAND MILITARY INHAITI, 40-42 (1 1 December 1995); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS,THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY,LAWAND MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,63-64 (13 November 1998).
334 See INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL,
THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S UNITEDSTATES LAW HANDBOOK, CHIEFSOF STAFF,
ARMY,OPERATIONAL 1 1-2 (1998) (citing THE JOINT CHAIRMAN OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 5810.01, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD LAW OF
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS WAR PROGRAM DIRECTIVE 5 100.77,DoD Law of War
(12 August 1996); see also DEP'TOF DEFENSE Program, 5.3.1. (9 December 1998).
335 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS TECHNIQUES,
OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANTEVACUATION 1-1 (30 September 1997); CENTER
OPERATIONS, FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, ADVOCATE SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY
THEJUDGE GENERAL'S OPERATIONS IN HAITI,1994- 1995, 37-39 & 79-84 (1 1 December 1995); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS,THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL, OPERATIONS
GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY IN THEBALKANS,1995-1998, 102-4, 112-4, 125-6, & 139-41(13 November 1998).
336 See INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, GENERAL'S
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL, UNITEDSTATES LAW HANDBOOK,
ARMY, OPERATIONAL 10-7 to 10-10, & 11-3 to 11-14 (1998) (discussing civilian protection law applicable in MOOTW, citing The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; and The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the Protections of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 1391; and reprinting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
337 See THE JOINT CHEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, AND PROCEDURESFOR
TECHNIQUES, PEACE OPERATIONS, 11- 13 (1 2 February 1999); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL, OPERATIONS n\T HAITI, 1994- 1995,37-39
GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY (11December 1995).
338 See THE JOINT CH~FS TECHNIQUES,
OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, 111- 1 1 (1 2 February 1999).
339 See THE JOINT CHEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, AND PROCEDURESFOR
TECHNIQUES, PEACE OPERATIONS, 11-14 (12 February 1999).
340 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, AND PROCEDURESFOR
TECHNIQUES, NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS,
EVACUATION VI-3 to VI-5, & Appendix D (30 September 1997).
341 See CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS,THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S.
ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAlTI, 1994-1995,79-84 (1 1 December 1995); CENTER FOR
LAW AND MII~ITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAWAND
ADVOCATE SCHOOL, MILITARYOPERATIONS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998,139-141 (13 November 1998).
342 See THE JOINT CHEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, AND PROCEDURES
TECHNIQUES, FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, 11-24 (12 February 1999); THE JOMT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, VI-9 (30 September 1997).
343 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS,THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS 1995-1998,1024, 1 124,125-6, & 137-9 (13
IN THE BALKANS, November !998) (referin& tc enfcrcemea: of weagoas policies, monitoring of checlrpoints, apprehension of persons indicted for war crimes, and election support).
344 See THE JOINT CHIEFS TECHNIQUES,
OF STAFF, JOINT m.3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS, B-1 & 2 (30 September 1997); CENTER
EVACUATION FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONSIN HAlTI, 1994- 1995,63-72 (1 1 December 1995); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILEARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL, OPERATIONSIN
GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY,LAWAND MILITARY THE BALKANS, 1995- 1998, 109-1 10 (1 3 November 1998).
Legal Support to Operations
345 See INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONALLAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE GENERAL'S
ADVOCATE SCHOOL, UNITEDSTATESARMY, OPERATIONAL 11-5 (1998).
346 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MIL~TARY U.S.
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995,99-100 (1 1 December 1995).
347See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS,TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR
EVACUATION VI-3 to VI-5 (30 September 1997) (discussing evacuation center procedures, many of which require legal advice); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY
OPERATIONS, T-W JUDGE ADVOCATFGENERAL'SSCHOOL, 1J.S ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS HAm. 1994-1995,93-4 (1 1 December 1995) (recommending Judge Advocate participation in the CMOC); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY THE JUDGE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND
OPERATIONS, ADVOCATE MILITARYOPERATIONS 1995-1998, 113 & 125-7 (13 November 1998) (noting that U.S.
IN THE BALKANS, forces sought legal advice as they came across checkpoints, and describing the immediate need for Judge Advocates upon apprehension of a person indicted for war crimes).
348 See CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S.
W,LAWAND MILITARY IN HAITI,1994- 1995,63-72 & fn 203 (1 1 December 1995)
OPERATIONS (describing the legal authority for detention, the detention facility, and the extensive Judge Advocate role in the release determination process); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY THE JUDGE
OPERATIONS, ADVOCATEGENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN THE BALKANS, 1995- 1998,109-110 (13 November 1998) (describing the legal authority and procedural safeguards).
349 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OPERATIONS,
OF STAFF, JOINT PLTB.3-07.4, JON COUNTERDRUG 1-4 & 1-8 (17 February 1998) (citing Foreign Assistance Act provisions prohibiting U.S. personnel from conducting foreign law enforcement, and prohibiting security assistance to governments with records of human rights violations (22 U.S.C. A. sections 2291 & 2304 (West 1998))).
350INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONALLAW DEPARTMENT, GENERAL'S
THEJUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL, UNITEDSTATES LAW HANDBOOK,
ARMY, OPERATIONAL Chapter 25 (1998).
351 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S.
ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995- 1998, 141 (13 November 1998) (quoting
Major Kurt Mieth, "[algain and again, especially in operations other than war, everyone wants to drink
from the American luxury logistical fountain." Interview with Major Kurt Mieth, SFOR Legal Advisor's
Office, at Sarajevo (2-23 Feb. 1998)).
352See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRWE OPERATIONS
FOR MILITARY OTHER THAN WAR, IV-9 (16 June 1995) ("Logistics personnel must also be familiar with and adhere to any legal, regulatory, or political restraints governing US involvement in the MOOTW.") (emphasis omitted); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGNINTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), II- 8 (26 June 1996) (noting 'legal restrictions and complex funding sources" involved in foreign internal defense); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS,
11- 19 (1 2 February 1999) (discussing U.N. reimbursement procedures); THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PLTB.3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG IV-3 (17 February 1998) ("There
are many legal restrictions on the use of CD funds.").
353 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (RD),
111-7, IV-21, A-1, & G-2 (26 June 1996) (relating to training, humanitarian and civic activities,
construction, and medical support); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
U.S. ARMY,LAWAND MIL~ARY IN m,1994-1995, 129-139 (11 December 1995) (relating to medical care, post exchange privileges, military air requests, LOGCAP, construction, training, and humanitarian and civic assistance); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, OPERATIONS
U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MIL~ARY IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 143-153, & 184 (13 November 1998) (relating to morale and welfare, LOGCAP, construction, humanitarian and civic assistance, maintenance, post exchange privileges, and mess hall services).
3" See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1,JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (ED), IV-22 (26 June 1996) (relating to the host nation); CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY w HAITI,1994-1995,
GENERAL'S SCHOOL, OPERATIONS 141 (1 1 December 1995) (relating to U.S. agencies); CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATEGENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 141-154, & 184 (13November 1998) (relating to allies and coalition forces, local civilians, non-governmental organizations, NATO headquarters, and the Army's R&R program).
355 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY ADVOCATE SCHOOL, U.S.
OPERATIONS, THEJUDGE GENERAL'S ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 142 (13 November 1998) ("Fiscal and procurement issues were the most pervasive and time consuming of sustainment issues, and perhaps of all three categories of legal support to military operations (command and control, sustainment, and personnel service support).").
356 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGNINTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), 11-8 &El-7 (26 June 1996).
357 See, e.g., Captain Glenn Bowens, Legal Issues in Peace Operations, PARAMETERS,65-66 (Winter 1998-
1999) (recommending use of section 607 and acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, 22 U.S.C.
section 2357 & 10 U.S.C. section 2342, respectively); CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN HAITI, 1994- 1995, 142 (1 1 December 1995) (relating to the value of a section 607 agreement); CENTERFOR L.4W AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 142 (13 November 1998) (recommending broader use of NATO Basic Purchase Agreements and Basic Ordering Agreements).
358 See INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, SCHOOL,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S UNITEDSTATES LAW HANDBOOK,
ARMY, OPERATIONAL 25-5 (1998) (describing in detail this six-step process).
359 See, e.g., INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, GENERAL'S
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL 25-5 to 25-20 (1998) (discussing various
U.S. funding sources); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, 11-19 (12 February 1999) (discussing U.N. reimbursement procedures); CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY GENERAL'S
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
U.S. ARMY,LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI,1994- 1995, 142 (1 1 December 1995) (regarding section 607 procedures for U.N. reimbursement);CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THEBALKANS, 1995-1998, 142 & 153-4 (13 November 1998) (pro?osing consideration of other than 119 fi~nding sources, and citing an example of NATO funding).
360 See CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY GENERAL'S U.S.
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL, ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS
INHAITI, 1994-1 995, 136 (1 1 December 1995) (noting that reliance on LOGCAP in Haiti was not always the way to meet requirements and recommending that commanders and staffs consider all options); CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 143-4 (13 November 1998) (citing the joint acquisition board as "a success story from Bosnia" and describing its functions).
Legal Support to Operations
361 See, e.g., CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,
U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILIT~Y
OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1 995,129- 13 1 & 141 (1 1 December 1995) (describing how Judge Advocates resolved requests for medical care, post exchange privileges, and military air travel requests, and recommending raising issues to higher headquarters for resolution); CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY SCHOOL,
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN THEBALKANS, 1995-1998,153-4 & 184 (13 November 1998) (describing how Judge Advocates resolved a NATO request for the U.S. to repair a NATO vehicle, and recommending early resolution of policy concerning access to the post exchange).
THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, OPERATIONS OTHER THAN
JOINT PJB.3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY WAR, IV-2 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).
363 See, e.g., THE JOINTCHEFSOF STAFF,JOINTPUB.3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE(FID),
IV-20 & 21 (26 June 1996) (describing considerations involved in providing intelligence assistance during
foreign internal defense operations); THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR
ANTITJXRORISM, V-1 (17 March 1998) ("Intelligence and counterintelligence are the fnst line of defense in
an AT [antiterrorism] program.") (emphasis omitted); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,JOINT PUB. 3-07.3,
JOINTTACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, X (12 February 1999)
("Intelligence is critically important to a PK [peace-keeping] force, not only for mission success but to
protect the force.") (emphasis omitted); THE JOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF,JOINTPUB. 3-07.4, JOINT
OPERATIONS, IV-3 (17 February 1998) ("[Intelligence] is the foundation upon which the CD [counter-drug] operational effort is built.") (emphasis omitted); THEJOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF,JOINT PUB.3-07.5, JOINTTACTICS, TECHNIQUES, EVACUATION
AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT OPERATIONS,
1V-1 to 3 (30 September 1997) (describing intelligence products provided for noncombatant evacuation operations planning).
364THE JOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF, OPERATIONS OTHER THAN
JOINT ]PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY WAR, IV-2 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).
365 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF,JOINTPUB. 3-07, JOINTDOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THANWAR, IV-3 (16 June 1995).
366 See THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, JOINTPUB. 3-07, JOINTDOCTRWE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, IV-3 (16 June 1995).
367 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGEADVOCATEGENERAL'S
SCHOOL, UNmn STATES LAWHANDBOOK, 15-1 (1998) ("It is imperative that operational
ARMY, OPERATIONAL lawyers consider them [intelligence law aspects of operations] when planning and reviewing both operations in general and intelligence operations in particular.").
368 See INTERNATIONALAND OPERATIONALLAWDEPARTMENT, GENERAL'S
THE JUDGEADVOCATE SCHOOL, UNITEDSTATES LAWHANDBOOK, Chapter 15 (1998) (listing and discussing the
ARMY, OPERATIONAL principal references on intelligence law).
369 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S U.S.
SCHOOL, ARMY,LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 170 (13 November 1998).
370 See CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S U.S.
SCHOOL, ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS (11 December 1995) (describing
IN H~1~1;1994-199558-63 issues arising in Haiti concerning interrogation of a U.S. person for force protection reasons, interrogation procedures for personnel in the detention facility, and use of intelligence contingency funds).
371 U.S. DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL25- 100, TRAINING THEFORCE(1 988); U.S. DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL25- 101, BATIZE TRAINING (1 990).
372 SeeCENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THEJUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN HAITI,1994- 1995,159 & 166-7(11 December 1995).
373 SeeCENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN THE BALKANS, 1995- 1998,197 (1 3 November 1998)
(recommending uaining with supported units as means to build relationships with supported units and improve the soldier skills of legal personnel).
374 SeeTHE JOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF,JOINTPUB. 3-07.6, FOREIGN HUMANITAFUAN ASSISTANCE, IV-4 (describing the need for personnel with political-military skills to coordinate with numerous organizations and to liaison with policy-makers and the diplomatic community) & IV-15 (describing legal coordination required for ROE in multinational operations and legal advice and assistance required for relationships with non-military organizations) (to be published).
375 SeeCENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THEJUDGEADVOCATEGENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THEBALKANS, 1995-1998,80-82 (13 November 1998).
376 SeeCENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATEGENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995- 1998, (1 3 November 1998) 59-6 1 (describing coordination of rules of engagement), 125 (discussing persons indicted for war crimes), & 130-131
Consider one judge advocate major . . . for example. He liaisoned with the U.N. mission, the U.N. Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the International Police Task Force headquarters, the Pope's staff. ..the President of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia . . . and the Minister of Justice . . . He represented SFOR in two cases before local courts, and drafted memorandums of agreement between SFOR and Bosnian entity-level civil aviation authorities . .. .
377 SeeTHE JOINTCHIEFSOF STAFF,JOINTPUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINEFOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THANWAR, IV-9 (16 June 1995); CENTER OPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE
FOR LAWAND MILITARY GENERAL'SSCHOOL, OPERATIONS
U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY IN HAITI, 1994-1995,148-9 & 155-6 (1 1 December 1995); CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998,79 (13 November
378 SeeINTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONALLAWDEPARTMENT, THEJUDGEADVOCATEGENERAL'SSCHOOL, UNITEDSTATESARMY, OPERATIONALLAWHANDBOOK, 17-2 (1 998).
379 See CENTERFOR LAW AND MIL~ARY GENERAL'S U.S.
OPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE SCHOOL, ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS
IN m,1994- 1995,155-6 (1 1 December 1995).
380 See CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995,40-42,89-93 (1 1 December 1995); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY,LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998,63-67 & 130-131(13 November 1998).
381 See CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995,89-93 (1 1 December 1995); CENTER
Legal Support to Operations
LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS, ADVOCATE SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAWAND
THEJUDGE GENERAL'S MILITARYOPERATIONS 1995-1998,130-131(13 November 1998).
382 SeeCENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS 1995-1998,63-64(13 November 1998).
IN THE BALKANS,
383 SeeCENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONSIN HAlTI, 1994-1995, 158-159 (1 1 December 1995); CENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS,THE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL,
GENERAL'S U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS 1995-1998, 161,170, 179, & 192-198(13 November 1998).
384 SeeCENTERFOR LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS,THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'SSCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAWAND MILITARYOPERATIONS 1995-1998, 193-197(13 November 1998).
FM 27-100 1 MARCH 2000
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
ERIC K. SHlNSEKl
General, United States Army Official: Chief of Staff
Administrative Assistant to fhe
Secretary of the Army
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 114869,requirements for FM 27-100.